https://thewire.in/security/india-moves-from-retaliation-to-restraint-in-its-post-operation-sindoor-doctrine

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-india-must-not-hanker

In the immediate aftermath of Op Sindoor, India perhaps for the first time articulated a strategic doctrine, adopting as the ‘new normal,’ swift and sure retaliation to Pakistani terror provocations. Not only have pronouncements been aplenty since, but military activity has also picked up. On the face of it, it would appear that a radical disjuncture has been brought about by Op Sindoor.

Understandably then, a recent commentary , predicting an opportunity for peacemaker Trump to tote up his Nobel chances, cries ‘Wolf!.’ The author thinks that in the next round the Indians, believing that the nuclear card is Pakistan’s way of instigating American peace initiatives, are likely to go for objectives across the Line of Control (LC). To him, this could lead up to ‘uncontrolled escalation.’ How real is the danger?

The doctrinal shift

An imagined strategic continuum has a defensive segment at one end and compellence at the other, with deterrence in-between. The deterrence segment can be further split into two - defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence. Prevailing in war involves compellence.

Over the years, India has moved from the defensive segment, where it was in Nehruvian India, to defensive deterrence under his more combative daughter, Indira Gandhi. But, the hangover from General Sundarji’s days of mechanised warfare simulation is long over. Limited War thinking dawned close on the heels of nuclearisation, with the Kargil War. In its wake, the cold start doctrine was whistled up.

The wellsprings of the doctrinal makeover lay in three sources. At the external level, Pakistan - instrumentalising Kashmir - remained a problem. Tackling it in the nuclear era involved pulling one’s punches. Thus, the doctrine posited several limited-depth offensives from a ‘cold start’ across a wide front.

At the internal level, riding on the back of an economy unleashed by liberalisation, India saw itself as an emerging power. Cultural nationalism, in its shaping of Indian strategic culture, infused an offensive content into the doctrine. During the Manmohan years the offensive content provided cover for the parlays underway with Pakistan. Later, with the advent of the Modi, it was presented as the strategic shift, heralding rupture of his era with the past .

At the within-the-box organisational level, the military exerted to stay relevant in the nuclear era. It trimmed its sails, divining space below the nuclear threshold for use of force. It hoped to thereby deter Pakistani subconventional provocations, without itself provoking at the nuclear level.

India thus shifted from a strategic doctrine of defensive deterrence based on a combination of denial (defensive battle) and punishment (strike corps counter offensives) towards offensive deterrence (proactive offensive).

Over the three terms of this regime, the strategic shift appears to have run its course. Not only has India responded to terror provocations by military action thrice over, but after Op Sindoor, claims to have upped its act. Its newly minted strategic doctrine collapses terror perpetrators with state sponsors and promises reflexive retribution. Evidently the two previous reprisal surgical strikes did not work. It is moot whether this formulation would signify a transit into compellence.

The gingerly conduct of Op Sindoor itself has pointers on strategic restraint continuing: petitioning Pakistan in wake of the terror camp strike; keeping own air out of action for three crucial days; and throwing in a parting punch, after knowing the Americans had already corralled Pakistan. More recently, official reticence was visible in the two days it took to officially recognise the recent Delhi blast as a terror incident.

The next round

While India dallied for two decades over Cold Start-ordained Integrated Battle Group (IBG) activation, Pakistan went ahead with tactical nukes and nuclear doctrinal moves. Almost in acknowledgement, Op Sindoor was altogether kept a stand-off engagement. Further, post Op Sindoor, the move is towards a scaled down version of IBGs, comprising Bhairavs, Rudras and Shaktibaans. It is apparent, while earlier India stepped back from corps level offensives, now it has done so also from sub-divisional-sized IBGs, in favour of mini-IBGs.

Noteworthy is the critique of IBGs that they signify an inability to work with an Order of Battle. Formations and units are available for operational tasking as per the flow of a campaign. What then is the necessity for objective-specific IBGs answering to a chain of command through the threat of a confidential report? What happens to IBGs after first phase objectives? Do sanskritic nouns function as force multipliers? Aware of its limitations, India appears to have settled for bites instead of mouthfuls, nibbles instead of chunks of enemy territory and fighting capacity.

Fortuitously, this is all for the good since the nuclear factor has taken to looming larger. It has acquired formidable portents with President Trump’s ‘favourite field marshal’ taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, one which Trump alleges continues to be polished up.

This year’s biggest military exercise was in wake of Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s mentions of Karachi and Sindh. Anyone would believe that an exercise that featured a Rudra brigade being put through its paces and an amphibious landing must indicate intent to follow through on Singh’s threats. However, the exercise had no mention of any nuclear angle. Instead the usual desultory practice of decontamination drills, carrying a hint of the nuclear backdrop sensitivity, were instead practiced in another - multinational - exercise.

