https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/20920/Lessons-From-the-Commemoration-Season-

Lessons from the commemoration season

Unedited version

It is important to commemorate the sacrifices of soldiers, airmen and sailors in the nation’s wars. However, it is well known in the land of the Buddha that moderation is a value in itself. Overdoing of commemorations, as seems to be the case with periodic commemorations of conflict related anniversaries, prompts the question: ‘Why?’ 

For congenital cynics, there could be two answers to this. One is that there is something to hide; and second, that other aims are sought rather than the purported honouring of sacrifices.

To begin with the first, the anniversary in the offing is of the post Uri terror attack surgical strikes. The air force has been tasked to conduct air shows across the country, to include one on 26 September over Dal Lake.

The surgical strikes of late September 2016 are advertised as signifying India’s indubitable casting off of its millennium-long Panipat syndrome. It had finally acquired the decision maker in Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the gall to use military power in the avowed national interest, casting into history India’s hitherto reticence to use force symbolized by the syndrome.

Other than the undeniable derring-do depicted in the movie, Uri – The Surgical Strike, there was little to show for the strikes themselves. The strikes gained the largest number of gallantry awards for an episode, surpassed only qualitatively by those dispensed for the counter to the terror attack on parliament.

Pakistan denied the strikes and no evidence was put out in the open domain of the damage Pakistan managed to hide to contradict Pakistan. The strategic fallout was incommensurate, since surgical strikes were repeated only a few years down the line, this time at an escalated level by using air power and targeting Balakot, within Pakistani territory.

This brings up the second purpose of overdoing commemoration: political appropriation. The following year, surgical strikes were used by the ruling party in its election campaign in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh. The positive elections results led to the subsequent anniversary in 2018 being observed as Parakram Parv since national elections were to follow.

The halo from Balakot – despite (yet again) of lack of credible bomb damage assessments - provided political ballast enough to also cover-up loss in the aftermath of one fighter jet to enemy action and a helicopter to fraternal fire.

Commemorations help manufacture consent

Currently, Mr. Modi is off to New York for addressing the General Assembly. He would also participate in New York in the in-person meeting at the White House of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners. The jigs through the week by the Surya Kirans of the air force across India can be expected to provide a fittingly muscular backdrop to lapdog media’s coverage.

Mr. Modi’s first post-Covid foray into jhuppi diplomacy with Biden at Washington caters for messaging to China, that India is not cowed by its continuing in situ in Ladakh. The second international appearance is in the General Assembly where either in ignoring or including a word on it, Pakistan can be expected to be taken down a notch or two from exulting over its protégé, the Taliban’s taking over Kabul.

The question is whether this - not unreasonable - aim requires the commemoration as backdrop?

For professional skeptics – skepticism is taken here as a democratic virtue that helps hold governments accountable – the abuse of commemoration - defined as honouring sacrifice - is avoidable.

After a promising beginning to the year in the reiteration of a ceasefire with Pakistan along the Line of Control, there has been a backsliding. The back channel that was supposedly active in the run up to that false dawn has presumably stalled.

It is unlikely to be revived any time soon since UP elections are on hand and precedence suggests a muscular approach to Pakistan proves useful as an additional ingredient in the polarizing domestic brew. Besides, in Kashmir, elections are slated for next year. This precludes any concessionary softening towards Pakistan, especially since Pakistan has required reversal of the Article 370 moves that set the stage for the upcoming elections in the union territory. 

A succession of such commemorations – year-round inter-alia observances of Balakot (February), Kargil (July) and Uri (September) – serve to condition the electorate, enabling the ruling party to genuflect to the majority sentiment for remaining averse to Pakistan. Missed in this logic is that the majority will is liable to being manufactured, and in this case has been assiduously steered in a particular, self-serving direction.

Two longer commemorations underway

The Swarnim Vijay Diwas on the resounding 1971 War victory The former is unexceptionable, being the most significant post Independence martial endeavour. Understandably, its observance includes reminiscences by veterans of respective communities of the diplomatic, intelligence and military run to the war and the military feats in it.

