The Ali Archive: The Modi era, this decade
A national security record of the times 2020-till date, comprising some 200+ commentaries
Monday, 2 November 2026
https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/regimechange29-the-prerequisite-in?r=i1fws
https://thewire.in/security/what-happened-on-the-eve-of-final-salvo-of-operation-sindoor
#regimechange@’29: The prerequisite in national security
What Happened on the Eve of Final Salvo of Operation Sindoor?
National security is one of the benefits cited by the regime for its continued stay in government and sway over politics. Here I look at how the regime measures on national security and find that it has taken advantage of an information environment that shows it in better light than warranted. Democratic accountability requires more access to relevant national security information for the electorate to take an informed position on its showing. Debunking pretensions is a first step to regime change.
Institutional vandalism
The structural changes effected have flattered to please. A toothless Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been in place for better part of the decade, with two generals fished out of retirement to successively tenant the appointment. The last CDS is on record lamenting the incomplete innovation in his recent recall of the planning and conduct of Op Sindoor. Theaterisation that is to cap the endeavor is way away, since the command and control aspect at Delhi has not been thought through. The final bricks will be laid in the elevation of the CDS to whom theater commanders will report only when the regime believes the military will remain subservient even when so empowered. For now, the regime does not have the intellectual heft, even if it wanted to.
The personnel policies have been equally bereft. Agnipath concept must be seen as a coup proofing measure, since the military was not involved in its conception. In one swell swoop it inducted a jugend-equivalent cohort into the military. At the tactical level, it has roundly busted cohesion, bonding being the bedrock of a primary group. Future cohorts will only have known the Modi era. From the current uncertainty surrounding an agniveer’s second innings, it is likely that the tactical level will get too competitive to allow for camaraderie.
At the officer level, its exercise of choice of military leaders from a wider base of selection has led to circumspection. There is a post-retirement phase to be mindful of too, now that the regime controls all billets to which higher ranked retirees have traditionally auditioned for. The only known case of speaking truth to power has been in a post-retirement autobiography of an army chief, that has seen light of day only as a deniable copy. The regimen of information security has been made stringent by the threat of loss of pension, undercutting the vigour of defence-related discourse in a democracy.
The military’s advisory role in fulfilling its professional responsibility surely suffers. It is not evident that there was even one cabinet committee on security (CCS) in the run up and during Op Sindoor that the chiefs were invited to participate in, though the CCS reportedly met twice in the period. We know of only a meeting of the defence minister and the chiefs with the prime minister and one of the national security adviser (NSA) with the prime minister on the nuclear dimension of the conflict, with no mention of the presence of the military adviser to the national command authority present. The chiefs were undercut by a meeting on the eve of the final salvo of Op Sindoor that had the prime minister conferring with a set of retired generals. The chiefs were present, but none thought it relevant to recall the Curzon-Kitchener controversy and register their objection to be second-guessed in the middle of a conflict by former colleagues, even if regime-compatible.
Institutional nihilism
More importantly, it appears that the military is unmindful of the guardrails and self-regulation that should attend information operations. It rightly takes information as one the domains to conduct cross- and multi-domain operations. But, it is uneducated on the relationship of information and electoral choice in a democracy. The electorate can only make a reasoned selection of a party to lead the country if it has the relevant information to base such a critical decision on. Denial or manipulation of information in the open domain to make the ruling party look better than it ought, is a political act. The military might believe that being economical with facts helps preserve national morale and its own reputation. Non-trivial factors in themselves, these factors pale if at the cost of twisting the political playfield. Willing participation in such acts is evidence of politicization.
In all three operations (2016, 2019, 2025) that signify a strategic shift under the regime, the narrative amplifies the significance of the military action to embellish the regime’s credentials as stronger-on-defence than predecessors. Surgical strikes that the regime uses for advertising its muscularity have always been an option and are not evidence of calling Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff’ as projected. Pakistan’s nuclear threshold has always been high enough for execution of local and limited military operations. As for the surgical strikes the regime has conducted, being too pat with peace offerings makes for an unbecoming tentativeness. The funk is from a potential reverse that could put back the regime’s domestic transformation agenda and damage its presiding demi-god. The regime could do without the distraction of war, but does seek dividend from military conflicts kept limited.
