https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/khalid-kidwai-doth-protest-too-much?r=i1fws

Khalid Kidwai doth protest too much, methinks

Khalid Kidwai spent the better part of his address (55min) at a recently concluded international non-proliferation conference in Islamabad extolling the virtues of nuclearization for Pakistan. Kidwai chaperoned the Pakistani arsenal in its fledgling years after the Chagai tests, putting in place the mainstay of Pakistan’s deterrence, its Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine. Since operationalizing Pakistan’s nuclear capability has been his life’s work, his indulgence in self-congratulations can be excused.

Whereas in the early days of Pakistan’s doctrine-making, Kidwai had explicitly pegged the nuclear threshold somewhat high, ambiguity surrounds current nuclear thresholds envisaged by FSD. The FSD was itself a doctrinal response to India’s ‘cold start’ doctrine that sought to reclaim space on the spectrum of conflict for limited military operations below the nuclear threshold. FSD rested on the shoulders of a short-range low-yield tactical nuclear weapon, the Nasr. It halted ‘cold start’ in its tracks.

Khalid believes that FSD has even pulled up Modi’s India short. To him, the strategic shift under the Modi regime has come a cropper. Successive Indian rejoinders to terror attacks have indeed been considerably attenuated, be it in September 2016, February 2019 or May 2025; respectively, merely one-night, two-day and four-day affairs.

Despite the certainty of a higher quotient of violence set to attend the next round, Kidwai is spurred into desiring Pakistan go beyond its currently favoured ‘quid pro quo-plus’ response, to a double-plus (“severe and unforgiving”) one. Even if his talk at the conference is discounted as deterrence rhetoric and designed to influence international participants - or as typical Pakistani posturing (though Kidwai is not Punjabi!) - it bears scrutiny. Afterall, Kidwai in retirement continues as adviser to the national command authority (NCA). His word may have a field marshal’s ear.

Querying Kidwai’s narrative

At the bespoke conference, another senior adviser on national security and fellow general to boot, had this to say: “It (South Asia) is a nuclear flashpoint owing to India’s ultra-nationalist tendencies as a result …of Hindutva’s rise and consolidated through the Brahmanist capture of the ballot box. The ideology espouses hegemonic ambitions of an imaginary continuity of Akhand Bharat. (41:30).” Clearly, the fizz in Indian political culture and its impact on strategic culture has spooked its neighbor.

To be sure, the army there has uses for such justifications for its nuclear capability and sabre rattling: to keep its military atop the political structure there, especially when challenged from the street and the periphery. For national cohesion, the army chief when yet a general, had zealously invoked the two-nation theory. Propping up of the Hindutva bogey helps with furthering the army’s institutional interests, but is at an operational risk of misreading Indian conflict strategy.

In his operational reflections, Kidwai drew attention to India’s nuclear submarine on patrol with its complement of mated nuclear missiles. India’s recent operationalizing of its triad – the basis of its ‘no first use’ (NFU) pledge - is counter-intuitively presented as enabling first use options for India. Contrary to the verities of nuclear theology, he – surprisingly for and old nuclear hand - takes boomers as weapon systems “pointing towards India adopting a first strike posture (1:24:59),” by deeming whether these are means for first strike or second strike “irrelevant.” Whereas being eminently survivable, boomers are pursued instead for the invulnerable second strike capability they furnish. An assured ability to strike back after absorbing a first strike is the fundamental of nuclear deterrence thinking, dating back to the cold war.

Kidwai conveniently forgets an implicit threat he once made. He signaled that Pakistan’s ballistic missiles could reach India’s island territories, implying Pakistan could degrade India’s second strike assets in their very pens. Taking cue, if India has since put one out to sea it makes sense. A ballistic missile submarine reportedly figured in naval deployment in 2019. Kidwai must introspect his role is in conjuring up this self-created threat for Pakistan.