Additionally, alongside is also warranted a sober, self-reflection on the war.

The war’s larger aims – beyond cutting Pakistan to size - remained unmet since the military victory did not serve to settle India-Pakistan differences. The peace was lost in lack of appropriate follow up to the promise of the peace treaty at Simla.

On the contrary, the war instead served to aggravate differences, with Pakistan – reverting to military dominance – seeking vengeance, and Indian actions in Kashmir arguably enabling it an opportunity to do so.

In effect, an unintended consequence of the 1971 War was India’s very own ‘forever war’. Clearly, a war does not end with fighting subsiding. Introspection on why the war has not ended is in order. While not discounting the well-known villainy of the Pakistani military, India must acknowledge its ownership of that war’s strategic underside.

The ongoing reminiscences inform that India meticulously set the stage for the war in year-long preparations for a war with ultimately realpolitik ends. Scholarly attention has not yet scrutinised the extent of Indian culpability for the humanitarian disaster in terms of it resulting from interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs. As could be anticipated, it led to increased severity of the Pakistan crackdown, thereby playing into Indian hands. As for the genocide, it remains Pakistan’s cross since there are no mitigating circumstances or rationale for such atrocity crimes.   

As against the mythology so far that the war was in self-defence to Pakistan’s air attacks of 3 December, the revelations on India’s creeping military action dating to mid-November suggest that their action amounted to belated self-defence. 

The lesson from commemoration of wars is that it is an opportunity for truth telling, even if revisionist. Doing so does not in any way take away from the valiant deeds of participants. Critical appraisal as this negates the notion that a docile India has been at the receiving end of aggressive tendencies of neighbours, with the ensuing heightened self-regard opening up peace possibilities.

The importance of this goes up as the second year-long commemoration underway, Azadi Ka Amrit Utsav, moves India away from the India as envisaged 75 years back. The 1971 War commemoration outpourings show, the make-over to a muscular New India is superfluous.

Indeed, commemoration with sobriety may instead be the more desirable manner of observing anniversaries having strategic import.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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https://www.academia.edu/43556374/Inside_Indias_Army

Inside India’s Army

 For comrades in olive green

Foreword

I have put together my commentaries and articles that dwell on aspects covered by the field of military sociology. Military sociology is not unfamiliar to India’s national security community, with the famous Krishna Menon-Thimayya episode being a case to point. Yet, it’s a subject with a rather low profile, no doubt because of the Indian military’s quest to stay out of, if not above, politics and at a distance from society, best illustrated by its cantonments. However, its visibility is much less than should be the case in a democratic society.

Taken collectively, the 99 commentaries here argue that this inattention to the military’s place in a democratic society – owing to its willing subordination to the civilian sphere – has led to overlooking perhaps one of the most significant changes within the military – a tendency towards the right wing ideology that has over the past three decades permeated society. This is understandable, since with society taking a marked turn to the Right, it is not unlikely that a democratic military can but be a step behind.

Even so, this is an anti-democratic development with constitutional  implications. We have witnessed over the past six years of the right wing regime’s sway over power, a dramatic fall of democratic and state institutions. The military has proven an exception in that it is only – at the time of writing – in the process of succumbing. These articles, written over the past fifteen years, trace the manner the military has been suborned by the right wing. The culmination has been over the last year, evidenced in its marginalization as merely a militant killing machine in Kashmir and but a border guarding force in Ladakh. 

The articles in the main discuss civil-military relations, the troubling aspect of which is in the military susceptible to subscribing to the ‘nationalist’ ideology of those in power. The major take-away is that this puts it at odds with the democratic system of alternation in power. This was mildly visible in the earlier period of the United Progressive Alliance in which the military was forever foot-dragging, be it in allowing peace initiatives in Kashmir to culminate or over demilitarizing Siachen.

