Some book reviews from the archives, early 2000s
BOOK REVIEW 13 Jul 2003
Lt Gen (Retd.) Sood, VK; Swahney, P., Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished; New Delhi,
Sage Publications, 2003; pp. 204; Rs. 280/-.
For strategic
affairs aficionados, it is not strange that the book reflects the Army’s
position, rather than a service position, the latter being non-existent. The
Army’s position would appear to be suffering from the shortcomings of a
‘military mindset’ in that it is narrow, myopic and has institutional
self-interest at its core. It also reveals a grave misreading of Clausewitz, in
that the Army believes that destruction of the military ware withal of a foe
would yield a desired political outcome. This is best summed up by an extract
from the Army’s doctrine brought out in the book: ‘The Indian Army believes in
fighting the war in enemy territory. If forced into a war, the aim of our
offensives would be to apply a sledgehammer blow to the enemy. The Indian
Army’s concept of waging war is to ensure decisive victory…’. Even though the
doctrine predates Pokhran and Chagai it appears to have not been revised in the
age of ‘limited war’. The book reveals that though the January avatar of Op
Parakram was a Northern Command inspired ‘bottom up’ one limited to POK, by
June its ambition had increased to launch three strike corps into Pakistan’s
desert sector in the hope that Pakistan’s mobile formations would be destroyed
without pushing its nuclear threshold. This, despite the author’s admitting
that the Indian military has not been kept in full picture of India’s nuclear
capabilities by its politicians and scientific enclave. If that be the case,
then it can be surmised it is less in picture with regard to the nuclear
capabilities and least of all intentions of Pakistan. Therefore, it can be
argued that a naïve belief that the war would not go nuclear underlay the
position of the Army, a factor the politicians appear to have happily been more
in tune to.
This brings one
to the aspect of political control. The book rightly criticizes the government
for not informing the military of the purpose of the mobilization. As a result
it was amenable to a permissive interpretation, evident from the contretemps
surrounding the dismissal of a strike corps commander for overstepping his
non-existent brief. A more generous interpretation could be that in leaving the
‘war unfinished’ the government exhibited political control despite the Army
position and pressure. While the book appears critical of the government’s lack
of resolve, the contrary appears closer to the facts. This is an aspect that
requires bolstering lest commentary in the vein carried in the book make the
case that the government is oblivious to strategic considerations that ought to
be sole preserve of a professional military. In a nuclear environment, this is
patently not the case, even if Clausewitz’s dictum on the abiding primacy of the
political of over two centuries vintage is ignored for a moment.
The book
suggests that there are two solutions to India’s joint Kashmir-Pakistan
problem. One is in administering a military defeat to Pakistan and second is
for an internal resolution to the Kashmir militancy. It considers the latter
impractical and therefore its inclination for the military option. The book
does not reflect on how success was to be obtained in the January and June
versions of Op Parakram, even though it does spell out the problems. With
regard to the January option, though it takes Gen Musharraf’s threat of
reacting ‘unconventionally’ at face value in that it brings out the threat of
the Mujahideen to Indian thrusts in the mountains of POK, and the difficulty of
taking on formidable mountain defenses particularly in snow clad winter, it
does not give out Indian Army’s answer to these problems. Strategic vapidity is
evident from the fact that though the first few chapters dwell on the Taliban
threat, the Army backed a winter offensive even as the Taliban was being
wrapped up by Op Enduring Freedom. In so far as the June option is concerned,
it does not tell us how Indian Army expected to grapple with the ‘operational
parity’ presented by Pakistan. At best, we are told of Indian Army’s obsession
with ‘territory’. The then Vice Chief is quoted as saying that ‘the role of the
Army was to occupy (territory) with the others (air force etc) come in support
of it’. The ‘what if’s’ such as ‘What if Pakistan’s reserves refused to play
ball?’ are completely ignored in this bit of advocacy of the Army’s untenable
position. Given this lack of information it is too pat on the part of the
authors to back the military position as they do – ‘the commanders would know
best…The Indian Army must call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff…’.
