Naravane’s place in military history
General Naravane has done a signal service to strategic thinking by penning down his version of the last crisis with China. Its circulation has been tamped down by the regime, though there is nothing much further than what was in the extracts that made the rounds a couple of years back. Everyone knows of Naravane’s anguish over the Agnipath scheme as also that the disengagement arrangements at some places limit Indian patrols to short of the pre-crisis envelop.
The addition to knowledge is of Naravane’s role in the final lap of Operation Snow Leopard, India’s mobilization and launch of a quid pro quo operation. He took the right decision on exercising restraint in opening fire. Authority was devolved on him through the now-immortal phrase – “Jo ucchit samjho, voh karo.” Rightly divining the restrictive intent of his political masters and assessing that the tactical situation did not warrant escalation, he let his forces stare down the Chinese from a position of advantage on the Kailash ridge-line.
Such moments of acutely-felt command responsibility have been competently faced by Indian military leaders earlier. Sam Bahadur fended off pressures for premature military action in East Pakistan, arguing that winter was the right time for such a campaign. When faced with evidence that the Kargil intrusion was a rather serious breach of the Line of Control (LC), General Ved Malik resolved to ‘fight with what we have,’ even if weighed down with a terms-of-reference not to cross the LC. Nanavatty’s date with military history was in his exercise of moral courage in preferring time for preparation for assault across a snowed-in LC when faced with tacit pressures for an early reprisal for the parliament terror attack. Satish Dua recalls his vigil in wake of the setback at Uri spurring on a cross-LC surgical strike. More recently, the air chief led his team back to the drawing board after suffering an aerial ambush on the first night of Op Sindoor, to come up trumps on the last night. Naravane’s experience of handling what is described as ‘hot potato’ adds to collective wisdom on leadership and command.
Preparation for the ‘hot potato’
A second-generation military man, he was an air-force brat marauding through military stations during childhood. His father’s more notable posting was to Paris on staff of the defence attaché (DA). Requiring stable schooling in the senior years, he was sent to a school founded by a luminary of the cultural Right. His lackluster record at the academies continued into his subaltern days. His tactical grounding was in his oversight of recruit training at the regimental center. No doubt this stint helped in his first operational spell with the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka on the outskirts of Trincomalee.
He ascribes a change of approach and fortunes to his marriage - outcome of a premarital romance - to a Jawarharlal Nehru University product of its halcyon days. Not only did he clear his promotion exams first shot, but also made it to the career-enhancing year-long staff course. He goes on to tenant the sought-after operational staff assignment as brigade major. He has an exposure to logistics aspects on staff of a paramilitary outfit, which enabled him also look at cantonment related affairs. Such broad-basing of background turns out a professional plus at higher ranks.
Of consequence is his rubbing one of his one-star superiors the wrong way. Unmindful of the effect on his report card he stood by what he thought right. Unsurprisingly, he did not make it to colonelcy in the first look. Reinstated, he goes on to command a Rashtriya Rifles unit in the midst of the Kashmir insurgency at the most testing of times, in wake of Kargil war. His showing earns him a place on the Higher Command course. In hindsight, subsequent postings turn out to be sound preparation for future operational and strategic level commands. These include spells in the perspective planning strategic affairs section and as DA in Myanmar. As a one-star flag officer, he raised a brigade headquarters on the watershed in the north east, cementing his grasp of the inscrutable Chinese.
His two-star command as inspector general of the Assam Rifles was where his prior knowledge from Myanmar helped in operations against recalcitrant Naga factions. Post-retirement, he completed a doctorate using his in-depth first-hand knowledge of issues in the region. In this assignment began his association with General Rawat, who was his immediate boss for a time. The inclusion of ‘destiny’ in the book’s title owes to Rawat going on to supersede two seniors to get the army’s top job. Willy-nilly, Naravane ended up topping the proverbial succession chain.
Such prospects led to his exposure both in Delhi as the area commander and at an operational level three-star command of a strike corps in the western sector. He then goes on to the Army Training Command. When there, though knowing of the new preference for ‘deep selection’ and the by-then well-known proclivities of the regime, in a speech at a university he highlights constitutional probity. As preparation for his next rank, he then gets to lead the China-facing eastern army. His penultimate appointment is as Vice Chief, preparation for the forthcoming step up.
He rightly rues the move through some five billets in four years, typical deficit of Indian military preparation to take on strategic level roles. A late return from his DA assignment led to a compressed one-star, at the cost of a year at the national defence college, an exposure missed but more from a family life point of view than any learning thereby.
His final ‘star of destiny’ is over the head of Rawat’s recommendation in favour of General Chauhan. So, when Naravane moves to 5, Rajaji Marg, he is not only lucky, but also well-equipped intellectually and character-wise. And, primed to meet the Chinese challenge head-on.
The book shows his family as central to this journey. Behind his success were three women, his wife and two daughters. His liberality shines through in his support as a parent for one of his daughters going for an inter-religious marriage. The reputation of Mrs. Veena Naravane as head of the military’s ‘second chain of command’ – of the formidable army wives’ welfare association – has been as an empathetic first lady. His daughter’s observation when he gained his fourth star is apt: ‘hard work, humility and family.’ Values practiced at home influence softcore professional issues as human rights. He records taking a dim view of the Amshipora killings. It is another matter that infirmities in the system allowed the perpetrator bail.
Saluting Naravane
Between Naravane as army chief and an army commander who had once been DA in China, there was enough expertise on hand to take on the Chinese intrusion on their terms. But that was not to be and Naravane’s telling is not too revealing on this. Naravane explains away the intrusion, till it became moot after the Galwan incident. Conscious of the reputational costs for the military, Naravane rolled out the strategically necessary quid pro quo operation, even bucking civilian control while at it. By also keeping in mind the priorities of his political masters, he exhibited strategic sensitivity and ample deference to civil-military relations in the Indian tradition.
To critique him for an insufficiently vigorous push-back against a political class playing coy is to be oblivious of the political reality of today. To hold that he approached the political leadership on an essentially military matter is to ignore the imperative cast by terms of reference, in this case the restriction on resort to firing. Though best positioned to take over as Chief of Defence Staff, he did not allow the carrot to impact his convictions, preferring instead to pay the price for retiring with dignity.
Since the Ladakh episode is considerably more consequential than Op Sindoor, the book must be piloted with dexterity for early clearance. It would not only be a favour to the publisher but to military history. That the book does not allow the regime to have its cake and eat it too is no reason for an apolitical army to dally over its clearance.
