From the Archives, 12 Nov 1997
'KASHMIR DIARY: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITANCY'
A CRITICAL REVIEW
General Ray's book is unique in being both a first hand account
of operations in Kashmir and a psychological study of militancy.
The book is both descriptive and prescriptive, and is a
worthy
contribution to the study of war by one who is both a thinker and
practitioner. The author draws on his professional experience in
Kashmir, and his observations on
politico-military matters
through his distinguished service, to throw light on a critical
facet of LIO- psychological operations. Understandably the book
has evoked appreciative comment from experts in the field.
Having
acknowledged the General's contribution to
military
thought and recent history of Kashmir, uncritical
acceptance
would be an injustice to his effort and intent. This review essay
hopes to provoke a debate by raising counterpoints to the Gener
al's arguments. The manner of doing so would be to present
the
General's contention on the issue under scrutiny, and
critique
his position. The idea is to thereby shed more light
on the
issue, since those chosen for discussion are of primary relevance
to coping with insurgency militarily in a democratic polity. Only
those issues have been dealt with that lend themselves to alter
native perspectives, while taking care to present the
author's
view in all fairness.
The Genesis and
Sustenance
The
militancy in Kashmir owes to 'alienation born of
economic
deprivation' (p. 40), fuelled by islamic fundamentalism' (p. 18)
exported by Pakistan in accordance with their strategy document
OP TOPAC dating from Apr 1988 (p. 47). In pursuing the strategic
objective of its 'info-islamic war', that of 'islamisation as a
pre-requisite to... overthrow of the Indian yoke' (p. 48), Paki
stan has taken care to keep the threshold of the proxy war below
what may provoke an Indian conventional reaction (p. 63).
This is
indeed the popular version. The General also makes the
error of believing that OP TOPAC exists as more than a
semi-
fictional piece of scenario writing by an IDR research team. In
doing so the General is in the august company of Mr Subramanyam,
who was gracious enough to apologise. That apart, there are major
analysis that are more socio-politically sensitive on the issue.
An
understanding has it that the promise of Indian democracy in
mobilising the people was squandered in it being unable to con
cede political space to the forces so generated in Kashmir
(S
Ganguly). This lead to an sub-national arousal, fuelled by
the
tide in international affairs at the turn of the
decade. The
people centered movement for ethnic assertion was subverted
by
the inoculation that fundamentalist forces received from a Paki
stan unamused by the rhetoric of 'azadi'. The external dimension,
militarisation and fundamentalisation legitimised the
military
option for India, while relegating any political remedial meas
ures.
Counter-Militancy
Operations
The General
rightly delineates the constituency of militancy
being the people (p. xviii), and the objectives being psychologi
cal- WHAM (p. 151). Theorising on the contrast between war
and
LIC in terms of the interpretation of victory and the measure of
violence involved (p. 166-8), he opines that the
clausewitzian
logic is untenable in LIC (p. 155). Whereas in war
maximises
violence on a 'hated enemy', in LIC this is unthinkable (p. 150-
1). Given this he believes that at the 'two critical levels
of
command' (p. 178), there must exist socio-political understanding
at platoon commander level, and the ability in the
commanding
general to 'lean back and take a wide angled and distant view of
the ground and political situation' (p. 186). His judgement
is
that the soldier- 'the strategic resourse' (p. 187)- 'has stood
the test of time' (p. 205), and so has the military
leadership
(p. 96, 106).
In tackling
the theory of war, the General has mistaken the
Moltkean understanding of Clausewitz (p. 167) as
Clausewitz's
gospel 'on war'. Clausewitz used Absolute War as an ideal type,
and emphasised that friction and political constraints made
it
so. Thereby, his definition of war as politics by other means. By
this yardstick, LIC, too, is subject to the clausewitzian logic
of political aims determining military objectives. So the
au
thor's contention that the 'centre of gravity'- the people-
in
LIC (p. 169) cannot be addressed with bullets is in accord with,
and not opposed to Clausewitz, as he seems to think (p. 167).
Secondly,
'hate' is not essential for armies to win 'decisive
victories', witness the victory in East Pakistan in 1971. Third
ly, war is not 'Darwinian' (p. 166). This insight
has been
Clausewitz's landmark contribution to the theory of
war. The
military objective is not to 'destroy the enemy' per se, but to
facilitate the political objective. This holds true for LIC also,
in that the military objective is to so degrade the
militant
forces as to gain a position of advantage for the
political
solution to be effected. This has been Indian policy (S
Gupta,
'India Redefines its Role'; Adelphi Paper 293), though Mr
KPS
Gill laments this in the Foreword (p. xiv).
If his book is to
be 'read between the lines' (quoted by Harinder
Baweja in her review), then the symptoms of brutalisation
(p.