The narrative on the China front has it that the regime stared down the Chinese bid for Indian territory, with the forces mounting a formidable logistics exercise to gain and stay-put at high altitudes in face of Chinese belligerency. It is clear from the unpublished memoirs of the then army chief that he took a decision in line with the regime’s thinking against upping the ante. This shows up a defensive mindset, even if with plausible strategic rationale. Being guarded with information on territory can be conceded if the purpose is to keep public attitudes in check, which if allowed to run riot can lead to pressure on the regime towards an uncalled-for military option. But with time, the facts must reach the electorate, if necessary through their representatives in legislature’s standing committees. It should not be an outgoing border guarding force commander informing the country obliquely of a situation on the border.
Importantly, information must be adequately disseminated, lest the regime have its cake and eat it too: use the Pakistan front to show its muscles to compensate for quiescence on the China front. Compromise opens up a military to blackmail, which at a liminal level could be as innocent as provision of an air show over a politician’s constituency in a state going to polls. Pragmatism might justify such acts, but it is precedent setting – a wedge that political forces cannot but exploit and expand.
#regimechange=accountability
From the capture of the state institutions, in particular the judiciary and the election commission, it is clear that the boast of the regime that it would last indefinitely is credible. That such matters are outside the pale of an apolitical military is quite right. However, the military is an institution of the state. Its probity is judged in relation to the Constitution. The military exercises an deterrence against anti-democratic tendencies across the political spectrum. While for insurgents it has a more physical effect, for mainstream politics its very presence serves to deter. This does not require the military to have or take up a position on the matter.
The forces out for a constitutional reset in India today are aware of the importance of suborning institutions to their political project. Their brazen take-over of most institutions is complemented by a surreptitious bid to pervade military culture under the guise of change in political culture necessitating accommodation and adaptation. The military may choose to prudently sway with the wind. However, it must exercise caution over collateral effects of information operations on the domestic arena. If the national security field cannot be pieced together - warts and all – by the attentive public, the ruling party can get away without democratic accountability.
The necessity for regime change is heightened by the inevitability of an inter-generational change in the regime’s leadership. An extension in tenure of the regime would see younger contenders staying in saddle for longer. The political and administrative background of those leading the pack suggests they want a subordination to levels allowing the misuse of institutions. The handling by each of the police and rule of law should alert. Detox later would be challenging. Consequently, since worse is to follow, regime change at the appropriate time with the usual means, the ballot, is almost an imperative.
The logic of the military being the last line of defence is that it must secure the state against all comers, including against those who may attempt appropriate it into perpetuity.
Monday, 26 October 2026
https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/khalid-kidwai-doth-protest-too-much?r=i1fws
Khalid Kidwai doth protest too much, methinks
Khalid Kidwai spent the better part of his address (55min) at a recently concluded international non-proliferation conference in Islamabad extolling the virtues of nuclearization for Pakistan. Kidwai chaperoned the Pakistani arsenal in its fledgling years after the Chagai tests, putting in place the mainstay of Pakistan’s deterrence, its Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine. Since operationalizing Pakistan’s nuclear capability has been his life’s work, his indulgence in self-congratulations can be excused.
Whereas in the early days of Pakistan’s doctrine-making, Kidwai had explicitly pegged the nuclear threshold somewhat high, ambiguity surrounds current nuclear thresholds envisaged by FSD. The FSD was itself a doctrinal response to India’s ‘cold start’ doctrine that sought to reclaim space on the spectrum of conflict for limited military operations below the nuclear threshold. FSD rested on the shoulders of a short-range low-yield tactical nuclear weapon, the Nasr. It halted ‘cold start’ in its tracks.
Khalid believes that FSD has even pulled up Modi’s India short. To him, the strategic shift under the Modi regime has come a cropper. Successive Indian rejoinders to terror attacks have indeed been considerably attenuated, be it in September 2016, February 2019 or May 2025; respectively, merely one-night, two-day and four-day affairs.
Despite the certainty of a higher quotient of violence set to attend the next round, Kidwai is spurred into desiring Pakistan go beyond its currently favoured ‘quid pro quo-plus’ response, to a double-plus (“severe and unforgiving”) one. Even if his talk at the conference is discounted as deterrence rhetoric and designed to influence international participants - or as typical Pakistani posturing (though Kidwai is not Punjabi!) - it bears scrutiny. Afterall, Kidwai in retirement continues as adviser to the national command authority (NCA). His word may have a field marshal’s ear.