In light of FSD’s predisposition for nuclear first use, India cannot but consider rescinding its NFU as an option in favour of preemption. This explains India’s canisterisation even of land-based missiles and tactical nuclear weapons (45min). Such development indicates that India having relevant assets at hand for nuclear first use does not require to dual task boomers. Clearly, Kidwai’s brainchild, the FSD, in putting Pakistan in India’s nuclear crosshairs is proving increasingly counter-productive in securing Pakistan.

While the Indian nuclear doctrine does posit ‘massive’ retaliation, developments since its promulgation suggest a wider menu on the table. Agreeing with Kidwai that since mutual assured destruction is inevitable in massive and equally telling counter-strikes, the doctrinal threat is at best appropriate for deterrence, not nuclear employment.

It’s doctrinaire proponent, K Subrahmanyam, held that combative phraseology was essential to ward-off an uppity opponent (likened by him to ‘irrational’ ‘children,’ presumably with Pakistan in mind), stating: “If the side which… has an image of being a risk-taker, that will have certain negative impact on others. The logical step for the rival side is enhance its image of punishing capability further, so that the risk-taker will not be in any doubt of the pain and suffering in store for him if he were to resort to nuclear weapons first.”

But a doctrine is not quite strategy. FSD can be met nuclear toe-to-toe by India; even if and especially if its fuse is set at ‘zero meters’. FSD can at best deter ‘large scale’ war it was designed for, not the kind of war India is looking to fight. Kidwai’s take that Pakistan is “dealing with irrational actors bordering on lunacy, driven entirely by the radical religious ideology of Hindutva, and hubris and hate mongering of the Indian leadership (1:11:30),” would compel his advice in the NCA to be for an upping of the ante at an untold risk for Pakistan.

Kidwai’s counterpoise for the New Normal

India has forged a New Normal. India holds that Pakistan’s reference to its nuclear card is but ‘nuclear bluff.’ Undeterred, India intends conflating terrorist and military targets into one target list, in a step-up from the opening round of Op Sindoor. Though India’s newly released land warfare doctrine is not in the open domain as yet, it may be informed by its long-held thinking echoed by its new chief on the relevance of territorial gains in the concept of victory.

Pakistan is not only embroiled on its western front, but has also sent troops and assets to secure its new-found ally, the Saudis. So, it is difficult to envisage the Kidwai-promised conventionally-executed double-plus counter. To compensate, it has taken care to place its strategic forces under unified command, that of its chief of defence forces (CDF). The CDF now exercising tight positive control calms earlier worries over delegation. By implication, FSD does not cover the lower reaches of the conventional level of the spectrum of conflict, at which surgical strikes and localised border skirmishes play out.

Pakistan need not necessarily overturn the trend of limitation visible in recent limited military conflicts. Indeed, Pakistan has historically under-played its hand. In 1947, it bogged down on the outskirts of Srinagar. In 1965, it did not push on either at Akhnur or Khem Karan. In 1971, it kept the western front inactive. At Kargil, it dismally pulled out under American watch. It has been unable to capitalize on proxy war. After Uri, it pretended nothing happened. In Op Swift Retort, its strafing of ground targets kept off military objectives. In Op Sindoor, it remained on the hotline, even as its airbases were pummeled.

Pakistan’s generals know they exaggerate Hindutva’s expansionism. India’s way to viksit bharat is through amrit kaal, which cannot be waylaid by wider conflicts or conflict escalation. Through surgical strikes and alleged proxy war, Modi’s India is at best keeping Pakistan on the backfoot in relation to Kashmir and prospectively its relationship with its minority. The surgical strikes are low-cost investments for high domestic political dividend. It cannot afford to chance wider war with its two-front connotations, evident from the first night of Op Sindoor.

FSD made irrelevant

Consequently, FSD - designed to deter major war - really has had nothing to deter. After the example of Russia in Ukraine and the United States against Iraq earlier and Iran now, it is indeed “not an era for war.” With military operations-other-than-war at the interface of subconventional-conventional levels, India has arrived at its own sub-war answer.