Lastly, the
authors appear to believe that the structural and technological evolution post
Op Parakram in terms of formation of the NCA etc would help India prevail next
time round with a better politician-military interface. A different approach
requires to be privileged in that such evolution ought to be utilized to
reassert political control on the military lest its propensity for role
expansion into the political domain of determining whether to wage war and its
ends is appropriately curbed. There is an certain urgency to this in that the
military perspective brought out approvingly in a quote from a former Chief’s
account of his term in office indicates that the Indian Army appears to be
adrift in the era of globalisation and its compulsions seized as it is narrowly
with admittedly palpable security threats across the country – ‘It was more
than obvious that when the Narasimha Rao government embarked on its economic
liberalization it also quietly pushed issues like defense and national security
very low down in the list of priorities’. Clearly India’s economic strides,
with their attendant national security implications, cannot be allowed to be
deflected by a bunch of terrorists inciting its Army into self-interestedly pushing
the government into over-reacting.
BOOK REVIEW 2 Jun 2002
Philpot, D., Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations; Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, Pages – 339, $ 19.95
Daniel Philpot is an
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa
Barbara. As befits a ‘rising star’ (Philpot is 35 years old) on the firmament
of international relations theorists, his book is an ambitious that sifts
historical evidence to prove his contention that ideas have had a role in
shaping modern international relations. The importance of his thesis on the
influence of ideas lies more in what the implications are for the future. If
ideas have brought about the state system as exists today, the ideas that are
current may well change its contours in the future. In short, ideas bear
watching. His theory is well substantiated, though he lays no claim to ideas
being the sole historical arbiter. He accords due respect to realist and
materialist macro-explanations of historical movements as the formation of the
nation state system of today in the Westphalian tradition.
In the introduction, the
book deals with the concept of international constitution – the underlying
precepts of the international system, which in the present rests on sovereign
states. International constitutions are the legitimating norms and practices of
the sovereign entities that ‘create orders but not necessarily orderliness’.
Philpot reflects on the three faces of sovereignty in international
constitutions: what are the legitimate polities; who are entitled to such
recognition; and what are their prerogatives. He characterizes as ‘revolution’
when there is any revision in any of these three faces of sovereignty. The
principal movement in sovereignty has been the two separate though similar
revolutions – the original Westphalia Treaty restricted to Europe; and the
spread of the same to remainder of the globe with decolonisation. It is
noteworthy that the author characterizes two recent phenomenon as revolutions –
the integration of Europe and the post-cold war propensity towards
intervention. These two aspects are reversing the steady march of state
sovereignty and are pregnant with possibilities in the future.
The author then dwells on
the role of ideas – they shape identities and are a form of social power. He
identifies how they become socially empowered through the input of
intellectuals and activists. By gauging cause and effect the author seeks to
substantiate his argument that ideas have had a role in shaping the present.
His proof is centered in the history surrounding Westphalia in the first
revolution he deals with, and in the second revolution (ie. the spread of the
first revolution across the globe in the sixties) he reveals the force of ideas
on the British and French empires. What a subsequent edition of the book can
reflect on is the manner the international constitution will turn out once the
reverse revolutions underway constraining sovereignty as we know it play
themselves out.
It is remarkable that such
books are not as yet originating in our cultural milieu. Our intellectuals
appear to concentrate on the here and now. There is a case for encouraging such
scholarship within our learning institutions. A means to this end is to emulate
the manner such work gets done in the West, the outlines of which are generally
covered by authors in their Preface. The extensive peer review of books
testifies to the gestation process that contributes to exactitude in argument
and fact. Another measure is the setting and sustaining of standards in the
production of knowledge through initiatives as the one under which this book
has been published – Princeton Studies in International History and Politics
edited by Jack Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg and Fareed Zakaria. The book is
therefore worth reading if only to reflect on how persuasively contextual
issues are tackled.
