https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-regimes-misuse-of-the-army-chiefs?sd=pf

https://m.thewire.in/article/security/is-the-army-chief-allowing-himself-to-be-used-to-make-political-points-on-china/amp - shortened version

The regime’s misuse of the Army Chief’s broad shoulders

Whereas in the popular perception Rahul Gandhi is being hounded for inquiring after the relationship of Narendra Modi with Gautam Adani, the regime wishes to also silence him for another reason. He recently set the cat among the pigeons, bringing up the ‘C’ word on China: ‘Cowardice!’

A regime boasting a 56” chest has had to reassert its masculinity. Its spin master, Dr. Jaishankar, had done a hit-wicket with his egregious contribution to strategy – that would’ve drawn a frown from his strategist father – with his ‘small economies don’t fight big economies’ theory. The damage resulting needed to be rectified.

It has trotted out the Army Chief four times since to stall the breach. The Army Chief has obliged by mastering his talking points.

The first of two choreographed interviews was with a regime favourite, who - though son of a military strategist – maintained twice over that ‘the nature of war has changed’. The latter two were appearances of the Chief at invited talks.

The Chief’s landmark take on China

The latest of the four was a landmark talk on China. Strangely, the Army Chief pitched the talk at the political level, which ordinarily should have been covered by a political leader or a senior diplomat, or perhaps by Dr. Jaishankar himself, whose identity is conflicted between the two.

It is not self-evident how these topics fall within an Army Chief’s brief: ‘predatory economics, weaponising resource supply chains, financing large infrastructure projects with little consideration for environmental and safety standards, burdening countries with unsustainable debt, IPR theft, stealing trade secrets and technology from foreign companies and unfair trade practices.’

The General waited 35 minutes to take to the podium for his 40-minute talk. It took the Chief some 15 minutes to get to content that can be – expansively viewed – taken as in the Army’s remit; getting to the strategic meat at the 25^th minute; and taking another 12 minutes to get to military specifics, with its 4 minutes were so wrapped up in jargon as to be abstruse.

It is a step forward that the Army Chief is taking on subject matter that had hitherto been placed above his station. With a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) back in chair, expansive dilation as this could reasonably be taken as his mandate, but the deep-selected CDS, being compromised, has largely been silent, seen last speaking at a birthday commemoration of his predecessor, regimental-mate Bipin Rawat.

Earlier such content would have been dished out through the chair of the National Security Advisory Board, an advisory body that has in the Modi era been decimated – like all other institutions. Using its aegis to launch broadsides had the advantage for governments to distance from taking ownership.

For the vehemence and higher order material way above the Chief’s pay bracket and outside his mandate, the National Security Adviser could have been considered, but that he was not deployed shows an avoidance. Though a Special Representative, Doval is out of his depth – restricted as his domain expertise is to intelligence and its murky underworld.

The Army Chief is a better bet to fire-off trenchant criticism of China - mostly echoing the Western narrative on China’s rise and nefarious intent.

The forthright hawkish line is an overcompensation, to rub out Gandhi’s words from sullying the image of the regime that – all evidence to the contrary – presents itself as strong-on-defence.

Characterising Gandhi as a ‘panda-hugger’, the regime needed to go out on a limb, without itself sawing off the branch it sits on. This explains the Army Chief’s sudden elevation as regime ‘smokes-man’ – breathing fire to obscure its timidity. 

So whats keeping the regime?

This abdication of responsibility to take up what is essentially a political task by the political leadership, shows Gandhi was right. If the political leadership needs the Army Chief to give voice to its sentiments and thought, what prevents it from doing so itself?

The ‘cowardice’ is in an inability and unwillingness to take ownership of policy assumptions on China given out by the Army Chief. By implication, the follow-on policy would be of a certain kind, which the government would be loath to be held to.

The assumption that India as an independent Pole in the international order would be able to withstand China’s rise is untenable, since India with its authoritarian turn has lost its way to any such Pole position. The economic promise of a capitalism-governance fusion in the Modani model taking off has also rudely come apart.

