The Modi Era

Impact on Strategic Culture

https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/21/strategic-affairs/modi-era.html

https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/2019_54/21/CL_LIV_21_250519_Ali_Ahmed.pdf

The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But, a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability. 

This column was written before the election results were announced.

The author would like to thank Kajari Kamal for comments that helped improve the article.

It is by now a trite observation that a change in India’s political culture has been wrought over the past three decades, dated variously to Indira Gandhi’s religiosity on display in the Jammu belt in the run-up to assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1980s, or to Lal Krishna Advani setting off on his rath yatra in 1990. The nomination of a terror-accused “sadhvi,” Pragya Singh Thakur, as a parliamentary candidate by the ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is emblematic as a culmination of this trend. The BJP’s impact with a parliamentary majority for the first time in three decades is liable to leave behind an unmistakable ­saffron imprint on India’s body politic (Arun 2019), and if it stays on in power, it would prove an indelible one.

The change in question is a marked shift rightwards beyond the traditionally-conceived conservative segment of the political spectrum under the impact of the political ideology of cultural nationalism—Hindutva—adhered to by the BJP. The Hindutva project is to create and convert a religious majority into a parliamentary majority (Noorani 2019: 27). Both dimensions of the project—the societal and political—are mutually reinforcing and have registered success over the past three decades. Even though a Supreme Court verdict of 1995 elevates it to “a way of life,” in practice, the term Hindutva now symbolises what to the Court it was not: “narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry” (Hindu 2016). Majoritarianism subscribed to by the Sangh Parivar—of which the BJP is the political front (Noorani 2019: 100–08)—is now a feature of political culture. An indicator is the invisiblisation of India’s largest minority, the Muslims (Mustafa 2017). Even the opposition party, the Congress, has been unwilling to chance the Hindu vote by projecting itself as a secular alternative and has instead settled for so-called soft Hindutva, symbolised by the temple-hopping engaged in by its leadership.

Hindutva and Strategic Culture

What has been the effect of the seeding of political culture by Hindutva on India’s strategic culture? The cultural space can be imagined as three layers, namely political culture, strategic culture and organisational culture. Political culture includes “commitment to values like democratic principles and institutions, ideas about morality and the use of force, the rights of individuals and collectives, or predispositions toward the role of a country in global politics” (Lantis 2002: 90). Strategic culture is the ideational milieu setting pervasive strategic preferences based on widely held concepts of roles and the efficacy of use of force in political affairs (Johnston 1995: 46). Political culture provides the top-down context for strategic culture—sometimes referred to as political–military culture—and feeds into creating and sustaining it, alongside a bottom-up influence of organisational culture of the military (Kier 1997).

While multiple cultures can exist in society, control of the political–military authority and apparatus of the state may render a subculture dominant and more influential (Duffied 1999: 778). Being the ruling party helps ease and expand the scope of such influence. A change in political culture has a corresponding influ­ence on strategic culture. This is multiplied if the political culture has an impact on the organisational culture through penetration of cultural artefacts and tropes, opening up an indirect bottom-up route to further make an impact on strategic culture. The political–cultural ferment with majoritarian nationalism as driver has been active over an appreciable duration of three decades. It is reasonable to infer that strategic culture—taken in theory as resilient and slow-to-change (Lantis 2002: 109–10)—has not escaped impact.

Besides, the incidence of majoritarian lines of thinking in strategic literature is such that it can be taken as having made inroads into the military’s organisational culture, thereby enhancing the impact on strategic culture. The rightwing has an insidious presence across intellectual spaces to hollow out institutions; the military cannot be an exception. Its influence on the military’s organisational culture has been largely through the writings by elements in the veteran community perched in right-wing think tanks in the internal publications of the military, echoed in part by unwary serving officers in such publications and on social media (Ahmed 2016). While not elaborated here it can also be asserted that the inflection in strategic and military professional literature of Hindutva trope calls out for an academic study as was done by Christine Fair of the presence of political Islamic thinking in the Pakistani army (Ahmed nd). The election-time controversy over the politicisation of the military is a pointer of worries within the military (Peri 2019).

Strategic culture, in turn, provides the setting and impetus for strategic doctrine, the approach to use of force that ranges across the continuum: defensive, deterrent, offensive, compellent (Posen 1984: 14). Elizabeth Kier (1995: 67), a key participant in the academic debate in the 1990s on the impact of culture on security, elaborated the manner in which organisational culture mediates the influence of political culture on military doctrine. Strategic doctrine can be inferred from strategic behaviour. A hardening of strategic culture has resulted in the strategic doctrine moving from a strategy of restraint to strategic proactivism (Ahmed 2016). Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his electioneering referred to strategic conduct in the surgical strikes of September 2016 that succeeded the Uri terror attack in the same month, the aerial strike at Balakot undertaken in the wake of the Pulwama car bomb incident in February 2019, the resulting stand-off—described by Modi as “qatl ki raat” (night of slaughter), referring to the reported activation of missiles sites (Hindu 2019)—and the anti-satellite test in March. India appears poised to undertake coercion of Pakistan. This locates India in between the offensive and deterrent ­segment. However, offensive–compellent is but a step away.

In a nutshell, political culture with Hindutva as a principal ingredient has had an impact on strategic culture towards strategic self-assertion. Organisational culture has also been separately impacted, through penetration of cultural nationalist thinking, thereby making it receptive to changes in strategic culture. This explains the offensive content in the strategic doctrine—offensive–compellent—reflected in offensive military doctrines. Drawing back entails a dilution of Hindutva agenda as a prerequisite.

Politics of Strategy

Hindutva, as a driver of change in political culture, contends that India has to overcome its millennia-old aversion to the use of force. The image of Hinduism as an accommodative and heterogeneous faith has to be rescinded in favour of a militant, unified religion (Noorani 2019: 101–05). A simple illustration is the recent macho depiction of Lord Hanuman (Bhatia 2018) in images and art.

This approach is reflected in strategic behaviour in a heightened threshold of retaliation to Pakistani provocations firming in. In case Modi is re-elected, he is liable to be hemmed in by a commitment trap of election-time rhetoric. Zero-tolerance, the very first manifesto promise (BJP 2019: 11), requires terrorism to be “paid back in the same coin, with compound interest” (BJP 2019: 3), colourfully put by Modi as “ghar me ghus ke maarenge” (forcible house entry) (Times of India 2019), evoking a dialogue from an eponymous film on the Uri surgical strikes. The use of force is also liable to be higher since the information war over the Balakot–Naushera episode has obscured whe­ther India did indeed get the better of Pakistan.

