Showing posts with label india-china. Show all posts
Showing posts with label india-china. Show all posts

Friday, 1 August 2025

https://m.thewire.in/article/books/who-dares-win-joshi-is-great-that-said-theres-more


https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/joshi-is-great-that-said-theres-more


Joshi is great; that said, there’s more.

Reviewing 'Who Dares Wins'


General Joshi interests on two counts. He is an authentic ‘Kargil War Hero’, as the book cover puts it.* More interestingly, he was the commander of the northern theatre during the Chinese incursion.

His autobiography is worth a read on the first count, on tactical level leadership, for it tells of the making of the war hero.

However, a reader would be disappointed if she wishes to know more about the Chinese actions in Ladakh during his time there. Presumably his current position as head of the China think tank of the external affairs ministry prevents him from being more informative.

Alternatively, the blanket on information access - that has been a feature of the Modi regime - perhaps kept the general reticent on that most consequential operational level command he held.

Reportedly, a few years back an order was put out restraining members of security services from discussing matters in their operational ken after demitting office; though it is uncertain if that covered the military. There were threats of stoppage of pensions too.

One problem with this regimen is the free pass given to the regime’s narrative on security incidents. Ordinarily, such narratives can only be self-interested and in case of the populist authoritarianism on in India, self-centered.

The downside is that it deprives the primary principal in the principal-agent relationship – the Voter – a grasp of whether ‘all is well’ with Indian security.

Absent a fuller perspective – brought about by a liberal information order as befits a democracy – the Voter is handicapped. This explains Mr. Modi recent surpassing of Indira’s record in number of days at the helm.

To be fair, a self-styled ‘apolitical’ army might not wish to put out a narrative that might show up the governmental one. Sure, the civilian masters of the military have the ‘right to be wrong;’ but its not for the military to conceal it.

However, this approach to ‘apolitical’ betrays a limited understanding of the principal-agent relationship.

While the government (here regime) is the principal and the army the agent in the principal-agent relationship of subordination, the army must know it is an institution of the State.

The State is run per the Constitution. The Constitution makes the regime accountable to the people - the ultimate principal. Thus, people exercise accountability through their power of the Vote.

Inadequate information on which to base their choice debilitates the Voter.

Hence, the Voter cannot be the target of and subject to information war - the feature of nascent emphasis in the current-day changed character of war.

The notion that all it takes is to win the war of narratives amounts to believing that the nature of war itself has changed. Worse is to ‘win’ the narrative war internally. This is absurd.

Since security concerns are existential in nature, it is of categorical imperative status that people are furnished reliable information on security.

That is the national interest and national security, as distinct from regime interest and security.

A mistaken conflation of the two appears to be at hand, resulting in a novel understanding of political subordination of the military.

A government is run by a political party voted to power may be less than forthright on security matters – using the security of information as cover. This enables hiding of shortcomings and projection of falsity as reality.

Absent State institutions playing their intended role with a commitment to Constitutional verities, the opposition, the attentive public, ‘armchair strategists’ and the Voter are deprived of the benefits of the democratic checks-and-balances schema.

To the extent the military is participant, it is complicit in the ‘dismantling of India’s democracy.’

Memoirs of officials serve a very useful purpose in fleshing out the record. They illumine areas independently, if not quite disinterestedly. Admittedly, memoirs are but a perspective and may be self-exculpatory; and yet, they constitute the drops that make up the ocean.

By this yardstick, Joshi’s memoir is half-baked. It is a useful tactical level take of the Indian fighting man.

However, for the next quarter century, a reader might have to be content with Joshi’s promise of a sequel. He says it will be a sanitized version, as Operation (Op) Snow Leopard - quite like Op Sindoor - continues indefinitely.

Joshi is only being practical. Recall, his then boss, Army Chief Naravane’s memoirs were aborted.

The upshot will be that readers won’t get to know anything more than the official version. Joshi puts this out as gospel in the couple of paras he devotes to what - to some - amounts to a significant setback.

He recounts how he witnessed as early as 5 May the first Chinese incursion, in this case a PLA helicopter making for Galwan but which scooted back on spotting the Indian one, in which Joshi was taking a ride.