Not meant to, the FSD has patently not “reinforced deterrence at all levels.” Forcing the choice of escalation onto Pakistan, India - not unreasonably - expects Pakistan to be self-deterred by the very logic of FSD: “It generates strategic deterrence effects for which it was conceived, i.e. deterrence against all-out war (1:2:53).” What demonisation of the other side, as indulged in by the Pakistani generals quoted, would do to nuclear decision making is worth a pause.

Like the FSD, its progenitor and propagandist, once prisoner-of-war Khalid Kidwai would do well to do as illustrious generals eventually do: fade away.

 

Deterrence Dynamics and Escalation Risks in South Asia

Lessons from the May 2025 Military Conflict

Summary of paper presented online at the Strategic Vision Institute’s Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference in Islamabad on 20 October 2026

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/deterrence-dynamics-and-escalation

A pre-conference video of the same is at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_wXKooDZ4unZqBwF_89RE0oqi5WXHuE9/view?usp=drive_link

The premier lesson from the limited military conflict in May 2025 between India and Pakistan is that limitation was possible since both sides were agreeable on keeping the conflict limited and the conflict witnessed a third party involvement, that of the US, in the background. Even though the third party’s supposed role and its effect was rejected by India, the direct communication channel it prompted between the two sides operation’s branches led to cessation of hostilities.

The takeaway then for any future iteration(s) of limited military conflict between the two sides is that the two aspects must be present for limitation – the two sides tacitly agreeing on limitation and a third party’s non-intrusive facilitation. Both may not be possible in future – with India rejecting a third party role and in either side’s concept of victory either initially kept expansive or expanding under conflict conditions.

Emerging Trend of the Unilateral Use of Force and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

The international order has witnessed outbreak of conflicts that have loosened the grip of international law against use of force. The likelihood of future iterations of limited use of force between the two sides is likely. This has implications for deterrence stability between the two, since – as seen from past iterations of limited military conflict – not only has outbreak occurred thrice over but has been at a higher order of violence. Since India wishes to bolster conventional deterrence of subconventional provocations by Pakistan, and Pakistan wishes to constrain Indian conventional advantages by manipulating perceptions of its nuclear threshold, there is a built-in potential escalatory dynamic.

Deterrence instability can arise at the conventional-nuclear interface if both get more ambitious in seeking more from respective level of deterrence manipulation (India at the conventional and Pakistan at the nuclear) than either ought to under strategic rationality. This can occur if the initial concept of victory is incorrect or is revised upwards as the limited military conflict unfolds.

Limited Conventional War under the Nuclear Overhang and Escalation Risks

The levels of conflict are taken here as: competition-limited military conflict-limited conventional war-conventional war-limited nuclear war-total war. There is scope to keep below ‘war’ with greater intensity, scope and duration of non-contact limited military conflict than witnessed in May ’25. Escalation is when this ‘buffer’ of a wider May ’25-like limited military conflict is expanded with an extension of non-contact warfare to unacceptable levels, such as by targeting civilians and civil infrastructure; prompting the outbreak of contact warfare.

Escalation risk is higher in the drawing down of nuclear overhang even as India asserts conventional advantage. This is heightened when there is revision in the concept of victory to go with the higher level of war; when under the uncertainties that attend war - such as unsettling breakthroughs prompting over-reaction - there is an unforeseen dynamic taking hold; and in the political level playing to the domestic gallery.

However, there are escalation dampeners too such as third parties invigorated to intervening with greater vigour; adherence to the May ’25 lesson on wisdom of limitation; and that escalation is an exercise of ‘choice’ rather than a default outcome.

Limited military conflicts and risk of Conventional-Nuclear Entanglement

The May ‘25 targeting of Nur Khan, Sargodha and Kairana hills was potentially escalatory, in that it was suggestive of nuclear signaling on India’s side – that it is unimpressed by Pakistan’s nuclear card as part of its intent to demonstrate it is not deterred by ‘nuclear blackmail.’ Pakistan, for its part, plausibly denied calling up its NCA. However, the contretemps energized US peace intervention. Pakistan has since separated its rocket forces from its strategic forces.

