https://thewire.in/security/a-free-hand-in-the-nuclear-age-is-political-abdication

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/a-free-hand-in-the-nuclear-age-is

Giving a Free Hand to the military is political abdication

The ‘free hand’ given to the military has been much acclaimed as a major reason for the operational results of Operation (Op) Sindoor. It will likely figure as a replicable lesson in the promised future iterations of Op Sindoor. However, not only must this lesson be reviewed in light of the constraints of the nuclear age, but Op Sindoor could do with a reexamination, warts and all.

Attempting one here leads to an opposite conclusion: that the free hand given in Op Sindoor amounted to political abdication. Consequently, the lesson to the contrary is that more intimate political oversight of the operational aspects in the military sphere befits appropriate civil-military relations in the nuclear age.

Some military theory

The popularly imagined ideal type has political and military circles adjacent to each other but with an overlap in-between. In the space jointly shared, the political supersedes military considerations. Outside the overlap is the essentially military space, on which matters are adjudicated with a professional lens. Yet, for military accountability to political masters the entire military circle is subject to political oversight.

Ideally, the political level sets the agenda and gives the military the necessary autonomy to execute it, with the degree of ‘freedom of action’ depending on the confidence the political leadership has in its chosen military leaders and the political delicacy of the operation. Even so, this is seldom an uncomplicated relationship; an example being the friction between Count Bismarck and General von Moltke.

Today, distinguishing ‘essentially military matters’ – from which the political class must maintain a respectful distance by leaving these to professional minds – is rendered more difficult by the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. Indeed, a principal impact of the nuclear age on military matters has been to restrict the scope of military; lest, in pursuit of autonomy, the military overstep the constraints placed on the use of armed force by the nuclear imperative.

An early nuclear theorist, Bernard Brodie, had it that the military’s role in the nuclear age is but to deter war and not to wage one. From recent revelations on Op Sindoor, it appears that this insight on the nuclear dimension is being given a dangerously short shrift.

A nuclear context to the free hand

In his telling of Op Snow Leopard in his unpublished book, the then army chief recounts that knowing that an affray involving tanks could start a shooting war, he looked back over his shoulders to his political masters for instructions. Told, ‘jo uchit samjho, voh karo,’ he decided to wait-out the Chinese. This revelation was met with the criticism that the delegation of authority on as grave a matter as war with a nuclear-armed neighbor amounted to abdication of political responsibility.

The matter rested in the overlap between the two imaginary circles - political and military – that required the political level to take a considered view with military input. No meaningful discussion followed the criticism, resulting in the ‘free hand’ recurring a few years on as the right and obvious manner of civil-military relations in a military conflict with another nuclear-armed neighbour.

A recent documentary on Op Sindoor informs that the national security adviser (NSA) briefed the prime minister that an attack on terrorist targets within Punjab (“soch se bahar” in the former Chief of Defence Staff General Chauhan’s words) could trigger a nuclear response from the Pakistan army. Yet, the political master signed off on the military operation, evidently sanguine in his hands-off supervision of the military through a trusted hand in the national security establishment, Ajit Doval, and with confidence in his deep-selected military leadership.

In the documentary, military leaders in all three colours of uniform confirm each service was prepared for escalation into a war, which could well spell a nuclear war. That Indian strike forces elsewhere were by then in assembly areas is already well known. The then naval chief once said that the navy was but five minutes from gate-crashing the landward military conflict.

Readiness for escalation helps deter it. Indian preparedness for Op Sindoor turning into a conventional war was to keep Pakistan from upping the ante up the ladder to a war. Pakistan throwing in the towel after a brief recourse to its Op Bunyan al Marsoos shows Indian escalation dominance on the last night.

Of consequence for the future, however, is the revelation that the military continued going after Pakistani targets, for over three hours after receiving their call for calling off the exchanges. Whether this had political imprimatur is not known. In either case, this was an egregious extension to Op Sindoor, befitting closer scrutiny on its necessity and escalatory potential.

The free hand vindicated?

A retired air marshal reveals that he told a white lie (“I lied”) to his air chief. He says he pretended that a strike was already underway when asked after their status by his chief, in order not to disappoint the crews long in the cockpit, ready and waiting, to preempt the possibility of the strike being called off. Later, when he in an informal setting he admitted this to the air chief in front of the defence minister present, it was glossed over.

An air marshal, who went on to head a temple trust, says he had no knowledge of the explosion at Kairana, though the hills fell within his operational responsibility. The now-retired chief of defence staff (CDS) making light of the matter said it was an ordnance-laden drone expending itself. That it did so with a visible bang near where Pakistani nuclear stockpiles are allegedly hidden shows it was not thought through in its entirety prior to launch.

In the documentary, the then director general military operations, Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai, informs that at the time when Pakistani call came in asking for a ceasefire, the response was not made then, attributing the delay – hold your breath! - to a glitch in the hotline! This is the first and only mention of the supposed glitch.

