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Comparative
Strategy
ISSN:
0149-5933 (Print) 1521-0448 (Online) Journal homepage:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20
Cold
Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine
Ali
Ahmed
To
cite this article: Ali Ahmed (2012) Cold Start: The Life Cycle
of a Doctrine, Comparative
Strategy,
31:5, 453-468, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2012.731964
To
link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.731964
Published online: 19
Nov 2012.
Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine
India’s conventional war doctrine has been extensively discussed
over the past decade.
It has been dubbed Cold Start, though the term has been dropped
from usage recently.
The article discusses India’s limited-war doctrine in its origin,
impetus behind it, tenets,
and reasons for the current distancing from the doctrine. The
doctrine was India’s
rekindling of its conventional deterrent in the face of Pakistani
subconventional proxy
warfare. Its implications in terms of escalation possibilities to
the nuclear level attracted
considerable attention. Its “quick on the draw” nature added to
concerns on crisis
stability. These conspired to shift the latest doctrinal movement
in India away from
default reliance on traditional conventional operations to a
proactive strategy that
includes in addition punitive military response options.
Introduction
In the
wake of the Kargil War, India developed a limited-war doctrine, colloquially
referred
to as
Cold Start. Formally, it dates to the publication of Indian Army Doctrine in 2004.1
The
doctrine is for conventional war with limited-war tenets embedded, the
understanding
being
that whether a war is limited or not would depend on political aims set and
their
strategic
translation. Since political aims can reasonably be expected to only be limited
in the
nuclear age, the doctrine is taken as a limited-war doctrine.2 That the doctrine is
offensive
and proactive bespeaks nevertheless of a readiness to go to war, and, further,
to
take
the war to the enemy. This is not necessarily in line with the demands of the
nuclear
age.
Further, the nuclear doctrine released in the year preceding the army doctrine
envisages
“massive”
punitive retaliation. When taken together, the two go beyond deterrence to
border
on
compellence.
Pakistan’s
offensive posture at the subconventional level, and India consequently having
an
offensive orientation on the conventional level, leads to heightening of
nuclear
dangers.
Escalation could occur at either level by accident or by design. This betrays
the
logic
of nuclearization that had it that it would be possible to resolve outstanding
disputes
from a
position of strength and parity. Relations with Pakistan have witnessed a war,
one
near-war,
and a crisis since nuclearization.3 Under these conditions, to have a war doctrine
predicated
on a quick, proactive offensive is to be unduly venturesome. That realization
can
be
seen in Pakistan’s restraint over much of the last decade and, in turn, India’s
move away
from
limited war toward the end of the decade. Skepticism toward aggressive postures
at
the
subconventional and conventional levels respectively indicates a healthy
intellectual
adaptation
to the imperatives of the nuclear age.
This
is therefore an appropriate juncture to study the advent, life cycle, and
prospective
demise
of India’s limited-war doctrine. This article looks first at its antecedents
and then
the
doctrine. Since the conventional and nuclear levels are interlinked, it then
takes a look at
nuclear
doctrine and the conventional-nuclear interface. It finally examines the
beginnings
of the
departure away from Cold Start.
Limited-War Thinking
Doctrinal Antecedents
The
doctrine has evolved from military developments going back over four
decades.While
India’s
earlier doctrine in the post–1971 War period had been a defensive one,
organizational
and
doctrinal innovations in the 1980s served to enhance the offensive content of
military
doctrine.4 Initially,
changes were prompted by the necessity to pursue conventional
operations
under conditions of perceived nuclear asymmetry. This took the form
of
mechanization, taken as more suited to a nuclear battlefield. The doctrine was
one of
conventional
deterrence comprising a dissuasive capability (deterrence by denial) along
with a
counteroffensive capability (deterrence by punishment). In light of Pakistani
acquisition
of
nuclear capability by the late 1980s, the counteroffensive capability embodied
by
strike corps operations became problematic. Pakistan capitalized on this
conundrum
to
enhance its subconventional provocations. Consequently, India was forced to
adapt its
offensive
capability to bring back its conventional edge. This has resulted in an
offensive
conventional
posture, with the Cold Start doctrine envisaging limited war.5 The idea is to
reinforce
deterrence and, in case that is found wanting, then to be in a position to
execute
coercion
or compellence.
