India’s Military Options in a Future 26/11 Scenario* Colonel Ali Ahmed (Retd)* Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 575, January-March 2009.

Introduction 26/11 gave a sense of déjà vu in the sense of being in a way a repeat of the 13 Dec 2001 attack on the Parliament.1 India’s response on the previous occasion was military mobilisation as part of an exercise in coercive diplomacy.2 The outcome was in drawing out a commitment from Pakistan not to allow its territory to be used for terrorist purposes directed against India. Since then, there has been the resumption of the peace process, ceasefire along the Line of Control and a drawdown in Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism in Kashmir, best evidenced by peaceful elections there. However, that terrorist infrastructure remains intact in Pakistan was starkly revealed in the well prepared and orchestrated terrorist outrage perpetrated at Mumbai on 26-29 Nov 2008.3 This gave rise to considerable speculation of Indian exercise of the military option in response.4 In the event, while the option has been kept open, India has instead relied on diplomacy targeting Pakistan, the UN, the USA and the international community, to bring pressure on Pakistan to take appropriate action against terrorist organisations. Even as the military option has not been exercised, it has been part of the backdrop in the crisis, with the media bringing it to the fore now and then. Should a similar crisis re-enact itself in the future, use of the military instrument may be quite different. Therefore, there is a need to analyse utility of the military option in terms of political aims, military objectives and implications with respect to effectiveness, costs and the nuclear overhang. Prospects Likelihood of terrorist outrages. Pakistan has perpetually been on the brink of ‘failed state’ status over the recent past. This tendency has been accentuated by its frontline status in the global war on terror (GWOT) that has grown to encompass its North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal area (FATA), with terrorist incidents also occurring with increasing regularity and lethality in its in hinterland.5 With the likelihood of the GWOT increasing in intensity in the vicinity due to the ‘surge’ in Afghanistan and the stated policy of the new US administration,6 there is the possibility of the situation worsening over the middle term before it gets better over the long term. Given that one of the possible reasons for the 26/11 outrage was to divert the Pakistani military from its counter insurgency engagement in FATA and NWFP to its eastern border,7 the possibility of a similar attack in the future remains. This could be state inspired, at least partially and covertly, or could have autonomous origin in terrorist strategy against both India and the GWOT. Therefore, the possibility cannot be ruled out.8 However, likelihood of the same should not be over inflated as the current conditions that inspired the attack may not recur in the future. Additionally, strengthening of India’s deterrent posture in wake of the attack by the laws enacted, investigative agency set-up and the additional security measures and coordination undertaken would also impact terrorist calculus.9 State sponsorship, if any, would in all probability get diluted in light of the increased likelihood of India’s possible response with a military option in future. However, the internal complexion of the Pakistani state could veer to the ‘right’ in face of the additional US pressure in the GWOT, which may make a diversion on its eastern front a tempting strategy for the Army-ISI combine.10 Possible resort to the military option. India has demonstrated restraint and maturity in wake of both the Parliament and the Mumbai attacks.11 It has not allowed the calibration of its policy to be hijacked by war hysteria. However, India has possibly reached the limit of its tolerance levels. Internal politics may compel adoption of a hard-line in face of future testing of its resolve.12 Media orchestration of public opinion, inevitable in a free democracy, would impact policy. While public mood should not determine policy, democratic accountability requires that it be taken into account as a factor. India’s credibility would also require to be demonstrated lest restraint be mistaken for weakness. International community would be more amenable to an assertive Indian response, but with the direction of the GWOT at the juncture duly factored in.13 India’s military preparations for a set of response options would likely be in place as a result of the lessons learnt from this crisis and would be in a position to execute a response strategy in a short warning scenario. Lastly, having tried mobilisation in Dec 2001 and diplomacy in Dec 2008, and with both being found wanting, there would be a requirement for adopting other options, not excluding the military option. Contextual aspects Recalling the Clausewitzian Trinity. It bears consideration that the outcome of conflict is usually uncertain. The only certainty is that change accrues and often outcomes may prove undesirable. This is not only with respect to the levels of attainment of aims of the conflict, but also to internal political complexion of state and society. Therefore, resort to the military instrument is not an exercise that can be done under provocation by a few terrorists, but must be a well considered one. The aspects of ‘chance’, ‘passions’ and ‘policy’, reflecting the concerns of the ‘military’, ‘people’ and the ‘government’ – they comprise Clausewitz’s Trinity – combine to make for unpredictability in the outcome of a conflict.14 In the India-Pakistan case, adversarial history serves as a potentially escalatory backdrop. The second insight of Clausewitz - of the tendency towards Absolute War inherent in conflict - is also relevant to serve as a theoretical context to any consideration of the military option.15 Therefore, even if political aims and military objectives of a military response option are kept limited to begin with, the over riding aspect of limitation – even without factoring in the nuclear question – necessitates that any response option be first thought through and not one conducted in isolation of and without reference to Pakistan. Instead, counter-intuitively, getting Pakistan on board by acquiescing with India’s action would be an inescapable prerequisite.16 India’s Grand Strategy. India ventured a course correction in its grand strategy by resorting to a change from socialism and non-alignment to liberalisation and a realist foreign policy to cope with the demands of the post Cold War era. This has resulted in its positioning as a potential Great Power today.17 The premier element of this grand strategy has been its economic policy of faster growth in order to expand the dimensions of the ‘cake’.18 The impact of a military response option on this aspect would be the most important consideration. This impact would be accentuated in the period of global economic recession. This factor would have a dissuasive influence and any military response option would necessarily have to be a limited one with the least escalatory potential. GWOT. The US presence in the region would have to be reckoned with. India would require making any military decision to be in consonance with the US aims. This would not only be sound diplomacy but would supplement GWOT resources. Since the performance of the Pakistani Army is crucial to the GWOT, any Indian action would require ensuring that it is least diversionary for Pakistani action to its west. Any diversion would result in a vacuum there; with the adverse fallout of giving strategic space to the Taliban to regroup. Therefore, India’s aims would require to be overtly and explicitly conveyed to Pakistan. Since this may not be possible when the operation is under execution due to crisis constraints, the possibility should be discussed with Pakistan during the interregnum prior to the next provocation. Doing so would ensure Pakistani reaction can be managed away from being an escalatory over reaction. The nuclear factor. Bernard Brodie’s understanding of the nuclear era has not found a wide audience in India. His conceputalisation of the chief purpose of militaries being the prevention of war has been adapted by India to read – the purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons and not war itself.19 The Limited War and Cold Start doctrines are a result of this understanding.20 For votaries of the military option, the Pakistani nuclear threshold is ‘high’ and any interpretation that it is instead a ‘low’ one is but deterrent posturing by Pakistan.21 This understanding has created the space for the military response option despite the nuclear era.22 The Kargil episode demonstrates that it is an understanding shared by Pakistan. Therefore, while there appears scope for employment of a military option, caution is nevertheless warranted. Strategic Dialogue. Limitation to any military response option is inescapable. Keeping it confined to the lowest rungs of the escalatory ladder would be prudent. Doing this would require a certain amount of concurrence on Pakistan’s part. This would entail networking it into acquiescing with India’s intent, if necessary with the US intervention on India’s behalf as intermediary. This should be done prior to the next attack as the response would likely be executed under a time constraint and in a crisis situation. This unprecedented exercise implies a meeting of minds between the Indian and Pakistani security establishments. The assumption is that the Pakistani security establishment is rational and not the one sponsoring the terrorist act.23 It’s not being in complete control is resulting in terrorist acts against India. Thus to avert an Indian military response drawing a like response from Pakistan and resulting in an escalatory ‘tit for tat’ spiral, India’s military response should instead be met with restraint by Pakistan, if not proactive action by it against the persisting terrorist infrastructure. Incentivising such action by Pakistan is the test of Indian diplomatic strategy in the interim before the next terrorist strike, if it takes place at all. Pakistan could use the Indian military response as an excuse for a turn around and crack down on terrorist organisations under the rationale of the larger national interest. This has precedence, i.e. the manner in which it reacted to the US threat to ‘bomb it back into the stone age’.24 A strategic engagement with Pakistan is required, through back channels, if need be.25 Response Options Political aims and military means. From political aims flow military objectives and strategy. Political aims range from minimal to expansive. In the context of response options these would be formed internally by political pressures, media hype, public outrage and capabilities; and externally by availability of international support and an assessment of Pakistani reaction. Along an ascending order the aims could range from exacting revenge to making Pakistan comply. The former would imply acute limitation in military strategy restricted to ‘demonstration strikes’ on terrorist infrastructure, while the latter means strategic compellence amounting to Limited War.26 Since escalation cannot be ruled out – there being two actors – a shared understanding of an escalatory ladder needs to be arrived at, so as to enable termination of hostilities at the lowest possible level. Operationalising the Strategy. Military means would require to be tightly controlled in light of limited political ends. Self-regulation internal to the military would be a necessity. Likewise the media would require to be appropriately managed in order that media fanned public passions do not adversely impact policy. Use of multiple voices and diplomacy through media should be abjured. The opposition would require to be taken on board so that a consensus is presented not only internally but also to the outside world. Maximisation of diplomatic effort should be done simultaneously as the military instrument is only meant to complement these resources. At all times, all channels to Pakistan be kept open to include direct diplomatic, through friendly countries and intermediaries as special envoys, back channel and hotlines. The Military Option Prior discussion of the escalatory ladder should be undertaken with the states involved in the GWOT, particularly the US. Compatibility between the operations to the east and west of Pakistan needs to be built in conceptually, a priori. A strategic dialogue needs to be initiated with Pakistan so as to convey Indian resolve and limited intent in wake of a possible future terrorist outrage.27 This would in the event defuse Pakistani over-reaction, permitting termination of the conflict at the lowest escalatory levels. Higher escalatory levels of a Limited War should be avoided at all costs. However, these need be resorted to only in case of usurpation of power in Pakistan by right wing extremists and in coalition with the international community, preferably with the approval of the UN Security Council. The timeline of response at the lowest level should be earliest. The firebreak between each level should be such, so as to allow diplomatic gains to be made and assessed. The main limitation of the military option is the implication of its inherently escalatory potential for political aims. It is likely that military coercion would serve to prompt Pakistani nationalism, resulting its cohering at least temporarily, behind its military.28 Such a constellation would push India to further exertion or stand down. Exerting high levels of pressure could prompt the undesirable outcome of rightist forces taking over the state in alliance with fundamentalist elements in society. Pakistani fragility, though taken as being over projected by Pakistan for the purposes of blackmailing the international community,29 should be taken with seriousness as Pakistanis themselves see their ‘failed state’ status as an existential threat. Since India would prefer to see Pakistan on even keel, the utility of the military option is only for posturing to supplement diplomacy. Resorting to it, however, would be only in an extreme circumstance since India would not like to be deflected from its socio-economic trajectory by the action of a set of terrorists aimed at this very reaction. Conclusion The limited gains made so far in wake of 26/11, of getting Pakistani compliance with Indian requirements indicate that next time around there would be greater pressure for adopting a hard line, to include the military option.30 The discussion here has revealed this to be of limited utility. There is, therefore, a need to think through the need for India to engage with Pakistan meaningfully as has been envisaged in the Simla and the Lahore Agreements.31 So far India has refrained from doing so in the belief that increasing relative power differentials would eventually lead up to Pakistan band-wagoning with India. This expectation has considerable weight. Incentivising Pakistan to bring this about would be correct prioritisation by India of its grand strategic goals with economic goals taking precedence over power oriented strategic conflict. Contrary to the suggestion of a proactive military response made by some strategists in wake of the Mumbai terror attack, the argument here is instead a ‘strategic pause’32 in which husbanding of power indices along the economic and social cohesion vectors are preferred as against the use of military power.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

