https://m.thewire.in/article/books/general-anil-chauhan-spills-the-beans-in-his-new-book

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In his new book, General Chauhan spills the beans

Discussing the ‘many lines of action through which one can enhance the capability of a state to defend itself,’ General Chauhan, in the subsection on ‘Civil-Military Fusion’ in his chapter ‘National Security: A Conceptual Framework’ says in his new book:

This (civil-military fusion) ensures the optimal utilization of civil and military resources to achieve national objectives. It fuses military professionalism with political ideologies (emphasis and parenthesis added) (p. 44).”

Given that military professionalism and political ideologies have historically and universally been taken as incompatible, the misbegotten insertion appears to have escaped the eye of avid copy editors.

Even so, since it explains a lot of what’s been going on in the military sphere over the past decade of the Modi regime’s tenure in power, it must be alternatively read. It should not be mistaken as a ‘slip of tongue’.

It is instead a bold assertion, meant to be read, absorbed and normalized; even if alongside it is – as here – scrutinized, critiqued and pilloried.

Since the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) himself puts it so bluntly, it does not require further explication. Even so, since it is so shocking it might require a helpful word or two to digest.

The good General lists civil-military fusion among the intangible factors, which together with military force application, help with ‘Defence of a Nation State.’ ‘National security remit being larger than the application of military force,’ its instruments include ‘civil-military fusion’.

To be fair, he elaborates on the sentence, arguing that the infusion of state-of-the-art technologies across multiple domains and advent of dual-use technologies and infrastructure lend credence to the concept of civil-military fusion for optimizing resources. Fusion is also ‘paramount’ for citizen-centric HADR (humanitarian and disaster management) operations.

The General appears to want to take the sting out of the sentence by sugar-coating it by highlighting the close interconnection between the civil-military spheres. However, it is not self-evident why the military needs to be imbued with ‘political ideologies’ for interconnectedness to be efficient and effective.

Whats clear is that the interconnection cannot be seamless, since the military is an institution of a democratic State that by definition sees alternation in power of political ideologies.

By no means must a military be at odds with the national spirit or the political master, but adoption of ‘political ideologies’ goes beyond the consensus thus far on military subordination of the political.

So, what could Chauhan possibly mean?

His view is perhaps unknowingly informed by a theory in civil-military relations (CMR) termed Concordance theory. The theory is important enough in CMR to have been reprised in the golden jubilee commemorative edition of Armed Forces and Society (AFS), an international inter-disciplinary journal on the subject.

Its academic proponent, Rebecca Schiff, claims that the theory, ‘sees a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society.’ She argues that ‘three partners - the military, the political elites, and the citizenry - should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation but does not require it.’

In her seminal essay in the frontier AFS - later expanded to book length - she had used India as an example of concordance, incidentally, alongside Israel in the other case study. Her book went on to include a case study on Pakistan, of discordance there resulting in military intervention.

Unpersuaded with the understanding on civil-military ‘separation’, attributable to the dominance of the Huntingtonian notion on CMR, she had sought out ‘integration’ as a more descriptive term on CMR in many, particularly, non-Western states, such as India.

The theory has it that concord between the three stakeholders – the political elite, the military and society – brings about domestic non-intervention by the military. This is probable when the three ‘partners’ agree on four factors: ‘the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.’

To her, ‘(c)ooperation and agreement on four specific indicators may result in a range or civil-military patterns, including separation, the removal of civil-military boundaries, and other variations.’

Such a consensus existed in India through the Congress raj with civilian preponderance and separation of the military. Schiff approaches her case-study in the tumultuous decade of the Nineties, when political consensus was showing cracks. She concludes that political dominance alone (recall the political disarray of the coalitions back then) cannot explain continuing Indian military reticence on domestic intervention. Institutional (the military’s non-political style) and cultural factors (continuing British legacy) need factoring in. Thus, ‘separation’ served India well.

Today, India faces a new reality: that of an ideological capture of the State. Requiring a quiescent military, an ideological state can have one, but only through cooption. Thus, separation is no longer necessary.

So, is India moving towards ‘removal of civil-military boundaries’ – one of Schiff’s models?

This could explain General Chauhan’s brief, and for now cryptic, advocacy.