This can imply three things: one, the use of the Rudra brigade suggests India does not intend to trigger any redlines; two, a more ambitious capability demonstrated through the amphibious landing, is to deter Munir from upping the conventional ante; and, three, absence of the nuclear angle suggests a belief that Pakistani symmetric escalation is stayed by a strengthened Indian Triad.

Dangers arise if India finds itself wrong on any of the three counts. One, the escalatory quotient in use of Bhairavs and Rudras depends on the objectives set. If on the LC, the objectives are proxy war and defensive posture relevant, it would not be escalatory. However, those that lend an offensive advantage could lower the other’s redlines. Bhairav’s launched elsewhere across the border can also instigate escalation.

Two, the new Chief of Defence Forces Munir’s propensity to hold out may lead to components intended to signal escalation dominance - such as the amphibious elements - getting sucked into the fight. Also, mission creep, inadvertence and accidents do happen.

Finally, Munir’s bombast of taking ‘half the world down’ with him is plausible not only because of what Pakistan would do with its nuclear weapons, but equally in light of the promise in the Indian nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation.

These are unintended outcomes that India ought to avoid. It must be cautious against venturing past offensive deterrence into compellence. This is not a tall order for a regime that reckons its not an era of war. It must be receptive to third party off-ramps. With peace deals reckoning with underlying causes of war as much as proximate ones, it must know that Kashmir will figure on the negotiation table, especially in case of nuclear clouds.

Consequently, its best that where a teaser will do, don’t hanker after a trailer, and where a trailer is enough, just forget the movie.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/military-leadership-shape-of-the?r=i1fws

Military leadership: Shape of the lineup ahead

The regime is by now well known for its disruptive decisions. Appointments of military leaders is an area where such ‘masterstrokes’ have been successively visible.

The first was supersession by General Rawat of two of his able seniors. While one of these sported a Muslim name, the other was felled by a whisper campaign by men in shadows.

The second time round, it was when Rawat was to be accommodated beyond his sell-by date. A Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) position was created, but only conveniently after retirement of the then chair of Chiefs of Staff Committee, hero of the Balakot operation.

The third time was when Rawat’s untimely demise left a vacancy behind. Since the regime didn’t want Army Chief General Naravane elevated, it procrastinated on rekindling the post. That the regime’s stonewalling on Naravane’s memoirs shows he was too independent-minded for its liking.

Waiting out Naravane, eligibility for CDS was revised beyond belief to include three-star officers, along with retirees from that rank below 62 years. This brought another ethnic kin of Ajit Doval, General Anil Chauhan, then holding an advisory position under him, to the post.

Naravane was replaced by General Pande, an engineer officer, a first for a non-combat arms officer to tenant the top army post. An earlier engineer contender - with a Victoria Cross to boot – had been felled by Indira Gandhi.

In turn, less than a week before his due date for retiring, Pande was given a month’s extension for no apparent reason. His retiring on time could still have seen the next senior, his vice chief, General Dwivedi, step up – which was in any case done a week after the 2024 election results.

What the army chief had to do with the results or the aftermath is uncertain, but appears a consequential factor for the regime. This factor therefore must inform any consideration on baton handovers.

Now, the regime has extended the tenure of the CDS till he gets to 65. There may be two vacancies coming up, if General Dwivedi’s services are not taken further. He retires a month after Chauhan.

This allows for two ‘political appointees’ – in the ‘deep selection’ system adopted by the regime that opaquely ferrets out those with an ‘ease of doing business with.’

Notably, the tenure of the two selected will take the regime up to the next elections, a factor the regime thinks, matters.

While the CDS’ uniform could be of any of the three hues, here I dwell only on the chances of olive green.

Ironically, the onus will be on these officers to preserve what’s salvageable yet of the military’s apolitical character. Now that ‘ideology’ – like-mindedness – is no longer a dirty word, this is a tall order.

The regime has taken cue from Mrs. Gandhi, who placed a fellow Kashmiri Pandit in the chair, setting the stage for the Emergency. In the event, General Raina stayed immaculately neutral. (I look to read what Srinath Raghavan has to say of this.)

A retiree from the vice chief’s chair told me that when he arrived in Delhi, he was advised by insiders to make himself more in evidence to circles that matter by making the right noises (on television?) and meeting the ‘right people.’

A distressing spectacle can be expected with brass-hats jockeying till the announcements of the change-over, mostly left to the last minute. Another regime departure being short-circuiting not only of procedure, but also timelines.