The
Indian Army’s first attempt at reducing doctrine to paper was in 1998. It was
published
in the form of a book, Fundamentals, Concepts,
Doctrine—Indian Army.6 It
sought
capabilities across the entire spectrum from high-intensity conventional war to
low
intensity
conflict. The main idea was “to fight the war in enemy territory” in order to
deliver
“a
sledge hammer blow to achieve decisive victory.”7 The quest for “decisive victory” was
despite
it being illusive and elusive. Though the document quoted Clausewitz’s “war is
continuation
of politics by other means,” it was obvious that in the nuclear age an end
state
may
preclude “decisive victory.” The document disapproved of flexible nuclear
response,
peremptorily
stating, “in the context of the sub-continent, the nuclear doctrine of flexible
response
does not have any validity.”8 No evidence of realization that the army’s “belief
in
fighting in enemy territory,”9 potentially lowers the nuclear threshold in having Pakistan
compensate
for India’s conventional edge.
Clearly,
the 1998 document was not one favoring limited war. This owes perhaps
to it
being written prior to the Pokhran and Chagai tests. Yet, it appears oblivious
to
“recessed
deterrence” that prevailed then.10 The new circumstance of covert nuclearization
had
once prompted General Sundarji to observe in the early 1990s that the last
conventional
opportunity
India had to discipline Pakistan was lost during Exercise Brasstacks.11 Advent
of the
nuclear age on the subcontinent had rendered unusable the conventional military
power
he had helped build up in the 1980s. The document was a vestige of conventional
military
thinking of the pre-nuclear era. That it lasted almost a decade into the
nuclear era
is
testimony of the great difficulty that attends getting an older idea out of a
military mind.
Advent of Limited-War Thinking
Prior
to the Kargil War, the incipient understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons
was
that these had made war recede as a ready policy option. To an extent, the
logic
served
to propel the Lahore peace initiative in February 1999. That the military
allowed
itself
to be caught off guard at Kargil indicates that the logic was subscribed to
partially
within
the military.12 The Pakistani
military, on the other hand, was able to discern that
there
existed a window of conventional opportunity between subconventional operations
and
the nuclear threshold.13 The lessons
of Kargil, learned from Pakistan, helped initiate
doctrinal
thinking along the lines of limited-war. The main idea was to restrict the
space
available
to Pakistan at the subconventional level for conducting its proxy war.14 Pakistan
was
seemingly emboldened to undertake the intrusion thinking that its nuclear
capability
had
neutralized India’s conventional capability. To undercut this logic,
limited-war thinking
was
initiated to bring conventional war back into the reckoning.15
The
first discussion on limited war was conducted on January 5–6, 2000, at the
think
tank
affiliated to the Ministry of Defence, the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses
at New
Delhi. At a national seminar on The Challenge of Limited War: Parameters and
Options,
Defence Minister George Fernandes made two points. The firstwas on limited-war
under
nuclear conditions. He stated, “India has understood the dynamics of
limited-war
after
it declared its nuclear weapons status. Nuclear weapons do not make war
obsolete
but
simply imposed another dimension on the way warfare could be conducted.”16 The
second
was on building an offensive bias, saying, “India has traditionally pursued a
nonaggressive,
non-provocative
defence policy based on the philosophy of defensive defence.
This
represents the political doctrine of employing military power. But military
efficiency
will
continue to demand the pursuit of the principle that ‘offence is the best
manner of
defence.”17
That a
change was underway was soon noted by Ashley Tellis, who observed the
military
“becoming familiar with new and innovative doctrine . . . . Though these
efforts
have
barely begun, at least the shift in preference is fairly clear.”18 The debate was taken
forward
by General V. P. Malik, who was one person decidedly most singed by the Kargil
War.