Even if a different government is formed, the necessity to “mow the grass” occasioned either by periodic provocation or to end Pakistani impunity, is now common sense. India has evidently learnt from its key strategic partner. Retired general D S Hooda (2019: 12), to whom the Congress turned to help gird up its national security image, tendered a report reinforcing the policy on cross-border operations. Modi’s overplaying the card at election time forced the Congress to claim it oversaw six such strikes—though the military operations branch denied having any record of the same (India Today2019).

The response to terror provocations at the interstices of the sub-conventional–conventional level has long been reckoned as viable. A Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI 2010: 48) report back in 2010 had dwelt on surgical strikes. Pakistan’s nuc­lear awning, based on tactical nuclear weapons, is not designed to cover the lower portion of the escalation ladder. India did not respond sternly earlier, since no terror attacks warranted such response, testifying to the success of the post 26/11 strategy of restraint. Shiv­shankar Menon, who was party to the decision as foreign secretary, retrospectively surmises that, “the decision makers concluded that more was to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from attacking it” (Menon 2016: 62). Menon rightly reminds that the world economy was then in the midst of an “unprecedented financial crisis” (Menon: 64).

In contrast, the BJP has been only too keen to derive political mileage out of military action, taking advantage of the diversionary effect to paper over concerns regarding its performance on issues such as farmer distress, employment, etc (Indian Express 2019). Though it took care to set restrictive parameters to the Balakot aerial strike—leaving out civilians and the Pakistani military from potential target lists (PTI 2019)—this laudable precaution in the event mattered little. The Pakistani counterstrike makes for a combustible mix in the future.

It is with reason that D S Hooda (2019: 12) in his version of the national security doctrine calls for being wary of the risk of escalation. Modi was willing to run this risk, ready to chance a missile exchange merely for influencing the release of a downed pilot.

Clearly, the BJP marches to a different tune than a “normal” conservative party. The BJP’s political interest supersedes the national interest since it is charged with state capture. The aim is a majoritarian democracy, shifting the constitutional goalposts from civic nationalism to ethno-religious nationalism (Economic Times 2017). The Pakistan angle helps generate hyper-nationalism and militarism (Ayoob 2019), deflecting Hinduism from its civilisational moorings (Tharoor 2018: 209–10).

Retracting from the Brink

The strategic cultural shift towards an assertive India has long been in the making. The continuity owes to the rule of the Congress as it remained fearful of being outflanked by the BJP for being soft on security. As a result it continued with the strategic trajectory set in the National Democratic Alliance’s first term (1999–2004). An example of like-mindedness in national security perspectives is seen in the omission of Hindutva terrorism by the national security adviser in the first United Progressive Alliance’s period in his post-retirement ref­lections on terrorism (Narayanan 2019). This is indicative of a pervasive bias in strategic culture, attributable to the Hindutva-generated cloud over Indian Muslims. Hence, it is an evidence of the genuflection of strategic culture to political culture.

The Indian strategic cultural discourse echoes the right-wing thesis of Indian effeteness. This impels the military’s approbation of strategic assertion through surgical strikes and is manifested in its doctrinal products valuing proactivism and the offensive. This places India in harm’s way. The Pulwama–Balakot–Naushera episode should sensitise the region to dangers ahead.

An electoral verdict enabling crystallisation of the political culture along Hindutva lines is liable to push strategic culture towards compellence. There is also the bogeyman of Akhand Bharat, an up-­stream element of the Hindutva project. The backstory to a radioactive denouement is the mainstreaming of Hindutva into political culture. If the electoral verdict is against Hindutva, the opportunity must be used by the incoming government to insulate political culture and cauterise strategic culture by bottling up Hindutva.

References

Ahmed, Ali (2016): “India’s Strategic Shift: From Restraint to Proactivism,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 51, No 48, pp 10–12.

— (2017): “The Dark Side of the Army’s Social Media Groups,” Tribune, 2 March, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dark-side-of-army-s-social-media-groups/371308.html.

— (nd): “Comments and Reviews (unpublished),” https://www.dropbox.com/s/s3payxkvnjkd0d8/Ali%20writings%20-comments%20and%20reviews.pdf?dl=0.

Arun, T K (2019): “How India’s Politics Has Changed over the Last Five Years,” Economic Times,15 May, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/69332255.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

Ayoob, Mohammad (2019): “Is the Future of Indian Democracy Secure?,” Hindu, 17 May, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/is-the-future-of-indian-democracy-secure/article27153232.ece?homepage=true.

Bhatia, Sidharth (2018): “Art Appreciation Modi Style,” Wire, 8 May, https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-angry-hanuman-art-sangh-parivar.

BJP (2019): “Sankalp Patra: Lok Sabha 2019,” https://www.bjp.org/en/manifesto2019.

Duffield, John S (1999): “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neo-realism,” International Organisation, Vol 53, No 4, Autumn, pp 765–803.

Economic Times (2017): “Hamid Ansari Pitches for Liberal Nationalism,” 14 February, //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/57151507.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

FICCI (2010): Task Force Report on National Security and Terrorism, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi.

Hindu (2016): “Hindutva at the Hustings,” 27 October, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Hindutva-at-the-hustings/article15801007.ece.

— (2019): “On Home Pitch, Modi Bowls the ‘National Security’ Line,” 21 April, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/on-home-pitch-modi-bowls-the-national-security-line/article26904755.ece.

Hooda, D S (2019): “India’s National Security Strategy,” March, https://manifesto.inc.in/pdf/national_security_strategy_gen_hooda.pdf.

India Today (2019): “In RTI Reply, Centre Says No Records of Surgical Strikes during Upa Regime,” 7 May, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/rti-reply-upa-surgical-strikes-1519181-2019-05-07.

Indian Express (2019): “Mind the Gap,” 30 March, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/editorials/narendra-modi-election-speeches-national-security-balakot-lok-sabha-5649338/.

Johnston, Alastair I (1995): “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol 19, No 4, pp 32–64.

Kier, Elizabeth (1995): “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” International Security, Vol, 19 No 4, Spring.

— (1997): Imagining War: French and Military Doctrine between the Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lantis, Jeffrey S (2002): “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” International Studies Review, Vol 4, No 3, pp 87–113.

Menon, Shivshankar (2016): Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Mustafa, Seema (2017): “The Invisibilization of Muslims,” Citizen, 13 December, https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/12497/The-Invisibilization-Of-Muslims

Narayanan, M K (2019): “The Many and Different Faces of Terror,” Hindu, 3 April, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-many-and-different-faces-of-terror/article26714414.ece.

Noorani, Abdul Ghafoor (2019): RSS: A Menace to the India, New Delhi: LeftWord Books.

Peri, Dinakar (2019): “More Veterans Oppose ‘Politicisation’ of Army,” Hindu, 14 April, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/more-veterans-oppose-politicisation-of-army/article
26836906.ece.

Posen, Barry (1984): The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, Germany between the Wars, London: Cornell University Press.