Another major theme is the lack of representativeness of the military in that the articles capture the phenomenon of the military keeping India’s largest minority out. This has to be boldly said up front since playing footsie with the compelling statistics that underlie this claim is no longer possible. In short, with a dramatic right wing turn combined with the Muslim minority missing from its ranks, the military is only secular in name. In short, we are almost there, where the Hindutva ideologues, under-gridding the strategic establishment of this regime, want India to be.

On this count, this book is important. The compilation of articles that have appeared at various web-portals when put together between two covers, as here, make clear that the penultimate bastion of the state – the judiciary being the last (but one which has already bitten the dust) - is falling. As to whether the situation is retrievable, I leave it for readers in their capacity as voters to answer. The book compilation is an effort towards reversing the trend towards a Hindu army of a Hindu India.

Contents

1.    Right Wing Ascendance In India And The Politicisation Of India’s Military

2.    Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority Lessons from the Gujarat Carnage

3.    Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir

4.    Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’

5.    The Missing Muslim Army Officers

6.    Whose army is it anyway?

7.    Questioning afresh Indian military’s social representativeness

8.    An Army Day resolution for the new chief

9.    The land warfare doctrine: The army's or that of its Chief?

10.  The army's two impulses in Kashmir: Human rights Doctrine and departures

11.  Human Rights: All so unfortunately ho-hum

12.  A police wallah as proto Chief of Defence Staff

13.  Spiking possibilities: What is the army chief up to?

14.  Contextualising the army chief’s news making

15.  Selectivity in military justice

16.  Command responsibility in relation to good faith

17.  Opening up the cantonments: Army in the cross hairs of the right

18.  The army chief as regime spokeman?

19.  The Hindutva project and India's military

20.  Budget let down further strains army-government relations

21.  A revolt of the generals?

22.  A political army or an apolitical one?

23.  Dissension in the top brass?

24.  The General is at it again

25.  Debating the ‘harder military approach’

26.  An Army to fear: The Army’s future?

27.  The Gogoi award puts General Rawat on test

28.  To the army: Any gentlemen left please?

29.  Dark side of Army’s social media groups

30.  Internal security duties in their impact on the army

31.  Saluting Bipin Rawat but with a caveat

32.  The army officer corps: Missing Muslims

33.  Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha Ventures Further Than he Should