Sadly, the sorry spectacle seems to have commenced in anticipation of the CDS’ turn-over at his three-year mark. In the event, the extension of tenure of the CDS made this a premature start. Shuffling out the CDS at this juncture would have robbed the celebratory aftermath of Op Sindoor of any credibility.

The senior army commander today retires earlier. It appears his gaffe – under circumstance of the times - of alluding to the now historical ‘apolitical and secular army’ is unforgiven. Now, paraphrasing the Chetwode dictum – in his otherwise somewhat innocuous interview – cannot resurrect his chances.

He held that nationalism must be the first religion of a fauji, followed by the religion of the troops served with, and one’s own coming last. Such reification of the nation sounds suspiciously like how the Hindutva mothership, the Sangh, would have it, conveniently collapsing the ‘first’ and ‘second’ religions into one.

This, despite the general noting earlier in the interview, where he discusses Havaldar Abdul Hamid’s martyrdom, that it is a sense of duty (‘dharma’ if you will) that drives fauji endeavour.

The focus thus shifts to the next cohort. Of the two from this batch (full disclosure: my joining-up batchmates from academy), one demonstrated his secular credentials, while the other gifted a ‘horrible’ memento to the visiting defence secretary. Notable is that it is unusual for the august civil servant to be visiting a command headquarters in first place, and that to, to discuss ‘operational preparedness,’ a subject outside his domain.

The second at a conclave gave out prepared answers to what appear to be questionnaire shared prior, taking great care to quote the usual hon’bles; ‘hon’ble’ dating in the military lexicon to the onset of the regime.

Its no wonder that grapevine maintains the second, Lt Gen Dhiraj Seth, is frontrunner. Son of a general and former governor appointed in the ruling party’s turn-of-century incumbency, it would be churlish to envy him his silver spoon; even if ‘nepo-kid’ is now a jibe.

But, realistically, the influence of dining-table conversations cannot be elided. Recall General Seth, as Governor Chhattisgarh, was empowered by the state’s scheduled status to preserve it from the likes of Salwa Judum, that took shape in his time at the rajbhawan, but the rest is history.

Military common-sense has it that all at senior three-star level are deemed competent to take on four-star responsibilities. How do the competitors stack up?

Other than the frontrunner, all others, in keeping with their generation’s lot, have operational experience. I have personally seen one coolly look over the parapet to spot where incoming fire was from so as to direct resources appropriately. Another was a fire-breathing one-star commander on the Line of Control. Another led para-commandos. An army commander picked up a Sarvottam medal for Op Sindoor. Another is a gallantry awardee.

For the frontrunner to lack on this score is curious, when a prescient army chief from the armoured corps, General BC Joshi, had catered for blooding of all officers, throwing open cross-postings of mechanized forces’ officers with infantry units and raising the Rashtriya Rifles.

True, strategic level command requires a different skill set, which presumably all reaching three-star rank are endowed with. General BC Joshi himself was one such with zero operational experience. Also true, a wide-angled vision is usually in short supply with commanders from the Kashmir cauldron. Imagine if BiRa had not pipped Praveen Bakshi at the post!

While expertise on the western front – as the two contenders from the mechanized forces have – will be useful in Op Sindoor phase II, it would be wiser to cater for the more significant, China front. By this yardstick, the dossiers of the two from the next batch gain traction (full disclosure: friends from my passing-out batch).

Such professional yardsticks might escape the regime. It is shortsighted enough to repeat the electoral gimmick of plucking out Rawat from the line up to influence Uttarkhand elections then at hand.

Next year, the one in Uttar Pradesh (UP), slated for the following year, will be nigh. At least three contenders belong here. This has semblance of a policy of ‘stacking’ (the Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan policy’s bias towards the Gangetic plains favours increasing number of officers from this region).

The new vice chief, incidentally from UP, moved without first heading of a field army. While not without precedent, it is a premature exposure to the underbelly of the defence sector, unless it is to be only a penultimate move. Should he make it to four-star, it would be a first time for a non-National Defence Academy product; a factoid of interest to a regime set on setting precedents.

As to whether the contenders stick by their oath to the constitution at the crunch – next elections – depends on whether professional military education at the higher ranks makes recipients appropriately politically alert.

They spend a year at Tees January Marg, keyed into strategic discourses. Yet, the jury is out if political sensitivity imparted translates into prudence or acts as impetus to bandwagon.

While the military apex has the potential to deliver on the military’s professional mandate, erring on the side of caution is advisable on the inevitable political tunic to their job.

Since the regime itself believes the miliary is critical to managing potentially sensitive outcomes of elections, it would likely make its selections in this light, especially so when of late election outcomes are being increasingly questioned.

Note: With thanks to unnamed former colleagues for improvements in the first draft.