PTI (2019): “No Pak Soldier or Civilian Died in Balakot: Sushma Swaraj,” Hindu, 19 April, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-pak-soldier-or-civilian-died-in-balakot/article26881304.ece.

Tharoor, Shashi (2018): Why I Am a Hindu, New Delhi: Aleph.

Times of India (2019): “Ghar me Ghus ke Maarenge, PM Modi Warns Terrorist Outfits,” 5 March, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68262587.cms?utm_source=contentof­­i­­­­­nterest&utm_medium=text&utm_cam­pai­gn=cppst.

India: Strategic doctrine-military doctrine linkage
CLAWS
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1915929642_AliAhmed.pdf

Introduction

India has embarked on an ambitious programme on the conventional and nuclear fronts that taken together spell out its strategic doctrine. The strategic problem has been how India ‘causes’ security for itself. While the previous government’s strategic doctrine is often described as a “strategy of restraint”, the current government seems to have based its strategic doctrine on the realist philosophy of offensive realism. Since military doctrines – conventional and nuclear – derive from strategic doctrine, these must be considered in relation to the strategic doctrine. The doctrinal dissonance of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) period that practised restraint while building potential for an offensive shift, stands superseded, with the new government explicitly moving towards offensive realism in its strategic philosophy and towards, in the words of the National Security Adviser (NSA), “defensive offence” in its military doctrines. While the doctrinal dissonance of the UPA period has been resolved, whether strategic clarity makes India any more secure awaits the test of crisis.

The Doctrinal Inter-Linkage

Strategic and Military Strategic doctrine and military doctrine are inter-linked. Strategic doctrine orients the state strategically. According to Kissinger, strategic doctrine translates “power into policy”. To him, “strategic doctrine must define what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them (1969: 4)”. Strategic doctrine orients the state to its security compulsions in the external and internal security environments. Strategic doctrine is itself informed by the state’s comfort levels in its security environment: whether its security policy is based on “defensive structural realism” or “offensive structural realism”. Strategic doctrine is, therefore, not evolved in a vacuum. The security philosophy of the state, or more narrowly, its government, informs strategic doctrine. To illustrate, if there is a change in government, such as took place in India in mid-2014, there will be speculation that the strategic doctrine of the new Hindu nationalist government would be more assertive than that of its predecessor.

States do not always endeavour to increase their power without limits or singlemindedly. Self-imposition of restraint in pursuit of power, ‘defensive structural realism’, is also in evidence in state practice. In this understanding, states seek security. Threats are viewed in relation to relative power, proximity, intentions, and the defence-offence balance. As increments in capabilities can be easily countered, ‘defensive structural realism’ suggests that a state’s attempts to make itself more secure by increasing its power are ultimately futile in the face of the responses these generate among neighbouring states. Therefore, states seek an ‘appropriate’ amount of power.

‘Offensive structural realism’, on the other hand, argues that since states face an uncertain environment, capabilities are of utmost importance and security requires enhancing these to the extent feasible (Mearsheimer 2001: 37). States respond to the external security environment by adopting the appropriate strategic doctrine, placing them along the offence-defence-deterrence continuum (Posen 1984: 40). Heterogeneity along the dimensions of offence-defence-deterrence depends on the political objective of a state’s grand strategy and the geographical, technological, and political constraints and opportunities it faces (Posen 1984: 40). 

This suggests that strategic doctrines could be defensive, offensive, deterrent or compellent, depending on the aims, opportunities and constraints. In Posen’s words (Posen 1984: 14): “Offensive doctrines aim to disarm an adversary – to destroy his armed forces. Defensive doctrines aim to deny an adversary the objective he seeks. Deterrent doctrines aim to punish an aggressor – to raise his costs without reference to reducing ones own.” In the words of Henry Kissinger, strategic doctrine identifies whether “the goals of a state are offensive or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve or to prevent a transformation” (1969: 7).

Accordingly, strategic doctrine “must define what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them” (1969: 4). Thus, a status quoist power usually has a deterrent or defensive strategic doctrine, while an expansionist or revisionist power is likely to have an offensive one. The former seeks to preserve, the latter to change. A state with a security policy informed by defensive structural realism would have its strategic doctrine inclining towards the defensive and deterrence segments of the continuum, whereas a state with a security policy informed by offensive structural realism would favour offensive or compellent strategic doctrines.

Military power, though one among the other power instruments, such as technological, political, cultural, etc., is a consequential component on account of the military instrument being the ‘ultimate’ arbiter. The effectiveness of the military instrument is not only a function of military budgets, leadership, etc., but also of appropriate doctrine. Scott Sagan defines military doctrine as, “Military doctrine refers to the underlying principles and specific guidance provided to military officers who produce the operational plans for the use of military forces” (Sagan 2009: 222). 

Military doctrine deals with “what” military means are to be employed and “how” (Posen 1984: 13). A military doctrine enables execution of grand strategy by aligning the military instrument to strategic doctrine. Formulation and implementation of military strategy is informed by military doctrine. Military strategy is formulated in the context of what eminent military sociologist, Morris Janowitz, termed as its “operational code” or “logic” of professional behaviour (Janowitz 1960: 257), or military doctrine. Military doctrine manifests the dictates of strategic doctrine: offensive or defensive.

India’s Conventional and Nuclear Doctrines: A Limited War Doctrine?

In the nuclear era, limited war is the only kind of ‘war of choice’ that India can possibly embark on. However, the preceding discussion indicates that there has to be political direction to the military on this score. The military can then reflect on doctrine accordingly. This first step not having been taken, the military has proceeded doctrinally without explicitly engaging with the requirement of limited war. While the confidential Raksha Mantri’s Directive exists, that it has left the doctrinal space to the military is self-evident. It is also not known if the doctrine the Services formulate receives political imprimatur since the ministry’s annual reports do not carry a mention of doctrine.

The Indian Army Doctrine (2004) has no discussion of limited war. What the new 2010 edition of the doctrine states in this respect is not known since, unlike its 2004 predecessor document, it is confidential. While air power permits flexibility, not having the limited war concept inform doctrine would result in greater scope for expansive targeting in the tradition of application of air power set by the USled West. The Navy doctrine is also ambiguous. It takes general or total war as “involving nearly all resources of the nation, with few, if any, restrictions on the use of force, short of nuclear strike/retaliation” (Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009: 19). This formulation appears to suggest that total war aiming for “annihilation or total subjugation of the opponent” can yet occur below the nuclear threshold. The overall impression is that the military is undecided to weigh in on the side of limited war unambiguously.

This is surprising given that it needs to clearly communicate an intention to wage limited war in order to raise the nuclear threshold for conventional force application. If it does not reassure the enemy of a limited war, then the enemy may be stampeded into nuclear use. This makes lack of reflection on limited war counter-productive in the light of Pakistan’s lowering of the nuclear threshold in response to India’s conventional doctrinal movement.

