http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=6 


http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=85786

Kashmir: Towards peace with dignity

The November end update of statistics from the bean count in Kashmir was intended, as usual, to embellish Operation All Out, ongoing in Kashmir in its second iteration beginning mid-year. The detail has it that some 233 militants have been killed this year, overtaking with a month to go the count of last year.

Since criticism has long had it that martyrdom creates its own attraction for social media savvy youth, the statistics take care to preempt it informing that this November for the first time there were no fresh recruits to militant ranks, contrasting this with the figure for October that had been pegged at 30.

The other positives we are given to understand are that stone throwing episodes are down; interference by bystanders in military operations has declined; and mass attendance at funerals of ‘martyr’s’ has dwindled. Some half of those figuring on the list of 14 ‘most wanted’ have been dispatched, including a few hardcore Pakistanis terrorists in high profile operations.

This is attributed to the synergy between the intelligence grid and operations, with terrorist high handedness – such as kidnaps and killings of policemen, their relatives and alleged informers - reportedly increasing skepticism and intelligence inflow from people. 

In short, the November update caps Operation All Out at the end of the traditional campaigning season in Kashmir. The year end is on an upbeat note in Kashmir. There are 300 odd militants still out there to keep the counter ticking through winter, with intelligence led operations through winter setting the stage for the wrap up of the militancy in summer.

The security establishment then can report ‘all clear’ to the lead national security minder, the National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, who put them to Operation All Out a couple of years back. He can in turn apprise his boss, Prime Minister Modi, as he takes to electioneering hoping to gain a second term tenancy of 7 Lok Kalyan Marg and its garden-track inspired by the five panchtatvas (elements of nature).

Experts have it that Operation All Out now has its aim violence free elections to both the assembly and the parliament in summer. Since people vote in the state government to keep the administration going even as the militancy continues, the elections turnout is unlikely to need any exceptional vigilance. Elections are an excuse to keep the operations going.

Since the summer will be around by then, the campaigning season will kick in. The bean count reflecting success in Operation All Out indicates that the militancy would need a Pakistani injection soon enough.

Pakistan, that has self-servingly held off, this year, may be tempted by the reopening of passes come summer for taking to its old tricks. This year it had been put on notice by Trump over its support to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

On delivering the Taliban for talks with the US it may be off the hook, allowing it to get back to business in Kashmir. With India ignoring Imran Khan’s outstretched hand, reportedly with his army’s backing, Pakistan will have an excuse.

The new governments in Delhi and Srinagar, even if either is reelected, would take time settling in. Worsened security indices, reflected in the statistics, will stay their hand at changing tack. If Modi is reelected, in part on account of his showing in keeping with his 56-inch chest, he may have Doval continue.

For his part, Doval has taken care to kick off electioneering in his Sardar Patel lecture calling on the electorate to keep his boss in saddle for another ten years. So, Doval, having assured himself continuity in office, persistence in the hardline can be expected.

Doval acolyte, General Bipin Rawat, would be happy to oblige in order to earn his tag as counter insurgency specialist, that got him his elevation to his appointment over heads of two of his seniors. He has till next year end, when he retires, for firming in his legacy.

Ideally, such a legacy would be if he is able to bring about an end state in keeping with the army’s counter insurgency doctrine. The doctrine has long had it that kinetic operations can at best create the conditions for political initiative.

This has usually been misinterpreted with elections turning in a provincial government. It is no wonder then operations continue, as does the facilitating cover of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, even as state administrations extend it indefinitely. What needs doing instead are peace talks initiation, as in Nagaland.

The general’s challenge is in bringing this about. He gave voice to his quandary, lamenting recently, “If separatists don’t want to approach the interlocutor, then I don’t know what further can be hoped.”

He was referring to the low-profile representative of the Union government, Dineshwar Sharma. Dineshwar Sharma missed the boat during the mid-year month long ceasefire. Flat-footed Sharma had not taken cue from the Chief’s words during the Ramzan period of suspension of offensive operations, “Talks must happen. The issue is that a lot of locals are joining militancy. We kill them and more would join. Infiltration can be controlled, but this cycle of recruitment of local youth can go on and on. So…let’s give peace a chance and see.”