Joshi admits to a challenging situation that required ‘deft handling’. Enumerating the ‘transgressions’, including at Galwan, he pats himself of the back – “We handled them well.”

To be sure, Galwan triggered due planning and preparation for the launch of a ‘quid pro quo operation (QPQ)’ in the Rezang La-Rechin La complex on the Kailash ranges, on either side of the Pangong Tso and also further to the north.

He appreciatively writes: “We completely took the PLA by surprise, brought them back to the negotiation table and forced them to beat a hasty retreat. This was Operation Snow Leopard.”

Whereas a show of force was warranted and its execution commendable, it, firstly, took rather long in coming, and, secondly, its effects were not exploited – any gains given up even before Joshi demitted uniform. There is no word on the latter.

As theatre commander, Joshi had the wherewithal in-situ for securing Indian territorial integrity. The Indian military’s pivot to the China front having begun a decade earlier, quite like at Kargil which - is not dissimilar - he ought to have echoed Ved Malik: “We’ll fight with what we have.”

Providentially, as a self-acknowledged China-hand, and a Mandarin speaking one at that, he was the right man in the right place at the right time. He’d done time in Beijing as defence attaché.

All his three star-commands were in Ladakh, successively at Tangtse, Karu and Leh. He took over command after a stint as chief of staff, just as the Chinese reportedly marched up from their annual exercise for lodging on the Indian side.

The buck stopped with Joshi.

Joshi has the correct appreciation of operational command, calling it ‘a major transition’. To him, ‘officers who have operated at the tactical level for thirty-five years of their career are suddenly catapulted to the operational and strategic level of warfare….’

He prepared for the transition by reading up the likes of aggressive ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis’ autobiography.

So, what held Joshi back?

Whereas he has an appreciative word for this other two corps commanders, there is nary a mention of his commander in Leh. Was there any dissonance on the response? Can Covid-19 be held responsible? If his hands were tied, did he remonstrate? Or does he buy into the Jaishankar’ism: ‘they are a larger economy’?

The two paras are but ‘haan mein haan milana’ with the regime; the upshot is that a 1962 Henderson Brookes-like report is kept in abeyance. Accountability – no strong point of the regime – cannot be exacted.

Consequently, General, a self-exculpatory sequel may please be dispensed with. (Another general of his cohort has already brought out a sequel of his self-eulogy, this time on transitioning from ‘war-room to boardroom’).

Instead, critical biographers and military thinkers are alerted to a prospective subject: the ji-huzoor interpretation of ‘apolitical’ by Joshi’s leadership cohort.

Clearly, under this regime the military qua institution is not pulling its national security weight.

Whereas the question earlier in Indian civil-military relations (CMR) was of bureaucratic inter-positioning stifling the military, now the key question is the extent political interests and compulsions of the regime - if not its narcissist numero uno - are trammeling the military’s institutional role.

By now enough instances have accumulated of the military’s misconstruing political subordination with subservience.

After all, what else is new-fangled terminology as Udbhav, Bhairav, Rudra, Op Mahadev, Op Shivshakti meant to signal?

Joshi’s mentor on operational and strategic intricacies, along with the current-day Chief of Defence Staff, trashed the notion of raids across the LC prior to Modi’s advent.

The claim of destroying a seminary in Balakot, and downing an F-16 in the bargain, is another. Then came the famous waving of an anti-tank mine on national television to abort the Amarnath yatra, setting the stage for the vacation of Article 370.

Joshi’s characterising the Chinese incursions as ‘transgressions’ also amount to as much. There is also no mention in the book of the Agniveer scheme, the antecedents of which can be seen as long term response to the intrusions.

Lately, it’s the withholding of information relevant to forming an assessment on the regime’s showing in Op Sindoor. It took a middle-rung naval officer speaking at a seminar abroad to inadvertently spill the beans.

It is not known since when has a Lieutenant Governor taken on responsibility for an ‘All OK’ in the military’s Area of Responsibility, which surely covered Pahalgam. A record of prevarication puts under cloud the passing off of the three terrorists killed as the perpetrators at Baisaran.

How the generation of military leadership of which Joshi is a self-acknowledged leading light coped with regime onset and consolidation bears serious CMR reflection.