*The views expressed in this article are that of the author and do not reflect USI / Government of India views. **Colonel Ali Ahmed (Retd) commanded 4 MARATHA LI. Presently, he is a Research Fellow at the IDSA, New Delhi and a doctoral candidate in International Politics at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 575, January-March 2009.

LIMITATIONS OF A MILITARY RESPONSE TO 26/11 Monday, January 5, 2009

The Front Page - Edited by Seema Mustafa

Advocacy for military action has not only come from notable voices such as that of opposition politician Mr. Arun Jaitley during the parliamentary debate, but also by military analysts as Gurmeet Kanwal and Maroof Raza. Though India has a stated position that military options have not been discounted in the current crisis, the option would certainly figure once again the next time round and with greater salience. While India has rightly not chosen to exercise the military option this time, its leadership may not be able to withstand the domestic pressure for military action next time. The good sense at the current juncture owes to several factors, not least of which is the status of the GWOT ongoing in the close vicinity. Besides, India would not like its economic trajectory to be diverted by a conflict in the midst of a global financial downturn. In refraining from the military option, India has wisely chosen not to play to the gallery. This may not be the case next time. In case the terror infrastructure persists in Pakistan, the likelihood of taking a different decision next time remains. This would be all the more certain in case of yet another terror attack of unacceptable magnitude. Therefore, the probability of employment of the military option early in the conflict would be higher. The military options therefore warrant a closer look from point of view of their consistency with political aims, their effectiveness in doing so and their escalatory potential. Military options are in an escalatory ladder in terms of force levels used, objectives addressed and nature of Pakistani response. At the lowest level is launching of fire assaults by artillery all along the Line of Control against known terrorist infrastructure such as camps. This would require simultaneous communication to Pakistan so that it does not mistake these attacks as presaging a wider attack. Missile attacks, with Brahmos missiles on targets in depth and in Pakistani hinterland, is the option at the next higher level. In the category of response through destruction by fire power means are also attacks by aircraft no similar targets. This would be much more escalatory, besides the problem of extrication of downed crew would heighten the crisis. Land forces could be used to activate the Line of Control by breaking the ongoing ceasefire. This would enable infliction of punishment on the Pakistani Army deployed there. At a higher level is sending of ground forces across. At the lowest level this would be in the form of special forces operations against terrorist camps in shallow depth along the Line of Control. Terrain objectives that serve as launch pads for infiltration may also be captured by infantry attacks. This would necessitate crossing of the Line of Control, which if contested by Pakistan has an obvious escalatory potential. The possible actions mentioned so far have the effect of conveying Indian resolve and to exact a price from Pakistan for its continued support of terrorism. If crisis communication is suitably managed escalation need not necessarily result. However, Pakistan is unlikely to act under such coercion. On the contrary, in expectation of further Indian action on the escalatory scale and even to provoke the same, it may carry through with its blackmail by diverting its attention and effort from pursuing the Taliban in the FATA and the NWFP. To prepare for and in response to Pakistani counter moves, India would require an a priori raising of its military alert status. This alert status may not involve mobilization as was the case in the Kargil War and Operation Parakram. India now has the Cold Start doctrine which entails swiftly moving into battle stations, as the name suggests, from a 'cold start'. Nevertheless, the moves and counter moves in anticipation and in misperception would complicate crisis management. These may even be deliberately resorted to so as to focus the attention of the international community on crisis resolution with each side trying to influence world community favourably. Over-extension in this posturing could lead to an unwanted outbreak of conflict. In case wider aims are sought, such as punishing the Pakistani Army for its sponsorship of terrorism, then taking the Cold Start doctrine to its logical conclusion has been suggested as a deterrent strategy by no less than the noted strategist and academic, Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan. While this may not be the option being considered presently by the government, this may be a response option in future in the magnitude of continuing terrorism and public pressures in India for firmer action demands it. According to Dr Rajagopalan the nuclear threat should not stay India's hand for Pakistan has a 'high' nuclear threshold. Its nuclear doctrine can be interpreted as the Israeli one of 'first use, last resort'. Therefore considering the next higher step in the escalatory ladder is worthwhile since there is space between conventional war outbreak and the nuclear threshold for inflicting attrition on the Pakistani military. The Cold Start doctrine is an outcome of post-Kargil Limited War thinking in India. It was initiated at a conference at IDSA by the then Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes. He said that nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons and not war. The idea was carried forward by the then Director IDSA, Jasjit Singh. It has resulted eventually in the adoption of the Cold Start doctrine by Indian Army in 2004. The logic behind the move is reminiscent of the Cold War. As in the Cold War era, acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides made general war unthinkable. To avoid Total War, Limited War concept was developed during and in wake of the Korean War. Limitation is through self-imposed restrictions on aims, theatres of operation, weapons used and duration of conflict. Since the nuclear threat exists, limitation on the conduct of the conflict has been thought through in India also. It must be noted though that the doctrine has also drawn criticism. The employment of Cold Start in the context of a punitive response would likely also be along an escalatory ladder. It is possible that conflict could be restricted to the Line of Control. This may involve, in the first instance, capture of features that are of a defensive value so that their post conflict retention by India would enable firmer defences and secondly would make infiltration problematic of Pakistan. It is unlikely India would think of returning such heights as it had done in 1965. More offensive options could be capture of additional features that would place Pakistani defences there in jeopardy. This would make POK vulnerable to future attack by India, thereby dissuading Pakistani support. India may even consider deeper penetration, for once the initial crust has crumbled wrapping up the remainder would not be a problem. In this scenario the action would be confined to J&K, with India going in for a military solution to end the conflict there. Confining the conflict to J&K may not be possible since Pakistan may seek to react to its problem there by attacking in the plains sector of J&K or south of Pir Panjal. This could lead to an opening up of the Punjab front, making for a larger than originally conceived conventional war. This scenario may be pre-empted by India were it to choose not to confine the conflict to J&K but to expand it to the heart of Pakistan from the beginning. This would be to India's advantage since surprise would be capitalized to capture Pakistani territory and inflict attrition on its troops reacting to the invasion. The intention would be to capture shallow objectives, provoke Pakistani military reaction and decimate the same with armoured maneuver, artillery and missile fire assaults and air attacks. With requisite damage inflicted, India could declare unilateral ceasefire and withdraw from territory seized across the international border, while retaining the territory captured along the Line of Control. The aim of such a campaign would be to expose the Pakistani Army to defeat and weaken its standing