Sharma continues to be missing in action, outflanked most recently by the initiative last month of the controversial godman Ravi Shankar, who organised the visit of a former Norwegian prime minister, who now heads a typically Scandinavian peace think tank, to the Valley for meetings with Hurriyet stalwarts.

Sharma is probably waiting for Ajit Doval’s cue. Therefore, besides his official pitch in the relevant forum, Bipin Rawat needs working his direct line to Doval arguing for a turn to doctrinal compliance, with initiation of peace talks on the backs of a successful operational showing. Rawat would only be urging the government to toe the doctrinal line.

He could sugar coat his pitch arguing that it would look equally good at election time in case Modi follows through on his promise from the ramparts of Red Fort this year that he would resolve the Kashmir issue by embracing people. With the state elections results hardly enthusing for the ruling party, it appears Modi would need all the innovative ideas he can get. He can claim to be taking advantage of the success of his hardline.

The appropriate juncture is at hand. The winter’s operational respite, that is in terms of operational intensity akin to a period of non-initiation of offensive operations since only intelligence led operations are usually launched, can be taken advantage of. Pakistan can be put on notice that its bona-fides in its peace overtures are under test in the peace initiative succeeding, even as it continues for now under US pressure.

Operation All Out, an operational success, can prove a strategic failure if India yet again foregoes a peace opportunity brokered by its security forces. It must reach out to the remaining Kashmiri militant leadership rather than strike them off one by one from that list. 

A two-track peace initiative can be visualized, one to the Hurriyet and one to Kashmiri militants. Sharma can set the conditions for a dialogue, with operations continuing against Pakistani terrorists and any Kashmiri camp-followers. The timeframe should be to have a process in place by end winter, so that a full-throated summer campaign resumption is precluded.

A third track involving Pakistan can kick in as the internal political track begins to show promise and the outreach to Kashmiri militants matures into a ceasefire of sorts.

With 86 member of security forces dead this year – the highest figure for the decade – both militants and their supporters in the Pakistani establishment can claim to have forced the talks on India through military action, thereby justifying to themselves a turn to the table.

The national and regional parties in their manifestos need to be incentivized to come out with how they respectively conceive of talks going forward. A competition in peace mongering can develop, ensuring the longevity of talks and momentum.

The party or coalition that comes to power in the Center, in consultation with the regional parties or coalition in power in Srinagar, can appoint a political level interlocutor of national eminence to take the process forward.

Radha Kumar’s recent book, Paradise at War, mentioned that an idea for a high-level political initiative was dashed early in the Manmohan Singh years when she had been a conduit with Singh’s predecessor Vajpayee carrying Singh’s offer for Vajpayee to be the lead negotiator. That history could have been different had he been allowed by his party to take up the offer reveals the potential in a purposeful peace process.

One name suggests itself for now, Gopal Gandhi, as patron, with the former adviser to chief minister Amitabh Mattoo for the heavy-lifting. This does not upset the current governor’s rule, that restricts itself to the administrative detail, as would any post-elections state government.  

Needless to add that all this would be wishful without contending with the naysayers, who will be potential spoilers. They are crawling all over in the strategic community, foreign policy establishment, veteran’s community, Hindutva brigades, media lobbies and national security corridors. The national security institutions are also actors with a stake in the troubles, on both sides of the border. A peace strategy will have to view how to neutralize them.

The Kashmiri Pandits must be central. Their return in security and dignity must be the ultimate benchmark. An lobby worth tackling initially will be the hardliners in them, some of whom - in perhaps justifiable vengeance - prefer the troubles.

A beginning is to engage in a theoretical debate on ripeness without a hurting stalemate and practical possibilities, such as opened here. Fleshing out alternative pathways such as this is necessary to energise thinking peace. Strategic thinking needs leavening by peace studies insights to get India and Kashmir out of a cul-de-sac. Peace with dignity is an attainable pathway.