With Hindutva now predominant in Indian political culture - opposition parties opting for ‘soft Hindutva’ – it’s the only political ideology in town. Is the CDS advocating the military bandwagon?

Given the change in political culture, a shift in strategic culture is but natural, with the verities of the former informing the latter. A preceding sub-section to the one on fusion discusses ‘Strategic Culture’.

He calls for creation of a strategic culture ‘in the nation to create an awareness among the people on the ‘whole of nation’ approach that is sine qua non with emerging challenges.’ This, to him, requires that ‘citizens and society in a nation must understand the importance of security in all its dimensions, be it external, internal, economic or social.’

In other words, a trickle-down must encompass society, strategic culture defined as a ‘set of beliefs, customs and traditions held by the strategic decision-makers about the political objectives of war and the most effective ways of achieving it.’

With the political elite and the military already politically concordant, the society must be brought in line through strategic cultural manipulation. Efforts as Project Udbhav must been seen in this context.

The author devotes a chapter to ‘Ancient Indian Wisdom and its relevance in modern strategy and statecraft.’ To his credit, he lists Moghuls alongside the Guptas in keeping up the Mauryan consolidation of the idea of India – Bharatvarsh’.

With Moghul history kicked out of pedagogy, strategic culture can only rummage in an ancient history attic. This shows the military has bought into the verities of the Hindutva project.

In short, the civil-military separation that facilitated Indian military professionalism is fast losing its sheen. Is professionalism itself next?

General Chauhan is appreciative of the civil-military integration that has taken place thus far (the creation of his appointment, the CDS), but is silent on the civil-military integration that the yet-pending theaterisation will wreak.

He states theaters will be ‘force employment’ mandated, while Service headquarters headed by the Chiefs will restrict themselves to ‘force generation’, with even the CDS continuing only in an advisory role.

This leaves unsaid where the command-and-control chain of theater commanders’ stops. It cannot be at the desk of a triple-hatted CDS, one hat of which is as a Secretary.

The recommendatory line - ‘the chain of command and the operational decision matrix will also need to be redefined’ - is hardly helpful.

His one-line mention - ‘There should be NO ambiguity in the command-and-control structures for the higher direction of war (emphasis in original, p 168)’ – suggests civil-military ‘integration’, with theater commanders answering to the defence minister, as is in the American system.

No harm in that, but a book from the CDS need not have avoided the subject, particularly if there is dissonance (what else explains the ‘NO’, in caps?).

Another subject missing is nuclear weapons. That these are significant is clear from the manner the regime went about limiting Op Sindoor. Clearly, ‘(A) Blueprint for the transformation of India’s Military’ – the book’s subtitle – cannot have elided this topic.

It is logical to expect the CDS as the military adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority on nuclear matters, to have touched on the matter. Besides, the General’s previous book, authored at a one-star level, was on nuclear war effects; indicating his being attuned to the dangers. Instead, nuclear weapons find a mention at three places only in generic terms.

This keeps this critical matter under wraps, particularly the command-and-control arrangements, given that the CDS does not have command authority over the Strategic Forces Command. This begs the question: Who does? If a civilian (the NSA?), then does it presage theater commanders answering to a civilian?

Finally, and importantly, here’s evidence of the populist dogma in the political sphere finding its way into the military’s innards. General Chauhan writes:

In terrorism, one finds the absence of a political goal. It is not a means to an end but an end in itself. In the Quranic concept of war, terror is not a means to impose a decision but a decision in itself. Such violence without any definite political end state is contributing to the changing nature of war (p. 57).’

This is of a piece with the longstanding misinterpretation of the book by a Pakistani brigadier titled ‘Quranic Concept of War’ written in Zia’s times. Some two decades back I had refuted the notion of a Quranic endorsement of terrorism in the Army War College journal, that had asynchronously carried its review, writing in the following edition,

Terror in the author’s (Brigadier Malik) perspective is taken as akin to ‘Shock and Awe’, rather than ‘Terror’ as is currently, fashionably defined, more for propaganda purposes than accuracy. Terror can be taken as the imposition of a decision paralysis on an enemy commander, a numbing fear in his army and popular disaffection in the cause of the war. To the author (Brig. Malik) it is not the spectacular killing of innocents and non-combatants that is Terror in the post 9/11 Age (p. 198).