34.  Yoga as prelude to politicization of the military

35.  Look who’s doing yoga now

36.  Handwara: Going Beyond SOPs

37.  What a short, swift war means for the Infantry

38.  The military musical chairs

39.  Challenges of the brass in a political minefield

40.  Doctrine in Civil-Military Relations

41.  Where veterans refuse to give up

42.  Is the army court’s verdict on the Machhil killings enough?

43.  Kashmir: Hooda walks the talk

44.  Kashmir : Politicisation of security and its consequences

45.  Modi and the Military

46.  Wearing Religion on their Uniform Sleeves

47.  The Army: Missing Muslim India

48.  Why are Muslims Missing From Army?

49.  Fixing Responsibility CI Decisions and Consequences

50.  AFSPA: A Question of Justice

51.  Do We Need a Chief Warlord?

52.  The Sub-Unit Cries for Army Attention

53.  Civil-Military Relations: Questioning the VK Singh Thesis

54.  Readings for Officers

55.  A General’s Unforgettable Legacy

56.  Army ‘Transformation’: A ‘Radical’ One?

57.  The Third Front: Military Ethics

58.  Civil-Military Relations: Under Scan

59.  The Army’s Decade in Review

60.  The Central Debate in India’s Civil Military Relations

61.  Politicisation: In the Context of the Indian Military

62.  The Coming Threat of Politicisation

63.  India’s Brass: What the Controversy Misses

64.  The Military at the High Table?

65.  Modi and the Military: Not Quite an Innocent

66.  The LoC Incident Calls for Self-Regulation by the Army

67.  Countering Insurgency and Sexual Violence

68.  Dear General, Please Stay Out of Politics

69.  Interrogating Security Expansionism in India

70.  The Indian Army: Organizational Changes in the Offing

71.  An Issue in Civil-Military Relations

72.  Soldiers, not servants

73.  Expanding too fast?

74.  Uncivil war in South Block

75.  An age-old lesson

76.  The ‘Age’ of misjudgement

77.  Defence reforms: The next phase

78.  The Army’s right to its opinion

79.  Initiatives to Transform the Army Officer Corps

80.  The New Chief and Transformation

81.  The Military in Kashmir The Debate Between the Generals

82.  An Unacknowledged Vested Interest in a

83.  The Army’s Subculture in the Coming Decade

84.  The government versus the military

85.  Rethinking Civilian Control

86.  How deep is the rot?

87.  The Indian Army: crisis within

88.  Politicisation and the Indian military

89.  Hail to the new chief

90.  Security agenda: 2006 and beyond

91.  Menu for the New Chief

92.  Chief of Defense : Implications

93.  Elevate Human Rights As the Core Organising

94.  Extract from India’s Doctrine Puzzle: The Organisational Factor

95.  Extract from India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Service Subcultures

96.  Extract from article: ‘Borders and other such lines’, Journal of Peace Studies

97.  Review: Vivek Chadha, Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A Perspective on Human Rights, Strategic Analysis, 35:3 May 2011

98.  Review: K.S. Sheoran, Human Rights and Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict

99.  Countering Insurgency In J&K: Debates in The Indian Army

https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/4/18337/Whose-Army-is-it-Anyway

Whose army is it anyway?

My father having once been commandant of the Indian Military Academy receives a complimentary copy of the IMA’s biannual journal that covers happenings at the academy over the past term. Visiting on holiday, I leisurely leaf through the journal to catch up on my alma mater from which I was commissioned in summer 1987. In this article I share an observation on the IMA, hoping to redflag a trend I have spotted from my scrolling through some ten journals in some detail over the last decade.

Perusing through the Autumn Term 2019 issue I found not a single Muslim Indian officer listed in the faculty, and only one Muslim Indian gentleman cadet (GC) listed among the 306 passing out comprising the 145th Regular and 128th Technical Graduates courses. There are however 54 Muslim GCs of friendly foreign countries, including 50 from Afghanistan and their two Afghan army officer instructors.

There is no Muslim Indian officer in the lists below group photos of the headquarters and administrative staff, the training team, the academic department and the Army Cadet College Wing. Below the group photo of the commandant with all officers of the academy, of the 123 officers listed, none are Muslim Indians. Two Afghan officers are listed. Of the 59 officers posted in and out of IMA during the term, none was Muslim.

Of the 146 instructors below officer rank, there are two Muslims in the training team, one in the drill section, and one with the weapon training section. Of these four, only one is a junior commissioned officer. Three Muslims are with the equitation section, of whom two are junior commissioned officer level – only because the only equitation unit in the Indian army, the 61 Cavalry, has a proportion of Muslims. There is no Muslim in the Physical Training Section.

There is a lone Muslim Indian GC, Shahid Shah, most likely from Kashmir. He is also the lone Muslim to figure in the group photo of GC appointments with the commandant, having made it to the lowest GC appointment of Cadet Quarter Master Sergeant.

While this is the state of the passing out course, I looked forward to spotting some Muslim Indians amongst the academy sports teams, since they also list GCs of the junior course on the team. Not a single Indian Muslim figures in the nine academy sports team photos or the combined group photo, suggesting that the forthcoming passing-out course of summer 2020 will also be rather lean in Muslim Indian representation, and with no outstanding Muslim gracing its numbers. There is also not a single Indian Muslim name in the writeups on hobbies and clubs, such as the names of winners of debates etc.