BOOK REVIEW 30 May 2001
Major Vivek Chadha, The Book of Military Quotations; New Delhi: Bookmart Publishers, 2001; Pages- 320; Rs- 695/-
Major Chadha’s operational service in theatres ranging from Sri Lanka to J&K, has instigated his quest for an understanding of the nature of his calling. His first book was a first hand account of the demands on the leader at the spear end of the LIC battlefield. His book under review promises more to come, for there is still a bright career ahead for this officer – the insights of which he is unlikely to keep to himself. This is hopefully the sign of arrival of the modern officer corps, wherein the members deliberate not only the experience but also its meaning.
The book
originated in a remarkable observation by the Major, in that there is a vacuum
of military quotations originating in the Indian cultural and military milieu.
It is to the credit of the Major that he has taken time off from his official
schedule to prepare this useful book. It reveals a point of wider import, in
that the army is now diluting its anti-intellectual culture in its transition
to being an army of the info age. That this book is as much about military
history, it would appear that sensibly the army has not lost a sensitivity to
its past.
It is a book that will get repeatedly thumbed for it has a
thoughtfully prepared menu of topics, which the complier, being an insider, is
in the best position to know. It has been well presented by the publishers, but
at a price that may seem daunting. Nevertheless, it is a book that should grace
the shelf of any young officer who adopts the forces as a way of a life. The
section on India’s wars will no doubt expand in editions that can be predicted
to follow this one. This may infuse a greater Indian bias in the book, thereby
fulfilling the compliers original intent.
Quotations are the compression of wisdom into memorable language.
Thus they are both a work of art and philosophy. The selection on offer reveals
the compiler’s aesthetic sense as also the wide scope of his search. In this
age of attention spans as short as commercials, quotations serve the further
purpose of attracting the reader to reflect on the thought they transmit. Since
in right thought springs right action, the food for thought that this book
contains is recommended as staple to the fresh entrants to the officer
corps.
BOOK REVIEW 15 May 2001
Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military – The Changing Security Environment; Baltimore and London; John Hopkins University Press; Pages – 184.
The author acknowledges that John Mearsheimer planted the seeds of the book under review with an interesting anecdote. He describes Mearsheimer as dividing the field of security studies into three subfields. The first deals with nuclear strategy; the second with grand strategy and conventional forces; and the last with military-society issues. The impression he left was that specialists had treated the first two exhaustively, whereas the last, by far the more interesting subfield, was the least studied. This is relevant in our context as well, for there is indeed a striking dearth of specialists looking at the ‘soft’ underside of the military profession. Recently, some work in this direction has come out of Rajasthan University.
However, the subject is somewhat alien to the general
reader. It is for this reason, this book and similar ones that originate abroad
are recommended. They help provide the conceptual tools with which to
understand military sociology. Though most such books do not deal with the
political orientation of the Indian military, there are some remarkable exceptions
as Rosen’s India and its Armies, Cohen’s classic The Indian Army and the one on
the absence of coups in India by Apurba Kundu. Intelligent analogies and
inferences can be drawn to come to grips with the Indian setting. Moreover,
there is a certain convergence in the sociology of modern militaries, even if
some of the writing deals with the movement of militaries into the post-modern
age. Since ours is a military and polity in the throes of change the experience
of the same elsewhere has very pertinent lessons for us. It is for this reason
military sociology must find right of place on our reading lists.
The book under review deals with the impact of the
changing security environment post-cold war on civilian control of the
military. It approaches the subject on the theoretical plane, instead of merely
being descriptive in the case studies it uses to embellish the academic points
it seeks to raise. It advances a structural theory on civil-military relations,
as against the existing ones based on the personalities, organizational
characteristics, and the nature of the civil authority. He basically wishes to
resolve the debate between two points of view on the impact of external threat
environment on civil-military relations – the first is Lasswell’s thesis on the
‘garrison state’ wherein adverse threat environment may lead to a loss of civil
control; in the opposed viewpoint this is unlikely to be the case. Desch’s
argument reinforces the latter point of view. His case-studies include the US
and Russian militaries; the Latin American militaries and the French and German
cases. These case-studies are worth perusing from the general knowledge point
of view, and to gain an insight into an academic approach to theory building.
