From the Archives, 12 Nov 1997

'KASHMIR DIARY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITANCY'

A CRITICAL REVIEW

General  Ray's book is unique in being both a first hand  account

of operations in Kashmir and a psychological study of  militancy.
The  book is both descriptive and prescriptive, and is  a  worthy
contribution to the study of war by one who is both a thinker and
practitioner. The author draws on his professional experience  in
Kashmir,  and  his  observations  on  politico-military   matters
through  his distinguished service, to throw light on a  critical
facet  of LIO- psychological operations. Understandably the  book
has evoked appreciative comment from experts in the field.

 

Having  acknowledged  the  General's  contribution  to   military
thought  and  recent history of  Kashmir,  uncritical  acceptance
would be an injustice to his effort and intent. This review essay
hopes to provoke a debate by raising counterpoints to the  Gener­
al's  arguments. The manner of doing so would be to  present  the
General's  contention on the issue under scrutiny,  and  critique
his  position.  The  idea is to thereby shed more  light  on  the
issue, since those chosen for discussion are of primary relevance
to coping with insurgency militarily in a democratic polity. Only
those issues have been dealt with that lend themselves to  alter­
native  perspectives, while taking care to present  the  author's
view in all fairness.

 

The Genesis and Sustenance

 

The  militancy  in Kashmir owes to 'alienation born  of  economic
deprivation' (p. 40), fuelled by islamic fundamentalism' (p.  18)
exported  by Pakistan in accordance with their strategy  document
OP TOPAC dating from Apr 1988 (p. 47). In pursuing the  strategic
objective  of its 'info-islamic war', that of 'islamisation as  a
pre-requisite to... overthrow of the Indian yoke' (p. 48),  Paki­
stan has taken care to keep the threshold of the proxy war  below
what may provoke an Indian conventional reaction (p. 63).

 

This  is indeed the popular version. The General also  makes  the
error  of  believing that OP TOPAC exists as more  than  a  semi-
fictional  piece of scenario writing by an IDR research team.  In
doing so the General is in the august company of Mr  Subramanyam,
who was gracious enough to apologise. That apart, there are major
analysis that are more socio-politically sensitive on the issue.

An  understanding has it that the promise of Indian democracy  in
mobilising  the people was squandered in it being unable to  con­
cede  political  space to the forces so generated in  Kashmir  (S
Ganguly).  This lead to an sub-national arousal, fuelled  by  the
tide  in  international affairs at the turn of  the  decade.  The
people  centered movement for ethnic assertion was  subverted  by
the inoculation that fundamentalist forces received from a  Paki­
stan unamused by the rhetoric of 'azadi'. The external dimension,
militarisation  and fundamentalisation legitimised  the  military
option  for India, while relegating any political remedial  meas­
ures.

 

Counter-Militancy Operations

 

The  General  rightly delineates the  constituency  of  militancy
being the people (p. xviii), and the objectives being psychologi­
cal-  WHAM (p. 151). Theorising on the contrast between  war  and
LIC in terms of the interpretation of victory and the measure  of
violence  involved (p. 166-8), he opines that  the  clausewitzian
logic  is  untenable in LIC (p. 155). Whereas  in  war  maximises
violence on a 'hated enemy', in LIC this is unthinkable (p.  150-
1).  Given this he believes that at the 'two critical  levels  of
command' (p. 178), there must exist socio-political understanding
at  platoon  commander level, and the ability in  the  commanding
general to 'lean back and take a wide angled and distant view  of
the  ground and political situation' (p. 186). His  judgement  is
that  the soldier- 'the strategic resourse' (p. 187)- 'has  stood
the  test of time' (p. 205), and so has the  military  leadership
(p. 96, 106).

 

In  tackling  the  theory of war, the General  has  mistaken  the
Moltkean  understanding  of Clausewitz (p. 167)  as  Clausewitz's
gospel  'on war'. Clausewitz used Absolute War as an ideal  type,
and  emphasised that friction and political constraints  made  it
so. Thereby, his definition of war as politics by other means. By
this  yardstick, LIC, too, is subject to the clausewitzian  logic
of  political  aims determining military objectives. So  the  au­
thor's  contention that the 'centre of gravity'- the  people-  in
LIC (p. 169) cannot be addressed with bullets is in accord  with,
and not opposed to Clausewitz, as he seems to think (p. 167).

 

Secondly,  'hate'  is not essential for armies to  win  'decisive
victories', witness the victory in East Pakistan in 1971.  Third­
ly,  war  is  not 'Darwinian' (p. 166).  This  insight  has  been
Clausewitz's  landmark  contribution to the theory  of  war.  The
military  objective is not to 'destroy the enemy' per se, but  to
facilitate the political objective. This holds true for LIC also,
in  that  the military objective is to so  degrade  the  militant
forces  as  to  gain a position of advantage  for  the  political
solution  to be effected. This has been Indian policy  (S  Gupta,
'India  Redefines  its Role'; Adelphi Paper 293), though  Mr  KPS
Gill laments this in the Foreword (p. xiv).