  

,  

     

Doctrine in Civil-Military Relations

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/doctrine-in-civil-military-relations/

16 May , 2015

Supervision of doctrine making is one way by which civilian control is exercised over the military. Military doctrine writing is largely done within the military. However, it is to be in close coordination with the Ministry and national security institutions. This is clear from the fact that, firstly, military doctrines are based on the government’s strategic doctrine; secondly, the civilian part of government has to have a sense of ownership of the doctrine by being part of the process; and, finally, military doctrines must receive ministerial imprimatur to signify that they are outcome of a shared process and responsibility.

As for the first, the fact that India does not have a strategic doctrine in the form of a white paper or an open-domain strategic defence review is well known. While the National Security Advisory Board does undertake defence review, it is not within the pail of government. As seen when it released the Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999, the government indicated that it is merely advisory. As for the second -civilian participation in doctrine making – it is not self-evidently the case in India. And, the last – governmental ownership – can be assumed from the press statements that accompany release of doctrine.

This article reflects on the second aspect: ministry participation in doctrine making.

It is not known as to the extent the Ministry of Defence is part of the process of doctrine formulation in India. Its website carries no mention of doctrine formulation. There is also no reference to conventional doctrines in the Annual Report of the Ministry. This suggests the Ministry is keeping at a distance from the doctrinal sphere, perhaps under the mistaken impression that the doctrine function is solely the military’s preserve.

If this inference is a fair approximation of reality, it is certainly yet another area of deficit in civil-military relations in India. It indicates that the ‘lesson’ of 1962, of civilians keeping out of military matters has possibly been over-learnt. Since there is considerable overlap with the civilian sphere, the doctrinal space is not one that can be left to the military alone. While the overlap is self-evident for subconventional doctrine involving as it does the defence and home ministries, it is equally so for conventional doctrine.

The region now into the second decade of the nuclear age, the nuclear and conventional doctrines are intertwined. Since the nuclear doctrine is a politico-strategic function, with apex level military input and participation, the nuclear doctrine making is understandably a civilian led process. Military conventional doctrines are to be sensitive to the demands of nuclear doctrine on the conventional space. For instance, conventional doctrine cannot envisage operations that are overly escalatory. Since conventional military doctrines have to be cognizant of the civilian led nuclear doctrine, they cannot be without reference to civilian expertise in the national security establishment. Such participation of civilians is at two levels: at the ministry and at the National Security Council institutions.

Military doctrines give out the manner the military wishes to fight future wars. Consequently, in peacetime they are critical to the type of military being formed in terms of strength, equipment, training and elan, and serve to inform military plans. In wartime, they inform military strategy. Since the Ministry has a role to play and an interest in all these aspects, such as for instance in platform acquisitions necessitated by doctrine, it needs to play its part in the doctrinal process. In case the Ministry’s engagement with the process is suboptimal then problems emerge down the line.

An illustration is the indication by the defence minister of a stepping back for financial reasons from the creation of the mountain strike corps. 17 Corps is reportedly to be pruned so as to make its additional manpower and necessary equipment acquisitions affordable. The corps has been under discussion for over half a decade. It is a result of the revision in army doctrine that was reported in the press in end 2009. The army doctrine of 2004 had thereafter been revised and released internally in 2010. The revision of doctrine was however not revealed in the public domain through a press release as is usually the case.

The revised doctrine, unlike its 2004 predecessor, being confidential, press reports on doctrinal change of the period suggest a ‘two front’ doctrine with a similar offensive turn on the China front being envisaged as had been adopted on the Pakistan front under the 2004 doctrine.The ‘two front’ doctrine envisages a counter offensive capability also be created for the China front, akin to the strike corps in the plains. The implications for size and equipment of the army are of such magnitude that a doctrinal shift cannot obviously be taken without governmental imprimature.

The previous UPA government authorized two mountain divisions late last decade and with reluctance gave approval for the mountain strike corps only in mid 2013 after much stalling by the finance ministry. It would appear that the present government’s reservations on the costs are a legacy of the period. It can therefore be concluded that had a ‘whole of government’ approach been part of doctrine formulation at the outset itself, this awkward stepping back on 17 Corps would not have been necessary.