Counter-intuitively, Pakistan profits from entanglement, with entanglement seen as bolstering deterrence by building in inadvertence. Pakistan’s preemptive dis-entangling effort is good for signaling non-nuclear intent; thereby indicating a readiness to meet India at its professed level of continuing with limited military conflict(s). The projected drawn-down nuclear awning incentivizes against Indian conventional targeting of nuclear complex. Pakistan is thus mindful of uncertainties at nuclear level, indicating it is sensitive to Indian indication that it will ignore nuclear signaling in its ‘new normal’ strategic doctrine.

In any case, in regional setting, threat of conventional-nuclear entanglement is exaggerated, as both states – not having the capability for LOW - can await impact to reveal the nature of the attack; thereby, do not have to be held to Cold War or superpower relevant nuclear theory and jargon. Even so, references to entanglement are in Pakistan’s deterrence brief since projecting nuclear dangers helps secure Pakistan’s nuclear capability from Indian conventional degradation; an effort the Indian side will profess to deny, though in practice take the threat onboard.

Integration of New Technologies and Non-linear Escalation Pathways

Effects of new technology heighten the scope and intensity of a conflict, allowing for both escalatory and non-escalatory possibilities – since as mentioned escalation though an intrinsic tendency of conflict in general is equally a matter of ‘choice’. Consequently, technological upgrade can well function to up-the-ante as much as allow limiting conflict by reassuring a side. In a multi-domain conflict, disadvantage that could have resulted in upping of the ante can be offset by technology-facilitated advantages in another domain; thereby, enabling limitation. For instance, both sides offset their respective setbacks in May ’25 with information operations in the cognitive domain targeting respective national audiences that each prevailed, thereby mitigating impact of their respective setbacks (India on the first night and Pakistan on the last night of their four-day limited military conflict). In brief, tech upgrades in air defence will empower both to stay the distance, while targeting of air defences will be escalatory if a disarming effort; offensive air munitions may prove escalatory in damage inflicted, as was the case with use by both sides in May ’25; cruise missiles and UAS use may lead to escalatory infrastructure busting, such as by Pakistan of dams on Kashmir rivers seen as violative of IWT; and non-kinetic warfare will assume significance if AI-powered cyber attacks target civilian infrastructure.

Non-linear escalation pathways will also kick-in such as grey zone, intelligence operations and proxy war expanding, under uncontrolled conditions with autonomous actors use the opportunity to their own purposes. Overall, the cumulative impact could be an in-conflict redefinition of concept of victory. The dual-faced nature of cognition warfare that can also target domestic space enables national mood manipulation, ruling-in de-escalation by taming street power. Pakistan in particular could manipulate third party intervention propensities with information operations directed without.

Summary

Limited military conflict is likely to continue as a policy choice for both sides, with May ‘25 lessons on limitation well-learnt. Info war targeting respective domestic audience can fill in for any deficits, as was found efficacious by both sides in May ’25. This enablement of use of force will disincentivize strategic engagement for resolving problems as it provides both with a substitute in use of force for negotiated settlement. This suits the vested interests of both sides’ politically dominant lobbies.

However, limited military conflict is liable to escalate in a future iteration(s), with escalatory risks stemming from uncertainties in the dynamics of conflict and from contact warfare. Ambitious aims may derail initial concept of victory and third party efficacy may be limited, given India evincing disinterest. Even so, the critical nuclear-conventional interface will unlikely to be breached since brown sahibs are equally capable of strategic good sense. It can however be threatened if limited conventional war is allowed to proceed to becoming a full-blown conventional war.

Strategic good sense is in not using a risky pathway to get to a mutually sought dividend. If such a military risk is run then only a grand strategic dividend must be an outcome. Such a dividend is belied by continuing of limited military conflicts, but may be possible in case of war itself. Therefore, resolving the resulting paradox – that war alone can deliver grand strategic dividend but cannot be chanced - is the principal challenge for the strategic communities of both sides.