in post conflict national politics. This would help democratic forces establish control there and roll back the terrorist infrastructure. The probability of this happy outcome is questionable in that a conventional Indian attack would arouse the nationalist instinct in Pakistan that would be capitalized on by right wing forces. Thus even if Pakistan Army were to suffer reverses, the nature of the conflict would change to an irregular war reminiscent of Iraq. President Musharraf had once promised an unconventional war in case of Indian invasion. Thus civilian casualties would mount even if India intends to quit Pakistani territory early. The lessons of Israel's Lebanon War of 2006 are stark. Withdrawing in face of an irregular counter would invite the odium of defeat for India. Therefore, war hysteria would mount and India would be sucked into an unintended conflict of indefinite outcome. Therefore, even if India were to win the battles as is likely in light of relative military power equations, political victory would remain distant. The nuclear question needs highlighting. Many security analysts, such as Dr Manpreet Sethi of the Center for Air Power Studies, are of the opinion that the Pakistani nuclear threshold is fairly high. To deter Indian conventional power, Pakistan depicts an irrational stance and projects a lower nuclear threshold. Others, as Kanwal, advocate that Pakistan's bluff be called and India's conventional power be used more aggressively with the threat of Pakistan being dismembered were it to resort to any kind of nuclear first use. This is the dominant school of thought in India. Their argument is fairly sustainable in case of Limited War and makes the military option politically enticing. That possible nuclear thresholds would be incorporated in all operational planning is evident from the Limited War thinking in India. Therefore, escalation to nuclear level can be discounted in case it is credibly conveyed to Pakistan that the war embarked on by India is a Limited War. In such a case, Pakistan would attempt maximum self-preservation and exercise of nuclear restraint even as it awaits India's return to its starting blocks. However, it can be expected that during the conflict the nuclear card would be used to maximum rhetoric effect in attracting international mediatory attention to the 'most dangerous place on earth'. The improbable however must not be lost sight of, for both are nuclear powers. In the circumstance of an expansion in the Limited War, through the dynamic of war acquiring its own logic and momentum, Pakistan could resort to the ultimate form of nuclear signaling through nuclear first use in the form of a 'demonstration'. This could be the conduct of a nuclear test, nuclear explosion on an uninhabited portion of its territory or a use of a single low kilo ton bomb on an insignificant Indian military target on its own territory. While this would be intended to energise conflict termination efforts, it would certainly arouse passions It is here that the Indian doctrine of 'massive retaliation' would be found wanting. Presently the doctrine is one of 'assured retaliation' in the 'assured destruction' mode. It would just not do for India to lose the moral high ground that is crucial to political outcome, by devastating Pakistan through counter value targeting. It would amount to genocide exposing the Indian leadership to serious accusations of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The response is only appropriate for an attempted 'first strike' by Pakistan which is the least likely form of Pakistani first use. The doctrine therefore requires revision to the form suggested by General Sundarji. His sensible recommendation is for nuclear war to be terminated at the lowest level of escalation. It should countenance a quid pro quo or at best a quid pro quo plus response. This would be more suited to the proactive Limited War doctrine that India has adopted. His perspicacious reading is that enemy aims should be accommodated to maximum extent possible and face saving should be part of the end state to avoid escalation in the charged setting. It may be argued that this could result in a lowering of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan, further limiting application of Indian conventional power. It would make nuclear war fighting a seemingly feasible proposition, thereby drawing India away from its position that these weapons are political tools only for deterrence. While not contesting the genuineness or moral strength of the Indian position, it is not one shared by Pakistan. Pakistan's position is akin to that of NATO in its Cold War years in which it relied on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet conventional aggression. Pakistan's resort to first use would require a sensible India response. Were India to resort to a massive punitive response it would be abandoning its Limited War intent, rendering its cities vulnerable in turn. Indian punitive response cannot guarantee elimination of Pakistan's retaliatory capability, not being intended to. Pakistan could use its surviving warheads in retaliation even in face of in-conflict deterrence. Thus absurdly India stands to lose a city or two just for the sake of the initial Pakistani strike on an ingressing Indian military target. This crisis should help initiate a debate on 'proportional deterrence' or 'graduated response' in India. The options lower down on the escalation scale are India's most likely response options in future. Stand off missile attacks and air strikes, as earlier conducted by the USA against Libya, Sudan, Pakistan and Iraq, would only dent terror facilities for these can be recreated at will. Ending the ceasefire would be of little utility as it would amount to a return to the pre ceasefire period that had yielded little by way of helping resolve any issue. Cross Line of Control use of land forces would only shift the Line of Control forward, create a fresh set of recruits to terrorist ranks of displaced Pakistani settlers along the Line of Control and would require unnecessary expenditure in firming in the relocated forces in new defences, as was the case in Kargil after the war. The new line would be even more porous to infiltration as the area would be well known to the Pakistanis and would take India some time to settle into. Therefore, terrorism in Kashmir would receive a boost, exposing India to further terrorist outrages. This indicates that military options have a limited value, if any. They are found wanting in effective compellence and coercion. In no way is Pakistan incentivised to act against the terrorist organizations, for it alone can root them out, or at best contain them, should it choose to do so. Therefore there is a case for India to consider other avenues of addressing its strategic predicament. These include engaging with the Kashmir issue meaningfully. Credible elections there should be taken as a start point and not as an end in themselves. Pakistani overtures of the Musharraf era are an opening. The presence and actions of the US in the region are another causatory factor for the spread of terror. There is a case for India to exercise its growing power in trying to bring about a regional approach substituting the US in the region. While relying on US engagement in terms of aid, development assistance and political support, cessation of military operations that are leading to an accretion in terrorist ranks need to be fore grounded. Other measures already being undertaken by India are required to be followed through. These include defensive measures and development initiatives with respect to its minority community. Discussing military options is useful so as to reinforce deterrence. However, the discussion also contributes to self-deterrence. These would therefore not be impressing Pakistan much. Which means resort to these would only be a futile expression of frustration and playing to the gallery. This would only help the terrorist cause and shift the political center of gravity of both states to the right. In the current circumstance they jeopardize the GWOT and on that account have probably not been resorted to. Therefore, India and Pakistan are at a juncture where their continued reliance on military means to settle differences should be seen as being untenable. Moving away from the militarized paradigm of thought is an alternative. Since Pakistan is unlikely to initiate this and would be a follower in this regard, the onus is on India. But for that it must first acknowledge the limitations of the military option.