For the Chief to have it that India is a leader of the South only shows him taking a recent preliminary G20 conference, Voice of the Global South, rather too seriously.

Not getting to be a Pole means that India – in light of what the Chief says of China – has to either be part of the Western Camp or go it alone.

The Western Camp is welcoming, tactically using simulated umbrage at India’s human rights record to nudge India into subordinate status within its ranks. India is not averse, its leaning towards the other side in the democracy-dictatorship dichotomous image of the world order notwithstanding.

Even so, India projects a ‘go it alone’ Pole positioning, through keeping up a din on multilateralism and on Atmanirbhar Bharat. This allows the regime the cover of the very plausible internal balancing argument to continue with the crony capitalist model, though coming apart at the seams. It helps to keep out of global stakes and quietly consolidate Hindutva.

What is clear is that, properly, this is not the Army Chief’s territory. So, is this an Army Chief's push for a particular policy direction? Is this an Army Chief held hostage by an anti-China lobby? Is the Army Chief just an unwitting obedient camp follower or is he a willing participant?

Or is this a stratagem on part of the regime to show China India’s policy choices, so that China is suitably conditioned in changing its policy of subordinating India for its rise? Is it pleading on India’s part with China to allow it space in Asia and South Asia?

Using the Army Chief for making such a strong case helps with plausible deniability of sorts. The government cannot be held to the implicit messaging, allowing it to step back and away if needed.

Not to forget, trial balloons also serve the purpose for domestic kite-flying.

The Chief in his lair

The Chief made his military-relevant case generally along the lines: wars are not quite history; nations indulge their hard power for raison d'état; wars could last long; technology is a great leveler; Atmanirbharta is the need of the hour; and the Agnipath scheme is a game-changer.

In the tradition set by the olive-green-hearted, General Rawat, General Pande (who as a one-star operations staffer at the Army’s Kolkata headquarters was a subordinate of a two-star Rawat) prioritized the Land Domain in the next war.

Rawat had once conceptualized the land-centricity of the next war, famously having the Air Force playing the role of extended artillery, even as he – typically Infantry and a Gorkha-to-boot - waded into the carrier-submarine debate of the Navy.

To Pande, unsettled borders could set-off War, one that could last long. The observation is gratifying for this author, having first made the point some 15 years ago and following up a decade on.  

But the major point the Chief makes is land centricity of future wars in light of landward outcomes – territory changing hands. The assumption that any such losses unacceptable, the Land Domain gets privileged and - as a convenient corollary – so does the premier Service for the Land Domain, the Army. Jointness notwithstanding, QED.    

Given the absence of a national strategy document - evidence of competence levels of the national security establishment nine years into Ajit Doval’s overlordship - Pande cannot be faulted for using the opportunity for some bureaucratic politics.

Not waiting for either the national security doctrine or a follow-on joint doctrine (though the elapsed five years since its second iteration meriting an update), the Air Force unilaterally updated its doctrine, ten years to the date. Since there is also vocal strategic advocacy for looking to the seas for coping with the China challenge, the Army has had to stake out its Himalayan turf – with the Chief slyly torpedoing the Navy in his reference to the Moskva taken down with low-cost munitions.

Interestingly, the Chief in his elaboration of the regime’s China policy assumptions does not refer to two significant points he made elsewhere (which on account of their salience could reasonably have figured in his China talk): the first on the strategic deterrent and the second on conflict resolution.

His cryptic reference – since unelaborated - to the strategic deterrent at the technology seminar, was put forth as, “It is important to recognise that infirmities in border management can lead to wider conflict. Therefore, the first imperative that comes across is that ‘possession of strategic deterrence instruments is essential.’” The term ‘full spectrum conflict’ (a derivative from the Pakistani term Full Spectrum Deterrence) can only include nuclear conflict.