Conventional Doctrines 

Militaries conceptualise a ‘spectrum of conflict’, defined as “a continuum defined primarily by the magnitude of the declared objectives”, and plan to be capable of victory across the spectrum. Consequently, escalation dominance or superiority at the highest level of force in use along a particular scale in the spectrum of conflict assumes importance. Capabilities and plans aim for generating asymmetry and, in the case of financial or technological constraints, at a minimum, symmetry. Enemy capabilities become the defining yardstick rather than intentions or, indeed, even the aims of the government in cases of deficiencies in political control.

The Army’s so-called ‘Cold Start’ or officially, “proactive operations”, doctrine that was first mentioned in the open domain in April 2004, permits only a limited time window for crisis management and war avoidance efforts. This reveals that it was not entirely aligned to the national interest as explicated in the “strategy of restraint”, protective of the national economic trajectory. The strategy of restraint prefers a period of crisis management in order to explore if war, and its effects on the economy, can be avoided. The government may be inclined to manipulate the risk of war for prising concessions from Pakistan through coercive diplomacy. T

he problem this poses to the military is that it gains Pakistan the time to mobilise and consolidate its defences, thereby increasing the challenge to any Indian military offensive later. This explains the Army’s preparedness for proactive operations at short notice. Whereas Cohen and Dasgupta (2010: 61) in their book Arming Without Aiming argue that “a strategy of compellence seems so high risk that the political leadership is unlikely to embrace it” and “there is little reason to expect the Indian government to abandon strategic restraint for a more assertive policy”, “the army’s plans continue regardless.”

However, what was true in 2010 may not be so in 2015, with a changed complexion of government subscribing to a more robust strategic doctrine and disavowing from a ‘defensive’ strategic culture. In effect, the earlier ambiguity in strategic doctrine stands dispelled, even if the strategic doctrine remains unarticulated in the public domain. The earlier lack of clarity was under the assumption that the doctrinal domain is the military’s preserve. In the nuclear age, this is no longer tenable. Governmental ownership of the doctrinal sphere is evident as far as the nuclear doctrine goes, and the conventional doctrines cannot any longer be seen in isolation.

The Nuclear Doctrine

India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine is that in case of a nuclear first use by an adversary in any manner against India and its forces anywhere, India will retaliate with a “massive” counter to inflict “unacceptable damage”. When nuclear first use by the enemy is of such an order as to result in unacceptable damage to oneself, then it makes eminent sense to consider retaliation of levels that inflict unacceptable damage right back. But, in case the damage caused by the nuclear first use is not of an unacceptable order, such as in the popular scenario when it is a single warhead of low kilo-tonnage on a tactical level target, then inflicting unacceptable damage in return would be unnecessarily escalatory. The criterion that emerges then is a ‘tit for tat’ nuclear response. It is conceivable, therefore, that in India’s case, a declaratory doctrine is distinct from an operational doctrine and based on a ‘tit for tat’ response, at least in the initial stages and for lower order levels of nuclear first use. Beyond a point, there may be a need to limit damage to oneself by indeed going ‘massive’ to take out the enemy’s ability to continue exchanges.

The Conventional-Nuclear Interface

The deterrence logic currently subscribed to is that the likelihood, if not inevitability, of the spiral of nuclear exchanges on introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict, would see Pakistan worse off at the end of it all. This would ensure that it does not resort to first use in the first place. In the light of Pakistani self-deterrence, India can then proceed to administer conventional punishment for sub-conventional provocation. Since this would be a limited war, not intended to invade or occupy territory, first use thresholds will be steered clear of. This is plausible, but neglectful of nuclear risks and environmental consequences of nuclear use that additionally must inform decision-making in India’s Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority. That the political domain of nuclear decision-making is distinct from the strategic is clear in the separation of the Political Council from the Executive Council. Since the Political Council has to be attuned in to the nature of post conflict peace, it needs to override the Executive Council advice if based on the current declaratory nuclear doctrine.

The earlier emphasis on ‘unacceptable damage’ was due to a buffer existing then at the conventional-nuclear interface. India’s conventional doctrine was a defensive one of counter-offensive in the wake of Pakistan’s taking to the offensive first, in keeping with its (Pakistan’s) military doctrine of offensive defence. This situation has changed in the light of a changed conventional doctrine in India. This means that proactive operations can make Pakistan reach for the nuclear button as its Foreign Secretary officially intimated this September. Consequently, being more offensive at the conventional level, India needs to be more restrained at the nuclear level. Therefore, India’s distancing from its declaratory nuclear doctrine needs to be publicly acknowledged in favour of an operational nuclear doctrine informed by ‘graduated’ or ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliation.

The Future Direction

From the direction of India’s deterrent, it is clear that India is going in for ‘something of everything’. India is going in for a nuclear triad and ballistic missile defence shield. Together, these two could position India to even consider abandoning no first use at will. First strike considerations in the light of surveillance capability and missile accuracy developments will be the pull factors. This possibility will enhance the ‘will he, won’t he?’ apprehension on both sides, building in a tendency to preemption in a ‘bolt from the blue’ attack in both sides. An emergent Indian first strike capability would then only await a preventive or preemptive war rationale. This can be provided by the vicissitudes of future strategic equations, the security situation and the internal political configurations.

Strategic doctrine remains little articulated. It is essentially a civilian responsibility. The new government can remedy this by removing from the apex defence structure the firewall between the civilian and military (Prakash 2015). The ministry does not have either the ‘hardware’ or ‘software’ to think through linkages between the strategic and military doctrines. Further, the ministry is also not the site for nuclear doctrinal thinking. That is the preserve of the National Security Council (NSC) system comprising the National Security Council and its Secretariat (NSCS). There is no equivalent staff in the HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) that can serve as the secretariat for the Chairman Chiefs of Staff (CoSC) guidance of the Strategic Forces Command and input for the NSC. The Strategy Programmes Staff cannot serve both the NSA and COSC.

Cognisant of the potential for disconnect, an organisational innovation has been the creation of the Strategy Programmes (Strategic Programme) Staff within the NSCS. This multi-disciplinary entity perhaps replicates some functions of the Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) of Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA). According to Shyam Saran (2013), then Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), this unit is charged with looking at the reliability and quality of our weapons and delivery systems, collating intelligence on other nuclear weapon states, particularly those in the category of potential adversaries, and working on a perspective plan for India’s nuclear deterrent in accordance with a ten-year cycle. This agenda makes it resemble the Development Control Committee of the Pakistani NCA. Missing is mention of the operational nuclear strategy staff to mirror the SPD. Since this cannot be located in the Strategic Forces Command that is concerned only with execution of nuclear decisions reached, the input to these decisions to both the councils of India’s Nuclear Command Authority requires a nuclear trained staff. Nevertheless, that it has uniformed and civilian components, suggests that there is a linkage, amounting to interpenetration between the nuclear and conventional levels; and on that count, is an advance.

