https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/short-wars-creating-tomorrows-reality-2/
Short Wars – Creating Tomorrow’s Reality
USI Journal: October
2007 - December 2007
|
Short Wars – Creating Tomorrow’s Reality |
|
Introduction Conventional
wars have historically been resorted to with the intention of being kept
short. Military
history proves that as often as not, this is not how wars have turned out. The
expectation that tomorrow’s wars will be short arises from the transition of
South Asia into the Nuclear Age. However, if tomorrow’s
wars are to be short, two aspects will need to be kept
in mind. The first is regards the elements which keep conflict duration
limited, and, secondly,
are the factors that militate against this. Most
studies on Limited War suggest a deliberate limitation to politico-strategic
aims, geographic
spread, weapons and forces involved. Keeping conflict ‘limited’ is easier
said on
account of factors that stoke the conflict spiral. This article dwells on the
drivers of conflict,
through a look at military history and by analysing the current strategic
reality in South
Asia. The concluding recommendations are for working on the pre-requisites of
a Short War
during peace and in future conflict; these being, paradoxically, moderation
of national
passions, war aims and military means. The
lessons of military history The key
impetus to conflict initiation has been the expectation of victory. Strategic
sense decrees
that victory be obtained at the earliest and at minimum cost and risk.
Political masters considering
war initiation in an inter-state setting have historically been persuaded of
war as an option
only in case of a short duration war. Other than the nuclear factor, factors
that lend themselves
to Short Wars have been present earlier. These include the role of
international organisations;
international opinion and pressures; tacit understanding between adversaries;
sensitivity
of leaderships to the underside of conflict, such as escalation and
extension; and finite
military capabilities at the outset of war. But these have not proven
consistently effective
in keeping wars short. Recourse to military history would help identify
factors that bring
about a reality contrary to expectation. A review
of military history reveals that most wars in the modern age dating to the
Napoleonic Wars have been long. Napoleon spent the better part of two decades
at war prior to meeting his Waterloo. The
inspired manoeuvres of the revolutionary French armies led to his opponents joining
in concert,
thereby prolonging the war1. The American civil war is taken as the first war
in which modern
military systems, weapons and tactics made their rudimentary appearance. It
was a long war
with Lincoln preserving the Union through a time-consuming strategy of
bringing the industrial
might of the North to bear. The
relatively brief campaigns of the Bismarck-Moltke era were on account of
Prussia having perfected
the general staff system. Such momentary asymmetry can bring about quicker victory;
however, German triumph led to French revanchism culminating in the Great
War2. The First
World War was embarked on by all sides with the expectation that, troops
would be home for
Christmas3. The static front owed to Moltke the Younger losing his nerve in
carrying through
the Schlieffen plan, evidence that the art in war can confound any science in
it. The
limitations of operational brilliance in the industrial age are revealed once
again in the next war. Blitzkrieg heralded joint-manship of a high order that
won campaigns, but could not withstand the test
of war in the industrial age. Industrial capacity in case of Albert Speer’s
Germany was not of the
order required to impose Hitler’s will4. Likewise in the East, Admiral
Yamamoto, who struck at Pearl
Harbor, is quoted as saying: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with
the US and Great
Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if war
continues after that, I have no
expectation of success.”5 Ultimately, the Total War doctrine of
‘unconditional surrender’ ensured a
prolonged contest eventuating in the nuclear age. The
nearly half-century long Cold War, curiously dubbed ‘the long peace’,6
witnessed the Superpowers
contending through proxies in the Third World, with individual conflicts
lasting for
decades. The three year long Korean War, energised ‘Limited War’ and
escalation control theories.7
The wars of colonial liberation were also long duration ones in Africa and
South East Asia. The Vietnam War, sustained in the belief that incremental
application of force would ensure its early conclusion,
was a decade long. So was the Afghan war. In the post Cold War era, wars,
both conventional
and sub-conventional, have largely been of long duration, be they in central
Africa, the
Balkans and, indeed, counter intuitively, the Gulf. The Iran-Iraq War that
consumed half a million
lives lasted seven years, being fuelled by all the Great Powers interested in
its extension for
strategic and commercial reasons. The two
Iraq Wars are taken as Short Wars and seen as heralding wars of the future.
However, this case
is based on the interim between the two Gulf Wars being taken as a period of
‘peace’- an
arguable proposition in face of a decade long blockade, sanctions, air space
restrictions and episodic
intervention using missiles and proxies leading up to an assessed toll of
half-a-million.8 Besides,
the second Iraq War has self-evidently not quite ended. The latest Israeli
month-long incursion
into Lebanon against the Hezbollah was a short foray. That it cost the Army
chief, General
Dan Halutz, his job, indicates the limitations of Short Wars in gaining war
aims.9 The only gain
has been avoidance of the earlier outcome of intervention under Begin and
Sharon of 1982; but
the jury is still out as to whether Israel is more secure today on account of
this military self
assertion. From the
foregoing brief survey, certain lessons help identify the drivers of
conflict. The first is that, aims that
do not brook compromise, such as ‘unconditional surrender’, ending secession
and regime change, presage a long haul. Keeping aims
limited through a conflict is at best a difficult proposition. Second, from
Napoleon through Guderian to Petraeus, the lesson is that operational level advantages cannot make up for strategic shortcomings.