To substantiate that this is a long standing trend incontrovertibly, below are extracts from my earlier articles in various journals highlighting this as a troubling aspect, calling out for enlightened intervention:

. “A perusal of six editions of the biannual IMA journal over the period 2005–11, covering about half of the seven-year period, led to a tally of 50 Muslim officers having passed out of the IMA. This suggests that about 2% were Muslim, excluding those from friendly foreign countries. In the academy journal’s Spring Term 2016 edition, on the 137th Regular and 120th Technical Graduates’ course, nine out of 469 or 1.9% of the officers having passed out were Muslims. The figure from the 2016 Autumn Term is five GCs with Muslim names out of 403 GCs. The figure goes up thrice over, to 14 GCs for the following course, Spring 2017, that had 423 GCs in all. In effect, Muslims constituted 2.1% of those taking the Antim Pag, the ‘final step’ of training, also the first step as an officer, to the lilt of ‘Auld Lang Syne’.”

. “The problem appears to be worsening. The latest National Defence Academy course at Pune commencing in January 2018 and consisting of 371 cadets (including those bound for the air force and navy) has only four Muslims. Only two Muslims joined the 153 cadets of the 10+2 Technical Entry Scheme course that commenced in January 2018 in Gaya. In the Direct Entry course that commenced at the IMA in January 2018, only one Muslim GC featured in the list of 103 names. Only one of the nine who joined the Army Education Corps course commencing in January was Muslim. One Muslim figured in the list of the 59 who joined the Technical Graduates course at the IMA. Of the 705 Indian youth signing up for an army officer career at the start of 2018, Indian Muslims could not even make it to double digits.”

. “The IMA journals perused for data reveal only one Muslim as having figured in the top GC appointments (34 appointments per course) at the battalion and company levels. In the two recent courses examined (Autumn 2016 and Spring 2017) only two Muslims held a ‘tabbed’ appointment as the lower-rung Junior Under Officers, responsible for a platoon (the subordinate grouping to a company). Of the surfeit of academy awards, only one Muslim GC received a mention for meritorious performance in equestrian sports.”

. “There were no Muslim officer instructors in two of the terms examined, one each in 2008 and 2011. In the latest two editions of the journal, there was a single Muslim major visible in the IMA Autumn 2016 edition and two in the Spring 2017 edition.”

. “The Platinum Jubilee issue of the magazine of the IMA, published in 2007, has some revealing tidbits of information. Only six Muslim officers who have passed out of the IMA have made the supreme sacrifice for the country since the 1971 War. Only one, the late Captain Haneefuddin of Kargil fame, has been awarded a higher gallantry medal, a Vir Chakra, since then. Only one Muslim Gentleman Cadet has won the Academy’s Sword of Honour post Independence, with that award being won way back in 1973.”

. “From the two IMA magazine issues in 2005, it is evident that only eight Muslims passed out of the portals of the institution to become commissioned officers. In the Spring Term 2006, there were eight Muslims commissioned. In the Spring Term 2007, nine Muslims took the ‘Antim Pag’ or ‘Last Step’ as GCs, but their first step as commissioned officers, of the 555 taking commission that term. The following Spring Term, 11 Muslim GCs passed out of 611. In the Autumn Term 2011, 14 Muslims passed out. However, this last figure includes those from friendly foreign countries such as Afghanistan.”

. “In other words, of the six magazines perused for ascertaining the numbers of Muslims gaining the officer commission from the IMA, 45 have made the grade. Assuming some were from foreign countries, less than 40 Indian Muslims have made it over two-and-a-half years into the Army from IMA.”

. “A concerning figure, but less remarked upon, is that of the 291 cadets of the passing-out course from the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, in the Spring Term 2019, only five were Indian Muslims; all of 1.7 per cent. The figure is from the NDA’s magazine, Trishakti. In contrast, seven cadets are from foreign countries. Among the 132 names below photos of the faculty, only one was Muslim. Two junior commissioned officer-instructors were Muslim, both unsurprisingly in the equitation section since the only horsed cavalry regiment is 61 Cavalry.”