A second illustration of disconnect between the ministry and the military concerns subconventional doctrine. It has recently emerged that in 2013 the army adopted a new edition of the Doctrine on Sub Conventional Operations of 2006. As with the 2010 revision of the conventional doctrine, Indian Army Doctrine 2004, the DSCO 2013 has been kept confidential. It is not known as to the extent the changes are merely cosmetic making the 2013 version merely a new edition or are substantial enough to reckon that it is indeed a revised doctrine. Since it is confidential, it cannot be known as to the levels of participation of the two ministries in internal security – defence and home – in its revision.

The DSCO 2013 was released internally without intimation in the open domain through a press release. Therefore, it cannot be known if the doctrine has ministerial imprimature. Clearly, subconventional operations overlap the civilian sphere almost wholly. Since the DSCO 2006 version was in the open domain and well received for its ‘iron fist in velvet glove’ thesis, that the 2013 version has instead been kept confidential is intriguing. Had the two ministries been hands-on participants in doctrine making then this situation would unlikely have arisen.

This underlines the point of ministries distancing themselves from the doctrine sphere. It can be argued that this owes to ignorance of matters military. This is probably quite right, but cannot on that account be allowed to stand unchallenged. The ministry cannot abdicate the doctrinal space owing to its deficiency. It has to be instead to be held accountable. It has to create the structures necessary to participate actively and exercise oversight effectively. This can be done, for instance, by empowering the affiliated think tanks of the ministry and the forces HQs. Just as the ministry of external affairs has ratcheted up its policy and planning division under the new foreign secretary, the defence ministry could likewise upgrade itself with an in-house think tank of academics, bureaucrats, veterans and practitioners.

Clearly, there is a case for governmental ownership of the doctrinal space even if the military is in the lead.It must begin with an NSCS strategic review followed by a ministry driven doctrine process with the product minimally being acknowledged in the open domain or, maximally, being democratically placed in it