In a nutshell, his view is that good civil-military
relations are likely in high external and low internal threat environments.
With respect to low external and high internal threat environments, as obtain
in our case his theory predicts the poor (worst) civil-military relations.
Given this, the reader can judge the veracity of Desch’s theory on his own.
Since most commentaries on the ongoing systemic reengineering of our security
structure deal with its efficiency and effectiveness, a look at the same from
what it implies for democratic control will be instructive – a look that can
only be facilitated by military sociology.
BOOK REVIEW 31 May 2001
Maroof Raza, ed. Generals and Governments in
India and Pakistan; New Delhi: Har Anand Publications; 2001; Pages 144;
Rs. 250/-
The book under review is the first of an intended ‘Military Affairs Series’ by the publishers, the series editor being a former member of the army officer corps Major Maroof Raza. The purposefulness of the publishers is evidence of the marketability of books regards security issues in today’s India – a niche market originally identified with Lancers. Earlier a criticism of our strategic culture had it that ours was a society apathetic to security and threats to the same. This is happily no longer the case, thanks in part to the effort of the retired fraternity as also the more pro-active stance on these issues by recent governments. The series aspires to enlighten the concerned citizen on the major aspects of security issues in the public eye in order that a constructive debate ensue and inform the executive. How it differs from the periodicals dealing with the same is that it shall be dealing in the main with ‘how’ to think through such issues rather than ‘what’ to think about them.
More importantly, the series editor has
chosen military sociology as the first theme. The Western centric discourse in
this field has been breached by this effort that brings under one cover the
writings of the younger generation of the strategic ‘community’. The
contributors are working with institutions involved with security matters to
include the IDSA, the Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace
(WISCOMP), and the BBC. It is heartening to note that two of the contributors
are ladies, for this is a trend that will surely enhance the perspectives on
offer in the hitherto male preserve of strategic analysis. Their views, that
have earlier appeared elsewhere, reflect the importance accorded to the aspect
of civil-military relations in a democratic society. Seen in a comparative
perspective, in this case with the Pakistani example of dysfunctional
relations, the positive aspects of the Indian experience stand out. The fact is
that the stability of this equation has been in some measure responsible for
the wider success of the Indian experiment with liberal democracy. It is now in
the process of evolution, with the Government seized of the matter
restructuring the national security apparatus, an aspect that Raza could have
done well to throw more light on.
The contributions include an
interesting discussion of the militarisation of Indian politics since the
Eighties by Dr. Sumona Dasgupta, who works with WISCOMP. She avers that the
readiness of application of the military template in both the internal and
external spheres is indicative of the same, though it does not imply that there
has been any politicization of the military as a consequence. There is a
theoretical look at the meaning of the cliché ‘apolitical military’ by Sanjay
Dasgupta, who is completing his Phd from the reputed Department of War Studies,
King’s College London. (Incidentally, Raza and the present reviewer share the
same alumni.) His chapter provides the conceptual tools with which the
layperson can approach the subject. His examination of the implications of
nuclear weaponisation for civil-military relations is instructive, for it looks
at the way both South Asian states have coped with the changed circumstance.
Dr. Smruti Pattanaik of the IDSA reviews the unfortunate dominance of Pakistani
politics by the military. It has its lessons for us in terms of being a
constant reminder of the impact of politicization on professionalism. We need
look no further than the Kargil encounter to acknowledge the debilitating
effects of the same.
Raza’s own contribution is
the comparative study, which can be faulted for being somewhat soft on the
Indian armed forces quest for access to the higher decision making process. The
input of the armed forces has been an increasingly important feature of defence
and internal security decision-making. The armed forces have played the game of
bureaucratic politics adeptly in the recent past. In so far as they may have
fallen short, it owes in part to their falling prey to service parochialism –
which has been exploited by the intermediary layer, the bureaucracy. The
success of jointness (the singular aspect that the institution
represented by this journal deals with) will be in the synergy at the apex
level of the inter-service hierarchy when representing the armed services
position on issue of joint concern – which at this juncture is the
materialization of the apex command structure that encompasses within it the
Strategic Command.
