Is Chief of Defence Staff as Supremo safe for Democracy?

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/is-chief-of-defence-staff-as-supremo

 Strategic discourse in India has it that the reason for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)-with-teeth is to have an efficacious military instrument against threats, such as the extant Two Front threat. The reality however is that this consideration is not necessarily what drives the military’s civilian superiors in their ongoing touching up of the higher defence organization (HDO). They could well be more interested in coup proofing the HDO.

The Narendra Modi regime has been more willing to chance an empowered CDS – one with command authority over significant and sizable military tools. It can afford this since it already has in place coup proofing measures. To the regime, the CDS is no longer the Man on Horseback. Such fears had kept the appointment at bay in the past decades.

Coup proofing – a primer

A coup could be ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. The former is military conduct of or participation in the forced displacement of a civilian government. On the other hand, a ‘soft’ coup is a more advanced form of the not unusual ‘shirking’ that militaries take recourse to in order to get their way or avoid disagreeable pressures. This includes disobedience and insubordination.

The Modi regime has taken care of ‘hard’ coup proofing by holding the military to the professional till in aggravating the national security predicament by needling China on the borders. Even as it does so, it has taken care to keep its escape hatch open, by also keeping China appeased, and counter-intuitively soon the military talks table. It has taken care not to settle matters with Pakistan, though the time was ripe, till instability in Pakistan robbed India of another credible interlocutor. This way, a military engaged in its primary task alongside and in the midst of transformative change would unlikely pose a threat, even if it could.

As for ‘soft’ coup, it has tried to throw in a cultural change as part of its transformation agenda. The CDS in a recent talk alluded to the Panch Pran as guiding light to take India, and its military, to Amrit Kaal by 2047. Decolonisation of the mind is the proverbial old idea being removed prior to the new one being inserted based on original, authentic and unpolluted Indian (read Brahminical?) ideals of yore. The former is especially difficult for the military mind, while the latter might first see the nation being conditioned – another iffy proposition.

This discussion shows coup proofing figures in the consideration, even if operational effectiveness through Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC) is the more visible topic in the HDO discussion. Whereas for the regime the problem has seemingly been rendered academic, for other political parties the CDS and its baggage of coup is a legacy question suddenly acquiring traction. Since a CDS-with-teeth – with some kind of command relationship with ITCs – may be a reality soon, prudence requires a look at whether democracy stands any more threatened than it already is under the Modi regime.

The past decades

Though Independent India started off with a CDS-like appointment in a Commander-in-Chief, it soon jettisoned it in favour of Chiefs of Staff for respective Service. Not only was the intent to empower the junior two Services by letting them come abreast of the land forces, but to cut the Army Chief to size. The fledgling democracy required the military to be politically neutered, a sensible precaution in light of events in other post colonial states, particularly the one next door.

The three Services growing up in silos led to suboptimal prosecution of war. The 1947 War, confined to Jammu and Kashmir, remained land-centric, with use of air power only for logistics. Even in the 1962 War, offensive air power remained untested. In 1965, the sister Services of the Army bemoaned being left out of war planning and, as result, were surprised by its outbreak. In the Sri Lanka episode, though a joint headquarters was anchored on the Southern Command headquarters, protagonist memoirs have it that it grew dysfunctional soon. The start of the Kargil conflict witnessed an unseemly face-off between the Army and Air Chiefs, the latter unwilling to spark off a war without political level say so.

India dithered on the CDS-equivalent appointment for about half a century. The debate started after its showing in the 1971 War. Inter-Services cooperative war effort served as argument for moulding structures and processes. What held India up was not so much the strategic sense behind the idea as much as fear that a military unduly empowered could prove a threat to Indian democracy, since by then democracies were falling like nine-pins across the under-developed world to military interventions – mostly super-power backed. The division of the armed forces into three Services was useful to prevent generalissimo pretensions. The security situation did not warrant an Indian Hindenburg-Ludendorff.

Indian democracy was a light house of sorts. This was not fortuitous. Enlightened coup proofing by political minders was in evidence, much derided by military men as a downgrading of the military. Early in the aftermath of the 1971 War, Jagjivan Ram had to assure parliament that Sam Bahadur – elevated to field marshal rank only a couple of months prior - had been spoken to for when in retirement, he, in his inimitable style, responded to a scribe’s hypothetical question. The journalist lost no time in transmitting the wisecrack to jittery politicians. The seemingly exaggerated issue of a military coup was very much alive in consciousness of politicians, testified to by the appointment soon thereafter - through manipulation of the chain of seniority - of an ethnic kin, General ‘Tappy’ Raina, by Indira Gandhi.