Querying Kidwai’s narrative
At the bespoke conference, another senior adviser on national security and fellow general to boot, had this to say: “It (South Asia) is a nuclear flashpoint owing to India’s ultra-nationalist tendencies as a result …of Hindutva’s rise and consolidated through the Brahmanist capture of the ballot box. The ideology espouses hegemonic ambitions of an imaginary continuity of Akhand Bharat. (41:30).” Clearly, the fizz in Indian political culture and its impact on strategic culture has spooked its neighbor.
To be sure, the army there has uses for such justifications for its nuclear capability and sabre rattling: to keep its military atop the political structure there, especially when challenged from the street and the periphery. For national cohesion, the army chief when yet a general, had zealously invoked the two-nation theory. Propping up of the Hindutva bogey helps with furthering the army’s institutional interests, but is at an operational risk of misreading Indian conflict strategy.
In his operational reflections, Kidwai drew attention to India’s nuclear submarine on patrol with its complement of mated nuclear missiles. India’s recent operationalizing of its triad – the basis of its ‘no first use’ (NFU) pledge - is counter-intuitively presented as enabling first use options for India. Contrary to the verities of nuclear theology, he – surprisingly for and old nuclear hand - takes boomers as weapon systems “pointing towards India adopting a first strike posture (1:24:59),” by deeming whether these are means for first strike or second strike “irrelevant.” Whereas being eminently survivable, boomers are pursued instead for the invulnerable second strike capability they furnish. An assured ability to strike back after absorbing a first strike is the fundamental of nuclear deterrence thinking, dating back to the cold war.
Kidwai conveniently forgets an implicit threat he once made. He signaled that Pakistan’s ballistic missiles could reach India’s island territories, implying Pakistan could degrade India’s second strike assets in their very pens. Taking cue, if India has since put one out to sea it makes sense. A ballistic missile submarine reportedly figured in naval deployment in 2019. Kidwai must introspect his role is in conjuring up this self-created threat for Pakistan.
In light of FSD’s predisposition for nuclear first use, India cannot but consider rescinding its NFU as an option in favour of preemption. This explains India’s canisterisation even of land-based missiles and tactical nuclear weapons (45min). Such development indicates that India having relevant assets at hand for nuclear first use does not require to dual task boomers. Clearly, Kidwai’s brainchild, the FSD, in putting Pakistan in India’s nuclear crosshairs is proving increasingly counter-productive in securing Pakistan.
While the Indian nuclear doctrine does posit ‘massive’ retaliation, developments since its promulgation suggest a wider menu on the table. Agreeing with Kidwai that since mutual assured destruction is inevitable in massive and equally telling counter-strikes, the doctrinal threat is at best appropriate for deterrence, not nuclear employment.
It’s doctrinaire proponent, K Subrahmanyam, held that combative phraseology was essential to ward-off an uppity opponent (likened by him to ‘irrational’ ‘children,’ presumably with Pakistan in mind), stating: “If the side which… has an image of being a risk-taker, that will have certain negative impact on others. The logical step for the rival side is enhance its image of punishing capability further, so that the risk-taker will not be in any doubt of the pain and suffering in store for him if he were to resort to nuclear weapons first.”
But a doctrine is not quite strategy. FSD can be met nuclear toe-to-toe by India; even if and especially if its fuse is set at ‘zero meters’. FSD can at best deter ‘large scale’ war it was designed for, not the kind of war India is looking to fight. Kidwai’s take that Pakistan is “dealing with irrational actors bordering on lunacy, driven entirely by the radical religious ideology of Hindutva, and hubris and hate mongering of the Indian leadership (1:11:30),” would compel his advice in the NCA to be for an upping of the ante at an untold risk for Pakistan.
Kidwai’s counterpoise for the New Normal
India has forged a New Normal. India holds that Pakistan’s reference to its nuclear card is but ‘nuclear bluff.’ Undeterred, India intends conflating terrorist and military targets into one target list, in a step-up from the opening round of Op Sindoor. Though India’s newly released land warfare doctrine is not in the open domain as yet, it may be informed by its long-held thinking echoed by its new chief on the relevance of territorial gains in the concept of victory.
Pakistan is not only embroiled on its western front, but has also sent troops and assets to secure its new-found ally, the Saudis. So, it is difficult to envisage the Kidwai-promised conventionally-executed double-plus counter. To compensate, it has taken care to place its strategic forces under unified command, that of its chief of defence forces (CDF). The CDF now exercising tight positive control calms earlier worries over delegation. By implication, FSD does not cover the lower reaches of the conventional level of the spectrum of conflict, at which surgical strikes and localised border skirmishes play out.