The themes that are to follow
include military technology, the military-media interface, internal conflicts
and defence budgets. The publisher would do well to live up to the attention
the series is bound to attract, in that the production values will have to be
set higher than were for this apparently hastily assembled book. Raza must be
complimented for continuing the good work of keeping the service interests in
the public eye. His is a model example of transition from the regimented
confines of the military to the savvy echelons of the civil street – a
transition that is to be inevitably made by most of those in service. It also
indicates that ‘we have it in us’ – not only what was required to join up, but
also that required to begin anew. One can only wish the series a wide audience
that will be made wiser by its focused attention to the security problems of
our times.
Karnad, B., ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy’: New Delhi, MacMillan, 2002; pp. 724, Rs. 795/-
Nuclear enthusiasts owe a debt to Karnad’s daughter for goading her father into finishing his first book. This book is certain to join the other two equally penetrative tomes by Perkovich and Tellis on India’s nuclear journey on the bookshelf of any discerning military professional. It is a book that must be read in conjunction with Vanaik and Bidwai’s South Asia on a Short Fuse. While Vanaik and Bidwai have delved into Gandhian and Nehruvian thought and India’s position on nuclear weapons since then to arrive at the conclusion that Pokhran II was a radical departure, Karnad seeks to establish that weaponisation was a logical corollary to Nehru’s policy of acquiring the nuclear deterrent. Contesting this widely held perception of Indian aversion to the Bomb helps Karnad forward his wider thesis that India requires to move beyond its current nuclear posture of gaining a ‘force in being’ (as termed by Tellis) to a tous azimuts capability to include a strategic triad, thermonuclear weapons and ICBMs. In this manner, Karnad believes India will be able to acquire the strategic space, international stature and military muscle considered necessary for a major player in realism inspired world politics.
The book begins
with a survey of the Vedas to establish that violence to further state goals is
envisaged as a permissible practice in these revered verses that serve as the
roots of India’s civilisational ethos. His aim appears to be to bust the myth
that India stands for abnegation and non-violence alone. In arguing the
contrary, he avers to Arthashastra as evidence of past political practice,
proving thereby that pursuit of national interest through the use of force has
been a characteristic feature. He thereafter attempts to interpret Gandhi and
Nehru in a light that Gandhians and Nehruvians may find debatable, if not
subversive. Since his work is an advocacy of the maximalist nuclear posture for
India, he requires tackling these aspects to undercut the arguments raised by
votaries of renunciation or moderation who rely on these sources for sustenance
of their position.
Thereafter the
book relies on access to freshly declassified material in archives in the USA
and the UK. The argument that the author propounds is that India’s policy of
nonalignment in the initial years was a cover for pursuing its national
interests deemed as being furthered by a nuclear program and tilting towards
the West to the extent of seeking security guarantees and military hardware
from these sources. The book traverses the Perkovich revealed terrain of how
the Nehru-Bhabha combine covertly maneuvered India down the nuclear lane. His
interviews with the key personnel of the nuclear program as Iyengar and Ramanna
and strategists as K Subrahmanyam take the book through the Indira period. He
is particularly interesting in his coverage of the last decade, primarily
because his sources have been senior bureaucrats, military men and scientists
who have been generally kept anonymous in the footnotes. He has himself been an
‘insider’ over these years, having been a member of the First NSAB that drafted
the paper that today probably serves as the basis of India’s as yet unstated
nuclear doctrine.
He dissects
several areas that comprise the nuclear discourse revealing new nuances in each
instance. These include the bureaucratic politics that has been in attendance
in India’s nuclear journey, the interpersonal interactions and the personality
profiles of the politicians, scientists and bureaucrats who have been in on the
nuclear loop, the shortcomings of ‘minimum deterrence’ popularized by the IDSA
school, the manner in which military input into decision making has been
neglected over the years, the use of Special Forces to plug the subconventional
space that can be exploited in a dyadic conflict and a critique of the ‘force
in being’ posture. Karnad, in keeping with his reputation, writes authoritatively,
articulately and with passion. The production values of the book indicate that
Indian publishing industry has come of age, for there was no incidence of the
printer’s devil in the 700 pages that comprise the densely argued book. The
drawback of the author sometimes repeating himself in both detail and ideas can
be forgiven in light of the fact that his effort was to win converts to his
grand Grand Strategic vision for India.