Conclusion

In a speech for the Subbu Forum Society for Policy Studies at the India International Centre in April 2013, Ambassador Shyam Saran, reiterated India’s nuclear doctrine, stating: “…India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary.” His view finds reiteration, such as most recently by Ambassodor Parthasarathy (2015), “Pakistan will be very foolish to test out Indian resolve to respond massively to its use of tactical nuclear weapons.” Parthasarathy recommends taking out Pakistani Punjab. What this will do for India’s abutting provinces is not pursued by him. Such blind spots increase the urgency to revisit the nuclear doctrine since it is cognisant of deterrence, but less so of the potential for deterrence breakdown. Consequently, the government needs to ‘do more’.

The logic of ‘mutual assured destruction’ in the light of vertical proliferation in the subcontinent implies that India needs to ensure a limitation not only in the conventional doctrine – that it is already apparently pursuing – but also in attempting to limit a nuclear war. It has to, in this case, abandon the understanding that nuclear use inevitably triggers a nuclear exchange. It needs to ensure that the nuclear war is brought to a speedy close at the lowest levels of nuclear use by either side. Since this cannot be done unilaterally, it must engage with Pakistan on this score directly and with mutual strategic partners for working out the modalities of facilitative intervention.

References

ARTRAC, Indian Army Doctrine (Shimla: HQ ARTRAC, 2004).

S .Cohen, and S. Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2010).

IHQ of MoD (Navy), Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: IHQ of MoD–Navy, 2007).

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: WW Norton and Co, 1969).

John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton, 2001).

G. Parthasarthy, “Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb”, The Tribune, November 19, 2015.

Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars (London: Cornell University Press, 1984).

A. Prakash, “Politicians Uninterested in National Security”, The Hindu, November 19, 2015.

Scott Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrines” in Scott Sagan, ed, Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 219-63.

Shyam Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?”. Paper presented at the India Habitat Centre, April 23, 2013. http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-IndiasNuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf. Accessed on October 24, 2014.

Jasjit Singh, “Dynamics of Limited War”, Strategic Analysis XXIV (7), 2000, pp. 1205-1220

The strategic doctrine of an Assertive India

Published in Agni July 2015

India is a status quoist power. This is easier to establish in terms of its approach to territory. It appears to have reconciled to the fact that some of its territory is occupied by neighbours, Pakistan and China. While rhetorically it is inclined to see the return of this territory, it has not taken any military or political steps to bring this about. However, it would not like to see any more territory lost to neighbours and on this count has a credible military in place. However, is India politically a status quoist power?

Politically, it is an emerging power. A regional power, it is now also a power of reckoning in Asia. This can be easily seen from the busy diplomatic schedule of the new prime minister in his first year. Its growing economic clout, self-evident from the finding that it has displaced China as the fastest growing economy, is being translated into political power. Its growing economy is also enabling military power, with it being the largest importer of weapons over the past decade and having its defence budget touch $40 billion this year. This makes India’s position as a regional power unassailable, thereby partially sustaining the proposition that it is politically a status quo power.

However, India is also demonstrating assertiveness as a power under the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in Delhi. The strategic refrain of the political forces currently in government when in opposition during the preceding United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime was that India was not measuring up to its weight. It was constantly reactive and on the back foot. Such arguments came to a head in the wake of the 26/11 attacks in which India did not respond militarily. When elected via a majority in the lower house for the first time in two decades, the government has attempted to distance itself from the strategic policies of its predecessor.

The most visible manner it has done so is in the way it cancelled the talks with Pakistan last August and engaged in a prolonged standoff with that country on the Line of Control (LC). Even while engaging China, it is clear from its stance with Japan, the US, Vietnam and Australia that it is hedging its options even if not part of the containment of China. The recent outreach by the prime minister into the Indian Ocean Region, backed by rhetoric of India as a security provider, indicates the direction of the future. Cumulatively, these are suggestive of an Assertive India.

This means that it is not quite a status quoist power politically, but would like to see a change in the status quo with India acknowledged as a pre-eminent power in the region and one with a continental role in Asia. The former implies distancing from Pakistan decisively and the latter implies measuring up to China, if not substantially, at least nominally and perceptually. Therefore, the short answer to the question is that politically India can be counted as a quasi-revisionist power.

It is a truism that the strategic doctrine of a status quoist power is different from that of a revisionist power. The former tend towards the defensive and defensive-deterrent end of the doctrinal continuum, whereas the latter’s strategic doctrine can be situated towards the offensive and offensive-deterrent ends. The continuum can be imagined with defensive at one end and compellence on the other, with defensive-deterrence, offensive deterrence and offensive, as three mid-course stops (See Figure A below).

Figure A: Strategic doctrine in theory

This framework informs this review of India’s strategic doctrine. A discussion of strategic doctrine is a necessary prelude to discussing military doctrine since the former informs and determines the latter. An offensive strategic doctrine finds expression in and is reflected by offensive military doctrines.

The popular image is that India is a status quoist power and its strategic doctrine is one of defensive deterrence. However, there are two very diverse adversaries that India contends with. Therefore, it has a differentiated strategic doctrine: in effect two strategic doctrines. With respect to China, India would readily accept that it moved from a defensive strategic doctrine to a defensive-deterrent one. At the conventional level the mountain strike corps is evidence a credible defensive-deterrent doctrine. At the nuclear level, the long range Agni series and the efforts for a ‘boomer’ underway indicate firming in of such a doctrine. India’s foreign policy confabulations with the US, Japan, Australia and Vietnam are also indicative of this. This is the case for the moment.

However, taken cumulatively, the three – conventional, nuclear and foreign policy – enable a potential turn towards an offensive-deterrent strategic doctrine. An invulnerable second strike capability, a deepened strategic relationship with partner US and maturing of the mountain strike corps in terms of equipment and infrastructure needs met, could by end of the decade position India at a juncture of choice between the defensive-deterrent and offensive-deterrent. It is here that the preceding discussion on India’s positioning as a status quo or revisionist power comes in. A revisionist India, one with a self-image of an Asian power, if not a great power itself, would want an Asian balance of power reflecting this image. This would imply greater involvement in the strategic games afoot in Asia, pitching it at odds with China and in the US camp, even if today the refrain is one of multi-alignment. An offensive-deterrent can be envisaged once all the enabling elements are in place. The current defensive-deterrence is for the interregnum (See Figure B below).