Pakistan need not necessarily overturn the trend of limitation visible in recent limited military conflicts. Indeed, Pakistan has historically under-played its hand. In 1947, it bogged down on the outskirts of Srinagar. In 1965, it did not push on either at Akhnur or Khem Karan. In 1971, it kept the western front inactive. At Kargil, it dismally pulled out under American watch. It has been unable to capitalize on proxy war. After Uri, it pretended nothing happened. In Op Swift Retort, its strafing of ground targets kept off military objectives. In Op Sindoor, it remained on the hotline, even as its airbases were pummeled.
Pakistan’s generals know they exaggerate Hindutva’s expansionism. India’s way to viksit bharat is through amrit kaal, which cannot be waylaid by wider conflicts or conflict escalation. Through surgical strikes and alleged proxy war, Modi’s India is at best keeping Pakistan on the backfoot in relation to Kashmir and prospectively its relationship with its minority. The surgical strikes are low-cost investments for high domestic political dividend. It cannot afford to chance wider war with its two-front connotations, evident from the first night of Op Sindoor.
FSD made irrelevant
Consequently, FSD - designed to deter major war - really has had nothing to deter. After the example of Russia in Ukraine and the United States against Iraq earlier and Iran now, it is indeed “not an era for war.” With military operations-other-than-war at the interface of subconventional-conventional levels, India has arrived at its own sub-war answer.
Not meant to, the FSD has patently not “reinforced deterrence at all levels.” Forcing the choice of escalation onto Pakistan, India - not unreasonably - expects Pakistan to be self-deterred by the very logic of FSD: “It generates strategic deterrence effects for which it was conceived, i.e. deterrence against all-out war (1:2:53).” What demonisation of the other side, as indulged in by the Pakistani generals quoted, would do to nuclear decision making is worth a pause.
Like the FSD, its progenitor and propagandist, once prisoner-of-war Khalid Kidwai would do well to do as illustrious generals eventually do: fade away.
Wednesday, 21 October 2026
SVI International Webinar on “Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability in South Asia” on December 20, 2022
1h29min to 1h48min
3. Second Session: Crisis Escalation, Nuclear Deterrence and Doctrinal Shifts in South Asia.
3.1 Crisis Escalation and Drivers of Instability
The first speaker of the second session was Dr Ali Ahmed (Independent Security Analyst, India) who shared his views on “Crisis Escalation and Drivers of Instability”. He started by saying that the focus of his presentation would be the element of “stability” instead of instability. He said that crisis is not a situation of pre-violence alone. It can be said that crisis would also play out during conflict while violence is ongoing. Therefore, his presentation focused not so much on the nuclear aspect of crisis, but on crises that occur in other non-violent or pre-violence phases. The second point of his presentation was “the drivers of instability”. He said that though there are drivers of instability but states should also remember that there are dirvers of stability too, and they need to be reinforced, and we need to also factor-in, when we take into account the holistic picture. As a methodology Dr Ali Ahmed used “levels of war” and “levels of analysis” to see what kind of cycle develops. Before going into details of his presentation, he said that his views entail a little bit of subjectivity.
He explained levels of war, sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear; he also showed a slide on levels of analyses, which included international, national, sub-national, regional, organizational and personality/individual. He said the complexity in this equation is at which level the crisis has been pitched. The actors at various levels of analyses will be forming and influencing the crisis, which will resultantly impact the crisis outcome. He went on and explained the drivers of instability at the international level. According to him, Ukraine War and Sino-US conflict act as drivers of instability at the international level. At the regional level, Dr Ahmed highlighted three drivers of instability from the Indian perspective, which were two-front war, Chinese factor and extremism. The next level explained by the speaker was “inter-state level”, where drivers of instability were “Indo-Pakistan relations”, the military balance between forces of both states and political dynamics. At the “national level” in India, economic downturn, political Hindutva and social polarization were considered drivers of instability. At the “organizational level”, Dr Ali Ahmed considered aggressive doctrines, the politicization of issues at an organizational level and restructuring at military organizations as a source of instability. At the “personality level”, three personalities can influence the situation: political leadership, advisors and military leadership (Brass hats). These personalities and their actions determine how the national and organizational levels play out.