It is this
vision that is unfortunately the least compelling aspect of the book. It does
appear far-fetched that India requires to acquire a nuclear strike capability
against not only China, which is understandable, but also against USA. Doing so
will enable India to gain a place at the high table in the author’s view. He
does not adequately contest the perspective that India’s nuclear capability can
only do so much for India in gaining it credibility as a global player. There
are several other indices, not least of which are economic power, social
cohesion, ideational and moral strength, that make for a Great Power. Over
emphasizing the nuclear aspect of national power may not be appropriate given
the demise of nuclear-armed Soviet Union. It is also not self-evident that
doing more in the nuclear field would contribute to the national interest by
further strengthening the Indian deterrent. Ability to convert the Californian
coast into rubble is not necessarily the most compelling index of power. The
second feature of the vision is that it takes an ahistorical view of interstate
relations in concentrating only on the power dynamic. International relations
theory has moved beyond realism to furnish paradigms that ought to attract
attention of policy makers. In avoiding serious theoretic confrontation with
the contending philosophies in the discipline of international relations,
Karnad appears to have taken the easier way out. Perhaps in attracting a
rigorous counter from the opposite side of the diverse membership of the
‘strategic community’ this may have dividend for those interested in strategy.
As a last word, it may be said that though Karnad attributes his interest in
matters military of which we are the beneficiaries to the influence of Shri
Jaswant Singh and Shri KC Pant, partial credit for the same should perhaps also
be given to his school, Belgaum Military School!
BOOK REVIEW 13 May 2001
Robert W Stern, Democracy and
Dictatorship in South Asia: Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes In
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; Westport, Praeger, 2001; Pages – 194.
The argument is a difficult one to follow for those who are not
habituated to think in terms of classes (many in the subcontinent prefer the
shorthand of ‘communities’). That is not reason enough not to persist with the
book for it does have a worthwhile perspective to present – one that gets more
interesting as the narrative moves closer to us in time. He delineates two
‘communalisms’ of the pre-independence era to which he attributes the partition
and the evolution of the three (initially two) political systems subsequently.
The interaction of ‘popular’ communalism and
‘elite’ communalism under imperial intervention of weightage and
reservation led to the imagination, invention and consolidation by dominant
classes of the ‘communities’. In the post-partition era the meaning and impact
of parliamentary democracy on dominant classes varied for the two states.
Whereas the Westminster model found root in India under the tutelage of a
single party system, the imbalance between the two wings of Pakistan prevented
its emergence with any degree of certainty and depth there. While East Pakistan
was predisposed to it, owing to its pre-partition tradition of mediated
politics, it was not so in West Pakistan dominated as it is by the landlord class.
This accounts for the second partition. The book brings us up to date with the
internal politics of all three countries.
Though we are familiar with the details, a sophisticated
understanding of the same is often elusive. The book is therefore a useful
addition to the literature on the contrast between democracy and dictatorship
in South Asia. Its bibliography lists other works to include Ayesha Jalal’s
rewarding one on the same theme. The importance of perusing these works by
those in the security field, such as the readers of this journal, is that
dogmas and myths get exposed for what they are. This is the first step to the
realization that in new-age security thinking, coming to grips with the
socio-political thought must precede understanding of the region’s
geo-politics. Secondly we do need to know more of our neighbors. With regard to
Pakistan, our perception is generally limited to it being a Punjabi dominated
state on the verge of being a ‘failed state’. Our knowledge of and interest in
Bangladesh is generally abysmal. The book helps us flesh out our knowledge base
and theoretical heuristics.
Kanwal,
G., Nuclear Defense: Shaping the Arsenal: New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2001;
Pages- 246, Rs___.