JOURNAL OF DEFENCE STUDIES

Military Response to a Future 26/11 – A Dissuasive Analysis

Ali Ahmed

October 2009

Volume: 

 3

Issue: 

 4

Perspectives

The advantage in foregrounding the military option is in the deterrence value. Further, it helps the military and the government prepare for the exercise of the option in case of a shift to compellence. However, it leads to a displacement of alternative approaches from center stage. These approaches arguably have greater potentiality for delivering on long term peace and stability. The nuclear age requires that these be explored to the fullest extent.

Attachment	Size
Download Article [PDF]	35.67 KB

IDSA COMMENT

India’s response to the next terror attack

Ali Ahmed

August 26, 2009

http://www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/Indiasresponsetothenextterrorattack_AliAhmed_260809

“There is credible information of ongoing plans of terrorist groups in Pakistan to carry out fresh attacks. The area of operation of these terrorists today extends far beyond the confines of Jammu & Kashmir and covers all parts of our country…In dealing with the terrorist challenge we need to be prepared for encountering more sophisticated technologies and enhanced capabilities.”

- PM’s speech at CM’s conference on internal security, 17 August 2009

Periodic reiteration of the continuing threat to India helps consolidate the security sector reforms that were initiated in the wake of 26/11. In surveying the period since, the Home Minister observes that the record has been a ‘mixed one’, with the balance sheet as under: “Our best achievements have been in the reiteration of our determination to fight terror; in the sharing of intelligence; in the unanimous support for new laws and new instruments; and in acknowledging that police reforms have been neglected for too long. On the other hand, there are still critical deficiencies in budget allocations for the police, recruitment, training, procurement of equipment, introduction of technology, and personnel management.”

