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https://m.thewire.in/article/security/india-pakistan-in-a-nuclear-dyad-the-war-that-cannot-achieve-anything

India-Pakistan: Our very own ‘small potatoes’

From the relentless badgering on Operation (Op) Sindoor, it is clear that we are being conditioned for the next round. With a dispute over what the dispute is about in first place, it can only be a matter of time when the cycle of crisis-to-conflict kicks in, yet again. Gauging from preceding military exchanges, while the bad news here is that our own ‘little incursion’ will be on a higher note, the good news is that the military conflict may yet turn out ‘not a big thing.’

The usual crisis-to-conflict cycle has a terror attack of egregious proportions provoking an Indian backlash at the conventional level, to punish and deter. The Indian counter has been deliberately kept limited both in scope and duration. Likewise, Pakistan has also taken care to limit its conventional rebound.

Lately, however, India has gone on to evince indifference to Pakistan’s tacitly-held out nuclear card, by indicating a readiness to climb up the escalatory ladder. Ostensibly, India’s striking of airfields associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ complex was to show Pakistan that it was less-than-deterred. Such risking of escalation was to reinforce its conventional deterrent by exhibiting a nonchalance towards ‘full spectrum deterrence’ posited by Pakistan. It enabled coming good on the rhetoric on ‘Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.’ This stands incorporated into India’s ‘new normal’ doctrine: India will disregard Pakistan’s ‘nuclear blackmail.’

Indian feigning of unconcern in face of risk could do with an alternative explanation than helpfully offered in some detail by the doubly-retired chief of defence staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan.

Querying the General’s narrative

The strange exchange between the then CDS and the air chief provides the clue. It’s another matter that the air chief had no business taking his cue from the CDS, who in the current arrangement only has an advisory role. The former CDS admits that his office was institutionally ill-equipped for such decision-making, revealing that his small staff was expanded by an cell of ‘best set of officers’ (43:33); the ad-hocism of this arrangement is clear from confusion over its nomenclature – research or implementation cell.

Indeed, given the Pakistani outreach amidst calls from friends, a new reality had emerged after the 29 April meeting (7:55) with the prime minister described by the former CDS. At the juncture, Indians were aware of the third-party role of the United States (US). They reckoned on Pakistani restraint under US influence. This allowed India to chance a risky blow targeting select places – Nur Khan, Sargodha and possibly Kairana hills - despite their known association with the Pakistani strategic deterrent.

Consider if the Pakistanis had not committed to the US, would they not have responded to the four spells of strikes from pre-dawn and well into the morning and instead wound up their 48 hour Operation Bunyan al Marsoos in 8 hours (26:00)? The former CDS’ account that awareness of their dwindling ability to strike back decidedly influenced the Pakistanis to throw in the towel (28:50) sounds somewhat self-serving.

Chauhan betrays no indication in his recount of the decision whether their political master and other stakeholders were consulted. The general’s recall of the meeting with Prime Minister Modi on the use of force (8:26), has no mention of the cabinet committee on security, though the committee met the following day and may have endorsed the marching orders given at the meeting on 29 April.

However, those guardrails were regarding the attacks on terrorist camps on the first night. There is no record of the CCS ratifying the expansive follow-on attacks of the fourth day, though makes a passing mention of its meetings (30:10); nor does Chauhan inform of any consultations on the escalatory matrix and the decision-making authority to move up the ladder.

Indeed, Chauhan is quite clear: “(O)bviously over here we didn’t seek political decisions because those decisions were very clear. But if we had to seek political decisions it would have taken time. Whereas in these operations, in these fast pace of operations, which are happening overnight and at various domains over vast distances to understand that itself becomes very challenging (32:00).”

Indian flippancy – immediately after and a year on – is cover for an apt exploiting of the closing window on an opportunity and the seemingly ‘free hand’ given them. The ‘complete freedom of action’ given the military sounds suspiciously like the abdication of responsibility by the regime, reminiscent of General Naravane’s recollection in his unpublished book on the close-run incident on Kailash range against the Chinese. A retired air marshal under whose watch Sargodha was attacked claims no knowledge of the Kairana episode (1:05:50), while ingratiatingly contrasting the ‘operational freedom’ given the services by ‘this dispensation’ with previous ones (1:05:00); a thoughtful share that possibly got monitored favourably enough to land him a post-retirement job.