The second is his mention of ‘conflict resolution’. He said, ‘it is only through dialogue and talking to each other that we can find resolution’. While this would not be out of place for a peace studies professor to declaim, an Army Chief pushing for talks as the preferred strategy is to throw in the towel.

The Chief outlined India’s strategy as being settlement of the remaining friction points through talks, while in the interim keeping up troops deployed and at a high level of alert. It is only correct to give talks a fair chance and keep our muscle honed, in the interim.

This presumably presupposes that should talks not make a dent, then India has other options. Apparently, some 20 rounds of talks at the military and diplomatic levels over three years don’t suffice. Amazingly, the Chief has ruled out the military option, even as a notional threat-in-being to influence further rounds of talks.

Taking the two together – readiness of the strategic deterrent and conflict resolution – indicates the usual reticence of professional militaries countenancing war. The Indian military is playing its advisory role in highlighting that wars escalate, making the strategic deterrent loom larger. Consequently, it makes sense to settle matters without resort to war through conflict resolution.

This contradicts the lesson learnt alighted on by the Chief – that wars are pursued in the national interest. These could be long duration and could nudge the nuclear threshold. Militaries use such escalatory possibilities to deter the other side, thereby – through tacit bargaining - building in limitations in a conflict. Surely, the Indian military is no less adept at this than any other.

Even if an unsettled border might provide a spark, the house need not burn down in a border war. It is easier to keep a war limited, since the site of the fighting allows for this. The Army is well versed with Limited War theory, which presumably is also well war-gamed.

Indeed, the Cold Start doctrine it had put out in wake of Operation Parakram, building on the lessons of both the Kargil War and Parakram, was Limited War theory compliant. It had taken care to modulate its offensive so as not to offer any nuclear provocation to Pakistan.

The Chief’s land-centric notion of victory shows that limitation informs plans. Else, the advocacy for horizontal expansion into the high seas of a Himalayan-origin conflict might have caught traction by now.

Also, so would have the Air Force’s parallel war of an Indian version of ‘shock and awe’. The assumption is that India has the edge in the air since we have a technological advantage as also capacity, operating as it is from airfields that allow higher payloads of fuel and weaponry.

Both have escalatory portents, which are not discussed by the Chief in his elaborate talk on China, showing a noteworthy instinct for limitation.

So why the reticence, Chief?

True that it takes two to tango and that not only is territory at stake, but - progressively - so is ‘face’, leading to an implacable upping of the ante.

However, there is no prior certainty of which side finds a conflict - that is getting more painful by the moment - less sustainable. The side wanting out does not necessarily have to be India.

India’s leading the table of weapons purchasers over the last five years, shows India has the wherewithal to take on China. The Ukraine War shows that more can be expected when the balloon goes up.

Conversely, China could well feel that India has been put to a diversionary war by the United States and might want out. It has vicariously learnt from Putin’s experience in the Ukraine War. 

Consequently, there is no call for the Army Chief to pronounce that there is ‘only’ one way for conflict resolution: dialogue. Leave such language to leftist intellectuals, peace activists and writers as this one in the Asokan tradition.

That similar homilies (‘Not an era for war!’) were mouthed by the prime minister on the Ukraine War shows that India continues to be uncomfortable with accepting ownership of use of force. It remains strategically inept.

Red-flagging for the Chief

This begs the question why is the Chief weighing-in on the side of prudence by overcautiously putting his eggs in a negotiator’s basket? Is the regime using him doubly – to back-up its spin master, Dr. S Jaishankar’s skittishness? Is the regime using the Chief to cover up its pusillanimity, fully on display at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s meet of National Security Advisers at which Doval brought up ‘territorial integrity’?

The Chief needs cautioning that the regime could use advice publicly transmitted by him to claim that this is what holds it back from asking him to militarily deliver up an end-state restoring Indian territory.

The Chief might merely be voicing elements of policy but is opening himself to being double-crossed – with the policy being laid at the military’s door.