In the interim of three hours, concerned Indian diplomats in the external affairs ministry keeping American crisis manager Marco Rubio on hold inquired after the hold up. Evidently, India utilized the time gained to have a last crack at Pakistan, the go-ahead for which was given by the CDS directly to the air chief, without any thought by either of the two to his lack of jurisdiction.

During Op Sindoor, it must be recorded that a lackadaisical attitude to the rule of law and procedural integrity attended military actions in internal security. The army supported the demolishing of family houses of alleged local militants in Kashmir by using controlled explosions, even though NSA Doval in the documentary confirms that it was known early enough that the perpetrators of the Pahalgam atrocity were Pakistani. The military participated in deporting alleged Rohingyas from Delhi by air lifting them to Nicobar and then deboarding them from a naval ship into the sea off the Myanmar coast. Clearly, a free hand has a drastic underside.

The opposite conclusion

In such a reading of Op Sindoor, the political level opens itself to credible criticism of abdication. It turned a blind eye to the military disregarding ceasefire overtures; going ahead on their own accord (absent evidence of political approval) with strikes that were no longer a military necessity; allowing a ‘glitch’ in the hotline and to hold matters up without considering work arounds (if the glitch story is taken as true); and, allowing for expansive targeting (that may have included the ‘kill’ at the longest range ever) that that could trigger uncertain consequences.

Blinded and with their conventional counter strike capability dwindling, the Pakistanis could have brought into play their cruise and more capable ballistic missiles. That they didn’t do this owes not to their being over-awed, but American crisis-mitigating activity - which India is in denial over. That the next round will now begin at this higher level is almost certain. Therefore, the consequences required taking a grand-strategic call, which there is no hint of.

As for the military, it must introspect on the political call on it to expand the space for conventional punishment of Pakistan. Its over-enthusiastic execution was at such nuclear risk that it has squandered the trust a ‘free hand’ implies. They must know that the free hand given could well have proven an alibi for their political master, if things went south. They surely are aware that the political firmament does not produce the likes of Nehru anymore.

The ideal type of adjacent political and military circles with an overlap no longer holds in a nuclear age. The military circle must hereon be seen as an embedded within the political, for accountability and holistic appreciation of military pathways. There are no essentially-military matters qua operations any more. Persisting with a free hand can only imply political abdication or military usurpation of a political call.

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/indian-armys-new-found-love-for-hindi-and-hindutva-has-serious-consequences

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/politicisation-from-below-hindification

Politicisation from below: Hindification and Hinduisation of the army

A portrait of all army chiefs and commandants of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) is placed in the academy’s hallowed Chetwode Hall, with respective name below each, written in hindi. This avidity in furthering the hindi agenda is touching; a true signifier of political control of the military. Only, it appears the military is being more loyal than the king. Whereas earlier the paramilitary under police loyalists tumbled over themselves to show their worthiness on this score, the army appears to have scrambled aboard the bandwagon.

A complementary agenda is that of Hinduisation. This has been roundly addressed most recently thus: ‘The concern is not religion itself. The concern is the perception that the military institution may be identifying itself with particular religious narratives at a time when religion has become deeply intertwined with political discourse.’ The author, a prominent military-watcher, goes on to warn of outsized consequences:

The Indian Armed Forces have enjoyed extraordinary public trust precisely because they have historically remained secular, apolitical and professionally detached from political contestation. This reputation is a national asset. Its dilution has horrendous ramifications for the military of a multi-religious, multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual nation.

The general lets-off the brass-hats, assuming that such a ‘dilution’ may be for ‘perceived personal gains.’ The temple visits of General Dwivedi show a conscious lending of an epauleted shoulder to the national reset. Its moot whether this was for ‘personal gains,’ now that he departs into the sunset. Precedent set, his successor cannot but be expected to conform.

However, what if brass-hats are instead driven by a sense of their mandate, handed to them tacitly by the regime? What if the military leadership believes that is indeed the way to go for the military, to keep step with the pronounced and unmistakable turn in the social and political spheres?

Two perspectives of the nation – ‘multi-religious, multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual nation’ and one from Hindutva thinking emphasising oneness and wholeness – are in contention. Even if the latter not a full-fledged reality, it is not quite an illusory either.

The national security-conscious military may be sufficiently impressed with the unity-conferring promise of the majoritarian paradigm, and is consciously playing its part in its consolidation. Politically sensitive to the change in Indian political culture, the military may view the three characteristics – ‘secular, apolitical and professionally detached’ - as anachronistic. The 2H are the pincers of revision.

Does the future envisaged – a majoritarian state – fit national security better or would the general’s foreboding – ‘horrendous ramifications’ – be the outcome?