General Chauhan reveals the dangerous determinism that results when the military is left to itself, saying, “if you want to change (the escalation ladder) in between, this is not possible (33:50).” The air marshal is equally clear that the Sargodha attack did not need governmental decision, but was made in-house (1:04:40). This perhaps explains why the Pakistanis were kept on the phone even as the CDS gave the go-head for the Sargodha strike (34:05); though at another place in the talk he contradicts himself claiming the Sargodha and Nur Khan strikes were already done with when the Pakistani call came in (28:12).

Untested rungs

The manner Op Sindoor played out suggests that it will serve as a template for future military conflicts, since it enables the two sides to ventilate without going overboard. An untried rung exists: continuing non-contact exchanges of greater scope, intensity and duration.

An expanded military conflict could include – additionally - a transgression of borders by (wo)manned air power to complement the firepower of loitering drones and missiles, ballistic from the Indian side and cruise from Pakistan. Even if India was to throw in the repeatedly-promised sea power, with its impact taking time to manifest the effect would only be in a thickening of non-contact operations and a widened area of incidence.

Limitations in magazine size – a logistics lesson learnt the hard way separately by the US and Ukraine - on both sides would keep the two sides to a graduated escalation pathway. A hint that India is mindful of the quagmire Pakistan can pose is in the speculative slotting of an air warrior to head the western integrated theatre command if and when raised, implying it envisages predominantly non-contact operations on this front.

Yet, the conflict could turn into war if it goes on long enough. Russia’s war on Ukraine and that of the US on Iran show how best laid plans get waylaid. The ongoing air defence preparations by both sides could prove resilient enough to reassure each that it can last the distance. Support from respective strategic partners may add fuel: Chinese and Turkish for Pakistan and of Israel for India.

Persisting with the buffer of a stand-off conflict occasions greater risk of sliding into the more dangerous: contact warfare. It’s only when either was to throw in land forces into the conflict milieu that escalatory prospects truly kick-in.

India has recently created the capability – finally and at long last - for this and has a ‘dynamic response strategy’ to go with it. It has the temptation to deploy it to good effect. It may assess that it could exploit Pakistani vulnerability on its western border, and create favourable facts on the ground. Even so, India has taken care to keep these forces agile and, therefore, retractable.

In a ‘raid and revert’ role - in a replay of the post-Uri wide-front raids - tactical use of these is not in itself violative of the status quo on the frontline. If instead operational level dividend is sought in a ‘seize and hold’ mode - as at Siachen or in a ‘reverse Kargil’ or by taking back Pakistan-occupied areas - escalation gets ruled in.

Territorial transgressions are more difficult to explain away than the momentary violation of air space. In such a case, optics may drive Pakistani reaction rather than strategic good sense. Its holding to its quid pro quo-plus promise could prompt over-reaction. The need for the army for a good showing to retain its hold on Pakistani politics and that of its recently-elevated leader to earn his five-star spurs would be part of the impetus to escalate. Impending escalation could be projected to instigate third-party interest, noting that last time it managed to convert initial disinterest into avid involvement.

A third party’s mediatory activity has utility for India too, allowing it to climb off a high horse; especially if Pakistan when bested in the non-contact phase - it ups the ante to a contact war. To begin with, India does not wish to go the whole hog down a military route. Peace probes provide a much-needed off-ramp. Plausible deniability currently attends the re-forged links with the Pakistani establishment, almost in line with the US-revealed understanding arrived at between the two sides. It also knows better now the cost of discounting third party efforts.

The takeaway

The employing of the military for a meaningful political end is strategically fraught. In a nuclear dyad, military means cannot possibly serve any sane political end. The international order having become more accommodative of war itself, military conflicts not amounting to war – at least at their outset - will likely punctuate the regional future into the middle term.

The under-explored rungs of the escalatory ladder and an endurance-testing duration of such conflicts may see these plateau at a mutually affordable level. Consequently, though such a future is unwelcome in itself, it is not as bad as it could otherwise be. That the political direction by the head of a nuclear power is a laconic ‘we need to do something big’ (10:17) to ‘teach Pakistan a big lesson’ (9:04) shows how bad it can really get.

This finding should serve as incentive to timely get the parliamentary system of accountability and checks and balances into place, which in the security sphere is a revitalised cabinet committee on security.

A timely rehearsing of General Sundarji’s principal contribution to strategic thought

https://thewire.in/security/general-sundarjis-ideas-on-nuclear-conflagration-remain-relevant-to-the-india-pakistan-military-situation

 I was one of three Indian Military Academy gentlemen cadets selected to attend the Army Day events as the army chief’s guests in January 1987. At the traditional reception at Army House, General Sundarji personally introduced us to the president and the prime minister. We had a group photo taken, a portion of which has made its way into the selection that graces the new biography of General Sundarji, Probal Dasgupta’s General Brasstacks, with two of us, including me, edited out!