______

https://thewire.in/security/a-free-hand-in-the-nuclear-age-is-political-abdication

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/a-free-hand-in-the-nuclear-age-is

Giving a Free Hand to the military is political abdication

The ‘free hand’ given to the military has been much acclaimed as a major reason for the operational results of Operation (Op) Sindoor. It will likely figure as a replicable lesson in the promised future iterations of Op Sindoor. However, not only must this lesson be reviewed in light of the constraints of the nuclear age, but Op Sindoor could do with a reexamination, warts and all.

Attempting one here leads to an opposite conclusion: that the free hand given in Op Sindoor amounted to political abdication. Consequently, the lesson to the contrary is that more intimate political oversight of the operational aspects in the military sphere befits appropriate civil-military relations in the nuclear age.

Some military theory

The popularly imagined ideal type has political and military circles adjacent to each other but with an overlap in-between. In the space jointly shared, the political supersedes military considerations. Outside the overlap is the essentially military space, on which matters are adjudicated with a professional lens. Yet, for military accountability to political masters the entire military circle is subject to political oversight.

Ideally, the political level sets the agenda and gives the military the necessary autonomy to execute it, with the degree of ‘freedom of action’ depending on the confidence the political leadership has in its chosen military leaders and the political delicacy of the operation. Even so, this is seldom an uncomplicated relationship; an example being the friction between Count Bismarck and General von Moltke.

Today, distinguishing ‘essentially military matters’ – from which the political class must maintain a respectful distance by leaving these to professional minds – is rendered more difficult by the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. Indeed, a principal impact of the nuclear age on military matters has been to restrict the scope of military; lest, in pursuit of autonomy, the military overstep the constraints placed on the use of armed force by the nuclear imperative.

An early nuclear theorist, Bernard Brodie, had it that the military’s role in the nuclear age is but to deter war and not to wage one. From recent revelations on Op Sindoor, it appears that this insight on the nuclear dimension is being given a dangerously short shrift.

A nuclear context to the free hand

In his telling of Op Snow Leopard in his unpublished book, the then army chief recounts that knowing that an affray involving tanks could start a shooting war, he looked back over his shoulders to his political masters for instructions. Told, ‘jo uchit samjho, voh karo,’ he decided to wait-out the Chinese. This revelation was met with the criticism that the delegation of authority on as grave a matter as war with a nuclear-armed neighbor amounted to abdication of political responsibility.

The matter rested in the overlap between the two imaginary circles - political and military – that required the political level to take a considered view with military input. No meaningful discussion followed the criticism, resulting in the ‘free hand’ recurring a few years on as the right and obvious manner of civil-military relations in a military conflict with another nuclear-armed neighbour.

A recent documentary on Op Sindoor informs that the national security adviser (NSA) briefed the prime minister that an attack on terrorist targets within Punjab (“soch se bahar” in the former Chief of Defence Staff General Chauhan’s words) could trigger a nuclear response from the Pakistan army. Yet, the political master signed off on the military operation, evidently sanguine in his hands-off supervision of the military through a trusted hand in the national security establishment, Ajit Doval, and with confidence in his deep-selected military leadership.

In the documentary, military leaders in all three colours of uniform confirm each service was prepared for escalation into a war, which could well spell a nuclear war. That Indian strike forces elsewhere were by then in assembly areas is already well known. The then naval chief once said that the navy was but five minutes from gate-crashing the landward military conflict.

Readiness for escalation helps deter it. Indian preparedness for Op Sindoor turning into a conventional war was to keep Pakistan from upping the ante up the ladder to a war. Pakistan throwing in the towel after a brief recourse to its Op Bunyan al Marsoos shows Indian escalation dominance on the last night.

Of consequence for the future, however, is the revelation that the military continued going after Pakistani targets, for over three hours after receiving their call for calling off the exchanges. Whether this had political imprimatur is not known. In either case, this was an egregious extension to Op Sindoor, befitting closer scrutiny on its necessity and escalatory potential.