The Colonel’s writings are by now
familiar to those who follow the security debates, for he has been prolific
over the past two years of his academic existence. He has the credentials to
attempt the onerous task of examining the post-weaponisation force structure
for he has headed an in-house think tank in the South Block – a section in the
Military Operations Branch. The Colonel set out on the present undertaking to
examine the manner the Draft Nuclear Doctrine could be operationalised. His
findings are presented in a nutshell in the concluding chapter - that has, in
the main, appeared as an article in a recent edition of the Indian Defense
Review (though the article erroneously mentioned the name of the book as Force
Structure for Nuclear India). His book is in the tradition of military men
writing nuclear strategy, namely the redoubtable General Sundarji and Brig
(Magu) Nair.
His argument is that, in order for our
‘no first use’ policy and intent of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in
retaliation to be credible, we need to opt for ‘megaton monsters’ numbering
about 200 based on a triad of delivery systems under strict political control.
His calculations reveal that this is an affordable figure. Given the fact that
we are now a de facto nuclear power, reflections such as this are welcome for
they will shape the final manner of deployment and employment of this deterrent
capability.
However the point of interest is the
Colonel’s insistence that even a defensive use of the nuclear weapon on its own
territory on military targets by Pakistan as per its deterrence policy of
possible ‘first use’ should be met with a retaliatory strike by India on its
population and industrial centers. Given this certainty, he feels ‘they will,
quite naturally, sue for peace’. This is the kind of wishful thinking that even
the fictional scenario writer Humphrey Hawksley cannot be faulted with. This is
even more dangerous when the Colonel recommends that India ‘call the Pakistani
bluff’ by deep penetrations by its strike formations in pursuit of the
‘marginalisation’ of the Pakistani military as a ‘force majeaure’ in Pakistan.
That this conventional mode of thinking has not appreciably changed can be
discerned from the fact that the recent military exercise in the tradition of
periodic gigantic exercises has been codenamed Ex Purna Vijay i.e. Total
Victory (!). This is borne out by the helpful quote by the author from the
ARTRAC publication on doctrine on the army’s intention of winning a ‘decisive
victory’ by carrying the war deep into enemy territory (p. 98).
Brodie’s point that the sole purpose of
militaries in the nuclear age is not to fight wars but to deter them has not
been registered sufficiently for we believe that the purpose of nuclear weapons
is merely to deter nuclear use by the adversary and not to deter war itself. It
is this that raises doubts on the relevance of linear Cartesian logic to
nuclear strategy, adopted by the Colonel schooled in the military training
institutions as the Staff College and at the Higher Command Course. Clearly, if
the military is to staff an integrated MOD and the CDS system radical
restructuring of the officer development syllabi may be necessary. Minor
irritants as dating the infamous utterings of Zulfi Bhutto on a fond preference
for the staple for cows to post-1971 war are not germane to this point. This
rises to immediacy in light of the fact that despite considerable research work
that has gone in to produce this book, the author categorizes the Indian
deterrent philosophy as one of ‘deterrence by denial’!
Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn
Sikkink, (eds.) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic
Change: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1999; Pages- 318; Price-
The theoretical
framework in question is a five phase ‘spiral model’ dwelling on the manner of
socialization into international norms of recalcitrant states. In the
‘repression phase’, activation of the network is done in order to highlight the
violations. This leads to the ‘denial phase’, in which the state rejects the
imposition of an external paradigm of human rights. Once sufficient information
is made available on the state’s human rights record, it undertakes a defensive
‘tactical concessions’ phase. In doing this, it lays itself bare to penetration
through argumentation and lobbying by human rights activists. This forces the
state to acknowledge the ‘prescriptive status’ of human rights norms. Lastly,
is the phase in which the state exhibits ‘rule consistent behavior’ through
institutionalization and habituation to human rights norms.
The impact of
the international relations situation (‘world time’) on this spiral is
considered, though not in as much depth as may have been warranted. The fact is
that the West in keeping with its geo-political purpose has condoned repressive
behavior of violator states. To neglect this aspect is to iterate the West’s
assumption that human rights violations are a resultant of domestic factors in
the developing world. The second noteworthy point is that the book does not
discuss the cases of China and India, thereby disregarding the experience of
major states and regions. Therefore the book can be recommended reading only
for human rights buffs.