. “The IMA’s Spring Term 2016 edition figure is that of the 469 GCs of the 137 Regular and 120 Technical Graduates courses commissioned on 12 December 2015, nine were Muslims, making a percentage of 1.9 per cent.”

. “A leading military school in the country recently compiled the list of cadets that had entered its portals ever since it was founded pre-Independence. Of 2,896 cadets that have entered its precincts since Independence, only 28 had Muslim names.”

A similar exercise can be undertaken to see if there is similar institutional absence of the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Caste communities. It can be hazarded that even if these comprise one per cent each, the tentative percentage from the disadvantaged communities comprising some 45 per cent of India’s population is about 5 per cent, implying a deficit of nine times over.

The finding here is that the Indian army is not representative of all India’. From the profiles of the thirty-odd higher GC appointments of battalion level, only five were from other than north India. My suspicion is that the under-representation is to the benefit of north Indian, Hindi speaking, Hindu communities of the erstwhile ‘martial classes’ and emergent Other Backward Classes.

This narrowing of the social base of induction into the Indian army can only have long term, mostly negative, repercussions. The new Department of Military Affairs must introspect.

http://kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=98358

An Army Day resolution for the new chief

On taking over as the chief of defence staff, General Bipin Rawat was asked about his often figuring controversially in headlines for some or other political intervention by him. His latest was his decrying of the counter citizenship amendment act protests. He had this to say in reply: “We stay far away from politics, very far. We have to work according to directions by the government in power.”

On the face of it, this is as uncontroversial a statement as can be. The military keeps a distance from politics and is obedient to the government, irrespective of the ruling party in power. The new army chief, General MM Naravane, in his interaction with the press on taking over, when asked about military politicization asserted as much, saying, “I totally disagree. We are totally apolitical. It is a misperception of a few people which is totally incorrect.”

However, in light of precedence of military’s parochialism prominently featuring Bipin Rawat all through his army chief days, interrogating whether the military retains its pristine apolitical status is necessary. The plethora of political interventions by General Rawat, and his counter-part air force chief, BS Dhanoa, does not need reiteration here. These cannot be summarily dismissed.

General Bipin Rawat’s statement has clues as to whether the suspicion that there is more to politicization of the military than mere difference of perception holds water. The statement can well be interpreted to mean that though the military maintains a distance from politics, any action that smacks of intervention in politics is in obedience to directions of the government in power.

Such an expansive interpretation of the military’s idea of duty of obedience to the civilian political leadership calls for interrogation. While it does have to answer to the civilian political leadership, it can reasonably be understood that the duty of obedience does not extend to illegal or illegitimate directions.

On this, General John Hyten, head of the United States’ nuclear weapons related Strategic Command, clearly set the gold standard in a modern, democratic civil-military relationship, stating in the context of President Trump’s inconsistent decision making:

I provide advice to the president, he will tell me what to do,”… “And if it’s illegal, guess what’s going to happen? I’m going to say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal.’ And guess what he’s going to do? He’s going to say, ‘What would be legal?’ And we’ll come up with options, of a mix of capabilities to respond to whatever the situation is, and that’s the way it works. It’s not that complicated.

This means a military needs to have (and does have) an internalised yardstick against which it measures the legitimacy or otherwise of its marching orders. In case the departure from the constitutional letter and norm and past practice is inexplicable and unwarranted, the military instead has the obligation to revert to the civilian master with its reservations and the two together are to arrive at a via media, whereby the civilian will prevails and the military does not overstep any constitutional line.

In effect, the constitutional straight and narrow is the yardstick. The military brass has acquired its stature in the national scheme so far by its adherence to this. Even Bipin Rawat’s public gaffes through his tenure so far has not shifted the normative goal posts. On the contrary, he has been upbraided for transgressing the constraints on political speech and behavior by a senior of the veteran community, Admiral Ramdas.

The military is not obligated where directions fail the appropriateness test. Whereas the duty of obedience is primary, it is not sacrosanct or unconstrained. The military leader has to apply his mind to received instructions and act as per the mandate in relation to the Constitution and - normatively - in relation to the nation.