Afterall, the nation still does not know why Fire and Fury Corps held back, even if surprised by the Chinese. Was the Northern Command reined in or did it lack ‘go and gumption’ in first place?

By no means does an operational corps or command have the authority to set off a war, but if it has an Area of Responsibility and resources at its disposal for safeguarding it, there is no question of waiting for orders. Setting off a border scrap is within its ambit. It is for the ‘whole of government’ to ensure that this then remains limited.

If the Army was willing, but the regime held it back, the nation would like to know.

Is the army being kept in the doghouse or in the corner, up indefinitely in high altitude with nowhere to go, as scapegoat? The Army Chief’s rationalising of the policy choice is less than persuasive.

The only redeeming thing about the Chief’s conflict resolution push is if it turns out to be strategic deception at a grand scale, lulling the Chinese while the military quietly turns the table at Depsang and Demchok.

But that is not going to happen in election year. Not only is India hosting two multilateral summits in its national capital, but the capriciousness of war cannot be allowed to interrupt Narendra Modi’s run up to a hattrick in national elections.

Penultimately, the Chief needs being made wary of being used as the stalking horse on Atmanirbharta. The Modani controversy shows a proportion of the thrust for indigenization comes from profits to accrue to the regime’s cronies. The now-defunct windfall from Rafale for Ambani Jr. is a salutary case.  Indeed, there is concern wherefrom Rs. 20000 crores were used to underwrite the Adanis, Sr. and Jr.

Whereas the Air Force elided the controversy over Rafale, General Sundarji had to face up to the fallout of Bofors, being open to an investigation. General Pande must learn his lessons but not the hard way, lessons from the Ukraine War not being the only relevant ones these days.

Finally, the preparation of Agniveers for corporate security duties post-release by when capitalism will be in a hyper riot in Modi’s third term – plus as potential recruits as right-wing storm troopers - shows up agendas the professionally-oriented Chief is unwary of. An uncritical ‘positivity’ needs to cease.  

The Army Chief’s talk has had the plus point of allowing him feedback. It should make him more possessive of his broad shoulders here on.

 

https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/short-wars-creating-tomorrows-reality-2/