Figure B: Situating India’s strategic doctrine

In respect of Pakistan, the 1965 War fifty years back was the juncture at which India moved decisively away from a defensive strategic doctrine. The subsequent war in 1971 is evidence of an offensive inflection in India’s strategic doctrine before it once again settled back into one of defensive-deterrence. In the eighties and nineties, India’s posture was one of conventional deterrence by denial through its holding formations and punishment in the form of counter offensive by its strike corps. Its nuclear posture was one of NFU and minimum deterrence, implying counter value targeting but only in retaliation. The Kargil War and Operation Parakram resulted in a shifting away from defensive-deterrence. The question is whether this is a shift to offensive-deterrence or to an offensive strategic doctrine.

In the NDA period the shift towards offensive was made, with changes in both the nuclear and conventional doctrines. The nuclear doctrine that preceded the conventional doctrine created space for conventional operations by positing ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation in case of Pakistan going nuclear even in face of conventional pressure by India. The conventional doctrine – dubbed ‘Cold Start’ - was made proactive and offensive. Even if mindful of potential nuclear thresholds, the nuclear deterrent posture was to enable heightening of any such thresholds. Together the two spell an offensive strategic doctrine rather than an offensive-deterrence one. The NDA displaced soon thereafter led to the new offensive strategic doctrine being still born. Hypothetically, the NDA could if reelected could have employed the ‘carrot and stick’ strategy to get Pakistan to heel, by using the two doctrines – military and nuclear – as stick while the Vajpayee opening up to Pakistan was the carrot.

In the event, the UPA decade led to a step back from the offensive strategic doctrine to offensive-deterrence. The strategic doctrine was influenced by neo-liberalism, the wider strategic philosophy of the government. Even though there was no change in the declaratory doctrines, both conventional and nuclear, the government less than enthusiastic in respect of both. There was no political imprimatur to the conventional doctrine and the government was less than forthcoming on equipment demands, as the preparedness profile of the army in wake of 26/11 demonstrated. At the nuclear level, the critique of the ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation formulation was allowed to play out, discrediting the nuclear doctrine. The nuclear status quo did not matter since the government did not have an offensive strategic doctrine involving ‘Cold Start’ conventional offensives in first place. It was not a defensive-deterrent strategic doctrine either in light of the unmistakable offensive content in conventional doctrine and continuity in nuclear doctrine despite its lack of credibility.

Further at the nuclear level was continuing work on missiles and warheads which when viewed against the discredited ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation formulation meant a move away from the ill-thought out formulation. As to whether the move away was back to the safety of the earlier mantra of ‘punitive’ nuclear retaliation or further to not discounting a nuclear warfighting is moot and can only remain unknown for lack of evidence. The latter - a move towards nuclear warfighting involving lower order retaliation for lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan, such as employment of nuclear armed Nasr – cannot be ruled out owing to such a response being non-escalatory and assured.

This indicates an offensive-deterrent strategic doctrine was in play in the UPA period as seen from the two doctrines – conventional and nuclear. This finding is buttressed by the fact that there was no move in the Manmohan Singh years to coerce Pakistan, despite some grievous terror attacks targeting Indian interests such as at Mumbai and Herat. Even the intelligence game, cited frequently by Pakistan as targeting it, was caliberated at a level to sensitise Pakistan to its underbelly with a deterrent intent in respect of its proxy war in Kashmir. It was therefore not an offensive strategic doctrine.

The discussion brings one up to the current Modi era. The question is whether in light of the projection of itself as a decisive government that is strong on defence, the strategic doctrine is one of offensive-deterrence, offensive or one of compellence. What is Assertive India’s current strategic doctrine? What are the potential strategic doctrines for the future?

There is no question that a qualitative change has taken place with the advent of BJP to power with a parliamentary majority for the first time in a quarter century. This along with the government’s year long distancing from its predecessor in terms of optics and its projection of the prime minister as a decisive leader are indicative of a different India from hitherto fore. In its first year it has concentrated on strengthening fences, even more so than on the economy. In fact it would appear that the economic card of ‘Make in India’ has the defence industrial sector as key. Its foreign policy activism, being tough with Pakistan and taking a stand on the border issue with China are evidence of an Assertive India. The National Security Adviser (NSA) has articulated the intelligence possibilities of Balochistan, if only to deter Pakistani interference in Kashmir. The ‘terror boat’ incident off the Gujarat coast at the turn of the year indicates preparedness. It has hinted at organizational changes in the offing, such as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the previous government ignored despite its own committee, the Naresh Chandra Task Force, advice on the matter.

The strategic doctrine of the government has remained unarticulated so far. This is of a piece with India’s strategic culture and precedence. It can only be inferred from statements of higher appointments and actions on ground. The measures that make for an Assertive India are suggestive of a shift in strategic doctrine from the offensive-deterrent to an offensive strategic doctrine. Is this reflected in military doctrines: nuclear and conventional?

In the campaigning season last year, it was suggested that the nuclear doctrine would be up for revision. However, since India, as part of its hedging against China is also courting Japan, nuclear doctrine revision has been shelved. This does not mean that it is not underway, in that while declaratory doctrine could remain unchanged, the operational doctrine could be tweaked. With Prahaar posing as India’s answer to Pakistan’s Nasr, it can be taken that India potentially has lower order retaliatory strikes to Pakistani nuclear first use. Its movements towards operationalising the boomer on both fronts - nuclear power and nuclear armed submarine – enable it to move beyond the ‘massive’ formulation since it will by end decade have invulnerable second strike capability.

On the conventional front, the go-ahead to the Army on the LC can be taken as reinforcing conventional deterrence. While the measure was useful from point of view of deterring proxy war action during election season in Kashmir, it also is a message of offensive action on India’s part in case it is provoked by mega-terror attacks. In the event, that India has not been challenged so far is a positive. Also, feelers from the Pakistani army are largely that it is not averse to Nawaz Sharif taking the India relationship further. The downside is of a commitment trap in which India is forced to match its rhetoric and Mr. Modi is to live up to his image when and if tested by just such a terror attack the strategy is designed to deter. Will India in this case behave differently from the Manmohan Singh government when faced with 26/11?

Based on the foregoing the plausible answer to this question is affirmative. It would appear that India may take coercive action in such a case. This need not necessarily be military led. India’s NSA’s intelligence background enables prioritization of other instruments of response. The suggestions in Pakistan of an Indian hand behind Pakistani discomfiture from terror attacks indicate that this lesser known option is a live one. During the Manmohan years a constant refrain from former intelligence officials was underdevelopment of this option. The usual reason cited was that this was taken off the table by Inder Gujral who had excised the capability. That Mr. Manmohan Singh had ineptly allowed Balochistan to figure in his Sharm es Shaikh declaration with Zardari had made his reaching out to Pakistan after 26/11   a dead initiative. It had been pilloried in intelligence circles. Therefore, now that the national security elite and environment is more receptive and Pakistan revealed as more vulnerable after the Peshawar terror attack, it can be expected that the intelligence option figures prominently. Plausible deniability that Pakistani hid behind in the heyday of its proxy war is a card that can now be turned against it. Diplomatically, Mr. Modi’s shuffle of bureaucratic hand in the foreign ministry alongside enables a diplomatic offensive. Obama’s Republic Day visit on invitation to India and Mr. Modi’s impending China visit can help with isolating Pakistan.