In other words, in case a military receives instructions to make political statements, it really ought to politely fob these off. With time, deterrence against illicit action and mutual respect would set the relationship on even keel. The military needs to stand up for its constitutional obligation and tradition of apolitical and secular ethic, reminding political masters when necessary not to ask of it anything it cannot deliver on.

This is predicted on a dialogue between the two tiers – civilian and military – wherein the political tier respects the military’s space and the military does not attempt transcend it and resists attempts to prevail over it to act otherwise. Needless to add, such a ‘pull and push’ would require to be done discreetly within the corridors of power, so that the relatively delicate democratic edifice is not buffeted unduly.

Admittedly, this is a tall order, since, as Anit Mukherjee suggests in his new, eponymous book – The Absent Dialogue – dialogue is absent within the ministry. His finding reinforces Bharat Karnad’s colourful portrayal of the prime minister’s disdain for the anglicized military leadership, of the brass unavailable for discussion after sunset since they are presumably at the bar.

The last resort is of course for a military commander to resign. Civil-military theory has it that the civilian has the ‘right to be wrong’ and, in the agent-principal linkage, the civilian leadership is answerable to the electorate. It is for the electorate to punish the civilian leadership for wrong decision making. All a military professional can do under the circumstance is to resign.

This responsibility is not unknown to the military brass. Both socialisation and a professional military education underscore the importance of democratic civilian control, with its limits also forming part of the military acculturation. Exposure to civil-military relations (CMR) theory is part of military curriculum for higher ranks. The military is also cognisant of the place of tradition in military culture. Learning from peer militaries is also constantly ongoing. There is a hiatus of a year at Delhi’s Tees January Marg where those destined for apex ranks are exposed at the defence ministry controlled National Defence College to India’s democratic mores and practices.

In his rumination on his responsibility of the US’ nuclear arsenal, John Hyten, went on to say, “I think some people think we’re stupid. We’re not stupid people. We think about these things a lot. When you have this responsibility, how do you not think about it?” Basically, he underlines the extensive training and military professional education that prepares the brass for their jobs. In India’s case, an officer while getting to general rank spends a minimum five years in class rooms. This enables political sensitivity and knowledge of civil-military relations red lines.

The good sense in a professional distance from politics is as brought out by a former vice chief, Vijay Oberoi: that in a system of democratic alternation in government, the military can seamlessly transfer its loyalty between dispensations irrespective of who is elected to power. If and since political parochialism is not within the remit of the military, any insistence by the temporal political masters on this must be determinedly sidestepped by the military.

There are bureaucratic ways to ‘shirk’ – a Peter Feaver phrase - dodgy tasking. General Panag in an advisory piece for the new army chief recommends resort to cryptic military phrasing when interacting with the media, so as not to stray into political turf. This indicates that situations can be tactfully handled. The brass has over three decades of human relations management experience before getting to flag rank.

The unfortunate tendency today is in personalisation of power, an example is in the manner Narendra Modi supervised the annual conclave of director generals of police with a regimen that included yoga with Modi in the lead. The effect on policing in the national capital and India’s largest state is self-evident in the handling of the counter citizenship amendment act protests there.

Reminding the military of this verity at this juncture is timely in that there is a change of guard at 5 Rajaji Marg, the residence of the army chief. It is heartening to note the spoken reputation of General MM Naravane, the new incumbent. Any indoctrination residue from his schooling at a prominent right wing run school in Pune cannot but have been washed off in his close to four decades of imbibing and practice of military mores.   

Going forward, the onus is on the military to stockade itself within its professional space. Adoption of a prickly posture – reminiscent of a porcupine – may send the message and deter the regime from abusing its authority over the military. Naravane has begun well by drawing attention at his first Army Day press conference to the preamble of the Constitution, which is echoing across the land today in student protests. It remains to be seen if he is prepared for a personal cost for better serving national security. 

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