He put forward the argument that “in the changed Indo-Pak strategic
environment,
there
is a likelihood of limited-wars than an all out war” and propagated the view
that space
for
conventional operations existed between the subconventional and nuclear levels
of war.
To
him, the “escalatory ladder can be climbed in a carefully controlled ascent
wherein
politico-diplomatic
factors would play an important part.”19
The Cold Start Doctrine
The
subcontinental protagonists have entered the era of limited wars. General
Sundarji
outlined
the change necessary as, “If conventional hostilities become inevitable, Indian
conventional
counter offensives against Pakistan should be modulated in scope and depth
of
penetration into Pakistan territory, so that ingress can stop before Pakistan
resorts to
the
use of nuclear weapons.”20 His reference
was to counteroffensives. The new doctrine,
being
one of proactive offensive, adapted the idea to its purposes. India, cognizant
of
Pakistani
nuclear threshold, would “pull its punches” in order not to cross nuclear
redlines.
Nevertheless,
it is interesting that the Indian Army Doctrine carries no discussion of limited
war,
despite the doctrine being taken as one that “defined an approach to limited
wars in a
nuclear
environment.”21 It mentions
limited war just once in its diagram on the Spectrum
of
Conflict.22
The
impulse behind the doctrine can be seen at the four levels of analyses. At the
systemic
level, the United States was unilaterally defining its right to pursue action
against
terrorists,
even preventive and preemptive action. This logic was taken to its logical
conclusion
by
Israel in its military action against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas
in
Gaza in 2008. These tendencies in global strategic culture provided an enabling
environment
for a
shift by the Indian military to an overtly offensive military doctrine. At the
next
level, the structural one in terms of the regional security situation, the
doctrine enabled
reassertion
of India’s conventional advantage in the hope of discouraging Pakistan’s proxy
war.
At the unit level, the tenure of the National Democratic Alliance government at
the
helm
for six years, heralded by its first act of blasting the nuclear status quo,
witnessed a
shift
in Indian strategic culture to a more assertive one. Lastly, at the
organizational level,
the
army attempted to set the doctrinal agenda that was then under threat from the
air force’s
learning
of lessons from the changes in air power demonstrated in the GulfWars and in
the
Balkans.23
The
doctrine was intended to enable reacting to Pakistani terror provocations,
thereby
ending
its impunity under nuclear cover. It also permits giving vent to internal
political
compulsions
caused by a surge in public opinion for decisive action. Cold Start sought
three
goals: “inflict significant attrition on enemy forces; retain Pakistani
territory for
use as
a postcolonial bargaining chip; and, by limiting the depth of Indian
incursions,
avoid
triggering a Pakistani nuclear response.”24 In nutshell, the doctrine countenances
quick
mobilization for multiple offensives across a wide front. The doctrine is about
eight
rapidly
deployable integrated battle groups (IGB), supported by the navy and air force.
These
groups would be trained to make swift inroads into the enemy territory. The
strikes
should
be limited and calibrated to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play in
any
war
scenario. The doctrine caters to the changed nuclear reality by envisaging
military
advances
only up to limited depth.25
The
doctrine was released in two parts. The second part is classified and perhaps
carries
a more detailed discussion. The open-source document is itself in two parts. In
a
background
briefing to journalists on the release of the doctrine in 2004, “sources” in
the
military
mentioned the facets that have since lent the doctrine its name, Cold Start.