 

If his book is to be 'read between the lines' (quoted by Harinder
Baweja  in  her review), then the symptoms of  brutalisation  (p.
171)  and the 'fatal attraction of the 'bean count' and  'numbers
game'' (p. 179) can be deemed to have been present in Kashmir. Is
this the explanation for the 40000 casualties (p. 5) there in six
years, whereas the toll in Punjab, where brutalisation was  self-
evident,  it  was 25000 in ten years? In the three years  of  the
IPKF episode, we lost 1200 dead, as against 800 in the six  years
in Kashmir. Despite the greater intensity of the fight there,  to
include  the Jaffna battle, there were, by the LTTE's own  admis­
sion,  only  13000  casualties. Given that 60%  of  the  Kashmiri
militants  were not aggressive (p. 40); the kind of arsenal  they
had at their disposal courtesy Pakistan; the levels of recoveries
of  armaments; and, Pakistani care to keep the 'boiling pot'  (p.
63)  from spilling over, it would appear that the level of  armed
opposition cannot justify the casualty figure.

 

Therefore,  this analysis seems to indicate that the  General  is
rather  sanguine in addressing the effect  Indian  civilisational
ethos  (p.  188) may have had on  the 'faulty  perceptions  about
Kashmiris' (p. 142-3), and on degrading the influence of the then
ascendent  doctrine of hindutva (p. 136-7). Besides,  traditional
mores  are under severe assault in society. The officer class  is
not  inured to such currents. Thus the impact on  attitudes,  and
consequence  on  action, may have been more than  the  author  is
willing  to concede. In this perhaps is the explanation  for  the
seemingly exhorbitant casualty figure.

 

He praises the regimental system (p. 196), while overlooking that
the  'unit ki izzat' mentality may have prepetuated  the  'result
syndrome'.  Furthermore,  the  unstated  prejudices  that  inhere
within  the  psyches and memories of the various  ethnic  groups,
have scope for expression where the ethnic factor is foundational
as in the regimental system. This syndrome can also be attributed
to careerism (p. 171), the result in turn of a pyramidical organ­
isational structure, and, to the intake of 'mediocrity', itself a
result  of 'marginalisation of the  military in national  psyche'
(p. 175).

 

If this critique be true, then, is the General's prescription on

generalship  (p. 186) valid? Merely 'sharing his  intention  with
his  subordinate commanders, fighting the info war, and  managing
the  environment'  (p. 186) may not be 'what generalship  is  all
about' (p. 186). General Sardeshpande's position on formation and
higher level military leadership ('Assignment Jaffna', p.  150-1)
acquires  credibility.  He  envisages a  hands  on  inspirational
leadership as answer in environments, as these, where the army is

found to be less responsive than desirable, which incidentally is
how the General describes armies (p. 149-57). Where leadership is
such, it precludes the excesses, and allegations based on the 'no
smoke without fire' analogy, that invite media expressed societal
opprobrium- thereby winning the info war by deed.

 

On Civil-Military Relations

 

The General opines that the 'army belongs to the people, never to
the  government, accordingly, the army is answerable only to  the
people'  (p. 197). Given this, the 'commitment of the nation  has
to  be kept alive' (p. xix). The manner of doing so is to  inter­
face with the instrument that conditions the mind of the  people-
the  media-  in order to win the info war.  This,  alongwith  the
'management  of  the environment' (p. 186) and  strategising  (p.
178), is the sphere of operational responsibility of the command­
ing general.

 

The  General's  views on the military-society  relationship  echo
MacArthur's contention before his sacking underlined the position
of  the military in democratic polity. The army is an  instrument
of  the  state run by a government accountable  to  the  people's
representatives  in parliament. Inadequate understanding of  this
has led to military expansion (which, by implication, occurs when
the  commanding  general  acts in accordance  with  the  author's
outline of his role) into the political sphere, beyond its legit­
imate  involvement  in bureaucratic politics. The  military  must
defend  the  turf of its social responsibility of  protection  of
state and society, but this has the danger of the military equat­
ing its institutional interest with the national interest. It  is
for this reason the military is subordinate to the political head
in non-praetorian polities.

 

Understandly,  as  with any profession, the military  strives  to
protect  its  autonomy in the sphere of its  expertise.  However,
where the field is inherently political ('low intensity wars  are
political wars' (p. 167)), political control is doubly important.
It is at arriving at a modus vivendi that some of the problems of
interface, the General mentions in passing (p. 179), occured. The
author's severe indictment of the administration as 'nervous' and
'panicky'(p.  38-9)  in connection with the  media  clampdown  at
Tsrar  is an interesting casestudy. It would have been a  service
to  contemporary historiography on Kashmir had he put  on  record
what  the army' point of view put across was at the juncture  the
decision  was made, and subsequently, at the climax. As the  lead
and  controlling agency for operations in Kashmir, other than  in
Srinagar  town, it would be interesting to know if the  army  was
overruled  in this regard. If not, then to blame the  administra­
tion  entirely, as the General does, is to protect  institutional
interest- the danger alluded to earlier.

 

Conclusion

 

That this review essay has highlighted a differing perspective on
some  core  issues  is to the author's credit,  for  his  thought
stimulating work. The alternative perspective is not only academ­
ically important, but must be given due worth in arriving at  any
conclusions on the issues raised by the author. Since LIC is here
to  stay (Toffler, Creveld) such deliberation is well  in  order.
And  is a fitting tribute to those who are called upon to  sacri­
fice their lives in such conflicts- to whom the book is  dedicat­
ed. The author's principle achievement is thus in initiating  the
process with his timely, brave and frank account of the psycholo­
gy of militancy in Kashmir. 

 

Ray,  Arjun;  'Kashmir  Diary: Psychology  of  Militancy';  Manas
Publications, New Delhi; 1997; Rs 495.