Short Wars – Creating Tomorrow’s Reality

USI Journal: October 2007 - December 2007

Short Wars – Creating Tomorrow’s Reality

Introduction Conventional wars have historically been resorted to with the intention of being kept short. Military history proves that as often as not, this is not how wars have turned out. The expectation that tomorrow’s wars will be short arises from the transition of South Asia  into the Nuclear Age. However, if tomorrow’s wars are to be short, two aspects will need to be kept in mind. The first is regards the elements which keep conflict duration limited, and, secondly, are the factors that militate against this. Most studies on Limited War suggest a deliberate limitation to politico-strategic aims, geographic spread, weapons and forces involved. Keeping conflict ‘limited’ is easier said on account of factors that stoke the conflict spiral. This article dwells on the drivers of conflict, through a look at military history and by analysing the current strategic reality in South Asia. The concluding recommendations are for working on the pre-requisites of a Short War during peace and in future conflict; these being, paradoxically, moderation of national passions, war aims and military means. The lessons of military history The key impetus to conflict initiation has been the expectation of victory. Strategic sense decrees that victory be obtained at the earliest and at minimum cost and risk. Political masters considering war initiation in an inter-state setting have historically been persuaded of war as an option only in case of a short duration war. Other than the nuclear factor, factors that lend themselves to Short Wars have been present earlier. These include the role of international organisations; international opinion and pressures; tacit understanding between adversaries; sensitivity of leaderships to the underside of conflict, such as escalation and extension; and finite military capabilities at the outset of war. But these have not proven consistently effective in keeping wars short. Recourse to military history would help identify factors that bring about a reality contrary to expectation. A review of military history reveals that most wars in the modern age dating to the Napoleonic Wars have been long. Napoleon spent the better part of two decades at war prior to meeting his Waterloo. The inspired manoeuvres of the revolutionary French armies led to his opponents joining in concert, thereby prolonging the war1. The American civil war is taken as the first war in which modern military systems, weapons and tactics made their rudimentary appearance. It was a long war with Lincoln preserving the Union through a time-consuming strategy of bringing the industrial might of the North to bear. The relatively brief campaigns of the Bismarck-Moltke era were on account of Prussia having perfected the general staff system. Such momentary asymmetry can bring about quicker victory; however, German triumph led to French revanchism culminating in the Great War2. The First World War was embarked on by all sides with the expectation that, troops would be home for Christmas3. The static front owed to Moltke the Younger losing his nerve in carrying through the Schlieffen plan, evidence that the art in war can confound any science in it. The limitations of operational brilliance in the industrial age are revealed once again in the next war. Blitzkrieg heralded joint-manship of a high order that won campaigns, but could not withstand the test of war in the industrial age. Industrial capacity in case of Albert Speer’s Germany was not of the order required to impose Hitler’s will4. Likewise in the East, Admiral Yamamoto, who struck at Pearl Harbor, is quoted as saying: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the US and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”5 Ultimately, the Total War doctrine of ‘unconditional surrender’ ensured a prolonged contest eventuating in the nuclear age. The nearly half-century long Cold War, curiously dubbed ‘the long peace’,6 witnessed the Superpowers contending through proxies in the Third World, with individual conflicts lasting for decades. The three year long Korean War, energised ‘Limited War’ and escalation control theories.7 The wars of colonial liberation were also long duration ones in Africa and South East Asia. The Vietnam War, sustained in the belief that incremental application of force would ensure its early conclusion, was a decade long. So was the Afghan war. In the post Cold War era, wars, both conventional and sub-conventional, have largely been of long duration, be they in central Africa, the Balkans and, indeed, counter intuitively, the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq War that consumed half a million lives lasted seven years, being fuelled by all the Great Powers interested in its extension for strategic and commercial reasons. The two Iraq Wars are taken as Short Wars and seen as heralding wars of the future. However, this case is based on the interim between the two Gulf Wars being taken as a period of ‘peace’- an arguable proposition in face of a decade long blockade, sanctions, air space restrictions and episodic intervention using missiles and proxies leading up to an assessed toll of half-a-million.8 Besides, the second Iraq War has self-evidently not quite ended. The latest Israeli month-long incursion into Lebanon against the Hezbollah was a short foray. That it cost the Army chief, General Dan Halutz, his job, indicates the limitations of Short Wars in gaining war aims.9 The only gain has been avoidance of the earlier outcome of intervention under Begin and Sharon of 1982; but the jury is still out as to whether Israel is more secure today on account of this military