From the archives on Kashmir, 8 May 1998

QUESTIONABLE STATISTICS

 

In  conducting conventional operations, it is vital to  know  the

mind  of the enemy. Not without reason therefore did  Monty  keep

the picture of the Desert Fox in his caravan, and Swarzkopf  that

of Saddam. This was in keeping with Tsun Zu's dictum- to know the

enemy  is to win half the battle. Similarly, in CI  operations  a

'profile'  or 'portrait' of the militant is necessary  to  outwit

him,  as also help plan psy ops. Therefore the army  conducted  a

psychological study of captured militants in Kashmir.
 

 

Excerpts  of this study are now available in the writings of  Maj

Gen  Arjun Ray, who oversaw the study in his former  capacity  of

BGS,  15 Corps, and Colonel Saldanha, the Army  Psychiatrist  who

conducted  the study. These could have proven helpful  in  under­

standing insurgency in general, and, also, the conflict in  Kash­

mir, and are, on account of this, of interest to the professional

readership  of this journal. However, their efforts, namely,  the

chapter  'Portrait of a Kashmiri Militant' in Maj Gen Ray's  book

'Kashmir  Diary', and Col Saldanha's article 'Profile of a  Kash­

miri Militant' in the Military Intelligence Journal 1996-97, when

read in tandem, serve to confuse rather than enlighten. 
 

 

This  article  is prompted by the discrepancies  in  the  figures

advanced  and conclusions drawn by the two authors, both of  whom

mutually acknowledge the contribution of the other in the  study.

Owing  to difference in images of the militant presented  by  the

two  authors, their intent to enlighten fellow  professionals  is

negated.
 

 

 

Discrepencies
 

 

Col  Saldanha  records  that 67% of the  captured  militants  who

participated  in the study were 'hard core', described as  having

an  'impaired perception of the ego or reality. Believes that  he

is fighting for a cause. Power hungry, beyond rehabilitation' (p.

25).  The 22% Moderates are analysed as having a 'weak  ego'.  As

against  this consider what the  General informs us- '10% of  the

militants fall into the category of zealots...30% militants  fall

into the lumpen category' (p. 40-41). The rest 60% are,  presuma­

bly,  the  'average militant' with a 'weak ego'  whose  'fighting

qualities are suspect'.
 

Whereas the Colonel characterises 67% as hard core, the General's

figure is at best 40%. The latter figure is obtained from  infer­

ring  that the zealots are hard core, and conceding that the  30%

'criminalised'are so too, though not without reservations  since,

they  using  the 'name of jehad and behind the  well  camouflaged

screen  of militancy', are in it for 'Power and Money'  (p.  41).

However, in deference to the Colonel who says that some (an inde­

terminate percentage) have been 'hardened by violence and  crimi­

nal  activity... and made of militancy a profession  they  pursue

with  zeal' (p. 26), these could be counted among the hard  core.

The  difference between the two figures (67% and 40%) is  obvious

nevertheless.
 

It could be that the Colonel's definition is from the psychologi­

cal point of view in that they are 'beyond rehabilitation',  and,

that  of the General from the military perspective as measure  of

fighting  qualities.  The disparity is also explicable  if  their

observations  had  been based on two separate  studies.  However,

terminological  confusion  and the disparity in  figures  detract

from the credibility of the study/studies.

Lastly,  for  the  Colonel, 67% of the  militants  had  'impaired

perception  of the ego', 22% a 'weak ego', and 9% were  'inanima­

tive,  suggestible'.  To a layman it would appear that  none  was

quite  'normal'. However, to General Ray 'their mental  chemistry

and  neuro-dynamics are no different from the common man  on  the

street',  'they are normal people, but with a  different  psycho-

logic  of their own'. Clearly, in the absense of a definition  of

whats 'normal' by either of them, there is a self-evident contra­

diction here.
 

 

Conclusion

 

It  must be highlighted that 'the protrait of the Kashmiri  mili­

tant is not very clear (Ray, p. 41), and that their work 'is only

a begining' (Saldanha, p. 28)- this despite seven years into  the

militancy in J&K. Given that the army has had considerable  expe­

rience in J&K, there is both a personal and professional interest

in the findings of such studies. However the offerings by the two

protagonists of the study serve only to whet the appetite,  which

is in itself their major contribution. Yet, should conclusions be

based on and lessons drawn from their observations, in isolation,

it  could prove counter-productive. Afterall, was not  a  kingdom

lost for the want of a nail!
 

 

 

Bibliography

 

1. Maj Gen Arjun Ray, Kashmir Diary: The Psychology of Militancy;

New Delhi, Manas Publications, 1997.
 

2. Col Saldanha, 'Profile of the Kashmiri Militant', Military

Intelligence Journal, MITSD, 1996-97.