Ever since peer armies went in for amalgamation of the armed forces – the United States being the principal one in the late eighties – the push in strategic circles picked up for a tightening of the national security and military domain. Both could do with an organizational upgrade, particularly since the internal security scenario worsened, creeping nuclearisation took place and regional and global dynamics intersected on the periphery of the subcontinent.

After a false start in the early nineties, India proceeded by decade-end to acquire a fledgling National Security Council system, presided over by a National Security Adviser. A similar case for firming up the HDO was conceded in principle in wake of the Kargil conflict, but only worked towards with bureaucratic efficiency typical of Indian babudom. Though the military imagined the bureaucracy relishing being Acting CDS, this owed more to political reservations. There was no political consensus.

The wasted years

The Gandhi family held sway over the government for a decade at a time when the logical next steps could be taken. The presiding matriarch reportedly held the proverbial ‘remote’. Appointing a fellow devout, AK Antony, as defence minister, to ensure against a Bofors-scandal redux, Sonia Gandhi wished to prevent buffeting of the economic and social transformation India was attempting through trickle-down from liberalization (Sonia Gandhi headed the National Advisory Council to justify her holding the remote).

Expectedly, the Right Wing opposition kept chafing at the bit. They capitalized on revitalizing defence as a subject area. Within the Services was the understandable inter-Service pitch for a bigger slice of a better performing economy. Seeing peer militaries internalize the Revolution in Military Affairs – evident from the early gains from the so-called Global War on Terror – the military could not be faulted. It felt thwarted from getting back at Pakistan for its proxy war in Kashmir; successive crises fizzling out before turning into conflicts wherein it could show its mettle. The Right Wing tapped into its disquiet.

An easing of tensions with Pakistan in the period left the military without a compelling case. The military alighted on a China threat, induced by the normal operation of a security dilemma on China’s breaking out. After 26/11, this duly metamorphosed into threat of a Two Front War. India’s lack of response provided a handle for the military and the Right Wing the ammunition it needed to paralyse the Manmohan Singh government, already forced on the back-foot by a slew of corruption allegations.  

Fearing the Right Wing would outflank it, the Singh government did what it could under the circumstance – fall in line with the military’s argument on a Two Front threat. Aware that its strategic restraint could be misrepresented as pusillanimity, it had allowed the military doctrinal innovation. Though well practiced for a half a decade since the aborted Operation Parakram, the resulting Cold Start doctrine was not applied to 26/11. As answer to the fear of escalation – including to the nuclear level - the idea of surgical strikes was mooted. In face of a global economic downturn – the beginnings of which were apparent by then to the economist in Manmohan Singh – it was a decidedly sage decision not being provoked into war.

In compensation, the government upped defence spending, went in for high profile acquisitions (that included a deal for the Rafale), reluctantly adopted the Two Front threat and went slow on mending Kashmir. It was tough love for Pakistan. Laissez faire for military allowed it to mainstream the Two Front threat perception. Resultantly, competitive intrusions on the China front began towards the end of the Singh tenure. In retrospect, the initial confrontations in Ladakh can be seen as precursors to Galwan.

The Right Wing did not arrive at this happy conjuncture - where it could ride the national security horse to a win in national elections - by happenstance. It had over the past decade assiduously worked to create neurosis in society. Alongside, it built up a Champion in Narendra Modi. His image after the Gujarat Pogrom proved useful. He serenaded military veterans - led by the Army Chief of Date-of-Birth fame - with   promises of a national war memorial and museum, One Rank One Pension and fixing Pakistan and Kashmir.

Modi - ably backed by intelligence czar Ajit Doval - thus stepped into a national security environment tailor made for grandstanding. All the pieces were in place for smooth appropriation. As with other government schemes, Modi’s mug-shot was stamped on the fresh packaging. Going further, such as with the Rafale deal, Modi obliged those who’d put their money on him. The Right Wing came into its own, taking down institutions and sectors from education to judicial.