The free hand vindicated?

A retired air marshal reveals that he told a white lie (“I lied”) to his air chief. He says he pretended that a strike was already underway when asked after their status by his chief, in order not to disappoint the crews long in the cockpit, ready and waiting, to preempt the possibility of the strike being called off. Later, when he in an informal setting he admitted this to the air chief in front of the defence minister present, it was glossed over.

An air marshal, who went on to head a temple trust, says he had no knowledge of the explosion at Kairana, though the hills fell within his operational responsibility. The now-retired chief of defence staff (CDS) making light of the matter said it was an ordnance-laden drone expending itself. That it did so with a visible bang near where Pakistani nuclear stockpiles are allegedly hidden shows it was not thought through in its entirety prior to launch.

In the documentary, the then director general military operations, Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai, informs that at the time when Pakistani call came in asking for a ceasefire, the response was not made then, attributing the delay – hold your breath! - to a glitch in the hotline! This is the first and only mention of the supposed glitch.

In the interim of three hours, concerned Indian diplomats in the external affairs ministry keeping American crisis manager Marco Rubio on hold inquired after the hold up. Evidently, India utilized the time gained to have a last crack at Pakistan, the go-ahead for which was given by the CDS directly to the air chief, without any thought by either of the two to his lack of jurisdiction.

During Op Sindoor, it must be recorded that a lackadaisical attitude to the rule of law and procedural integrity attended military actions in internal security. The army supported the demolishing of family houses of alleged local militants in Kashmir by using controlled explosions, even though NSA Doval in the documentary confirms that it was known early enough that the perpetrators of the Pahalgam atrocity were Pakistani. The military participated in deporting alleged Rohingyas from Delhi by air lifting them to Nicobar and then deboarding them from a naval ship into the sea off the Myanmar coast. Clearly, a free hand has a drastic underside.

The opposite conclusion

In such a reading of Op Sindoor, the political level opens itself to credible criticism of abdication. It turned a blind eye to the military disregarding ceasefire overtures; going ahead on their own accord (absent evidence of political approval) with strikes that were no longer a military necessity; allowing a ‘glitch’ in the hotline and to hold matters up without considering work arounds (if the glitch story is taken as true); and, allowing for expansive targeting (that may have included the ‘kill’ at the longest range ever) that that could trigger uncertain consequences.

Blinded and with their conventional counter strike capability dwindling, the Pakistanis could have brought into play their cruise and more capable ballistic missiles. That they didn’t do this owes not to their being over-awed, but American crisis-mitigating activity - which India is in denial over. That the next round will now begin at this higher level is almost certain. Therefore, the consequences required taking a grand-strategic call, which there is no hint of.

As for the military, it must introspect on the political call on it to expand the space for conventional punishment of Pakistan. Its over-enthusiastic execution was at such nuclear risk that it has squandered the trust a ‘free hand’ implies. They must know that the free hand given could well have proven an alibi for their political master, if things went south. They surely are aware that the political firmament does not produce the likes of Nehru anymore.

The ideal type of adjacent political and military circles with an overlap no longer holds in a nuclear age. The military circle must hereon be seen as an embedded within the political, for accountability and holistic appreciation of military pathways. There are no essentially-military matters qua operations any more. Persisting with a free hand can only imply political abdication or military usurpation of a political call.

https://m.thewire.in/article/film/ikkis-no-age-to-die

https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/too-young-to-die-1238181

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/ikkis-no-age-to-die?r=i1fws

Ikkis: No age to die

Two very different army officers - a generation apart - performed acts of extreme courage for which each was recognized by a grateful nation with its highest gallantry award, Param Vir Chakra (PVC). A recent movie, Ikkis, recounts the life of one of the two, Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, PVC (Posthumous). The other is Captain Manoj Kumar Pandey, PVC (Posthumous), with a story awaiting a screenplay. Both came up with the same answer to their respective combat predicaments – the ultimate in leadership.