The threat of terror attacks of the magnitude of 26/11 continues to exist despite the deterrence value of the security upgrades in place in India. This owes to the instability obtaining in Pakistan. At the Yekaterinberg meeting with Dr. Manmohan Singh, Pakistan’s President Zardari had asked for time to dismantle the terror infrastructure in Pakistan. At the time Pakistan’s Army was in the midst of operations against the spread of Talibanisation in Swat. Presently, it is involved in rolling back the Taliban in Waziristan area of FATA in concert with US operations in Afghanistan. It would perhaps not like to open an internal front against the anti-India jihadi elements. This explains to an extent its reluctance and limited action against the handlers of perpetrators of the Mumbai terrorist outrage.

Prudently, India, in keeping with the dictum ‘trust but verify’, voiced by the PM in his address to the Lok Sabha clarifying the Sharm el Sheikh Joint Statement, has limited the opening up to Pakistan, restricting it to meetings of the foreign secretaries on the extent Pakistan has complied with its obligations under international law against terror and in its commitment to the landmark Islamabad Joint Statement of Janurary 2004. India’s strategy is to ‘wait and watch’ if Pakistan delivers on curbing the reliance of its Army and its intelligence agency, the ISI, on terror as a ‘strategic tool’ against India.

Under either circumstances of action against jihadi forces or inaction, the likelihood of terror attacks exists. In fact, in the unlikely case of Pakistani rolling back of terror infrastructure, the likelihood heightens owing to the jihadis wanting to set off a diversionary crisis or conflict between the two neighbours. Clearly, then, India requires thinking through its response strategy before the event itself. What would be the parameters of such a response?

Firstly, India needs to consider the military option seriously. This would not only enhance the deterrence in place against such attacks, but would ensure that the state-jihadi nexus is constricted. The state element would likely be more sensitive to the likely hurt that India could inflict militarily and therefore exercise restraint over jihadi impulses. Secondly, any such consideration would enable execution of the military operation better and integrate it with the political and diplomatic prongs of the strategy that would likely unfold in real time. Actions and mechanisms necessary for limitation can then either be pre-planned or pre-positioned. Thirdly, India would require monitoring the levels of state-non-state complicity in Pakistan. The extent the state is complicit would impact the energy India brings to its response. While ‘plausible deniability’ is a screen Pakistan has consistently exploited, proving links to state structures, if any, next time round would enhance India’s hand.

In particular, getting the Pakistanis to acquiesce to a robust Indian response, one with a military component, could also be broached directly. Though innovative, this idea is based on the understanding that the extent of state complicity in dastardly terror attacks such as Mumbai 26/11 is finite and likely limited to rogue elements. Pakistan has earlier been the origin of terror attacks on the legislative assembly in Kashmir, the Indian parliament and on commuter trains in Mumbai. It is aware that not only has India run out of tolerance but also of response options. In exercising restraint in each of the earlier instances, India has acquired the political capital and moral high ground for executing a more vigorous response in case of a future attack. Indeed, in case India is to apply the extended definition of self-defence against an armed attack as Israel does, then it is already entitled to military recourse at a time and place of its own choosing. Though discredited, the Bush doctrine of ‘preemption’ also exists in case India wishes to further cover its diplomatic flanks. Public anger may require purging through cathartic violence. Aware of the likely Indian political predicament in the wake of another attack, Pakistan cannot expect to get away lightly as earlier. In these circumstances, getting Pakistan on board so as to influence its reaction in favour of limitation makes for strategic sense.

The argument is that a robust, albeit restricted, military response may help Pakistan take a U-turn against the jihadis. This is reminiscent of the pressure put on Musharraf and Mahmood, the then ISI chief, by Bush and Armitage respectively in the wake of 9/11. The outcome was in Pakistan curtailing its support for the Taliban, leading to its defeat in the opening stages of the GWOT. Likewise, Indian pressure forced by the circumstance of another terror attack could result in an awakening, if a belated and a rude one, in Pakistan’s Army. Those privileging Pakistan’s interests over that of the narrower jihadi aims would be willing to snap the jihadi link. As it is Pakistan is reeling from the ‘blow back’. Zardari has admitted to Pakistan having nurtured terrorists and has even likened jihadis in Kashmir to terrorists. This is not entirely posturing as part of information warfare. It also reflects a certain disdain towards jihadi aims and methods not only in a section of the political establishment but also civil society at large. The extent to which the Pakistani Army has revised its view of jihadis is uncertain. But that there exists a rational-secular segment in the Army and a dominant one at that is known. This segment can be relied upon to take the internal debate as to the appropriate reaction to India’s military response in a rational direction.

In any case a military response, even one negotiated prior with Pakistan, would require a heightened state of military alert in India. This should not amount to partial moblisation since that would be escalatory. Central to such a response is limitation and inducement of limitation in Pakistan’s reaction. Limitation could be in terms of areas addressed, targets hit, duration of operation and weapons employed. Surgical strikes with stand off weapons relying on accurate intelligence fit the bill best. Even as these are being executed, diplomacy would require going into high gear for amplifying Indian limited aims. For this, direct and continuing interface with Pakistan is necessary. The three hotlines between the two states must be fully used along with back channels, Track Two contacts and the good offices of the US. Obviously, the media is not the conduit for such parleys. For this the Indian security establishment must rely on only one spokesperson. Information warriors should be wary of the underside of media induced and fanned passions.

Pakistani reciprocity is not impossible to imagine, since limitation carries with it definite advantages. Escalation would only worsen its internal stability and economy. The US would not subsidise any conflict with India. This would render Pakistan vulnerable to right wing forces within, an unpalatable prospect for both the Army and the elite. While chastened, Pakistan may prefer to allow India to blow off steam.

That such a strategy would require networking the US alongside is inevitable. Presently, greater demands on and scrutiny of Pakistani action under the Af-Pak policy has led to Pakistani compliance. Its action has been biased in favour of US interest in Afghanistan as against Indian demands. In case of US accommodating an exasperated Indian response, Indian national security interest would also be addressed through the GWOT. The follow-up would of course be heightened US pressure for India to concede ground on Kashmir. This could be met by a simultaneous offer by India of fast tracking the composite dialogue process, that includes Kashmir. The twin prongs – military and diplomatic – of the strategy would thus be sensitive to both US and Pakistani aims.

A military response option is not out of sync with India’s long standing strategic posture of restraint. Indeed, restraint requires that this option remains menacingly on the table. Restraint is implicit even in its exercise.

The Post 26/11 Regional Strategic Predicament

Ali Ahmed

December 3, 2008

http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ThePost26-11RegionalStrategicPredicament_AAhmed_031208

Evidence gathered in the aftermath of by far the most deadly terrorist attack in Mumbai indicates conclusively that the attack was planned by the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba. The attack on Mumbai was executed by a well trained and indoctrinated suicide squad comprising of ten Pakistani terrorists. This testifies to the long gestation planning and preparation that can only have been made possible by the resources of a well established terrorist organization. The recruitment was from Punjab, training was in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and maritime training was conducted in Karachi. A physical reconnaissance of the target area was then conducted, and after an aborted attempt to carry out the attack during Diwali, the terrorists were launched by the Lashkar operative, Zaki ur Rahman, from Karachi on November 23, 2008.