He clearly earned his spurs at the tactical level, brought out well in the strong first half of the book. A recently promoted lieutenant colonel, he took over officiating command in the midst of battle – his commanding officer was hors-de-combat due to high altitude effects.

His meeting the challenges at the academies, grooming in the unit and his career gaining traction are well handled. His progression was unremarkable for a good and successful officer – sound course gradings, grounding within the unit, exposure in an instructor tenure, the staff course rigmarole and a UN outing.

Fortuitously, he was also physically well prepared. Gaining weight during his tenure in Angola, h’d just shed 10 kilos in anticipation of a call for interview for the post of Adjutant of the military academy, a appointment that requires if nothing else a ramrod bearing.

Fit, young and belonging to the unit, he was the man of the moment, for the anointing under fire. Joshi credits officers as Vikram Batra, a stolid junior leadership, subunit bonding and the combat support provisioned for the unprecedented success (two Param Vir Chakras in one operation) of his team. He was also well-knit with the formation, being a ‘blue eyed boy’ of a charismatic divisional commander.

Nothing must be allowed to take anything away from his service to the nation, to the army and his unit.

It would be too much to expect his generation of professionally-imbued officers to have withstood the deinstitutionalization of the military that beset it as they reached higher ranks.

At best they may be arraigned for not applying peer pressure to rein in political entrepreneurs in uniform - who functioned as conduits for political contamination of the military. Such individuals were artfully placed in charge by the regime and therefore out of reach.

This is especially so when no other institution has been left standing (witness antics of no less than a recently retired Supreme Court chief justice).

It would be churlish to mar Joshi’s upstanding record with taxing him with the responsibility of preserving institutional integrity. Not being legend cannot detract from being great.

*: YK Joshi, Who Dares Wins: A Soldier’s Memoirs, Gurugram: Penguin 2024, pp. 240, Rs 699.

Saturday, 30 November 2024

 https://substack.com/home/post/p-152354915

Disengagement to de-escalation
Military lessons-learnt alone won’t do
https://kashmirtimes.com/disengagement-to-de-escalation-in-ladakh/ Disengagement to de-escalation Military lessons-learnt alone won’t do Kashmir Times, 2 Dec 24https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/disengagement-to-de-escalation

An early bird, the best National Security Adviser India never had, General Hooda, lists four military lessons from the recent step back in Ladakh: one, get intelligence analysis right; two, get contingency planning in place; three, get a realistic fix on relative capabilities; and, four, ‘rebuild’ deterrence against Chinese military coercion by communicating that redlines will be met by a ‘decisive and visible’ response.

Cumulatively, these steps could presumably defuse into the future the four possible explanations of the Chinese intent behind the provocation in Ladakh: one, to snap back against Indian infrastructure developments; two, to gain territorial control; three, to broadcast regional dominance; and, four, to influence India’s strategic relationships.

Here I undertake a reality check on Hooda’s unimpeachable case for a rebuilding of deterrence.

The four lessons reconsidered

The first on the (wish)list is sound intelligence analysis. As with the Kargil intelligence debacle, information did trickle in but did not inspire a scramble. However, this time round no intelligence review has been done. Sans any effort at accountability, even if a better look onto the Tibetan plateau and beyond - with a leg-up by a strategic partner - strategic intelligence will likely continue to be hobbled. Operational level intelligence - necessary to trigger preemptive or responsive action - will therefore unlikely be spurred.

Contingency plans are likely in hand, given additional troops and information periodically put out on exercises. The problem however is not with readiness as much as resolve.

Surely, Fire and Fury corps, as it was configured pre-Galwan, had the wherewithal to spring a counter grab action. The same could have been conducted anywhere else along the eastern front (then under the current Chief of Defence Staff). Covid outbreak is but a fig leaf, since Ladakh was in any way winter cut-off and had is integral resources in place.

So, it’s not so much capability, but delegation that is a problem.

The problem will likely remain. General Naravane’s recall of the hotspot atop Kailash range is a case to point. Extracts from his memoirs – since held up in the works – have him reaching for the defence minister, when the Chinese reactively clambered uphill from their side. Apparently, the answer he received was ‘jo ucchit samjhe, karo’ (‘do as your wont’).