In retrospect, Sonia Gandhi’s fears of a Right Wing take-over - forged in dinner conversations in the Gandhi home during her informal political tutelage by two prime ministers - were borne out. India was not witness to a mere change of government. With the questionable Pulwama-Balakot episode being ridden to electoral victory it seems increasingly likely that India was instead subject to what can arguably be categorized as a Right Wing coup -  even if electorally sustainable.

The scene today

Those who opened the doors from within - Jaichand and Mir Jafar-like – were Facilitators. The Facilitators busy themselves with matters as HDO. Their flagship enterprise – CDS - is soon to be capped by ITC, allowing for final touches to the CDS post. Unknown as yet is who the command authority over theatre commanders will rest with.

The CDS of today is toothless. There is more thinking in the open domain on the configuration of theatres rather than on the authority that will oversee these. As a retired general who once dealt with the issue pointed out at a talk - under Chatham rules - in the national capital late last month, that is the difficult part. To him, the operationalising the ITCs would be to put the cart before the horse, since logically who will control them, how and with what needs to be decided first.

Logically, the CDS must oversee ITC in his capacity as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. A second option has a civilian defence minister as war lord, with the CDS as adviser. The second option can safely be ruled out in the Indian context of rank ignoramus often tenanting the defence ministry (as now). The CDS could thus get a fresh mandate. He would have to be supported by a spruced up Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. This should precede ITC formation.   

Coup proofing revisited

A military that suppresses information - that ought to be in the ken of a knowledgeable voter for an informed choice - stands suborned. Such military action undercuts democracy, a political act. For its silence, professional accountability has been dispensed with by its political overseers – further tying the military to the regime with strings of complicity. Cases to point are Balakot, Ladakh and even the scenario-building that legitimized evacuation of Article 370 in Kashmir. The military ends up a handmaiden of the regime, a camel within the tent.

For cast-iron coup proofing, further measures are in place. Deep selection has rendered asunder any cohesion the military could bring to a coup. The regime resurrected the career of a retiree, reinforcing the unseemly lobbying in the retired fraternity for its attention. Serving officers have evidently learnt not to speak up, the catchment for CDS being opened to all at three-star flag rank. The infliction of the Agnipath scheme compels the inference that standing up for professional convictions is now passé.

Agnipath deflates the military as a cohesive force. Weighed down by Agniveers who have come of age in the Modi era, the military would be hard put to mount a military operation, leave alone a coup. Besides, the paramilitary – that has curiously been spared the Agnipath scheme – is well poised, with experience in operations in Maoist zones and in Kashmir, to pose a formidable obstacle to any would-be coup maker.

Even a CDS-with-teeth poses little danger. Deep selection enables a Right thinking choice, testifying to the onset of subjective civilian control over the military in Indian civil-military relations. The CDS would thus be powerful, but only in his own domain, while being reduced to a camp follower – not unlike Hermann Goring.

Besides, theatrisation would render ITCs powerful and with the wherewithal. If any theatre commander were to get such ideas, he would be balanced out by the other theatre commander. The four four-star officers at headquarters would not only cancel each other out, but also would not have the resources. This is one lesson that the Right Wing learnt from the incident-that-wasn’t when the defence ministry was spooked with the Para Brigade’s surreptitious move from Agra to outskirts of Delhi without the civilian side getting to know. (Also, take a look at the house of the CDS in Lutyen’s Delhi when compared to the done-up residences of the three Chiefs!)

What of Democracy?

Coups are not necessarily military executed; Hitler’s in Weimar Germany and, nearer our times, the Trump insurrection are cases to point. At the latter juncture, the United States’ military’s backroom consideration would legitimately have been a counter-coup to save democracy.

A military cognizant of Constitutional duties to prevent a coup – from any direction - serves as deterrent. Neutering a military from misplaced coup concerns can amount to disabling its ability for a counter coup. This renders democracy vulnerable to passing authoritarians and predatory ideologies. Taken beyond a point, coup proofing compels a questioning of motives.

For the Modi regime, going ahead with a CDS did not raise any coup relevant issues, since the CDS has no command authority. It was a politically useful move. However, coup proofing considerations must attend next steps. The political spectrum must be taken onboard prior. Since ITCs are on the cards, an empowered CDS or otherwise is a topic that must figure in strategic thinking.