Thirdly, in the Age of Nationalism, political forces in society
push for longer wars, thereby constraining autonomy of decision makers and
impacting strategic
rationality. Fourth, the form of the conflict embarked on could change, such
as from conventional
to sub-conventional. This would require viewing the conflict as one and its
duration as a
continuum. Periods of ‘phony war’, howsoever normalised in consciousness and
discourse, also
require being included as periods of conflict. Next,
there is no guarantee that external interests would converge to end conflict.
International organisations, including the UN, are vulnerable to manipulation
by the Great Powers; therefore any
expectations of these would have to be suitably tempered. Lastly, the
‘stability-instability’ paradox
is permissive of long duration LIC through which strategic aims other than
the most desirable
one of durable peace can be materialised.10 By this yardstick, even a
conventional war can
also be chanced in the stability afforded by nuclear deterrence, as Pakistani
planners persuaded
themselves to believe in the run up to the Kargil intrusion. The
sub-continental experience An
analysis of conflicts in South Asia does not unambiguously reveal an inherent
propensity towards
limitation from which it can be confidently extrapolated that wars of the
future will be short.
The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was short, less due to the unilateral
ceasefire by China
than to India refraining from joining the contest in earnest. It need not
have been so, especially
as Western aid was requisitioned. The War was kept short by Pandit Nehru
taking a considered
political decision on not displacing India’s development trajectory, even if non-alignment
suffered a momentary eclipse. Earlier
Indo-Pak wars have been taken as relatively gentlemanly affairs owing to
shared legacy. Of the
wars against Pakistan, the first was a long duration one lasting over a year.
Marshal of the Air Force
in hindsight reflects that the 1965 War ended prematurely as the full weight
of air power could not
be brought to bear.11 It was restricted to the three weeks of intensive
fighting. However, in case
the Kutch incident of April, Operation Gibraltar of August, and subsequent
violations of the ceasefire
till the Tashkent Agreement of the subsequent January are included, then the
conflict duration
qualifies as long. Likewise,
the duration of the 1971 War need not be restricted to the two week
‘lightening campaign’. It should instead be dated to April that
year when Sam Bahadur famously withstood political pressure
for an early campaign. The Mukti Bahini period, migration of 10 million
people, killings of hundreds of thousands within East Bengal and
local border violations can be subsumed in the period of
conflict.12 Even the short campaign was fortuitous, in that, the view of
Generals Jacob, Nagra,
Sagat Singh and Inder Gill of going for Dacca prevailed in the last stages of
run up to war, as
against the original intent of salami slicing and time consuming capture of
towns enroute’.13 The
Kargil War, called a ‘short, sharp war’ by the Kargil Review Committee, is
usually taken as forerunner of short duration wars of the
future fought in the nuclear backdrop. According to the suspect
Pakistani perspective,14 a long campaign of attrition was preempted through
US intervention.
President Musharraf’s claims in his autobiography have been credibly disputed
on this
score by former Chief, General VP Malik.15 However, a time-continuum can be
discerned with Low
Intensity Conflict across the Line of Control abutting either end of the
mid-intensity Kargil
Conflict. Conflating the two kinds of conflict into one would make the
conflict a long duration one and part of the wider proxy war. The
lesson to be drawn is that India’s conflicts, like conflicts elsewhere, have
an equal, if not greater chance,
to be of long duration rather than short. Political heads took decisions to
cease the conflict at a great personal and political cost on both
sides of the border. The development of rival nationalisms
and resulting politicisation of issues since, would impinge on future ease of
settlement of issues. Secondly, these wars have not
always yielded a meaningful result in terms of settlement of
issues. A Short War in the future may also leave core issues unaddressed,
begging the question of its
utility. The ‘push’ for resolving issues militarily ‘once and for all’ may
then make an appearance. Precautions require to be built into the
preparation for and conduct of war to ensure a Short War. An
analysis of the present Understandably,
none of India’s sub-conventional conflicts have been short duration ones:
Operation Pawan, Operation Rakshak, Operation Rhino
and the LIC in Siachen.16 This trend is likely to persist into the future. To escape this strategic
cul-de-sac, Short War thinking has arisen in which space in the
conflict spectrum can be opened up for a conventional ‘Limited War’, with
limitation being exercised
in duration as against other parameters as extent of theater of engagement,
weaponry used and
targets engaged. The
tendency of conflict towards escalation, leading up to the ‘ideal’ state of
Absolute War, has been conceptualised
by Clausewitz in his discussion of the reciprocal actions between
opponents.17 This tendency is accentuated by nationalism,
intrinsic to modern nation states, that yields ground to hyper
nationalism in times of crisis. Historical memories also impact the creation
of the ‘Other’, resulting
in stereotyping and dehumanisation of the opponent. This tendency can be
exploited by fringe
political formations to tie down the government to less palatable options.