The
source
is credited with saying, “The idea is that the international community should
not
get
the opportunity to intervene. Hence was the need for swift action from a ‘cold
start’
instead
of a slow mobilization.”26 The closest
the doctrine gets to a tangential reference to
the standing
start of Cold Start is in its stating that “All planning should aim to mobilise
forces
in the minimum possible time in order to take advantage of the many benefits
that
such a
step offers.”27 This lends
credence to the term Cold Start. As the term suggests, the
doctrine
calls for early application of force in conflict. Stephen Cohen and Sunil
Dasgupta
believe
that it is reminiscent of the European situation in the ColdWar in which both
armies
were
poised for speedy offensives, so as to enhance deterrence.28 The term itself deals with
increasing
speed of mobilization and launch. It is equivalent of the term in tactics,
attack
from
the line of march.29 This being
applicable only on the Pakistan front, it is more a
“strategy”
than a “doctrine” as such.
The
idea is to change from the existing strategy of slow amassing of India’s three
strike
formations into preparation for war with more agile IBGs. This owed to the
apparent
delay
in mobilization in Operation Parakram, the massive forward mobilization after
the
December
13, 2001, terrorist attack on Parliament.30 It had taken the army almost a month
to
deploy its three strike corps in “launch pads” along the Indo-Pakistan border.
Once
launched,
the forces are to conduct offensive operations, described as “a decisive form
of
winning
a war” with their purpose “to attain the desired end state and achieve decisive
victory.”
Decisive operations are defined as those that “force the enemy to submit to
one’s
will. . . . Enemy vulnerabilities should be targeted to achieve a clear-cut
victory. Such
operations
will invariably be joint operations.”31 Gaining such victories at the operational
level
is to neglect the nuclear factor. Laconically, the doctrine makes a three-line
mention
of the
nuclear factor: “Future operations will be conducted against a nuclear
backdrop; all
planning
should take this important factor into account.”32 Since the doctrine mentions that
nuclear
escalation can occur if a state attempts to avoid defeat,33 its mention of pursuing
“decisive
operations” for decisive or clear-cut victory is a holdover from the past. This
brings
out the disjuncture between the conventional and nuclear doctrines with both
being
envisaged
separately, despite interlinkages.
This
is best evidenced by strike corps remaining in vogue as a potent force employed
as a
whole. This is antithetical in the nuclear context. This tendency away from
limitation
is
pronounced in the manner that strike corps are expected to operate explicated
in the
doctrine:
• Employment of Forces.
Pivot or holding corps should be prepared to
undertake
offensive operations . . . and create “windows of opportunity”
for
development of further operations . . .
• Strike Corps. Strike
corps should be capable of being inserted into
operational-level
battle, either as battle groups or as a whole, to capture
or
threaten strategic and operational objective(s) with a view to cause
destruction
of the enemy’s reserves and capture sizeable portions of
territory.34
This
brings to fore the duality in the doctrine, in which there are elements in
favor
of
limitation, even as the doctrine does not appear averse to a wider,
nuclear-threshold
provoking
conventionalwar. The doctrine suggests that theoretically the spectrum of
conflict
heuristic
includes total and even global war in the conventional wars, below the category
of
nuclear war.35 In effect,
spillover from the preceding era of land warfare contaminates
the
doctrine in its inability to make a clean break despite nuclearization.
In a
comprehensive analysis of the extent of operationalization of the doctrine,
Walter
Ladwig
writes that “the goal of military operations would be to make shallow
territorial
gains,
50–80 kilometers deep, that could be used in post-conflict negotiations to
extract concessions
from
Islamabad.”36 The plan is
apparently to launch rapid thrusts by self-contained
and
highly mobile IBGs, with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks
backed
by air cover and artillery fire assaults within 96 hours.37 The perceived advantages
are
that more alert and agile IBGs would be off the blocks faster. They would not
pack
much
punch and therefore would keep below the nuclear threshold. They would—blitzkrieg
style—mentally
paralyze the operational-level leadership of the enemy. Lastly, they would
present
a smaller target for nuclear attack.38 Inflicting punishment on the Pakistani military
is to
be done by firepower, both land based and air delivered, once they are forced
into
reacting
to Cold Start forces.