171) and the 'fatal attraction of the 'bean count' and 'numbers
game'' (p. 179) can be deemed to have been present in Kashmir. Is
this the explanation for the 40000 casualties (p. 5) there in six
years, whereas the toll in Punjab, where brutalisation was self-
evident, it was 25000 in ten years? In the three years of
the
IPKF episode, we lost 1200 dead, as against 800 in the six years
in Kashmir. Despite the greater intensity of the fight there, to
include the Jaffna battle, there were, by the LTTE's own admis
sion, only 13000 casualties. Given that 60% of
the Kashmiri
militants were not aggressive (p. 40); the kind of arsenal they
had at their disposal courtesy Pakistan; the levels of recoveries
of armaments; and, Pakistani care to keep the 'boiling pot' (p.
63) from spilling over, it would appear that the level of armed
opposition cannot justify the casualty figure.
Therefore,
this analysis seems to indicate that the General is
rather sanguine in addressing the effect Indian
civilisational
ethos (p. 188) may have had on
the 'faulty perceptions about
Kashmiris' (p. 142-3), and on degrading the influence of the then
ascendent doctrine of hindutva (p. 136-7). Besides, traditional
mores are under severe assault in society. The officer class is
not inured to such currents. Thus the impact on attitudes,
and
consequence on action, may have been more than the
author is
willing to concede. In this perhaps is the explanation for
the
seemingly exhorbitant casualty figure.
He praises the
regimental system (p. 196), while overlooking that
the 'unit ki izzat' mentality may have prepetuated the
'result
syndrome'. Furthermore, the unstated prejudices
that inhere
within the psyches and memories of the various ethnic
groups,
have scope for expression where the ethnic factor is foundational
as in the regimental system. This syndrome can also be attributed
to careerism (p. 171), the result in turn of a pyramidical organ
isational structure, and, to the intake of 'mediocrity', itself a
result of 'marginalisation of the
military in national psyche'
(p. 175).
If this critique
be true, then, is the General's prescription on
generalship
(p. 186) valid? Merely 'sharing his intention with
his subordinate commanders, fighting the info war, and managing
the environment' (p. 186) may not be 'what generalship is
all
about' (p. 186). General Sardeshpande's position on formation and
higher level military leadership ('Assignment Jaffna', p. 150-1)
acquires credibility. He envisages a hands on
inspirational
leadership as answer in environments, as these, where the army is
found to be less
responsive than desirable, which incidentally is
how the General describes armies (p. 149-57). Where leadership is
such, it precludes the excesses, and allegations based on the 'no
smoke without fire' analogy, that invite media expressed societal
opprobrium- thereby winning the info war by deed.
On Civil-Military
Relations
The General
opines that the 'army belongs to the people, never to
the government, accordingly, the army is answerable only to the
people' (p. 197). Given this, the 'commitment of the nation has
to be kept alive' (p. xix). The manner of doing so is to inter
face with the instrument that conditions the mind of the people-
the media- in order to win the info war. This,
alongwith the
'management of the environment' (p. 186) and strategising
(p.
178), is the sphere of operational responsibility of the command
ing general.
The
General's views on the military-society relationship echo
MacArthur's contention before his sacking underlined the position
of the military in democratic polity. The army is an instrument
of the state run by a government accountable to the
people's
representatives in parliament. Inadequate understanding of this
has led to military expansion (which, by implication, occurs when
the commanding general acts in accordance with
the author's
outline of his role) into the political sphere, beyond its legit
imate involvement in bureaucratic politics. The military
must
defend the turf of its social responsibility of protection
of
state and society, but this has the danger of the military equat
ing its institutional interest with the national interest. It is
for this reason the military is subordinate to the political head
in non-praetorian polities.
Understandly,
as with any profession, the military strives to
protect its autonomy in the sphere of its expertise.
However,
where the field is inherently political ('low intensity wars are
political wars' (p. 167)), political control is doubly important.
It is at arriving at a modus vivendi that some of the problems of
interface, the General mentions in passing (p. 179), occured. The
author's severe indictment of the administration as 'nervous' and
'panicky'(p. 38-9) in connection with the media
clampdown at
Tsrar is an interesting casestudy. It would have been a service
to contemporary historiography on Kashmir had he put on
record
what the army' point of view put across was at the juncture the
decision was made, and subsequently, at the climax. As the lead
and controlling agency for operations in Kashmir, other than in
Srinagar town, it would be interesting to know if the army
was
overruled in this regard. If not, then to blame the administra
tion entirely, as the General does, is to protect institutional
interest- the danger alluded to earlier.
Conclusion
That this review
essay has highlighted a differing perspective on
some core issues is to the author's credit, for
his thought
stimulating work. The alternative perspective is not only academ
ically important, but must be given due worth in arriving at any
conclusions on the issues raised by the author. Since LIC is here
to stay (Toffler, Creveld) such deliberation is well in
order.
And is a fitting tribute to those who are called upon to sacri
fice their lives in such conflicts- to whom the book is dedicat
ed. The author's principle achievement is thus in initiating the
process with his timely, brave and frank account of the psycholo
gy of militancy in Kashmir.
Ray, Arjun;
'Kashmir Diary: Psychology of Militancy'; Manas
Publications, New Delhi; 1997; Rs 495.