This implies that the military option is not necessarily the default option. The Cold Start doctrine is now into its second decade and can be expected to be considerably practiced. The equipment shortfalls are being remedied by the government with one of its first major decisions last August clearing Rs 17000 crores of acquisitions. Since this will take time to materialize, India’s military option can be expected to take a back seat so as to avoid a repeat of the post 26/11 scenario in which its army chief reportedly pointed to equipment shortfalls on being asked after a military response. A military option is particularly risky in terms of outcomes. Inability to prevail could lead to escalation impetus from within the Indian side. This would imperil over the long term the developmentalist plank of the government. It would also expose it to embarrassment if it exposes lack of strategic finesse. The military reforms such as levels of jointness necessary for such operations have not been undertaken yet. There are no indicators in open domain as to whether the government has ironed out the issues roundly critiqued in both the conventional and nuclear doctrines. It is hardly likely to chance the military instrument with unrevised doctrines it has not had time to familiarize itself with. It would also be more difficult to sustain diplomatically. The China factor cannot be discounted. Therefore, the military option can better serve to deter rather than be deployed if it comes to the crunch.

What is the potential strategic doctrine of the new regime? Once all the military cards are on the table in terms of doctrinal revision, organizational reform and equipment acquisitions, possible by end decade and in the prospective second term of the current NDA government, it is possible for India’s strategic doctrine to move up a notch. On the Pakistan front, this could be from the offensive strategic doctrine today to a coercive and compellent strategic doctrine. For China, an explicit offensive-deterrent can be envisaged with acquisitions in the offing in terms of mobility and firepower for the Mountain Strike Corps. The direction of India’s US relationship, including its military-technology prong with US displacing Russia as India’s largest arms exporter, is such as to make primarily for a force projection capability. This is in keeping with US’ expectations of India in the relationship, currently couched in the security provider framework. This will be the culmination of Assertive India and signal its ‘arrival’ as a Great Power.

To sum up, this article has made the case of a shift up the strategic doctrinal continuum by India. In the UPA period, India placed at the interstices of defensive-deterrent and offensive-deterrent juncture of the spectrum. In the second NDA period, an Assertive India has been posited. The implication of this is a movement in strategic doctrine up one notch to an offensive strategic doctrine in respect of Pakistan and offensive-deterrent in respect of China. The multiple defence related measures in place by the new government suggest a potential movement towards a compellent doctrine in respect of Pakistan and an explicit offensive-deterrence in relation to China.
Previous governments have not been inclined to articulation of strategic doctrine. This owed to India’s unstated strategic doctrine being slightly more reliant on force than India’s strategic professions would have it. India’s present government has no such inhibitions. Therefore, its stepping up to acknowledge the strategic doctrine attributed here to it is possible to envisage. This should be encouraged by calls for a national security policy white paper or open domain periodic strategic reviews. This will serve deterrence, besides conditioning the government to the underside of the offensive-compellent direction it appears headed.  

  

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/07/29/india-pakistan-please-use-the-impending-opportunity-well/

India-Pakistan: Please use the impending 

opportunity well

July 29, 2015 

India’s actions on the Line of Control last year and its operations in pursuit 
of Naga militants who had ambushed its convoy inflicting heavy casualties 
on its troops this May together are being taken as indicators of India’s new strategic 
doctrine. Public statements by its leaders, in particular the defense minister’s on the
 use of proxy groups to fight terrorists, are another indicator.

Taken together the actions and the rhetoric can indicate India’s new strategic doctrine.
 Since India has not explicitly owned up to this yet, it has been variously termed as
‘disproportionate response’ in the media and as defensive offence’ by its National
 Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval.

Doval used the term in a lecture immediately prior to the elections early last year
 that has belatedly has become famous for his statement: ‘You can do one Mumbai,
you will lose Baluchistan.’ The lecture itself is important in reading as India’s current
strategic doctrine.

This is a step forward from earlier regimes that were coy of setting out where they
stood on defense and security. The resulting situation was such that analysts could
 be best visualized as ‘blind men of Hindoostan’ clustered around an elephant and
using whatever came within their grasp as the strategic doctrine of the state.

Since India has not published a white paper or strategic review paper, the
situation is not materially different but the advance this time round is that the
government owns up to being tough for both political and strategic reasons.

The political reasons for this are easy to see. Prime Minister Modi in an election
speech had referred to his 56-inch chest. A tough image is therefore one that he has
self-selected to. The ruling party subscribes to cultural nationalism. This ideology has
 it that India has neglected her defenses, leading to its subjugation not only by
colonialists but also by Muslims in the medieval ages. India has grown back its muscles
 which can now be unapologetically displayed to keep Pakistan on the backfoot.

Political utility apart, there are also strategic reasons for owning up to a more proactive
 and offensive strategic doctrine. It serves a deterrent purpose. The government having
prioritized is unwilling to see it thwarted by a mega terror attack originating in Pakistan. It therefore prefers to serve notice to Pakistan on the consequences.

It also has foreign policy benefit in that it enables it to then engage Pakistan from a
 position of strength. The preceding months of exchanges of firing on the Line of
Control serve to condition Pakistan that it is no longer business-as-usual.

Alongside, if a recent Pakistani corps commanders’ conference outcome is to be
believed, Indian intelligence has been fostering trouble in both provinces bordering
Afghanistan. A media report in the UK has revealed that the MQM party in Karachi,
currently commanding the attention of a disciplining sweep in Karachi, has reportedly
 received funding from Indian sources.

In so far as these lines of strategy are to sensitize Pakistan to its soft underbelly with
 the purpose of deterrence, they appear justifiable. Having pegged Pakistan down to
 an extent, India can then afford a measured reaching out.

Its new foreign secretary has put in place the possibilities for this with his early visit
to Pakistan on being handpicked for the assignment. The policy appears to be on
course, with Mr. Modi contemplating going to Pakistan on the invite of Mr. Sharif
for the next SAARC meet. More can be expected on this in case the two meet on the sidelines of the United Nations summit in September.

The problem is in between the cup and the lip. The recent terror attack in a border
 town in Indian Punjab which left ten dead is indicative. The attack is taken as having
 Pakistani imprimatur by many in India.