self assertion. From the foregoing brief survey, certain lessons help identify the drivers of conflict. The first is that, aims that do not brook compromise, such as ‘unconditional surrender’, ending secession and regime  change, presage a long haul. Keeping aims limited through a conflict is at best a difficult proposition. Second, from Napoleon through Guderian to Petraeus, the lesson is that operational level advantages  cannot make up for strategic shortcomings. Thirdly, in the Age of Nationalism, political forces in society push for longer wars, thereby constraining autonomy of decision makers and impacting strategic rationality. Fourth, the form of the conflict embarked on could change, such as from conventional to sub-conventional. This would require viewing the conflict as one and its duration as a continuum. Periods of ‘phony war’, howsoever normalised in consciousness and discourse, also require being included as periods of conflict. Next, there is no guarantee that external interests would converge to end conflict. International organisations, including the UN, are vulnerable to manipulation by the Great Powers; therefore any expectations of these would have to be suitably tempered. Lastly, the ‘stability-instability’ paradox is permissive of long duration LIC through which strategic aims other than the most desirable one of durable peace can be materialised.10 By this yardstick, even a conventional war can also be chanced in the stability afforded by nuclear deterrence, as Pakistani planners persuaded themselves to believe in the run up to the Kargil intrusion. The sub-continental experience An analysis of conflicts in South Asia does not unambiguously reveal an inherent propensity towards limitation from which it can be confidently extrapolated that wars of the future will be short. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was short, less due to the unilateral ceasefire by China than to India refraining from joining the contest in earnest. It need not have been so, especially as Western aid was requisitioned. The War was kept short by Pandit Nehru taking a considered political decision on not displacing India’s development trajectory, even if non-alignment suffered a momentary eclipse. Earlier Indo-Pak wars have been taken as relatively gentlemanly affairs owing to shared legacy. Of the wars against Pakistan, the first was a long duration one lasting over a year. Marshal of the Air Force in hindsight reflects that the 1965 War ended prematurely as the full weight of air power could not be brought to bear.11 It was restricted to the three weeks of intensive fighting. However, in case the Kutch incident of April, Operation Gibraltar of August, and subsequent violations of the ceasefire till the Tashkent Agreement of the subsequent January are included, then the conflict duration qualifies as long. Likewise, the duration of the 1971 War need not be restricted to the two week ‘lightening campaign’.  It should instead be dated to April that year when Sam Bahadur famously withstood political pressure for an early campaign. The Mukti Bahini period, migration of 10 million people, killings of  hundreds of thousands within East Bengal and local border violations can be subsumed in the period of conflict.12 Even the short campaign was fortuitous, in that, the view of Generals Jacob, Nagra, Sagat Singh and Inder Gill of going for Dacca prevailed in the last stages of run up to war, as against the original intent of salami slicing and time consuming capture of towns enroute’.13 The Kargil War, called a ‘short, sharp war’ by the Kargil Review Committee, is usually taken as  forerunner of short duration wars of the future fought in the nuclear backdrop. According to the suspect Pakistani perspective,14 a long campaign of attrition was preempted through US intervention. President Musharraf’s claims in his autobiography have been credibly disputed on this score by former Chief, General VP Malik.15 However, a time-continuum can be discerned with Low Intensity Conflict across the Line of Control abutting either end of the mid-intensity Kargil Conflict. Conflating the two kinds of conflict into one would make the conflict a long duration  one and part of the wider proxy war. The lesson to be drawn is that India’s conflicts, like conflicts elsewhere, have an equal, if not greater chance, to be of long duration rather than short. Political heads took decisions to cease the conflict at  a great personal and political cost on both sides of the border. The development of rival nationalisms and resulting politicisation of issues since, would impinge on future ease of settlement  of issues. Secondly, these wars have not always yielded a meaningful result in terms of settlement of issues. A Short War in the future may also leave core issues unaddressed, begging the question of its utility. The ‘push’ for resolving issues militarily ‘once and for all’ may then make an appearance.  