The Logic of Cold Start
The
doctrine is responsive to the stability-instability paradox that has been
operational since
nuclearization.39 The concept has it that that lowering the
probability that a conventionalwar
will
escalate to a nuclear war reduces the danger of starting a conventional war.40 However,
it has
been modified for the South Asian setting to read that nuclear portents reduce
the
likelihood
of conventional war and thereby increase Pakistani propensity for proxy war.
In the
South Asian case, stability at the higher levels—nuclear and conventional—led
to
instability
at the subconventional level.41 The aim of Cold Start is to undercut the impunity
Pakistan
enjoys at the subconventional level by catering for limited war at the
conventional
level.42 This injects instability at the
nuclear-conventional level, thereby, in the expectation
of the
planners, bringing about stability at the subconventional level through a
refurbished
conventional
deterrent.
Mobilization
in quick time is essentially to prevent Pakistani exploitation of the
diplomatic
card.
Since this is a military-generated doctrine, the reduction of the time window
for
crisis
management has perhaps prevented the doctrine from gaining political
imprimatur.
There
is an acceptable military logic to an early start. The operational dividend is
in terms
of
Indian attackers finding Pakistani defenses underprepared, since defenders
would have
little
time to reach and prepare defenses. The offensives can profit from strategic
surprise,
dwelt
in the doctrine thus: “Strategic surprise can herald both the beginning and the
end of a
war.”43 Thiswould enable easier penetration of defenses,
paralyzing Pakistani response. The
desired
political dividend in avoiding a long, drawn-out war can then be easier
delivered.
Mobilization
time differentials are seen to be in Pakistan’s favor because of proximity
of
cantonments to the border.44 Mobilization
is seen as a problematic exercise in the Indian
democratic
context as against the same effort in military directed Pakistan. The problem,
in
the
words of the doctrine, is given as: “Military mobilisation in the Indian
context involves
considerable
effort because of the wide geographical spread of the peacetime locations of
our
units and formations, the considerable extent of our borders and the
multiplicity of
agencies
that need to coordinate their actions in order to make it effective.”45
How
deep Indian troops would launch over the border would be dependent on the aims
set by
the government and their translation into strategic ends by the military. This
aspect
is
possibly dealt with in the classified part of the doctrine. These would be of
necessity
limited
so as to avoid provocation, indicating the influence of limited-war thinking in
terms
of constraints of political aims on military objectives.46 Bharat Karnad’s “Sialkot
grab”
scenario visualizes India cutting off a thirty-mile-deep swath of territory,
thereby
threatening
Pakistan’s “centre of gravity” located in the urban centres in Punjab. To him,
this
would not entail a nuclear war since it would not threaten Pakistan’s survival.47
Limited-war
theorizing in India has a utility for deterrence of subconventional war.
It has
constricted Pakistan’s strategic space by making war “thinkable.” The publicity
attending
the release of the doctrine and the commentary on the doctrine that persisted
all
through the last decade has had four aims: prepare public opinion; build
pressure on
Pakistan’s
security apparatus by indicating a build-up of Indian resolve; provision the
government,
seen as unnecessarily diffident, with the option of military response; and
increase
pressure on Pakistan. The posturing that accompanied the doctrine through its
years
of trial and validation, particularly during military exercises, can be
attributed to
“rationality
of irrationality” in the hope of further contributing to deterrence. For
instance,
one
exercise in the initial period was named Exercise Purno Vijay (Total Victory).
In
India’s
case a deliberate effort is deemed as required to dispel its studied restraint
described
famously
once as “passivity and restraint.”48
The
doctrine also has utility from the point of view of the two-front threat. Such
thinking
has a credible pedigree. Writing in wake of the 1971 victory on security in
the
coming decade, K. Subrahmanyam had stated, “India will have to develop and keep
at
readiness
adequate forces to deter China and Pakistan from launching an attack either
jointly
or
individually and in case deterrence fails to repel aggression effectively . . .
faced with
the
possibility of two adversaries, our aim must be to hold one and reach a quick
military
decision
with the other. It is obvious that the latter can only be Pakistan.