Following on, the speaker merged the identified drivers of instability at levels of war and analyzed the impacts of such a situation. First of all, while analyzing international-level drivers of instability with levels of war, he said that there is very little efficacy of international-level drivers to affect what happens at the sub-conventional/conventional level of conflict in South Asia. However, if India and Pakistan go up on the escalation ladder, then international concerns will be heightened, which speaker believed is good. At a regional level, South Asian nuclear rivals will be left to deal with each other. He said that there is exhaustion at the international level due to the periodic recurrences of crises at the regional level in South Asia. Hence, both countries will be left alone to fight it out at the conventional level of war until we start touching the nuclear threshold. At the inter-state level between India and Pakistan, what whole cycle of drivers of instability at different levels of war churn out is difficult to determine. At the National level, Hindutva is here to stay; therefore, at the lower levels of war India might wish to present a muscular image but as we go higher, it would like to disengage to dissipate crises. At an organizational level, we might expect a little bit more pushing and shoving, but there is recognition of the fact that nuclear level is not to be ventured into, which is valid for both states.
In his conclusion, he said that as states climb up the escalatory ladder along those levels of War, the cycle is mostly negative, the drivers of instability might become more cautious, they may decelerate, and the drivers of stability kick in. But that’s the conundrum, when it is hunky-dory at the lower levels we indulge ourselves in crisis and during this constant struggle both states could move towards the upper levels. Therefore, the two states shouldn’t really be complacent that nothing was going to happen at that level.
Tuesday, 20 October 2026
Deterrence Dynamics and Escalation Risks in South Asia
Lessons from the May 2025 Military Conflict
Summary of paper presented online at the Strategic Vision Institute’s Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference in Islamabad on 20 October 2026
https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/deterrence-dynamics-and-escalation
A pre-conference video of the same is at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_wXKooDZ4unZqBwF_89RE0oqi5WXHuE9/view?usp=drive_link
The premier lesson from the limited military conflict in May 2025 between India and Pakistan is that limitation was possible since both sides were agreeable on keeping the conflict limited and the conflict witnessed a third party involvement, that of the US, in the background. Even though the third party’s supposed role and its effect was rejected by India, the direct communication channel it prompted between the two sides operation’s branches led to cessation of hostilities.
The takeaway then for any future iteration(s) of limited military conflict between the two sides is that the two aspects must be present for limitation – the two sides tacitly agreeing on limitation and a third party’s non-intrusive facilitation. Both may not be possible in future – with India rejecting a third party role and in either side’s concept of victory either initially kept expansive or expanding under conflict conditions.
Emerging Trend of the Unilateral Use of Force and Deterrence Stability in South Asia
The international order has witnessed outbreak of conflicts that have loosened the grip of international law against use of force. The likelihood of future iterations of limited use of force between the two sides is likely. This has implications for deterrence stability between the two, since – as seen from past iterations of limited military conflict – not only has outbreak occurred thrice over but has been at a higher order of violence. Since India wishes to bolster conventional deterrence of subconventional provocations by Pakistan, and Pakistan wishes to constrain Indian conventional advantages by manipulating perceptions of its nuclear threshold, there is a built-in potential escalatory dynamic.
Deterrence instability can arise at the conventional-nuclear interface if both get more ambitious in seeking more from respective level of deterrence manipulation (India at the conventional and Pakistan at the nuclear) than either ought to under strategic rationality. This can occur if the initial concept of victory is incorrect or is revised upwards as the limited military conflict unfolds.
Limited Conventional War under the Nuclear Overhang and Escalation Risks
The levels of conflict are taken here as: competition-limited military conflict-limited conventional war-conventional war-limited nuclear war-total war. There is scope to keep below ‘war’ with greater intensity, scope and duration of non-contact limited military conflict than witnessed in May ’25. Escalation is when this ‘buffer’ of a wider May ’25-like limited military conflict is expanded with an extension of non-contact warfare to unacceptable levels, such as by targeting civilians and civil infrastructure; prompting the outbreak of contact warfare.
Escalation risk is higher in the drawing down of nuclear overhang even as India asserts conventional advantage. This is heightened when there is revision in the concept of victory to go with the higher level of war; when under the uncertainties that attend war - such as unsettling breakthroughs prompting over-reaction - there is an unforeseen dynamic taking hold; and in the political level playing to the domestic gallery.
However, there are escalation dampeners too such as third parties invigorated to intervening with greater vigour; adherence to the May ’25 lesson on wisdom of limitation; and that escalation is an exercise of ‘choice’ rather than a default outcome.