Coup considerations may be academic – after all, the regime intends to stay on till Amrit Kaal. That is not so with other political parties, now even more tuned in to the changes in the military’s organizational culture. Subjective civilian control leads to an internalisation of ‘nationalist’ dogma by the military. This makes a soft coup more likely in the increasingly improbable event of alternation in power placing a liberal government in saddle.

As for the military, demonstrating an apolitical character in this debate implies putting the brakes on hasty moves in HDO. It must recap that as a defender of the Constitution, it must have the political acumen and preserve the capacity to deter and prevent any illegitimate - even if legal – final touches to the Constitution that Hindutva may have in store.

https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/defence-strategic-importance-of-rajnath-singh-s-nigeria-visit-1223582.html

Strategic importance of Rajnath Singh’s Nigeria visit

Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh represented India at the swearing in of newly elected President Bola Ahmed Tunubu of Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria. Significantly, he was accompanied by heads of defence public sector undertakings, implying that the major thrust of the visit was defence exports as part of the country’s Make in India initiative.

Recently, India courted Egypt with military exercises, a visit of the Indian Army Chief and had its president over as the Republic Day chief guest. Rightly, it is expanding its scope of engagement with the West African behemoth, Nigeria, with this very first visit of an Indian defence minister to that country.

It is of a piece with India’s foreign policy thrust of late to enhance ties with Africa, a continent with a future rooted in its wealth of strategic minerals, youthful demographic profile and expanding continental integration. India-Africa summits are evidence.

Post Cold War, India's expanding economy has led to a focused engagement with Africa, with India-Africa summits peppering its outreach. This is in recognition of Africa being consequential to India’s aspirations as a global power, best exemplified by its emphasis on multilateralism. African middle powers in themselves and a future more fully integrated Africa are potential poles in the desired world order.

Mindful of its advantages, India is putting its best foot forward in projecting the defence sector. It has an India-Africa Defence Dialogue in place, the second edition of which was on the side-lines of the Defence Expo in Gandhinagar last year.

Defence exports reaching Rs. 16000 crores owe in part to African militaries opting for Indian technology and armaments that are affordable and, being technologically middle range, are user friendly.

Figuring in choices abroad enables India to meet its ambitions to be Atmanirbhar by expanding investment into defence manufacturing and research and development. Economies of scale result from an export market opening up could potentially entice the profit-oriented private sector into this field.

Military engagements take forward India’s training engagements with African countries, ranging from Lesotho to Uganda. At the Africa-India training exercise at the foreign training node at Aundh this March, 25 African nations participated in conduct of humanitarian operations under the United Nations’ (UN) flag. 

Even so, the perspectives of India and Africa on an aspect of peace and security need to be reconciled. While Africa is prescient in drawing a link between climate change and conflict, India wants that the peace and security agenda of the Security Council is not unduly expanded for addressing this.

Since Africa stands for ‘African solution to African problems’, India could up its support from peacekeeping to also include the ambit of peacemaking and peacebuilding. The three together form the three sides of the peace triangle, implying that a holistic Indian contribution requires India to lend a hand in propping up the two sides other than peacekeeping.

Peacemaking will require Indian special envoys to bolster regional and UN initiatives. For peacebuilding presence India must apportion more monies for the periodic global demands for voluntary contributions of the UN agencies, funds and programs. It could even set up an international aid agency of its own. Its strengths in security sector reform, flowing from its apolitical military, can prove attractive for Africa plagued by military coups. 

As defence minister, Rajnath Singh, cannot but be tuned in to the new scramble for Africa between the US, China and Russia, even as the presence of the United Kingdom and France dissipates. This should suggest to him that as an emergent great power, India cannot but also have a strategic approach to Africa.

Given that its major strategic competitor, China, is fairly ahead in light of its deeper pockets, India needs appraising Africa in relation China’s global scheme which sees Africa at one extractive end of its Belt and Road Initiative. China now has a military base in Africa, at Djibouti, even as it prepares two access routes to African trade via Gwadar and through Myanmar. It now also has the largest Navy.

This is anticipatory pre-emption of India’s prospective closure of the Malacca Straits and intended war-time domination of the Indian Ocean. Preparation for the worst case has a deterrent purpose. This strategic context to India’s African outreach must inform India’s military diplomacy.