Understandably, the general spending a longer-than-necessary portion of the evening with us left a lasting impression. It is no wonder then that a couple of decades later I wrote an article in tribute of the late general. The atypical conclusion of that article - that finds mention in the book – was that the General would be known to history not so much for aspects of his life well covered in the book - his commendable work on mechanization of the army and his spooking of the Chinese at Sumdorong Chu, or the less praiseworthy stewardship of two subconventional operations (Op) (Op Blue Star and Op Pawan) - but for his thoughts on nuclear use.

The fraught situation

The general’s thinking bears reiteration in the current regional security environment, that has a ‘forever war’, Op Sindoor 2, on ‘pause’. A prominent strategic commentator, General Panag, reckons that if not sooner when prompted by a black-swan terror event, the next round of Op Sindoor is due within five years, by when both sides would be well up-gunned.

Rightly, Panag notes that, “There is no scope for decisive wars among nuclear-weapon-armed states. Conflict must remain below the nuclear threshold….” He had earlier held that, “India, and Pakistan are modern armies that have to wage conflict below the nuclear threshold. Keeping in view the nuclear threshold, there are obvious constraints in the way conflict will manifest.”

Though he expects “a high-end conventional air, missile, and drone campaign with each side trying to do all it did in 2025 with higher tempo, depth, and lethality,” and can also “foresee limited ground operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K),” he nevertheless holds that, “(T)he echoes of a limited war, without major ground operations, can be heard loud and clear.”

However, Panag bases his case on the popularly held juncture of where the two sides left off in round one: “(T)he measure of victory is to create psychological paralysis…up the escalatory ladder, as a result of which the adversary, despite its military potential, cannot respond.” This, he believes, “was achieved in the early hours of 10 May, when the Indian Air Force (IAF) could strike at will…and the adversary’s air force and air defence could not respond or retaliate.”

Two problems with the popular version

One problem with a clipped reading of the conflict is in the significance of a news report not registering adequately. The report had it that the Pakistanis had convened their national command authority (NCA) that controls nuclear use. Overtaken by events the preceding night – the last night of Op Sindoor - the Pakistanis distanced themselves from the report.

That the matter is graver was clearer from one of the Pakistani airfields hit being the Nur Khan airfield. Apparently, it is proximate to the Chaklala cantonment where Pakistan’s nuclear hub, the Strategic Plans Division, is located. There was also considerable disinformation surrounding whether nearby Kairana hills had also been hit, allegedly a nuclear storage site. Such egregious targeting could have trigger nuclear-related misperceptions: that nuclear facilities are under a degrading attack. Consequently, it can reasonably be surmised that a nuclear dimension to the crisis might have materialised.

The second problem is the assumption that the Pakistanis succumbed to military force application. On his part, the raksha mantri takes to hyperbole on this: “Op Sindoor as a short-duration, deep-penetration, high-intensity, and high-impact operation which showcased India’s ability to compel its adversary to surrender.” The prime minister goes a step further, holding that India ‘forced Pakistan to its knees,’ whereupon Pakistan ‘pleaded’ to be let off. Even if theatrics and rhetoric are discounted, analysis that speaks truth to power cannot be wholly blind to such delusions.

From Pakistan catapulting to brokering of a ceasefire in the Iran-US conflict, it is clear Pakistan was playing for higher stakes. Munir forewent the opportunity for getting even, playing to get into Trump’s good books as his ‘favourite field marshal.’ Further, that there have been no images of like damage on the Indian side does not mean there was none. Pakistan, reassured by its performance on the first night, thought it could replicate the same with interest in future iterations.

The nuclear factor

Indian reticence to concede that the Americans had anything to do with the pause would likely make them less enthusiastic next time. Absent a line of communication between two parties increases the premium on third party intervention; which will be less than forthcoming. Therefore, Pakistan will likely holdout longer. Its principal takeaway from the Iran War II can only be that a weaker side must sustain in a fight. The field marshal is already attempting build resilience by reiterating his belief that a ‘battle of ideologies’ is on.