BOOK REVIEW 23 Aug 2001
Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignity: Organised Hypocricy: Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999; Pages- 264, Price- $ 16.95.
The author rightly begins with an overview of his argument.
Thereafter he attempts to demolish the meanings vested in the concept of
sovereignty in the contending theoretical schools, namely neo-realism,
neo-liberalism, the English school and the constructivist school. He then
appraises the concept against the backdrop of minority rights and human rights
– the two aspects that have caused the transgression of the concept in such as
a manner as to make it relatively meaningless. A similar examination with
respect to the conditionalities imposed by international financial institutions
and of globalisation is enlightening in that an Indian reader can relate the
arguments to the recent circumstances closer home.
The major thesis that the writer reinforces is the belief that ‘the
strong will do as they can while the weak suffer what they have to’. For those
with grandiose visions of a resurgent India this may be heart warming. However,
persisting with such Thucidydian truisms into the new millennium is unlikely to
yield a world society or an international community with which we may be able
to overcome the problems of the day and those of the future.
Sahadevan, P.,
(ed.) ‘Conflict and Peacemaking in South Asia’; Lancer Books, New Delhi, 2001; pp.533, Rs.
850.
The book has an optimistic theme in that it places peacemaking efficacy on par with the intractability of conflicts these efforts address. Given the events over the last year, it would appear that such optimism in the South Asian context, specifically with respect to the pivotal states India and Pakistan, is debatable. Nevertheless, it reveals the hope and tenacity in peacemaking that alone can bring about any movement in the status quo on the several conflicts without end that plague South Asia.
The book grew out of a seminar at JNU in the wake of the
nuclear tests in 1998. The papers presented at the seminar by academics from
all South Asian countries, along with some additional essays commissioned by
the editor to fill in the gaps, comprise the book. It is a useful addition to
security literature, even if it somewhat dated, for it deals with the plethora
of bilateral and multilateral issues at the root of ongoing disputes and
potential conflicts. The advantage of the book is in the treatment it gives
issues other than those that comprise the usual fixations of regional security
studies of Indo-Pak relations and Kashmir. Thus we have the water sharing
problem, the unresolved border problems and the Sino-Indian relations also
getting the fair share of attention that is justly their due if we are to gain
a perspective on the theme of peacemaking and conflict being complementary and
of equal import in South Asia.
The book is divided into four sections. Part I may
interest all strategic study enthusiasts for it deals with familiar issues of
relative power, its usage and means to temper it. For the purposes of the study,
China has rightly been included as a regional actor. The treatment of their
topics by Raju GC Thomas and Pravin Swahney is idiosyncratic. Swahney
particularly is high on military detail, but has not been able to integrate
these into a cohesive whole. Kanti Bajpai and Swaran Singh provide the optimism
in their assessment of the nuclear question and CBMs respectively. Territorial
disputes and water disputes are dealt with in subsequent two sections. This is
an educative section in that knowledge of the disruptive as also peace inducing
potential of these issues is not widely available and consequently these issues
have not been adequately appreciated. Lastly, is a look at how global balances
have affected the region, not only in furthering rivalries here but also in the
manner in which external powers have tried to bring about a modus vivendi
through their peacemaking efforts. The chapter by Moonis Ahmar, unfortunately
the lone Pakistani contributor, brings the Pakistani thrust toward mediation
into focus. The book could have done with a concluding, equally comprehensive
chapter as his introductory one by the editor.
In summation, two points need mention in assessing the
book. One is the signal contribution to security studies that academics at JNU
through their deliberations at the Core Group for the Study of National
Security are making for furthering interest and insights in the subject. Second
is that there requires to be greater participation by non-Indian academics in
such ventures dealing with South Asia. In this manner perspectives from the
periphery can mitigate the India-centric nature of the subcontinent that is
partially at the root of certain disputes.