Now, with the CDS endorsing nonsense, Islamophobic dogma appears to have gone mainstream.

Lastly, the book’s title is interesting in its inclusion of the term, ‘Resurgent’. Are we to believe that the Indian military was in stupor so far, a Rip Van Winkle (Kumbhkaran in Hindi-speak) to be stirred awake by regime using likeminded acolytes in uniform?

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*General Anil Chauhan, Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the transformation of India’s Military, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2025, pp. 200, Rs. 895.

https://m.thewire.in/article/politics/why-naya-bharat-needs-a-jameel-mhmood

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Why Naya Bharat needs a Jameel Mehmood

Even as the Indian armed forces engaged in Operation (Op) Sindoor, some concerning headlines this side of the border collectively call out for tempering of the elation in its wake.

Here, the incidents in question are first listed, followed by a caution.

It's not all that glitter is gold

One, with the hot-pursuit of terrorists who perpetrated the atrocity at Baisaran meadow failing, Kashmir witnessed the demolishing of houses of militants with controlled explosions, including of those uninvolved. The operation was by night and in at least one instance, neighbouring houses were also damaged. The security forces involved refrained from releasing official information on the action.

Two, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has opened an inquiry into “unconscionable, unacceptable acts” off the Rakhine coast in Myanmar. Allegedly, under the cover of darkness, the Navy dumped Rohingya refugees – who had been corralled from Delhi and transported by air to the Andamans by air - into the sea. (It would be a pity of the aircraft for move to Andamans were furnished by the air force.) Worse, allegations include sexual misconduct by unspecified escorts aboard the vessel.

Three, the Eastern Command informed of killings of 10 armed cadre of an unnamed armed group near the border in Manipur by the Assam Rifles. A Myanmarese group involved in the civil war against the military-led central authorities has since questioned the encounter. Apparently, the group was against the ongoing fencing of the border in the area; also objected to by local communities.

Four, the Sikh clergy denied deployment of air defence assets within the Golden Temple complex, forcing the army to distance itself from the statement of its air defence chief and local army commander. It appears that army was countering an earlier propaganda plank of the Pakistani military that improbably held that the Indian side had targeted Golden Temple during Op Sindoor.

For Indians to also refer to Golden Temple in a mirroring information war is to unnecessarily involve an Indian community in intelligence games. Whether the Temple witnessed a ‘surfeit of drone and missile attacks’, in keeping with the intelligence on threat to the Temple, is questionable.

Further, the commanding general in Amritsar in his media statement held that consequent to the Pahalgam attack, ‘the nation’s anger under able leadership took the form of Operation Sindoor.’ In Hindi, he describes it as ‘prabal netritva ke adheen (under bold leadership)’. Since the reference to the ‘able and bold leadership’ can only be to the political masters of the military. This is of a piece with the air force’s shabash: “…has been possible only because of budgetary and policy support from the government of India in the last decade." Both are egregious.

Five, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan’s new book just hit the stands. In it, the general has opined against any need for a written national security doctrine (NSS). Evidently, the leading military authority, in face of expert opinion to the contrary, provides covering fire to the government that has not been able to come up with one for over a decade.

Further, the timing along with its aim – “a cogent viewpoint…as to how the Indian Armed Forces are transforming…and their steadfast contributions towards realization of the national vison of becoming ‘Sashakt, Surakhshit, Samridh and Viksit Bharat’ by 2047” – lends ballast to the ruling party’s surge, capitalising on the military’s operational showing as is its wont.

Get up, stand up

It was not always this way. The military has been known to retain its lights even in face of political pressures. Its reputation for professionalism rests on this feature, of truth telling.

In the Nehruvian period, General Thimayya’s confrontation with Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon is well known. General Manekshaw, in keeping with Indira Gandhi’s view, reassured Indira’s cabinet that it would be premature to take down Pakistan in April 1971. General SK Sinha as Western Army Commander held a different perspective from Indira Gandhi on how the then nascent Sikh extremism should be handled. He was superseded, and the rest as they say is history. The military consistently pushed for nuclearization, even when the political class dithered. A naval chief was sacked, inter-alia, for intercepting gun-running through the Andaman Sea for Myanmar rebels favoured by the then defence minister.