Precautions require to be built into the preparation for and conduct of war to ensure a Short War. An analysis of the present Understandably, none of India’s sub-conventional conflicts have been short duration ones: Operation  Pawan, Operation Rakshak, Operation Rhino and the LIC in Siachen.16 This trend is likely to persist  into the future. To escape this strategic cul-de-sac, Short War thinking has arisen in which space in the conflict spectrum can be opened up for a conventional ‘Limited War’, with limitation being exercised in duration as against other parameters as extent of theater of engagement, weaponry used and targets engaged. The tendency of conflict towards escalation, leading up to the ‘ideal’ state of Absolute War, has been conceptualised by Clausewitz in his discussion of the reciprocal actions between opponents.17 This  tendency is accentuated by nationalism, intrinsic to modern nation states, that yields ground to hyper nationalism in times of crisis. Historical memories also impact the creation of the ‘Other’, resulting in stereotyping and dehumanisation of the opponent. This tendency can be exploited by fringe political formations to tie down the government to less palatable options. These factors conspire to dispel rationality. The expectation that external powers, valuing stability and fearful of the nuclear genie, would intervene early for conflict termination is also shaky. Pakistan has persistently defended its untenable position on Kashmir in defiance even of the US. India mobilised its troops in response to the Parliament attack irrespective of the effect on the US led GWOT. The impact of external pressure is limited to what states are willing to tolerate. International organisations also have their own limitations, hidden agendas and a case history of limited efficacy in sub-continental disputes. Lastly, a look at the nuclear question on conflict duration is in order. General VP Malik has it that there exists a window in the conflict spectrum below the nuclear threshold for conventional operations.18 This is elastic so long as the perceived ‘nuclear reaction threshold’ is not pushed. It is assessed that a threat to the threshold is more likely in a longer war in which comprehensive national power is brought to bear. However, the vulnerable state is also in a position to mobilise its national resources so as to preclude a lowering of the threshold. Against extant wisdom, it can be posited that a high intensity war, intended as a short one at the outset, poses the threat of stampeding the vulnerable side into premature nuclearisation to redress some or other emergent  asymmetry. Therefore, the argument, based on the existence of a nuclear backdrop, is not entirely persuasive. War termination would be dependent on like-mindedness of the adversary. In the Indo-Pakistani context, this may not be possible until Pakistan is able to pull off some gains either tangibly or psychologically. Its Army would require some face-saving action for holding onto power post-conflict  within Pakistani political structure. This would likely result in Pakistan extending the war till its purposes – not amounting to ‘winning’ the war, but merely preserving itself from ‘losing’ abjectly – are achieved. Such a long war is in Pakistani interests for it will enable resort to external balancing and ‘extended depth’. Besides, it may ‘do an Iraq’ on an advancing India. In the event, India may end up with a partner unwilling to Tango. India, on its part, would not like to be left strategically exposed lest a Short War not serve up its original aims. In trying to pull off a politically viable, strategically sustainable and militarily ‘decisive’ outcome, it may over-extend. Mission creep’ and ‘surge’ would then transpire, with uncertain outcome. Given the move of the discourse from Limited War19 to Short War,20 the premium on duration would necessitate a corresponding compensation through leveraging national and military power along other dimensions and levels in which India would be deemed to enjoy escalation dominance. This would compromise the resulting peace in leaving a bitter aftermath and an unrequited enemy. Concluding reflections Short Wars are desirable as against long duration wars, in that they imply limited war aims; keep damage limited comparatively; do not deflect the national economy overly; do not providing enough  time for passions to overtake rationality; and, resultantly, do not permit these to impinge unreasonably any future peace settlement. However, as seen here, the term Short War verges on an  oxymoron. Therefore, measures need to be identified and implemented to bring about such an outcome. A few pointers to this end are recommended in conclusion. At the political level, firstly, there requires to be a political consensus on the requirement, nature and aims of the war embarked on. In case this is not there, then self-interested political elements could whip up public passions forcing the leadership in unpredictable ways. Secondly, demonisation  resorted to generally in peace needs to be tempered to the extent of permitting the adversary a locus standi on a vexed issue. This would enable easier assimilation by the polity and populace of the necessity for early war termination through compromise on mutually agreed terms. On the military level, the first Principle of War, namely, ‘selection and maintenance of aim’ requires  constant foregrounding. Second, the threat of escalation would require monitoring, particularly as the demonstration a capacity for ‘escalation dominance’, so as to influence enemy thinking  towards conflict termination, may go awry. Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that operational brilliance may beget victory, but, paradoxically, victory is not usually a necessary and sufficient condition for subsequent peace. Lastly, the military would require conditioning to a half-fought war. Air power theory of ‘infrastructure busting’; land warfare concept of ‘decisive victory’; and the naval apprehension of ‘sitting out the war’ may require muting. War is the least predictable social activity and the least controllable political act, and on outbreak is liable to truncate rational aims and pious intentions. Short Wars have to be brought about by creating the context and circumstance conducive to early war termination; best achieved, ironically, through war aims that belie the necessity of war. The purpose of military power in our context  today is not to compel the enemy to one’s purpose; but to nudge the enemy to a mutually beneficial end.