OPENING UP THE DOCTRINAL SPACE

OPENING UP THE DOCTRINAL SPACE

http://www.claws.in/1375/opening-up-the-doctrinal-space-ali-ahmed.html

A recent article on this website[1] carried mention for the very first time in the open domain that the revised versions of the Indian Army Doctrine (Doctrine 2004) (2004) and the army’s Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO 2006) (2006) were issued respectively in the years 2010 and 2013. Whereas the Doctrine 2004 and the DSCO 2006 were released and placed in the open domain, this has not been done with their revised versions. Furthermore, no mention was even made of the fact of issue of revised versions through press releases as is usually the case.[2] This implies that there are three degrees of transparency followed.[3] One is with the military releasing the doctrines publicly and keeping these non-confidential. The second is with the fact of doctrines being released being communicated through press releases, even while the doctrines themselves are kept confidential. And third, is keeping the very fact of existence of certain doctrines confidential as also their contents. It appears that the Doctrine 2004 and DSCO 2006 when initially released were of the first degree. While this was true  of the DSCO 2006, it was only partially so for the Doctrine 2004 in that apparently only Part I was kept non-confidential while Part II was not released in the open domain. It later turned out that Part II found its way into Wikileaks[4] and has since been placed in the open domain also.[5] The Joint DSCO is also of the first type.[6] However, a soft copy of the JDSCO has not been placed on the HQ IDS website, even though it lists the other two doctrines, Doctrine 2004 and DSCO 2006.[7] Even so, while a link is provided, it fails to open. The doctrines of the Air Force (2012) and Navy (2009) are in the public domain. Most doctrines of western armies are in the open domain. Incidentally, the HQ IDS website helpfully provides links to about fifty of these of the US, UK and France, while mentioning only two Indian doctrines. The second degree of transparency attends most joint doctrines such as for Special Forces, Psychological Operations, Air-Maritime and Land-Air operations. This is of a piece in light of a culture of confidentiality attending security affairs in India. Recall that official histories of most wars have not been released as yet even if their soft copies have been made it to the net.[8] A viable explanation is perhaps that the contents of these doctrines being narrowly military, there is little reason for placing them in the open domain. Doing so may also have adverse security implications in the enemy second guessing possible strategies that may derive from these by a close study of them. The third degree is of keeping the very existence of a doctrine under wraps. This sacrifices the function of communication that doctrines enable. The military can through its doctrines convey the manner it intends to fight the next war to the public and to the enemy. The former stands to be reassured that a doctrine exists and the latter is deterred. In this case, that the Doctrine 2010 and DSCO 2013 are not known to the public or to the enemy, these advantages appear missing. Take the case of Doctrine 2010. That there exists a revised version is clear from the article that cites from it. The reference in Para 5.2 on End State in terms of ‘qualitative improvement’ in Doctrine 2010 is at Para 5.1 in the 2004 version. Para 5.4 in Doctrine 2004 does not carry the term ‘facilitators’ and has a different content from that of Doctrine 2010 mentioned by the author. Therefore, it appears that Doctrine 2010 is different at least in some respects from Doctrine 2004. As to whether it is a new edition of Doctrine 2004 or a revised version it is not clear. Also the extent of the revision cannot be known since the very existence of the revision only now stands revealed. That the doctrine was under revision had found mention in the media in 2010 when media reported the formulation of a ‘two front’ doctrine.[9] But the outcome of the deliberations of the closed door seminar in New Delhi mentioned by the media in the form of a revised doctrine was never communicated by the army. Firstly, it is successor to Doctrine 2004 which was precedent setting as an open source document. It is interesting that the Doctrine was itself a successor to Fundamentals, Doctrine, Concepts – Indian Army (ARTRAC 1998). The 1998 document was in the open domain till it was made confidential. General Vijay Oberoi who guided writing of the 1998 document when heading the ARTRAC remained a strong votary of doctrines being in the open domain. Therefore, as the third edition of doctrine, if the 2010 document is not made available in the open domain and, one step further, that  a revised version of the 2004 document has been approved and circulated within the army suggests a step backwards. Seen in light of the information environment in the 21st century this is difficult to understand, leave alone justify. Second and more importantly, Doctrine 2004 attracted considerable attention, if not controversy.[10] It sparked off a veritable cottage industry on doctrinal writing, not only in India but also in Pakistan and the US.[11] So much so that at a point the government and the army chief had  to distance themselves from the so called ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, that the Doctrine 2004 came to be called colloquially.[12] In light of the public attention and analytical critique, it is only legitimate that its successor doctrine, in this case Doctrine 2010, would continue to be of interest. Given the nuclear context in which it is situated, whether the revised version has taken cognizance of the critique is a point of public interest. That the new version is an improved one can readily be granted. But the fact that it has been kept under wraps prompts the question: Why? It may even lead to the wrong answer to the question that the army has not been able to answer the critique adequately and therefore has attempted to avoid a discussion altogether. This would be unfortunate since the army has the intellectual resources to engage in debate and reassure skeptics that it is cognizant of the nuclear-conventional interface.[13]  Next is a look at the DSCO 2013. That this is also a reworked doctrine to an extent can be easily seen by the quote from the foreword by the Chief not being in the DSCO 2006. A changed foreword implies a reworked doctrine, and not merely a second edition. It goes on to cite from ‘principles’ of counter insurgency, which are missing from DSCO 2006. Incidentally, while principles find mention in the Doctrine 2004, they are omitted in the DSCO 2006 and apparently find their way back in DSCO 2013. The excerpt in the article from the principles does not however figure in the principles mentioned in JDSCO 2010: ‘The political authority must lay down well-defined, militarily achievable objectives. These should be framed in consultation with senior military commanders.’ Clearly, the very important issue of principles could do with some more clarity than brought out here. If the DSCO 2013 has done justice to this aspect then it would have been better to have this in the open domain, considering it an improved version of DSCO 2006 that was not without its critics.[14] Keeping the public in the dark on DSCO 2013 is questionable since the DSCO directly and non-trivially impacts the army’s relationship with the civilian domain: the provincial authorities and public. Given that the DSCO 2006 had unveiled the ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’ philosophy,[15] the public cannot be reassured by the surrounding secrecy that this key facet has not been trifled with.    The foregoing discussion suggests that there are advantages in keeping the doctrinal space as open as possible. Where doctrines are narrowly military, there is no call to place these in the open domain. However, where there is a direct bearing on the civilian sphere and are relatively generic, such as the DSCO and Doctrine (owing to the nuclear context), these could be in the open domain. The benefits of this will be in a wider and better informed public discourse and commentary in the strategic community. It will force constructive engagement with the doctrinal space by the government that would be mutually beneficial to the civilian and military side of the security establishment.[16] The concluding recommendation is that the revised doctrines be placed in the public domain perhaps by replacing the non-functional links in the HQ IDS website and on the army website in emulation of its sister services that have  their doctrines on respective websites. - See more at: http://www.claws.in/1375/opening-up-the-doctrinal-space-ali-ahmed.html#sthash.RtatgHRI.dpuf