Consequently, our
force
requirementsmust be planned to achieve this aim.”49 The two-front formulation is now
a
central feature of doctrinal thinking. In amajor doctrinal conference in late
2009, the army
chief
had reportedly mentioned at a closed-door conference that, “even as the armed
forces
prepare
for their primary task of conventional wars they must also factor in the
eventuality
of ‘a
two-front war’ breaking out.”50 Presumably, taking care of Pakistan through a quicker
decision
would help India concentrate on China better in such a contingency.
The
doctrine has had its share of both propagandists and critics. Their debate
excited
considerable
interest in it over the past decade in the country and abroad. The latter owed
to the
fulcrum of conflict having shifted to South Asia after September 11, 2001.
Whether
the
intent behind the doctrine of refurbishing conventional deterrence has
succeeded is
uncertain,
since the restraint in provocations by Pakistan could as well be ascribed to
its
predicament
to its west. The intent of provisioning a usable military option for the
political
leadership
was also not tested since India has adopted a strategy of restraint. The
strategy
of
restraint not only owes to wider foreign policy concerns such as the evolution
of the war
on
terror at India’s doorstep, but also possibly to the government not being
persuaded of
the
case that limitation is possible in the levels necessary for it to chance the
option. The
military
has failed in convincing its client, the government.
This
owes largely to flaws in the Cold Start formulation. First, the continued
inclusion
of
strike corps operations, as practiced in the annual exercises, did not heighten
confidence in
limitation.
Their role in posturing and thereby non-provocatively undergirding deterrence
was
not brought to the fore as much as it could have been, such as through innovative
building-in
of caveats to Cold Start. In other words, institutional compulsions, such as
pressures
from the armored corps “lobby,” came in the way of logically following Cold
Start
through. Second, the army failed to carry the air force, in particular, along.51 The
air
force was hesitant to be reduced to a supporting role, fancying itself as an
instrument
of
strategic decision through application of an Indian version of “shock and awe.”
There
being
no adjudicatorymechanism between the two services and due to a stillborn
Integrated
Defence
Staff, the issue has dogged Cold Start throughout its lifecycle. Last, Cold
Start,
as the
name suggests, was high on how to get into a conflict, but did not provide
sufficient
answers
on what to do thereafter and how to exit one. It was premised on seizing
territory
for
postconflict negotiation. The utility of retaining territory is not high. Along
the Line
of
Control sector it would be difficult to retain in the face of terrain
constraints and armed
opposition
by irregulars. In the International Border sector, it would require to be
returned.
The
U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and the reports of Pakistan having
trained
over
time over 500,000 irregulars suggests that any occupation would turn into a
quagmire.
It is
disputed whether the army has taken the necessary measures to undertake
implementation
in
letter and spirit such as remodelling the strike corps, staging forward strike
units
closer to the border, etc.52 Its command
and control methods have not appreciably
shifted
towards auftragstaktik (mission tactics) based on delegation and “recon pull”
(reconnaissance
pull). While age limits for tactical command have been reduced, cadre
management
compulsions have brought about a top-heavy army that can hardly be called
lean
and mean. That weapons inventories have not kept pace can be seen from India’s
reluctance
to chance the military option in face of such gross provocation as 26/11, the
terror
attacks on Mumbai in 2008.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine
The
doctrinal change described has as its backdrop the evolving nuclear era. In
keeping
with
the emerging nuclear reality by the late 1980s, India developed a nuclear
doctrine
but
left it unarticulated. It had acquired a “recessed deterrent” and a doctrine of
existential
deterrence
was assumed.53 This implied
that the nuclear capability was not weaponized,
but
was capable of being fielded in a short time frame. Nuclear weapons were taken
as
political
weapons meant for deterrence of enemy nuclear use only.54 India stood by no first
use,
with the weapons to be used in a counter-value mode. The aim was to avoid
stockpile
build-ups
that had occurred among nuclear weapon powers in the Cold War. This is theconnotation
of “minimum” in India’s nuclear doctrine. The advantages of this posture were
that a
nuclear arms race was prevented; India’s conventional superiority could
continue
to
count; the nonproliferation agenda could be kept at bay; and last, the missile
delivery
capability
could continue to be built.