General JJ Singh, though initially in favour of a peace deal over Siachen, changed his mind. General VK Singh was not above keeping the bureaucracy on tenterhooks during his stand-off over the date-of-birth issue. From the turn of the 2010s, the military stood for a two-front threat perspective, in face of foot-dragging by successive governments. In Kashmir, the army withstood pressures for rollback of its special powers, though operational circumstance made it appear feasible. The army shied away from deploying in Central India against Maoists, though termed the graver threat to national security.

Don’t give up the fight

Have things changed over the last decade?

In Kashmir, the army abandoned the ‘velvet glove’ in favour of solely an ‘iron fist’. The air force went along with the shift towards a smaller number of Rafales at a higher cost. The army stood askance as the ruling party capitalised on its surgical strikes for electoral gains, using the army to organise Parakram Parv. Its operations’ head then denied surgical strikes were previously conducted. The air force hid its blue-on-blue helicopter accident till the elections were over, while maintaining a façade over the Balakot strikes. The army maintained a stiff upper lip on the extent of Chinese intrusions onto Indian territory. Lately, the air force was reticent on its losses.

Withholding information amounts to turning the information war inwards, to keep citizenry in the dark and the parliament uninformed. Willy-nilly the dividend is yet again to their political master, embarked on yet another campaign on the military’s shoulders.

It appears the military has abandoned taking a position on a professional matter professionally arrived at. This is colourfully put by a middle order politician as: ‘forces are bowing down to Modi.’ Veterans ruing such a state of affairs is testimony.

State capture by the right wing appears near complete.

So now you see the light, ay

Brigadier RR Palsokar, the commander of Mullaitivu brigade, brought out a heart-felt account of his command tenure at one-star rank. Anyone of the generation that witnessed or participated in the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) would know Mullaitivu as a hotspot then, and later as the site at which the Tamil Tigers took their last stand.

The Brigadier recounts a dilemma he faced towards the end of his command when the IPKF was recalled to the mainland by VP Singh on the change of government.

The Perumal government propped up by India was wary of ending up a foundling. The intelligence agency, perhaps with the concurrence of Indian diplomats in Colombo as Jaishankar and Hardeep Puri (‘Viceroy’ Dixit had likely left by then), wanted to steady their protégé in Jaffna. The Citizen’s Volunteer Force (CVF) was thought up.

While Perumal’s coalition herded Tamil youth together for the ‘boots on ground’, the agency ferried in weapons. What the project had not reckoned with was the commander on the ground in Trinco, Major General Jameel Mehmood.

Not lost on anyone in IPKF at the time - including this author - was that another fiasco was in the offing. A CVF company of underage youth rounded up from villages was deployed in his company area.

As Palsokar mulled over what he should do, he received a call from Jameel, whose area abutted Mullaitivu. Jameel told him what he had done in Trincomalee; going to the camp where the CVF was being assembled and asking after who were volunteers. Those who were not volunteers were marched out to rejoin their families. Palsokar’s recall in his own words:

Now came General Jameel’s crunch question. What was I going to do? I tried to tell him what our divisional headquarters had told us. He then asked me a direct question, what did I think personally? I said that I would like to do what he did, but I was not sure if I had either the authority or the guts to do so. General Jameel’s response was, ‘are you a commander?’ That settled it (pp. 169-70).

Folklore has it that Jameel, knowing that the weapons when in CVF hands would eventually get to the Tigers, took a stand. He was transferred out before the weapons were handed over to the CVF.

When I went round the CVF company in my area checking alert levels by night, I could see the luminous foresights of the Kalashnikovs from yards away. This, when I carried a World War II Sten. By when we reached Madras port on de-induction, the CVF had dissolved.

No wonder it took the Sri Lankans another two decades to clear out the Tigers; at the cost of being arraigned internationally for genocide.

Jameel was overlooked for three-star rank. On representation, he went on to command the eastern army.

You stand up for your right

Victories with stand-off weapons are laudable, but by the prime minister’s promise, the next round will be different. The Pakistanis have made that equally clear. If it turns out so, the Chinese might not sit it out either.

Instances recorded at the outset here could get to be a habit and habits we know are character-forming. If careers of officers of the Jameel ilk are not preserved, the CDS-envisioned Transformation and, in turn, Modi’s dream of Viksit Bharat will come to naught.