To have an organization with such capability within a country means that there has been an abdication of internal policing by the state and a loss of monopoly over force – a primary characteristic of statehood. This is an index of Pakistan’s slide to failing state status. And given the growing extent of ungoverned spaces in FATA and NWFP, Pakistan is poised on the brink of state failure. Given the Pakistan Army’s inability to tackle the neo-Taliban in these areas and the government’s approach to the IMF for a bail out make it apparent that Pakistan does not have the capacity to cope with the internal challenges confronting it. It may therefore not be prudent for India to rely on Pakistan for rolling back the Islamist threat emanating from within its borders.

India’s demarche has required Pakistan to act and be seen as acting against terrorist groups within its territory. India is in a strong position to press the issue since it has been at the receiving end of a proxy war for about two decades in Jammu & Kashmir. Terrorism sponsored by the ISI has been witnessed since the Mumbai bombings of March 1993. Lately these have increased in number and spatial spread to various parts of the country as well as the Indian embassy in Kabul. There is a case for all these attacks being taken cumulatively as amounting to an ‘armed attack’. India is thus in a position to legitimately undertake appropriate actions in self-defence to include military measures. In case Pakistan’s response against terrorists based in its territory is not adequately firm, India could then up the ante by unilateral military action. For additional legitimacy it could approach the UN Security Council to apprise it of the threat to international peace and security originating in Pakistan and which Pakistan is was unwilling or unable to do anything about.

India’s demarche demanding the handing over of those involved in anti-India terrorism has not been received well in Pakistan. While the civilian government appears willing, it does not have control over the country’s India and security policies and is therefore unable to deliver on its promises. In the earlier case of Operation Parakram, despite mobilization of troops India was unable to coerce Pakistan to hand over the twenty terrorists demanded. It is possible that prevarication would greet India this time around as well, with Pakistan blackmailing the United States with the threat that it would divert its attention from ongoing anti-Taliban operations towards its eastern front. India would require instead to put pressure on the US to have Pakistan deliver on its demands. The visit of Condoleezza Rice would be an opportunity to get the US onboard.

The approach should be one of convincing the US and, indeed, Pakistan also, on the long term threat posed by the Islamists to Pakistan. The awareness about this threat within Pakistan is apparently fairly high. That is why Pakistan has been avoiding a confrontation and is likely to continue to do so even in the face of Indian pressure. Its fear is that this may result in a civil war. Should this threat stay Pakistan’s hand, then India may require to determinedly convince Islamabad of Indian support in such a confrontation. Besides, Pakistan would be assured of the support of the international community in such an event. This would strengthen its hands against Islamists and hardliners in the state apparatus such as in the Army and the ISI. The outcome therefore would be along the lines as obtained in Algeria in the 1990s. Most Islamic states have successfully resorted to force of varying levels against Islamists. Since these negative forces have to be eventually confronted in any case, seizing this opportunity to do so would be in Pakistan’s interest.

Thus far Pakistan has been circumspect in its fight against Islamism both in the form of home grown Islamists or the neo-Taliban. This policy has had the rationale that Pakistan should not sacrifice its strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir in what is popularly seen as someone else’s war. This position is a carry over from the Musharraf era. The democratic dispensation and the new Army leadership have since been more assertive in operations against Taliban elements. There has also been appreciable restraint in infiltrating terrorists into Kashmir to disrupt the polls there, even though there have been more violations of the ceasefire this year, testifying to attempts at infiltration being foiled by alert Indian forces on the Line of Control.

However, the Islamist threat within Pakistan, of which anti-India terrorism is an expression, has not been addressed. The logic is perhaps that opening up an internal front to tackle these elements amidst the ongoing turmoil to the North West may not be prudent. Pakistan may not be able to see the necessity of opening up this front for it has not itself been subject to attack. Instead it has managed to direct the Islamist anger outwards and may consider that it has found, in such action, a strategic instrument to cut a growing India down to its own troubled size. This could well be how the ISI, and the Army, may be tempted to interpret the outcome in Mumbai.

The alternative approach is Indian military action. The argument in this respect could be that unless forceful action is taken against anti-Indian Islamists, terrorist attacks on India in future cannot be ruled out. The perception of success in the Mumbai attacks is likely to spur these groups to greater adventurism. Future attacks are thus a probability, particularly if the reaction of India or of the Pakistani authorities proves to be weak. This would make it politically impossible for the Indian government to remain inert against the mounting public anger. Such reasoning could eventuate in a limited retributive military action on Pakistani territory, which could assume the form of attacks against known Islamist strongholds such a Muridke and/or other terrorist facilities in POK. This could well provoke Islamist reaction against the Pakistani state, thus triggering a civil war. Indian military action could be even more implacable in the form of the Limited War strategy called Cold Start. Since both military approaches have escalatory potential, it would be well if Pakistan were to be responsive to India’s concerns and forcibly restrain the Islamists through a long term policy course correction.

Military means are available but useful only in so far as they are not used. Their ready availability is a useful tool to focus the attention of the United States and Pakistan on the necessity of taking visible and tangible action in accordance with Indian demands. Indian restraint in the face of provocation has buttressed its case politically and diplomatically. It could in the interim think through the spectrum of military options available to it, which could be in line with the aims of the international community in the ongoing and overarching global war on terror. This may be in the form of air and missile attacks on select Islamist targets such as camps. These attacks should be launched after informing Pakistan and as a form of overt signalling of Indian resolve, and should seek to avoid collateral damage. This would degrade any escalatory potential and provide Pakistan the incentive to take action against the Islamists in the name of a ‘Pakistan first’ strategy.