INTERNAL SECURITY CRISES IN
PUNJAB, KASHMIR AND JAFFNA:
THE POWER OF MODERATION
Ali Ahmed


South Asian Survey 17 : 2 (2010): 283–294
SAGE Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/097152311201700207


The article argues that the militarised nature of India’s initial reaction to an internal security
crisis contributes to deterioration in the situation. The resulting full-blown insurgency, usually
complicated by proxy war, takes several years to wind down due to the political prong of
strategy not keeping pace with the military prong. This is to the detriment of the legitimacy
of the state and exacts a high human price. Learning lessons from India’s initial reaction to
insurgency outbreak therefore helps to highlight the importance of prevention and possibilities
in non-militarised alternatives. The article considers the initial phases of three of India’s major
counter-insurgency engagements—Punjab, Kashmir and in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka—to
arrive at the conclusion that moderation in facing crisis prevents confl ict outbreak.
Keywords: India, counter-insurgency, internal security, Kashmir, Punjab, IPKF, Sri Lanka,
Jaffna, Indian Army, Khalistan, LTTE, national security

The Pro-Talks Argument
http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/the-pro-talks-argument-3066.html

India and Pakistan are talking again. If that is taken as good enough, then the fact that little progress was made in the latest round of talks is not taken amiss.

Those happy with the outcome argue that since Pakistan has not obliged India in rolling back terror infrastructure there is no case for meaningful talks. Pursuing these amounts to talking with a ‘gun to the head’, which no self-respecting nation can countenance. In the Islamabad joint statement, resuming talks required Pakistan to discontinue terror. Since this has not been done, Pakistan is remiss. The linkage of non-state actors to elements within the state indicates Pakistan’s double game.

Secondly, talking reduces the scope of intelligence and military pressure that can be mounted against Pakistan to act against terror. Not only does the deterrence value of possible military action reduce – the carrot being preferred over the stick - but ambivalence to use of force is conveyed, detracting further from deterrence.

Lastly, talking to Pakistan at this stage is giving it greater strategic latitude. It has managed to keep India marginalized in the emerging post London Conference AfPak scenario. India therefore needs to be circumspect in falling in line with Western pressure to ease pressure on Pakistan.

These reasons have led to an unproductive second round of foreign secretary level talks since 26/11. This indicates that the Prime Minister has yet to recover from being forced onto the back foot by the reaction to Sharm el-Sheikh. This was despite the wording in the joint statement being virtually a repeat of the formulation in the April 2005 joint statement during Musharraf’s visit to Delhi, “The two leaders pledged that they would not allow terrorism to impede the peace process.” This was the manner in which the peace process was to be made ‘irreversible’. Lacking the ballast of political consensus, talks are unlikely to prove consequential.

The alternative to productive talks being the hard line, a look at its effectiveness is warranted.