Pakistan has taken care to centralise military authority and authority over its nuclear structure under one chair, that of the newly-created Chief of Defence Forces; occupied by the army chief promoted to five-star rank. It has also divorced its conventional and nuclear missile forces, for prosecuting either type of war. An assessment has it that it has given itself a velocity upgrade, enabling a head start in the next round. Not only are Chinese J35s in the pipeline of procurement, but there is a half-a-billion dollars F-16 upgrade also on.

Even so, its budgetary increase of some 20 per cent is outpaced by India’s increase of 24 per cent of a budget eight-to-nine times larger than that of Pakistan. India is also on the cusp of theaterisation, allowing it to take on the western front with greater coherence. In the interim, there is movement towards operationalising a a joint operations and coordination center for greater synergy at the apex military level. Not only is convergence of outcomes in multi-domain operations sought by the out-going chief of defence staff (CDS), but the raksha mantri discerns a “new military ethos.”

Pakistan – even if back-stopped by China - may wish to preserve itself from greater punishment. With India fully capable of matching escalatory step, Pakistan reach for nuclear signalling. An American analyst warns: “They (India and Pakistan) also appear increasingly convinced that, should the conflict erupt again, more intense conventional fighting would not risk nuclear escalation.”

That such recourse that should worry has not figured in the deafening din from the one-year-on discussions owes to multiple reasons. First, is that there has been a clampdown on nuclear doctrinal discourse; in contrast to the appreciative buzz around missile tests. Two is that the political level may not wish to obscure the dangerous backdrop to India’s forever war, hastily and impulsively embarked on. Third, it wishes to avoid the corollary: that dialogue channels are necessary to keep open, if not for conflict resolution but merely for crisis management.

How will it manifest?

One measure has already found mention: activity of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making body, duly advertised to make an impression. The second is movements of its nuclear-related weapons, such as a Nasr or two visible to Indian peeking systems. The third is activating well-intentioned third party diplomacy, by mutual interlocutors as Gulf states or concerned neighbours. Fourth could be activation of its nuclear test sites for a demonstration test. Fifth could be a greenfield test of its nuclear weapon in, for instance, the Kharan desert. Sixth could be information operations to generate a ‘no smoke without fire’ panic. Seventh, as has been seen earlier, the firing of nuclear-capable missiles. Eighthly, intelligence operations; and, finally, a ‘shot across the bow’, at no military target in particular, such as in the Cholistan desert.

Likewise, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict can be decidedly at the lowest possible level of provocation. This could be in the desert along the border or on an enclave captured prior, or, indeed, on the seas.

Under the circumstance, the rationality exhibited by both sides in Op Sindoor, would hopefully continue. By the yardstick of strategic rationality, it would not be irrational on Pakistan’s part to bandy nuclear weapons. Since the escalatory tendency inherent in war - observed some two hundred years ago by Clausewitz - could take hold, it would be irrational for Pakistan not to reach for its nuclear card.

It could be forced by Indian reinforcing of failure by progressively larger scale conventional operations. For instance, while Panag’s reference to operations in J&K was in respect to operations to tidy up the LC; however, some chicken-hawks in the regime and its right wing support formations or a misinformed public may wish for taking Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Heeding Sundarji

It is at such a juncture that Sundarji becomes posthumously most relevant. He left behind the Sundarji nuclear doctrine, that has not received traction in Indian doctrinal discussion. He posited that any introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict must prompt not only an immediate termination of the exchange(s) at the lowest possible level of opprobrium of nuclear use, but also an early cessation of hostilities itself, if necessary by easing up on the matter that led to outbreak of the conflict in first place.

As is evident, this is diametrically opposite the tenet of India’s nuclear doctrine that calls for an annihilating nuclear attack of the nuclear taboo breaking party; ‘unacceptable damage’ being code for counter-value targeting, itself jargon for city-busting. It also goes against the new Pakistan-centric policy of ‘no talks with terror.’

The conclusions that emerge are as follows: the pursuit of escalation dominance is to chase a receding horizon; it is best to pull punches at every level to keep from ascending the escalatory ladder, even if matching the other side punch for punch (tit-for-tat has deterrence value as Axelrod found in his experiment at game theory); minimally a crisis management mechanism must be in place prior; and maximally, incompatibilities must be engaged with in a dialogue.

Though the incoming CDS General Subramani is advantaged by his current proximity to the nuclear strategy staff, he would unlikely have had his knowledge base for his forthcoming duties as military adviser to the nuclear command authority expanded with this bit of wisdom. He would do well to read up Sundarji on what nuclear armed states owe their citizens, a duty to preserve them from harm.