Limited military conflicts and risk of Conventional-Nuclear Entanglement
The May ‘25 targeting of Nur Khan, Sargodha and Kairana hills was potentially escalatory, in that it was suggestive of nuclear signaling on India’s side – that it is unimpressed by Pakistan’s nuclear card as part of its intent to demonstrate it is not deterred by ‘nuclear blackmail.’ Pakistan, for its part, plausibly denied calling up its NCA. However, the contretemps energized US peace intervention. Pakistan has since separated its rocket forces from its strategic forces.
Counter-intuitively, Pakistan profits from entanglement, with entanglement seen as bolstering deterrence by building in inadvertence. Pakistan’s preemptive dis-entangling effort is good for signaling non-nuclear intent; thereby indicating a readiness to meet India at its professed level of continuing with limited military conflict(s). The projected drawn-down nuclear awning incentivizes against Indian conventional targeting of nuclear complex. Pakistan is thus mindful of uncertainties at nuclear level, indicating it is sensitive to Indian indication that it will ignore nuclear signaling in its ‘new normal’ strategic doctrine.
In any case, in regional setting, threat of conventional-nuclear entanglement is exaggerated, as both states – not having the capability for LOW - can await impact to reveal the nature of the attack; thereby, do not have to be held to Cold War or superpower relevant nuclear theory and jargon. Even so, references to entanglement are in Pakistan’s deterrence brief since projecting nuclear dangers helps secure Pakistan’s nuclear capability from Indian conventional degradation; an effort the Indian side will profess to deny, though in practice take the threat onboard.
Integration of New Technologies and Non-linear Escalation Pathways
Effects of new technology heighten the scope and intensity of a conflict, allowing for both escalatory and non-escalatory possibilities – since as mentioned escalation though an intrinsic tendency of conflict in general is equally a matter of ‘choice’. Consequently, technological upgrade can well function to up-the-ante as much as allow limiting conflict by reassuring a side. In a multi-domain conflict, disadvantage that could have resulted in upping of the ante can be offset by technology-facilitated advantages in another domain; thereby, enabling limitation. For instance, both sides offset their respective setbacks in May ’25 with information operations in the cognitive domain targeting respective national audiences that each prevailed, thereby mitigating impact of their respective setbacks (India on the first night and Pakistan on the last night of their four-day limited military conflict). In brief, tech upgrades in air defence will empower both to stay the distance, while targeting of air defences will be escalatory if a disarming effort; offensive air munitions may prove escalatory in damage inflicted, as was the case with use by both sides in May ’25; cruise missiles and UAS use may lead to escalatory infrastructure busting, such as by Pakistan of dams on Kashmir rivers seen as violative of IWT; and non-kinetic warfare will assume significance if AI-powered cyber attacks target civilian infrastructure.
Non-linear escalation pathways will also kick-in such as grey zone, intelligence operations and proxy war expanding, under uncontrolled conditions with autonomous actors use the opportunity to their own purposes. Overall, the cumulative impact could be an in-conflict redefinition of concept of victory. The dual-faced nature of cognition warfare that can also target domestic space enables national mood manipulation, ruling-in de-escalation by taming street power. Pakistan in particular could manipulate third party intervention propensities with information operations directed without.
Summary
Limited military conflict is likely to continue as a policy choice for both sides, with May ‘25 lessons on limitation well-learnt. Info war targeting respective domestic audience can fill in for any deficits, as was found efficacious by both sides in May ’25. This enablement of use of force will disincentivize strategic engagement for resolving problems as it provides both with a substitute in use of force for negotiated settlement. This suits the vested interests of both sides’ politically dominant lobbies.
However, limited military conflict is liable to escalate in a future iteration(s), with escalatory risks stemming from uncertainties in the dynamics of conflict and from contact warfare. Ambitious aims may derail initial concept of victory and third party efficacy may be limited, given India evincing disinterest. Even so, the critical nuclear-conventional interface will unlikely to be breached since brown sahibs are equally capable of strategic good sense. It can however be threatened if limited conventional war is allowed to proceed to becoming a full-blown conventional war.
Strategic good sense is in not using a risky pathway to get to a mutually sought dividend. If such a military risk is run then only a grand strategic dividend must be an outcome. Such a dividend is belied by continuing of limited military conflicts, but may be possible in case of war itself. Therefore, resolving the resulting paradox – that war alone can deliver grand strategic dividend but cannot be chanced - is the principal challenge for the strategic communities of both sides.
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