Finally, India has been a beacon in Africa so far mostly for its progressive socio-political and economic developmental model. India’s Vishwa-Guru aspiration should feed into its current-day politics that otherwise unwittingly undercut its soft power. Its G20 leadership opportunity must be used optimally as voice of the global South to gain African favour.

 

 

 

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/does-the-brass-still-shine 

Does the Brass still shine?

Answering the question implicit in the title of his piece, ‘Army deciding common dress code for officers just a cosmetic change. Malaise runs deeper,’ army veteran, Lt Gen HS Panag, writes, “At the root of parochialism is the diluted character of officer corps that negatively impacts the appraisal system. The military hierarchy needs a straight spine….”

It's easy to see why General Panag takes this view. Ever the hard task master since his National Defence Academy days as the Academy Cadet Adjutant, Panag highlights whats been a niggling suspicion, seldom pinned down since no veteran really wants to be proven right on this. To him, Loyalty demands preserving the legacy of the military ethic. Perhaps in coming articles he may dwell on how to get to a ‘straight(er) spine’.

Academic preliminaries

Both terms don’t really require defining. Military men know what the two mean instinctively, since these partially made them gravitate to the military in first place. Selection, training and socialisation within the military makes these a prominent feature of their makeup. Even so, for the sake of form (not to mention academic conceit), here’s a definitional exercise.

‘Character’ comprises traits encapsulated in Rudyard Kipling’s ‘If’. These are qualities that, at a lower level, help when in combat; and at a higher level are useful for conduct in war.

Arbitrarily, at the tactical level, the lines that ring true are: ‘If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew; To serve your turn long after they are gone, And so hold on when there is nothing in you. Except the Will which says to them: ‘Hold on!’

At the operational level, the line that fits the bill reads: ‘If you can keep your head when all about you Are losing theirs.’ The strategic level could use the quality put by Kipling as, ‘If you can keep your head when all about you Are losing theirs and blaming it on you, If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you….’

Perhaps Kipling had in mind ‘spine’ penning these words: ‘If you can make one heap of all your winnings, And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss.’ Like the backbone that envelops the spine and holds up the skeleton, the spine makes these character traits hang in there, together. If there was no spine, these would all flop down.

‘Dilution’ of character is if the spine is far too supple to hold things up, even if supple enough on occasion to tactfully bend with the wind. ‘Straightening spine’ is to prop up the spine so that it provides a hanger for qualities – taken together and along with those of the team – to do their thing. 

Myths and reality

There is no end to myths and legends surrounding plain-speak in the military, making ‘spine’ perhaps the most appreciated quality of the bouquet ‘character’. This holds true right from the tactical level through the operational to the strategic.

At lower levels, some officers carry the aura of their supersession around, their reputation having it that they spoke up their minds and paid for it. At the last gathering of retirees I attended in my unit a former Second in Command strode the scene, knowing his contribution to unit legend that had him holding forth once in an officiating capacity. He had told off a visiting general throwing his weight around that the current in the canal being rather fast, he was not about to risk Ghataks crossing it without a written order to that effect. He retired in the same rank.    

At the operational level, there is a plethora of standard-setting stories of officers standing up for their command and men under command. General Hanut Singh personifies this trait. A story is of General Satish Sardeshpande taking a stand over delay in emoluments due to soldiers on duty in Sri Lanka.

On an operational matter, Lt Gen Rustom Nanavatty’s under-preparation biography will hopefully illuminate an episode in which he is credited with warding off pressures at the outset of Operation Parakram for attacking from the line of march – as it were - on prepared LC defences.

In 1965, Gen Harbaksh Singh is supposed to have brushed-off a suggestion to pull back to the Beas line, when faced with Pakistan’s attempt at Khem Karan to outflank his offensive stalled at Icchogil. (The story cannot be readily believed since Harbaksh and Chaudhury were peer competitors, so for those in the Harbaksh camp (the martial and non-martial race hangover) to trot out this story makes it more of a myth than a subject of due diligence in military history writing. It is logical that all contingencies figure in discussion, enabling the commander to alight on his course of action.) The story, even if embellished, serves to show the premium put on standing true to convictions.

My favourite one on conviction is of Lt Gen DS Hooda levelling with his command in a demi-official letter to officers on why he ordered trigger-happy soldiers to be arraigned for overstepping rules of engagement when they emptied magazines behind three kids out on a joy ride in a car that sped past their check point. He also convicted the human rights violators in the unforgivable Macchal case. That they were left off by an Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) shows the grain of opinion he was up against. That it is popular is evident from another AFT lately letting off Captain Bhoopendra Singh for a similar outrage at Amshipora.