The Sri Lankan example of single mindedness in dealing with terror is gaining traction. The Fonseka arrest episode is but the latest evidence on the effect of the hard line on Sri Lanka’s polity.

Vir Sanghvi in his Sunday column in Hindustan Times mentions Dr Manmohan Singh’s view on covert means, that Sanghvi advocates. He recounts asking Manmohan Singh why India rejected the covert option and his answer summed up the mood in government, “because of the manner in which it would brutalize the Indian State and damage our moral psyche. Indians simply do not do such things.”

The fallout of reliance on military and intelligence instruments is on internal politics. This would expand their political clout which would give them disproportionate power in a polity vulnerable to conservative forces as obtains in India. The conflict with an external ‘other’ in the form of Pakistan, would be exploited by interested forces to bear down on an internal ‘other’, seen to be allied with the external ‘other’ by undefined terror linkages.

Both Pakistan and India have resorted to these instruments and these have not got either state anywhere. This is more obvious in case of Pakistan in the cross hairs of a backlash. Since Indian self-image is that of a defensive state that perpetually reacts, it is more difficult to argue that it has resorted to the hard line at all; leave alone whether this has been useful.

Pokhran II did not prevent Kargil. India has experimented with a ‘live’ Line of Control and with coercive diplomacy through mobilizing its military might. It has resorted to brinkmanship in bringing down a Pakistani military air craft. That intelligence action has been taken in Baluchistan as Pakistan alleges is not implausible; intelligence agencies not being known to advertise their ‘success’. The myth of India’s pacific behaviour is difficult to challenge, but it would be useful to.

Doing so would help view India as Pakistani decision makers - privy to Indian doings - may be viewing it. Their reaction is expectedly along realist lines since they are in uniform. Their actions can be interpreted as their end of a dialogue of violence. Therefore, is it not possible to argue that India’s hard line contributes to the threat it faces?

The observation that Pakistan has not done enough on the terror front is correct. But to expect it to do more is both unstrategic and unrealistic. To help it do more, the obligation that India would engage in talks meaningfully had found mention in the Islamabad joint statement. This obligation was met while Musharraf was in control. However, little progress thereafter is attributed to political disarray in Pakistan. Talks not having made headway, is it any surprise that terror continues?

The two states have constituencies favouring both approaches – dialogue and violence. The two are in political contest in respective polity. The talks constituency is at a disadvantage since pressure and the threat of violence helps justify itself in light of the counter it evokes. Incapable of delivering peace, it needs to be exposed as self-serving.