From the Mumbai attack it would appear that an aim sought by the Islamists was to profit by setting off a regional crisis. The idea was perhaps that such a crisis would push Pakistan finally over the brink and make the Islamist agenda appear as the only feasible alternative for the hapless people of Pakistan. Such a plot line would require great political sagacity on the part of India to navigate through the crisis. India has in the past repeatedly demonstrated its strategic wisdom, even in the face of internal criticism. This time it has a more difficult situation on hand, with not only Pakistan requiring to be addressed but also the United States and, more importantly, the angered Indian nation. The necessary defensive measures such as a new investigation agency, additional NSG hubs, guarding of the sea front and improved policing have rightly been announced and are already underway. Of the offensive measures, the preferred option for India is to work patiently through a collaborative strategy with even a reluctant Pakistan on board. Even if the Indian response were to involve military force, this should eventuate in bold Pakistani action against its home grown Islamists. The other two options of unilateral action, and worse, of inaction, in the current regional strategic 

India-Pakistan: Prospects of War

8.ak
 http://www.w54.biz/showthread.php?790-India-Pakistan-Prospects-of-War

04 Aug 2010 Ali Ahmed*: The meeting of the two foreign ministers at Islamabad ended in failure. The announcement of another meeting in December acts as a silver lining. Could the silver lining be of war clouds? That the ‘pause’ in India-Pakistan relations has been extended to December encouragingly indicates that the two governments are sanguine of the improbability of war. Nevertheless, given the cyclic past of crisis bordering on conflict, it would be prudent to check how dark are the clouds overhead and over the horizon.

Past crisis have been been triggered by terror attacks; and this remains a possibility. Firstly, circumstances that surrounded 26/11 continue to obtain. It was thought then that Pakistan, under pressure to take on the Taliban on its side of the border, had sparked the crisis as a distraction. Pakistan is now under pressure to go into North Waziristan. The pressure can be expected to only grow given the extent of ISI complicity with the Taliban, brought out by Wikileaks. ISI linkages and support of rogue elements within the Establishment remain. A crisis would not be unwelcome for GHQ, Rawalpindi.

Secondly, the autonomous agenda of the terror groups has expanded in face of Pakistani action against them. They have taken on the Army there at its very heart, the GHQ, and have just killed the Frontier Corps chief. Lastly, in the tradition of Mumbai 26/11, strategic coercion by Pakistan for progress on what it considers the ‘core issue’, Kashmir, can be ruled in since the talks route has ruled itself out. It would help keep Pakistan relevant lest the agenda set by youth in ongoing agitations in Kashmir marginalize Pakistan.

That a crisis could occur as a result of the next terror attack is not lost on the government. This is why the government does appear to have preferred success of the talks. This can be seen from the foreign minister’s pinning of the blame for failure on the home secretary. If the talks failed, it was less due to design, than the dissonance on Pakistan and Kashmir that has come to characterize India’s policies. Nevertheless, it was also clear that the composite dialogue was not about to restart. This indicates the confidence India appears to have in being able to deter the next terror attack and, should that not succeed manage the consequent crisis.

It may also reflect its levels of confidence in its protective efforts since 26/11. The problem is that the next terror attack can be expected to work round these schemes. Best indicator of readiness of an offensive reaction to the next 26/11, is in the release last month of the joint air-land doctrine by the HQ Integrated Defence Staff. This is meant to deter calculated action by the GHQ. It could also instead act as spur for terrorist minders.

Without ongoing talks, there is no buffer left. The readiness of the military option will kick in. With both the NSA and the Home Secretary having unambiguously pointed out the ISI connection to 26/11, restraint based on the ‘plausible deniability’ argument would also not suffice. Public opinion has not been prepared on the continuing rationality of restraint. Instead, the government was only being responsive to public opinion in its ‘go slow’ on resumption of composite dialogue. US presence and pressure for restraint this time round may prove counter productive. The government like being seen as being more mindful of US interests than Indian. The right wing, presently in disarray, would get a handle to recoup. Recent interventions by the military in policy making such as on the AFSPA and Kashmir, albeit through the media, suggest that their input would be difficult to resist. Lastly, in case the agitations in Kashmir worsen, India may want to shoot its way out to a ‘solution’.

Indian military reaction by itself would not spell war. While being seen to be ‘doing something’, it would likely be least escalatory. It may be restricted to surgical strikes etc, well short of war. Nevertheless, war could be by inadvertence. Even as India goes about its military reaction, it would be bringing into place deterrence measures against escalation. These could be misread in Islamabad as signs of an imminent offensive. India’s doctrine, ‘Cold Start’, lends itself to such a reading. Pakistani attempts to preempt the same would amount to inadvertent escalation. On the other hand, escalation by design cannot be ruled out to the extent the terror attack is a sponsored one. Pakistan would use the outbreak of war to refocus the world’s attention on the issues left unaddressed by the two states at Islamabad.

The inference is that, engagement closed, the two states are sanguine about the other two options: status quo; and, were that to deteriorate, protection of their interest through military means. A status quo without a terror attack is not impossible, but is a risky proposition. In running the risk, both states apparently have confidence in their conventional war fighting abilities and ability to ward off or withstand attendant nuclear risks. While the former can be understood, the latter calls for comment.

No nuclear risk reduction mechanism exists between the two states. Their last engagement over nuclear issues was in 2007. Having gone nuclear is not enough. Preventing unintended consequences as the logical next step was acknowledged in the Lahore MOU. This is an area that cannot be held hostage to the state of their relationship. Opting for the status quo by the two states makes for a questionable strategy.

India waged Limited War Kargil, mobilized during Operation Parakram and exercised restraint after 26/11. None of these worked. Status quo could present it with the two remaining options left: engage Pakistan meaningfully or go to war. India needs avoid war by engaging Pakistan meaningfully. The interim till December can be used to create the opinion for enabling this.
Ali Ahmed recently left the armed forces to pursue a PhD, CIPOD, SIS at Jawaharlal Nehru University and writes occasionally for 8ak.

The ‘Pause’ in India-Pakistan Dialogue
http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/the-pause-in-india-pakistan-dialogue-2983.html

India-Pakistan relations are once again in a trough, perhaps this is fallout of the terror unleashed by the jihadis on 26/11. While cutting off of the dialogue can be seen as fallout of their action, persisting with the ‘pause’ has moved beyond mere ‘fallout’ to become ‘strategy’. Ostensibly it is a way to keep up the pressure on Pakistan to act against the handlers of these jihadis. By now, some forward movement could have been expected, particularly because of the need to avoid another 26/11. Why has this not happened?

What accounts for India persisting with the strategy of ‘pause’?

India is mindful that response to terror directed at India would require Indian pressure, separate and in addition to any pressure mounted by its friend and partner, the US. It is the success of such pressure that results in Pakistani complaints – exaggeration apart - about Indian action in Afghanistan and allegedly also in Baluchistan.

By withholding from talks, India is driving home its advantage. In case it succeeds in pushing Pakistan to deliver, then it achieves its aims. In case Pakistan takes some action, this can be taken as success of the pressure. In case Pakistani action results in an extremist backlash, then the reaction would force the Pakistani state to keep up the action, if not enlarge its scope. This is a situation not averse to some in India. Pakistan has taken limited, if reluctant, action. It has not done any more, lest the largely Punjabi jihadi groups combine with the Pashtun Taliban and destabilize Pakistan’s core areas. India may then, along with the international community, assist Pakistan and in doing so extract Pakistani compliance with Indian interests.