Hooda had to contend with backlash such as a publication in the Army think tank - by a Hindutva purveyor and former head of that think tank - carrying the canard that his actions were politically instigated. Thus, even moral courage that Hooda demonstrated was sought to be dismissed as falling in line to political dictation of the current-day right wing regime – thereby, appropriating the credit for human rights protections due the military for a regime otherwise well known for stealing the military’s thunder for its domestic political purposes. Hooda passes the test worded by Kipling, thus: ‘If you can bear to hear the truth you’ve spoken; Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools.’

In another instance, a general commanding in Kashmir once had no-less than his Chief of Staff complain to the Governor that he had a communal bias, supposedly evident from his insistence on mitigating the human effects of largescale crackdowns, by, for instance, provisioning milk for children caught up in them. In the event, the Governor records in his biography throwing out the calumny. But the incident serves to show that standing tall is harder when stabbed in the back, but to do so - nevertheless - is to take standards up another notch.

At the strategic level, there is the case of case of Sam Bahadur determining the timing of the liberation of East Pakistan. While the story in its popular retelling – not implausibly spiced up by Manekshaw himself – has it that he persuaded Indira Gandhi on the inadvisability of an invasion early in the crisis, a later version – put out by a retired diplomat - has it that Mrs. Gandhi was already so persuaded and only used Manekshaw’s opinion to turn around her cabinet colleagues wanting an early showdown. A recent movie shows the preliminary steps towards the war being taken by the intelligence minders in their engineering a hijack of an Indian plane in order to use the incident to isolate East Pakistan. Recall, that was prior to Pakistan lashing out in racist-tinged panic, thereby falling into the hands of Indian intelligence.  

However, stories of when standards were not upheld at this level are legion, serving to underline the value attached to plainspoken leadership at the higher levels. One such is how the army was pushed into the Golden Temple operation. Incidentally, Gen K Sundarji resurfaces in the very next episode, where again the standards of plain speak were supposedly not upheld when the army set off on its Sri Lanka (mis)adventure.

Unfortunately, the readiness to acknowledge a shortcoming – a plus-point of the military – has in both these cases – just as later in Pulwama and Ladakh - led to the intelligence fraternity being let-off scot-free for its ineptitude in providing early warning - and its cover-up thereafter by riding the broad shoulders of the military. Given the extant intelligence, General Sundarji cannot be wholly faulted in either instance. He could perhaps have insisted on first ascertaining the intelligence picture that had so besotted the political leadership.

The malady continues. Only one official was scapegoated by name in the Kargil Committee Report, a lowly brigadier – who, in the event, rightly mounted a spirited rejoinder. More recently, retired General Naravane lauded intelligence inputs, more or less exonerating them for the surprise at Ladakh.

Dilly-dallying over the war inventory after the 26/11 provocation and, more recently, the non-response in Ladakh (recall a provincial politico back in 2008 going hoarse on the pusillanimity of the Central government) and wanton infliction of Agnipath, are other instances of the Spine falling short.

In the aftermath of 26/11, General Deepak Kapoor is rumoured to have fished out a list of equipment deficiencies to bring home to the political leadership that it would be a political call to send the military to a war in which deficiencies could end up proving consequential to the result. His successor Chief leaked a letter to the government he was at odds with on his Date of Birth, dilating on continuing deficiencies in anticipation of yet another 26/11, providing himself a loophole to use in the event. Neither seem impressed with General Ved Malik’s stoicism, ‘We will fight with what we have.’

Closer in time, there is no public record if the command hierarchy chafed at the bit when Ladakh unfolded. General Rawat’s recently-released biography, which if a hagiography after the fashion these days might not put much light on this. It’s not impossible that they might have remonstrated for a more robust response. Whats certain is that none of them resigned on being disappointed by the political decision. Is it that all were persuaded over the past two decades by the Chinese-built smoke-screen on Comprehensive National Power?