While Manoj cleared enemy sangars off rocky heights of the Khalubar ridge in the Kargil sector; Arun joining battle in the Basantar bridgehead, knocked off enemy tanks wielding the still-functioning main gun of his tank, itself earlier disabled by a direct hit. The fierceness of the battles raging around them is clear from Kargil throwing up four PVC brave-hearts, including Vikram “Dil Mange More” Batra; and the Basantar sector, two - the other being the doughty grenadier, Hoshiar Singh.

The leadership puzzle

The intriguing part is though the two subalterns were superficially quite unlike each other, their courage suggests that deep down they were kindred souls. The dissimilarities in their background and personalities makes it difficult to catch what is the essence of such endeavour, something if captured could help the military inoculate all its junior leaders with.

Manoj, short and wiry, had his highpoint of his cadet days in striding up as team captain to collect the cross-country trophy – perhaps the most prestigious of academy trophies - at the National Defence Academy’s (NDA) famed glider dome. Not from a well-off family, he was likely irrepressibly unshod as a child. So, when the runners lined up for the start gun to go off, he would have his shoes on; but just after the start, he’d kick them off to run the rest of the rugged route - and win - barefoot.

Ikkis shows Arun similarly engaged in his last term. In the movie, he is depicted sounding a trumpet to gather his course-mates around him. He goes on to inspire them for a like collective effort, in his case, to move the squadron up from its long-held ranking at the bottom of the championship table. Over the term, they uncharacteristically top the table. He played a crucial role in the makeover, netting the drill competition – taken as the second most significant trophy since it has mass participation quite like cross-country - with the squadron marching to his word-of-command as squadron cadet captain (SCC).

Very alike in deed, yet the two were somewhat dissimilar in getup. While Manoj was the son of a small shopkeeper, Arun’s father was an army brigadier from the engineer corps. Manoj went to a sainik school, while Arun attended a public school. Arun was quite a swashbuckler – proficient at the saxophone and having a romantic interest at his elbow to boot. In contrast, Manoj was unassuming and - in a course-mate’s words - ‘happy-go-lucky, never hassled and always smiling.’ They were similar in one aspect: Arun was highly duty conscious and Manoj, focused.

Manoj had the advantage of having spent some time with his troops up at the highest battlefield, Siachen, prior to the outbreak of the Kargil War, allowing both – his Gorkhas and he - to get to understand each other deeply. In contrast, Arun, pitchforked into the 1971 War just six months out of the Indian Military Academy (IMA). He had to win the die-hard respect of his tank buddies doubly-quick.

Arun’s story

Ikkis shows Arun grow up the hard way, without the benefit of the combat-arm basic course. Finding the dates coincided with an upcoming war, tear-eyed Arun asked his reputed commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Hanut Singh to be taken off it. Hanut placed Risaldar Sagat Singh Rathore as his instructor to in-house mould him and another just-commissioned officer. Rathore transformed the two into junior leaders befitting the over two-centuries old, “Fakhr-e-Hind” Poona Horse. Sadly, both fell to enemy action in separate engagements.

Ikkis traces Arun’s leadership journey, much of which amounted to learning after a fall. The most significant episode has Arun at attention in front of his squadron commander (squaddie) at NDA. Taking his duties as SCC rather to heart, he was there to report a course-mate for wrong-doing. He fails to take the squaddie’s offer of an off-ramp, when the major hints that complaining of a course-mate amounts to ratting on a colleague, afoul of the academy culture of course-spirit. Apparently, he had earlier warned the wrongdoer, but recurrence led up to this. Even so, the very act of standing up for the ‘harder right’ – as the NDA prayer goes – shows moral courage. The movie goes on to reveal his girl-friend goading him to do the right thing, pushing him to realise that he’d gone overboard, particularly since his friend ends up losing a term. His apology settling the matter shows Arun taking responsibility for his actions.