Adjusting to a new dawn

A grand leader, advertising strength in his body language and rhetoric, is at the helm, even as dynastic politics is nastily derided. Since taking power, the regime has consolidated its grip, through the Chanakyan ministrations of a latter-day Kautilya. The planet’s richest and largest political party has the world’s largest NGO as its back-office and to hold its back. The unregistered NGO itself sees no distinction between itself and Hinduism. A revivalist narrative, built over the last hundred years, has culminated in supersession of the ‘unity in diversity’ thesis with ‘unity sans diversity.’ A single-party dominant political system - reminiscent of the so-called Congress system of yore - is different in the manner it has at its core, religion and – religion by itself being insufficient – insurance has been taken out in the form of a unifying Other.

Military veterans - enamoured or bought over – projected the benefits of a strong-on-defence regime prepared to foster a national will. The military was done with the strategic formulation of ‘resolve and restraint,’ manifested in supposedly limp-wristed responses to the proxy war, Kargil, Kandahar, parliament attack, spate of lesser terror attacks and 26/11. Sensing a military conditioned for institutional capture, the regime professed to be military-supportive.

It gave the military a ‘free-hand’ for retribution through exercise of conventional force. It took on its shoulders responsibility for the army blindsided by China in Ladakh. It delivered on long-demanded baubles, as the chief of defence staff (CDS) post and the constitutional status of Kashmir. It left the military to arrive at jointness and integration at its own pace. It upped the defence budget and fast-tracked acquisitions. It has avoided the operational-directive route fostering accountability in favour of a coffee-table variety of unenforceable defence forces’ vision and strategic guidance. The regime not only ingratiated itself with the military, through a set of parvs and photo opportunities, but has also taken care that the apex leadership is sufficiently supervised by a deep-selectee, the CDS. The beguiling agnipath scheme has a helped with coup-proofing from any drift towards critical thinking, leave alone dissent, within the military.

The military appears to have seen the writing on the wall, as have other pillars of democracy and institutions of governance. Now, no statement from a military functionary is without reference to either the ‘honourable prime minister’, viksit-ism and triumphalism over a military operation of meagre strategic effect. The military has also put forth a concept of fusion: collaboration of all stakeholders in the defence sector in the national security enterprise. However, since fusion is a two-way street, the military is also subject to an inverse embrace, such as hosting the defence secretary at its staff college or ferrying exam papers. It appears that the earlier bureaucratic buffer between it and the political master has receded. Such proximity presages an ideology influx.

The military has pragmatically cast the weight of its authority and respect it commands on the side of the majoritarian enterprise. In the secular era in which democratic alternation between parties was feasible, the military was secular and apolitical. The multifarious idea of India dispensed with, ‘secular’ is potentially redundant. With a single party set to even dominate the regional political space, ‘apolitical’ too is irrelevant. In an era of ‘one nation, one party, one election,’ to belabour the two would amount to being offside of their political masters. To end up on the winning side, the military has wilfully discarded political distancing as a hallmark of professionalism. For its part, the regime noting that to be ‘professionally detached’ may yet be desirable, has taken care to ensure interminable deployments on the northern border and a continuing operation on the western.

The military is sanguine that any backlash that the bull-dozing incites can be managed by an up-gunned central armed police force, that demonstrated its accountability-exempt capability in cleansing central India of Maoists. The suppressive template – with Israeli example – has been finetuned in Kashmir. The long-standing strategy of exhaustion appears operational in Manipur. No ‘horrendous consequences’ impending, the 2H can be allowed to do its thing within the military to attune it to a fusionist future.

A reality check

But what if the military barks up the wrong tree? Worst-case preparedness requires vetting the military’s assumptions: that a national levelling is underway; that an assist from the military for the regime is called for; and that a plaisant national security environment will emerge.

The military needs reminding that the elevation of crookery to a sublime political art cannot make a nation. Even if the vision enthuses, means and methods matter; cunning only conjuring up a house of cards. False gods are subject to an emperor-and-his-new-clothes syndrome. These are not platitudes and homilies, but wisdom. Anything can go wrong from policy missteps to fratricide over succession, etc.. At the eventual dénouement, the nation would need a ticking military; any dilution cannot but have ‘horrendous ramifications.’

Politicisation of the military has been in the air for long. Now it is taking flight. The cautioning extant is for the political class – essentially the opposition - to keep off the military, such as in General Naravane’s take on keeping contents of his book out of the necessarily hurly-burly political scrutiny. Another line of caution that has entirely fallen by the wayside is that the regime not appropriate the national institution’s showing for its own self-aggrandisement. As for politicization-from-below glimpsed here - the military’s tending unbidden towards a side of the political spectrum – there is little comprehension, leave alone commentary.

For now, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty whether the infusion of 2H into the military is organic through osmosis with society or if it is an institutionally sanctioned program. Either way, the two tend to ally the military with the baser political forces that have beset north India over the recent decades. Consequently, it distances the military from the social and geographic periphery, where diversity is most pronounced. Since the tendency in current-day politics is the devouring of the periphery by the dominant political forces of the heartland, the military’s 2H program makes it appear as a willing participant on side of the latter. It really ought to let up in its zeal to jump through the hoops before the rim strikes back.