These factors conspire
to dispel rationality. The
expectation that external powers, valuing stability and fearful of the
nuclear genie, would intervene
early for conflict termination is also shaky. Pakistan has persistently
defended its untenable
position on Kashmir in defiance even of the US. India mobilised its troops in
response to the
Parliament attack irrespective of the effect on the US led GWOT. The impact
of external pressure
is limited to what states are willing to tolerate. International
organisations also have their own
limitations, hidden agendas and a case history of limited efficacy in
sub-continental disputes. Lastly, a
look at the nuclear question on conflict duration is in order. General VP
Malik has it that there
exists a window in the conflict spectrum below the nuclear threshold for
conventional operations.18
This is elastic so long as the perceived ‘nuclear reaction threshold’ is not
pushed. It is
assessed that a threat to the threshold is more likely in a longer war in
which comprehensive national
power is brought to bear. However, the vulnerable state is also in a position
to mobilise its
national resources so as to preclude a lowering of the threshold. Against
extant wisdom, it can be posited
that a high intensity war, intended as a short one at the outset, poses the
threat of stampeding
the vulnerable side into premature nuclearisation to redress some or other
emergent asymmetry. Therefore, the argument, based on
the existence of a nuclear backdrop, is not entirely persuasive. War
termination would be dependent on like-mindedness of the adversary. In the
Indo-Pakistani context,
this may not be possible until Pakistan is able to pull off some gains either
tangibly or psychologically. Its Army would require some face-saving action
for holding onto power post-conflict within Pakistani political structure. This
would likely result in Pakistan extending the war till its purposes
– not amounting to ‘winning’ the war, but merely preserving itself from
‘losing’ abjectly – are
achieved. Such a long war is in Pakistani interests for it will enable resort
to external balancing and
‘extended depth’. Besides, it may ‘do an Iraq’ on an advancing India. In the
event, India may end up with a
partner unwilling to Tango. India, on
its part, would not like to be left strategically exposed lest a Short War
not serve up its original
aims. In trying to pull off a politically viable, strategically sustainable
and militarily ‘decisive’
outcome, it may over-extend. Mission creep’ and ‘surge’ would then transpire,
with uncertain
outcome. Given the move of the discourse from Limited War19 to Short War,20
the premium
on duration would necessitate a corresponding compensation through leveraging
national
and military power along other dimensions and levels in which India would be
deemed to enjoy
escalation dominance. This would compromise the resulting peace in leaving a
bitter aftermath
and an unrequited enemy. Concluding
reflections Short
Wars are desirable as against long duration wars, in that they imply limited
war aims; keep damage
limited comparatively; do not deflect the national economy overly; do not
providing enough time for passions to overtake rationality;
and, resultantly, do not permit these to impinge unreasonably
any future peace settlement. However, as seen here, the term Short War verges
on an oxymoron. Therefore, measures need to be
identified and implemented to bring about such an outcome.
A few pointers to this end are recommended in conclusion. At the
political level, firstly, there requires to be a political consensus on the
requirement, nature and aims
of the war embarked on. In case this is not there, then self-interested
political elements could
whip up public passions forcing the leadership in unpredictable ways.
Secondly, demonisation resorted to generally in peace needs to be
tempered to the extent of permitting the adversary a locus
standi on a vexed issue. This would enable easier assimilation by the polity
and populace of the
necessity for early war termination through compromise on mutually agreed
terms. On the
military level, the first Principle of War, namely, ‘selection and
maintenance of aim’ requires constant foregrounding. Second, the threat
of escalation would require monitoring, particularly as the
demonstration a capacity for ‘escalation dominance’, so as to influence enemy
thinking towards conflict termination, may go awry.
Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that operational brilliance
may beget victory, but, paradoxically, victory is not usually a necessary and
sufficient condition
for subsequent peace. Lastly, the military would require conditioning to a
half-fought war. Air power
theory of ‘infrastructure busting’; land warfare concept of ‘decisive
victory’; and the naval apprehension
of ‘sitting out the war’ may require muting. War is
the least predictable social activity and the least controllable political
act, and on outbreak is liable to
truncate rational aims and pious intentions. Short Wars have to be brought
about by creating
the context and circumstance conducive to early war termination; best achieved,
ironically, through
war aims that belie the necessity of war. The purpose of military power in
our context today is not to compel the enemy to one’s
purpose; but to nudge the enemy to a mutually beneficial end. |