If so, then its choice of target in a relatively remote location suggests strategic
messaging: that Pakistan has assets it could use more dangerously in case India
were to twist the knife Pakistan alleges India holds at its underbelly. From this point
of view, the two intelligence establishments that have no illusions of each other can now desist from a worse joust.

This would however take political control. It is clear that in Pakistan the control is with the military. The Pakistani military would likely take its cue from India.

India is aware that as an interlocutor, Mr. Sharif, continues to have the same limitations
 he had when the previous National Democratic Alliance government in Delhi had attempted
 a reaching out through the Lahore process in 1999. Therefore, India has acceded to a
meeting between the National Security Advisers and the two military operations’ heads.

A frank exchange between the two sides at this meeting—the schedule of which is not
been reached yet—can prove useful in determining political will on both sides to exercise control over their respective proxies. It can then open up possibilities at the following meeting
between the principals.

The two sides bear reminding of the Indian NSA’s speech referred to earlier. He seemed
to think that Pakistan could be deterred, saying, ‘Once they know that India has shifted
its gear from a defensive mode to defensive offence they will find that it is unaffordable
 for them.’ He went on to say that since the two sides know each others ‘tricks’, they would be able to settle.

The danger is in what he went on to say. To him, since this intelligence agency-led
tussle would not involve military engagement; there would be no nuclear threshold to
 reckon with. Since the speech was prior to his being briefed on the nuclear equations
in his new capacity as head of India’s Executive Council of the Nuclear Command
 Authority, he is now presumably has a better nuclear picture.

Hopefully, he finds his statement as a naïve underestimation of nuclear dangers.
Only in such a case will he use the opportunity of the meeting with his Pakistani
counterpart usefully, as an opportunity for both to get off the escalator or slide.

Else, whichever the metaphor chosen, the net result could well be the same.

The Diplomat - Balancing India's Right

Balancing India's Right

http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/balancing-indias-right/

In the immediate wake of U.S. President Barack Obama’s departure from India following his visit as chief guest at its Republic Day, India got itself a new foreign secretary, retiring the previous one prematurely. The new foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, was instrumental not only in arranging Obama’s visit, but also Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s successful trip to Washington last year, a visit that included the famous rock-star reception given to Modi by the Indian expatriate community at Madison Square Garden.

However, Jaishankar’s move has less to do with his ability to arrange diplomatic jamborees than it does with his well regarded experience and strategic skills, which stretch back to his days minding India’s political initiatives surrounding its peacekeeping presence in Sri Lanka.

What this appointment does is to redress the balance in India’s apex strategic establishment, which had become dangerously skewed towards an ideologically inspired strategic doctrine. India’s right-wing government began well, springing a surprise in reaching out to Pakistan and inviting its prime minister – and other South Asian leaders – over for Modi’s swearing-in. However, under National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, known for his tactical capabilities in the intelligence field and for his rightist ideological slant in his previous role as head of a think tank, India started to become decidedly hawkish, suggestive of an ideologically driven strategic doctrine.

Indian grand strategy aims at creating the strategic space and regional stability needed for its economic rise. However, as with foreign policy in general, there are domestic determinants and constraints. In India, this is principally the arrival in power of a right-wing government, one with a clear majority for the first time. The optics from a flurry of high-profile visits by the prime minister abroad and a reverse flow of dignitaries to Delhi fails to blur concerns stemming from India’s tryst with a majoritarian ideology.

The internal effect of this was best summed up in Obama’s town hall speech subtly reminding India of the risk to its religious equilibrium of Hindutva triumphalism, much in evidence since Modi’s convincing victory last year. Understandable apprehensions exist among India’s Muslims, who constitute the nation’s largest minority, according to figures released last month accounting for 14.2 percent of its population, or 172 million people. Modi’s apparent refusal to check his over-zealous followers has led to the middle class worrying that developmentalism, the reason why they cast their lot with Modi, may not be the only item on his agenda.

The socio-cultural agenda of Hindutva, which Modi has never disavowed and which his supporters espouse, appears more significant. Economic gains from developmentalism will serve to legitimize the Modi regime, giving it the time it needs for its pet project. If this is taken as the lodestar of the regime, externally, it is manifest in the rather heavy-handed approach India has adopted to Pakistan since it backed off from a promising beginning by aborting the resumption of talks last August.

Admittedly, strategic sense is not altogether absent. India keeps Pakistan from being too venturesome in Afghanistan, and meets the expectations of a higher regional profile the U.S., its strategic partner, has of it. When it is itself terrorism-infested, Pakistan cannot possibly rekindle the problem in Kashmir. Former U.S. Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel once alluded to the Indian backing of Pakistani insurgents, including possibly Baloch insurgents, who caused a nationwide blackout in Pakistan even as Obama was in Delhi. This hardline approach could conceivably permit a tradeoff in which Indian aims of a moderate Pakistan are met by India turning off the pressure.

However, an ideologically driven strategy would not stop at this. Its aims go beyond taming Pakistan. The ideological roots lie a hundred years ago in the Hindu-Muslim rivalry that led to Partition. Modi admitted as much when in his maiden speech in parliament he included the period Muslims have been on the subcontinent as one of Indian (read Hindu) slavery. Scores are to be settled. In that sense, while the middle classes want the economic rise of India as an end in itself, to India’s right-wing now in the saddle, power is also instrumental. It facilitates a strategy of compellence that, against a nuclear armed state, may not be in India’s best interests. It requires realists who, unlike hyper-nationalists and cultural nationalists, are sensitive to the limits of power, to balance out the right-wing influence on national security policy.

Within the Indian strategic establishment, the Prime Minister’s Office has had primacy at least since the mid sixties. Although the national security adviser has acquired stature over the last decade and a half, in this administration the reported convergence of minds between the prime minister and his adviser, Ajit Doval, has resulted reportedly in a centralization of national security decision making.

This cannot help with checks and balances. Since its formation at the turn of the century and despite credible people at its helm, the National Security Council Secretariat has not yet given any indication that it is an institution to reckon with. Acting as an ideological sieve by running ideas through a reality check may prove beyond it. The last deputy, Nehchal Sandhu, resigned soon after the changing of the guard in Delhi. The sacking of India’s defense research head and home secretary will only serve to further cow the upper ranks. Recall during the Emergency when bureaucrats were asked only to bend, but were inclined to crawl instead. The arrival of a realist such as Jaishankar is therefore welcome.

To rise to the occasion, he will need to turn his statement on learning of his new appointment – “Government’s priorities are my priorities” – on its head. What he must do is mellow the government’s ideologically driven priorities to conform, into a strategically sustainable realism. The parting advice of his predecessor on her departure from office is worth recalling: “It’s not about individuals … it’s about my Ministry as an institution.” Institutional checks and balances must return for the benefit of India’s national security.