A possible outcome is Pakistan not delivering on Indian demands, particularly the prosecution of mastermind, Hafeez Sayeed. While this is likely, by demanding it, India is compelling Pakistan to at least go after the smaller fish. It would also serve to justify India’s stand that Pakistan is not doing enough. This would permit India to pursue its containment of Pakistan by intelligence means. ‘No talks’ implies that no politically difficult concessions need be made. India cannot be held to the Pakistani requirement in the Islamabad joint statement. There being no buffer of talks, India’s possible recourse to military means in response to another 26/11 would deter Pakistani state complicity. In case of another 26/11, the Indian state cannot be put on the defensive internally for having resumed talks prematurely. India does not need talks anymore for controlling the situation in Kashmir since it appears to have arrived at a position of strength there. More importantly, talks serve little purpose in light of the political schizophrenia in Pakistan. The ‘talks as strategy’ route was to propel forces in favour of peace in Pakistan within its polity. This has not happened. Lastly, India, looking for parity with China, would like to end the hyphenation with Pakistan that talks only serve to reinforce.

For its part, Army-controlled Pakistan is hoping to transit its period of potential instability without overly compromising on its political ends and strategic means, both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In retrospect, would India’s strategy of ‘pause’ be seen as time lost?

Pakistan has now tasted ‘blow-back’ intimately. It is barely managing to roll back Islamists and would not want them to rise inordinately again. There are also internal forces in Pakistan, such as a growing middle class, the civil society and the media, which are not in favour of continued hostility with India. Some sections, especially the commercial class, instead may want to profit from engaging with an economically vibrant India. There is also an increasing pragmatism in the political class on the issue of Kashmir, as seen in statements by President Zardari and former President Musharraf from time to time. The fact is that anti-American and anti-Indian sentiments exist. Therefore, the regime cannot go overboard in meeting aims either of the West or of India. It would not do so at the risk of compromising Pakistan’s stability. Pakistan can be pushed only so far. It follows that strategic prudence requires that these limits be respected.

There is no escaping the fact that only talks can help tackle the outstanding issues between the two states. Just as the military action, Operation Parakram, lost its sting after a while, the ‘pause’ strategy too could do so. Therefore, India needs to change gears soon. ‘Pause’ is not an ‘end’ in itself, but an instrument of pressure. The pressure having succeeded to the extent it has, it is time to change gears. The opportune moment to resume talks seems to be the first anniversary of 26/11. It has been a year since the last terror incident outside of Kashmir. Perhaps an announcement may be made prior to the PM’s state visit to the US and as with the Islamabad meeting, the postponed SAARC summit of this year could witness a replay of Islamabad 2004.

Post 26/11 Strategy Recomendation For India
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/post-2611-strategy-recomendation-for-india-2758.html

The 'proactive' school of thought believes that India should respond rigorously to the Mumbai terrorist attacks. The argument is that the attackers need to be punished and future attacks deterred. India's credibility is also at stake. India, being a democratic polity, need to respond to enraged public opinion. The aim of a riposte would be to convey to Pakistan, and to the jihadi elements there, of Indian capacity and resolve. It would seek to pressurize the Pakistani state into action against its radicalized segments and their support base. This would focus the attention of the international community, particularly of the US, thus pushing Pakistan to deliver on its oft-stated intent of ensuring that its territory is not used for terrorist activity against India. In challenging this argument, this article recommends measures for incentivizing Pakistani action against Islamists in its establishment, polity and society.

First a desegregation of the power reality in Pakistan is necessary, to set the stage for a discussion of India's post 26/11 aims and strategy. The Pakistani state is characterized by, competing power centers, on a scale unlike any other. The state apparatus is an uneasy balance between the rational and Islamist elements, with power being tenuously held by the former for the moment. This is evident from the strategy of hedging Pakistan has followed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Both these strands have their support base in polity and society.

Second, two points that are relatively self-evident are not apparent to the protagonists of the proactive military response to terrorist strikes in Mumbai. One, is that India is not in a position to change the internal political equations in Pakistan. At best, its action can impact the equation, perhaps for the worse. In all probability, the impact of offensive action would strengthen the right wing in the establishment that is in a quasi alliance with the jihadist forces. The second is that the outcome India seeks in terms of whittling down the strength of these forces that are behind the Mumbai attack, which can only be brought about by Pakistan. It would involve the rational elements of the Army and ISI, in alliance with democratic forces, taking on the radicalized segment within the state structure and in society. Working towards the second outcome is in India's interest.

There are two possible outcomes of military response, even if at the lowest level of the proverbial escalatory ladder - that of striking Islamist targets with air strikes or missiles. The first, as desired by the proactive school, is Pakistani action against Islamist elements. A recalcitrant Pakistan may well respond negatively. There is also no guarantee against the power center shifting towards the Islamists. Considering the probability of the two outcomes one should try and clinch a decision on the issue. Even if the first outcome were to appear a higher probability, India would be required to consider the risk of the latter. It is argued here that the risk is fairly high and India should not, on that account, precipitate matters. The military option at the lowest level of missiles and air strikes can at best serve the purpose of signaling political resolve, reassuring the domestic lobby, and focusing international diplomatic energy.

The 'proactive' option not having passed the test of persuasive aims and likelihood of effectiveness, the alternatives need examination. Two competing strategies are possible at this juncture. One is to await the outcome of US and NATO pressure on Pakistan in the GWOT. This would lay India open to future attacks, necessitating a return to the present strategic discussion of the 'proactive' option.

The alternative strategy - one that has not been discussed in strategic circles - is that India should try and undercut the main cause of angst in Pakistan. It is the anti-Americanism arising from US presence and action in the region and elsewhere in the Muslim world. America could be seen as part of the problem and, by that yardstick, should be approached to form part of the solution through crafting an exit strategy. India should utilize its good offices with the Americans to convey that its military exit from the region would have the effect of undercutting the forces that derive their strength from opposing it. These forces are responsible for destabilizing the region. The US should therefore, realign its strategy from a military dominant approach to an indirect strategy of helping stabilize the region through developmental aid. The military 'surge' contemplated under General Petraeus should envisage an end state in which American troops leave Afghanistan in a finite timeframe. The same can be negotiated with the new government that would assume office after elections in Afghanistan in 2009. The announcement of the intent and time-frame and deepening the opening to the Taliban through Saudi channels, while giving fillip to the Taliban, would also undercut its militant ardour and that of its allies.

The strategic sense is in recognizing limits to relative strength and undercut vulnerabilities. 26/11 can therefore serve as a useful crossroad, one that should be traversed with greater wisdom than was 9/11.