Then there is the mother of all cave-ins, Agnipath. Did Naravane’s standing up against the scheme cost him the Chief of Defence appointment? Even regime-favourite General Rawat was sceptic. If so, did the former Military Adviser’s backing of the scheme fetch him a restart in a higher rank back in uniform? Cynicism arises from the question why the military was chosen as site of this experiment in first place. The scheme appears better suited to the equally-large central police forces. Is it that the political masters knew there would be little push-back, aware the military’s spine had withered under preceding blows from Rafale, Pulwama, Balakot, Operation Swift Retort and Ladakh?

How dire is it?

Evidence on the matter of a Character gone to seed and a rusting of the Spine can only be anecdotal. It’s been similarly noted in the civil services. It has long been so for the police. The intelligence has yet another problem at hand – ideological subversion. Surveys cannot be relied on in India – not after the number of study findings on the significance of Mann ki Baat.

The evidence here is of two officers who I consistently regarded as the best respectively in the two officer batches I was part of (Yes, I made brigadier well before I got to be colonel!) who were felled at the penultimate rank. This shows the elimination of both from tenanting command at the operational and strategic levels owed to a collegium of army commanders feeling that their elevation would threaten the structure and current-day norms from within. Not only was their supersession reflective of fallen standards but to facilitate the fall by those themselves earlier selected against falling standards. Did they pose a threat to the comfort zone of those already inside the departing carriage?

By no means are those selected instead, incompetent. I witnessed at first-hand, one of them leaning out of a balcony at a remote UN headquarters barking out orders to the Uruguayan protection detail as rebels waded in shooting up the town, while his boss from a Western army hid under the table inside. I am however not so sure that the averages have not been driven down by the best not making it.

General Panag informs of the stranglehold the Infantry and Artillery have acquired over those rising to higher ranks. An Engineer General’s elevation as Chief for the very first time does not mean the of Mandalisation has been laid to rest. Panag is clear that a change in uniform for the brass is only cosmetic.

While meritocracy must be the defining feature of higher military leadership, what constitutes merit at that level is consequential. An ability to re-site the Light Machine Gun - which is all Infantry hands get better at - is not quite it. Perhaps, they are also better at throwing a cordon round a Kashmiri village, but that’s not it either. Indeed, that ability perhaps accounts for India’s no-show in a localised conventional war opportunity against China.

The brass needs Brasso

At higher levels, military leadership is not of technical capacity or tactical capability or even operational acumen, though these are required to get to the door. What should open up doors is moral strength. This includes moral virtue; meaning, while abstinence is not essential, a roving eye must disqualify. However, it’s also much beyond virtue and piety. It embodies moral rectitude.

While no doubt the definition is encompassed in the Bhagwat Gita, reciting Kipling here is not a colonial hangover: ‘If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue, Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch.’ ‘Virtue’ appears to be the ‘common touch’. What the military teaches as the officer grows in service cannot but be based on the bedrock of what the mother imparts in the first five years. It’s not a case of nature vs. nurture as much of nature and nurture that make for a military leader.

Though unreliable, sometimes WhatsApp forwards illuminate. Take the one on Arun Khetarpal. It has him marching up course-mates to the authorities for plying juniors with drinks. When Arun couldn’t mend them, through example and exhortation, he took the ultimate recourse – which in the normal perspective is a strict ‘No Go’ area. This ability to know what is right and to do right is moral rectitude.

The major expectation of those tenanting higher ranks is the ability to stand true to strategic rationality and military good sense. Those with over-supple spines are liable to sell the family silver, not only of the military, but the nation. They have an advisory role in the corridors of power. They would be unable to play their part if flexibility is all there is to them – which is how the hind of those sitting on upper branches appears from down below.

The coming test

The system is already designed to co-opt them, to ensure their advisory input does not rock the boat. Such daunting circumstance prevails now, when the prime minister and his national security adviser have an oversized image and the ‘deep state’ – the subverted portion of the security edifice - is let loose to run the show. Through a doctrine of ‘deep selection’ – or ‘ease of doing business with’ - they have given themselves military advisers to echo the regime’s certitudes. The threat is under the circumstance of a deteriorated military ethic, the military brass just might.

If the military leadership takes cue, it can only do so at a price in national security and martial reputation. The threat is accentuated at both the nature and nurture ends, with nature falling to social entropy and nurture to military ossification. This would be insurmountable in the normal course, leave alone in a circumstance of deliberate sabotage of the military for ideological ends. To save itself, it’s not for the military to save the nation. Instead, to save its military, the nation must first save itself.