That he was inspired by a sense of duty is clear when at the IMA, he distances himself from his sweet-heart, reasoning that his taking french-leave to see her on discovery resulted in his being taken off the Sword of Honour shortlist. He argues that he would not like to be distracted from becoming worthy of his forthcoming pips. Towards the end of the film, when the war is drawing to a close, Arun is seen writing a forces’ letter to patch up with her. In the event, the girl in time became an army doctor, sending a cake to Arun’s parents on his birthday every year.

Ikkis does not romanticize Arun. The movie lightly touches on his distaste for boxing, with Arun reporting sick rather than getting into the ring in his weight category. If it was fright, it only humanizes Arun, reminding the viewer that he as a cadet on a learning curve was but a teenager.

In the regimental mess, Arun vows to bring home to the regiment a second PVC, the first having been notched up by its legendary commanding officer, Ardeshir Tarapore, in the 1965 War. Tarapore, commissioned in the Hyderabad Infantry unit (which incidentally was commanded by this writer’s grandfather) had been granted a transfer from infantry to cavalry after his showing physical bravery. On the firing range, he saved his detail from a grenade accident. His moral courage was evident from his taking on the British commanding officer of his next regiment to task for racist remarks. Such was the quality of officership in Poona Horse, which Arun was raring to measure up to. However, he was denied an opportunity of a skirmish almost right through the war, maturely held in reserve by his CO.

His last moments are epic, and there is no better narration of this than that of the Pakistani tank commander opposing him in battle. Though Pakistan surrendered in East Pakistan, the war went on a day longer on the western front. During those last hours, the regiment had firmed-up the bridgehead across Basantar river, but was being furiously contested in successive counter-attacks by the Pakistanis. A Pakistani regiment, 13 Lancers - ironically the pre-Partition ‘sister’ regiment of the Poona Horse - led the charge. Arun’s troop sprang to the fore as reinforcements. They overran the perimeter of the bridgehead in pursuit of the Pakistanis after one bout. Reforming, the Pakistanis returned for another go, with the squadron commander, Major Nissar, in the lead. The final scene has Arun fending off the Pakistanis in defiance of orders and standard procedures to abandon a burning - and disabled - tank. His last round puts the Pakistani commander’s Patton out of action. With Major Nissar surviving the exchange, history gets a live, unbiased witness.

The other part of Ikkis has interspersed scenes from a later time, when Arun’s father, Brigadier Khetarpal, visits Pakistan in a period of relative bonhomie between the two countries, when Track II dialogues seeking rapprochement were on. The brigadier had migrated from across during Partition and wished to visit his village. Major Nissar - who had since retired as a brigadier himself - volunteered to host the visiting Indian. Coincidentally, Khetarpal’s village was near the scene of Arun’s last battle. In a poignant scene, his host Nissar paints the tactical picture of his son’s first and last battle. Khetarpal absorbs the sad narration with sobriety and not a bit of rancor.

The message

The director does well to fire his anti-war message from the shoulders of one of India’s most senior and respected actors, late Dharmendra, who assayed his final celluloid role as Khetarpal just before his recent demise. The times required the dual message on the futility of war and of war between neighbours - if not brothers. On the face of it, a simply-told tale of valour hardly balances jingoistic films, especially one currently demolishing earlier records of audience attendance. Sensibly, that the movie does not attempt to match such movies in publicity, budgets, technical wizardy and noise is itself a resounding refutation of the narrative of eternal enmity sought by propaganda masquerading as film. Fearing the message will strike a chord, the regime’s minders have forced an insertion at the end, helpfully from its perspective, reminding film goers that the neighbor is not to be trusted.

For the military, the leadership puzzle is set to remain. That such human material obtains in every strata of society is altogether a good thing, and must be tapped. The military has traditional means to shape this putty for its moment. Arun would have been 75 today, and Manoj 50. Across time, both appear to caution against a leadership model new Bharat seems to be harking after: a loud-mouthed and rabble-rousing one that takes enemies as having mascara-filled or ‘small’ eyes. Ikkis’s story of a 21 years-old, makes clear that the warrior dharma has no place for hate.