Counter insurgency learning from Kashmir http://www.claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=736&u_id=77  Article No.:	1735	Date:	20/01/2011
Counter insurgency learning from Kashmir
Ali Ahmed
E-Mail- aliahd66@hotmail.com
The Indian Army has completed two decades of deployment in Kashmir. Its deployment dates to a few columns deployed in Aid to Civil Authority during the Rubaiya Sayeed episode at the turn of the nineties. However, in the period 19-21 January, 1990 the situation took a turn for the worse, resulting in the newly appointed Governor, Mr. Jagmohan, requiring the Army to restore order. The situation deteriorated rapidly, with an expanding insurgency, brought about by 10,000 youth returning, over time, after training in POK. This led eventually to the AFSPA being imposed by mid-1990. The Army having faced up to a major challenge ever since, currently stands within military success in its grasp. It is therefore an appropriate juncture for stock taking. What are the lessons from Kashmir for India’s counter insurgency repertoire? First, to set the stage, is a brief recap of the developments over the past decade. The two narratives – insurgency and counter insurgency – are interwoven. The Afghan conflict winding down, Pakistan diverted the resources into expanding the proxy war from Punjab to J&K. The internal political predicament in Kashmir dating to the mid eighties emboldened them. Beset with increased deployment over the eighties in internal security and strained by its IPKF sojourn in Sri Lanka, the Army prioritised Punjab for tackling insurgency. Yet, 15 Corps by the mid-nineties had decimated the JKLF and had its counter infiltration posture firmed in. In the later part of the nineties, additional raisings of the Rashtriya Rifles enabled the Army to increase its footprint in areas to which terrorism had spread south of the Pir Panjal. AFSPA was extended to these areas in 2001. Heightened action on the Line of Control culminated in Pakistan venturing into Kargil later in the decade. The resulting war disrupted the counter insurgency grid, enabling Pakistan to move the proxy war into higher gear with ‘fidayeen’ attacks. Thickened by additional forces in ‘Operation Parakram’, Northern Army reclaimed dominance by 2003. The turn of the tide can be dated to the Islamabad joint declaration in which Musharraf, suitably chastened by ‘Operation Parakram’ and beset by the GWOT, agreed to wind down terror. The November 2003 ceasefire enabled completion of the fence along the Line of Control, its manning, establishment of a twin tier counter infiltration network and the drastic limiting of infiltration. Political developments in terms of onset of the policy of ‘human touch’ internally and progress on the ‘back channel’ with Pakistan brought about a marked change for the better over the decade. This period enabled the Army to consolidate militarily and reflect on its counter insurgency practices. By mid-decade the Doctrine of Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO), dubbed ‘iron fist in velvet glove’, was available as guide. The two elections that returned coalition governments to power in Srinagar were conducted on Army watch. The current juncture finds the situation so much improved that the government has indicated that it would withdraw 25 per cent of the deployed para-military as a confidence building measure to bolster the search for peace by the three interlocutors appointed for the purpose. What are the ‘lessons learnt’? Firstly, the military and political prongs of strategy were often not in sync. Thus, at several junctures, when the militancy per se was under control, political initiatives could not take advantage in bringing the disturbed situation to a closure. The lesson the Army has repeated voiced is that there is no ‘military solution’. The latest lost opportunity was the honeymoon period of the current government. As a result continuing disturbances in summer over three years make the desired military disengagement an exercise fraught with uncertainty. Secondly, the problem of coping with the heightened insurgency, that in the early stages admittedly had some popular support, required building institutional capacities in face of the problem. This was at considerable strategic cost in terms of winning hearts and minds, since the Rashtriya Rifles concept evolved under fire. It could have been thought through in the framework of military sociology at the very outset, to arrive at its current institutional configuration in terms of affiliation helping primary group cohesion. Likewise, anticipating the next moves in Jammu & Kashmir may require that the retrenchment or redeployment of this force needs thinking through now, since its presence is a self-annihilating requirement. Thirdly, the AFSPA has come in for attention in civil society. The recommendation of various committees has been its repeal. The Army’s position is that it enables deployment, provides legal cover and the powers necessary to cope with higher order insurgency. Since it is likely that the military position will carry the day, the riders in the Supreme Court judgment, such as treating violations of the ‘Do’s and Don’ts’ as punishable under the Army Act can be incorporated into law by insertion of the ‘Do’s and Don’ts’ into the Army Act or as Notes thereto. The Army must also approach considerations on progressive reduction of areas declared ‘disturbed’ under Section 3 positively. Fourthly, the Army must continue to sensitise its command echelon on human rights to levels of internalisation in which they are persuaded by the norms rather than treat the issue with reservations. Since the human rights issue will have increased strategic consequence in future due to growing awareness, the Army must follow the DSCO doctrine in letter and spirit. A measure to this end is to going beyond restricting Law of Armed Conflict pedagogy to the Geneva Conventions to progressive inclusion of Law of Armed Conflict. The customary law and Additional Protocols, though not binding, may figure in curriculum down to Young Officer and Junior Command level. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, is learning regards civil-military relations. The GOM on Internal Security of 2001 was the last effort in this direction. A decade on, this issue needs a revisit, since the government is perhaps contemplating deployment in multiple states in Central India. Inter-linkages of the para-military and MHA with the military and the MoD and the Center and the states need to be worked out in detail, with joint headquarters predefined in case of such deployment. The brutal manner of other armies countering insurgency, including the US, have no lessons for India. Having discovered the Indian way at some cost and long last, lessons should not have to be relearned next time. Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)