Clearly, preparedness can incentivize action only up to a point. Will to shoulder the consequence and unintended consequences must be demonstrated by matching delegative power with redlines.

Hooda’s third lesson carries two examples of the Indian perception of Chinese capability. Apparently, pre-Galwan, there was a belief in an Indian advantage in the air and adeptness in mountain warfare. The two should have instigated a vigourous response to Chinese provocation. In effect, the assumptions turned out as vapid as General Ayub Khan’s pre-1965 views of the Indian military.

Now that Chinese have caught up on both counts, and are amply ahead on parameters as infrastructure, advantaged as they are by terrain, and technology – if Pravin Sawhney is to be believed - India is left without comforting assumptions. When it couldn’t take the cue of wishful assumptions, why will a better fix on relative capability today spur action?

On to General Hooda’s fourth ask: ‘a successful deterrence strategy rests on three critical pillars, often called ‘3C’s - capability, communication and credibility.’ Credibility is based on resolve. Resolve is but synchronized military capability and political will.

That the counter in 2020 - though a great logistic feat - was operationally reactive, shows that though adequately poised (it had a decade of military buildup in Ladakh behind it and a nationalist government into its second term), India was not able to deliver a credible counter. Neither parameter – military capability and political will – having changed relatively since, how can deterrence find itself ‘rebuilt’?

Deterrence of what?

Deterrence is to prevent harm on oneself by creating the perception that the action will prove futile or will invite like or disproportionate hurt on the perpetrator. For now, self-evident is India’s potential for deterrence by denial.

Having achieved its objective of having India respect its territorial claims through springing the crisis and the gambit of interminable talks, China is satiated territorially. Since it has no further territorial intent in Ladakh, a capability for deterrence by denial has only a limited benefit, restricted to preserving an ability to protect existing infrastructure, and that yet to come up if not effected by unrevealed compromises at the parlays.

Contrarily, India needs a capability for deterrence by punishment, a better heft on tackling the other three explanations of the crisis and likely to persist into the future.

India has exerted a capability for deterrence by punishment - or ability to up the military ante - to bring home to the Chinese that disengagement is in the interest of both states. Its showing on Kailash range amounted to this.

It may yet need to show military muscle to influence talks to go beyond their current enabling of patrolling access at merely two of the friction points. There are three other friction points where buffer zones have to be rolled back to open up patrolling points.

A deterrence by punishment capability serves to deter Chinese adventurism in search of regional dominance. With 17 Corps coming into its own, and the Uttar Bharat Area being converting to an operational corps, and incipient steps to theaterisation in the works, China must be wary. At the cusp of super-powerdom it would unlikely wish to be defrocked.

The third explanation is regards Chinese messaging India against too close a relationship with the United States. The latter might be more pronounced as the Trump Presidency kicks in, wherein, to cosy up to the Russians, he is liable to be more assertive with the Chinese. Given India’s past propensity (‘Ab ki baar, Trump Sarkar’, ‘Namaste Trump’), it is liable to fall in line, with a need for external balancing as cover. This would necessitate preparedness at a higher notch.

By this yardstick, the step after disengagement - de-escalation – must only be selective and partial. The ‘new normal’ must see India’s capability for deterrence by punishment in place, with its contingencies well practiced. Even so, a military doing its bit is never enough.

Realistic?

The problem with intelligence setup is set to remain. The military can expect to be let down with a recurring lack in strategic intelligence. Recall how the hype around two rounds of personalized diplomacy – Wuhan and Chennai – failed miserably to pick up signals of Chinese reneging. With the same narrative employed yet again before Kazan, the intelligence subsystem of national security will likely fall in step with the political narrative, stemming ostensibly from need for an economic reopening to the Chinese behemoth.

The larger problem is with political reluctance in reconciling with playing second string in global affairs. It does not go well with the ideological beliefs of the regime in place and its domestic posturing. Yet, it cannot afford being upended, like was Nehru, during its national majoritarian project. Consequently, it would unlikely countenance a military distraction, whatever the cost in national interest. It follows that expecting delegative authority for activating contingency responses is mite too much. Expect instead dilution in deterrence by appeasement: much fury, no fire.