The
situation changed dramatically with the Shakti tests at Pokhran in May 1998.
The
first National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the National Security Council
(NSC)
system set up in wake of the tests was charged with preparing a nuclear doctrine.
It
came out with a “Draft Nuclear Doctrine” in August 1999.55 The draft was a unique
document
in being a departure from the Indian tradition of not articulating its
strategic
thought.
It was, however, not without controversy with its credibility affected by
Jaswant
Singh,
speaking for the government, stating: “It is thus not a policy document of the
Government
of India.”56 Eventually,
the government approved many of the provisions of
the
draft in the official nuclear doctrine of January 2003.57 The key features pertinent to
conventional
doctrine were: “The posture of ‘No First Use’: nuclear weapons will only be
used
in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces
anywhere;
Nuclear
retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict
unacceptable
damage.”58 Further, the Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS) approved the setting up of a
Strategic
Forces Command (SFC) to handle nuclear assets under the control of the Nuclear
Command
Authority (NCA).
Implications of Nuclear Doctrine
It
emerges that “massive” punitive retaliation would be a pronounced escalation of
the
conflict,
unless Pakistan has provoked it by attempting a “first strike” or an attempt to
disarm
or decapitate. This is distinct from the term “first use,” or the introduction
of nuclear
weapons
into the conflict for the first time. Such introduction can be in various ways
not
amounting
to first strike, to include demonstration strike(s), nuclear signalling by
targeting
intruding
forces, and a more potent strike in case of value objectives being threatened
with
capture. In lower order cases, a massive response would be disproportionate and
abandonment
of limited-war tenets in one step. If introduction of nuclear weapons is not
overly
destructive and is a lower-order use, such as in targeting tactical forces—which
is
themore
likely form of first use as against pre-emptive attempt at first strike—then
for India
to go
massive in response would be a departure from the limited-war concept.59 India’s
nuclear
doctrine of massive punitive retaliation and of inflicting unacceptable damage
is
credible
for the upper rungs of Pakistani nuclear first use. They may not be prudent and
proportionate
for lower order strikes. Limitation therefore has scope even at the nuclear
level.
What are the implications for conventional doctrine?
India’s
new conventional doctrine envisages a “proactive” India, implying that it would
be
taking the conventional initiative at the start of the conflict. In accordance
with the
tenets
of limited war, the aim would be limited. Conventional forces thus would not
be
unnecessarily provocative. However the Pakistani nuclear threshold not being
known,
nuclear
first use cannot be ruled out. Since the Pakistani military will determine
nuclear
strategy
in war, a military as against political-dominant approach may be expected.
Thus,
thresholds
would be under cumulative pressure from tri-service and joint military action
of
India.
Presently, Pakistan has admitted to four thresholds: territorial; attrition
inmilitary and
strategic
assets; economic strangulation; and, lastly, externally induced internal
instability.60
Even
if the Indian military is fighting within politically laid down limited-war
parameters,
the
risk of nudging Pakistani thresholds, individually for each service or
collectively,
remains.
For
instance, the first draft of the new air force doctrine formulated in 2007
revolves
“around
the primacy of airpower in ‘shaping’ or ‘customizing’ the battlefield in such a
way
that the Army, as also the Navy, can carry out their designated tasks.”61 From the
experience
of the Kargil conflict and Operation Parakram, the navy can be assumed to
address
Karachi port, the Pakistani navy, and enemy shipping.62 Moreover, intelligence
operations,
which allegedly demonstrated a reach into Baluchistan and were associated
with
the Mohajir opposition in Karachi, would be enhanced. Diplomacy to isolate
Pakistan
from
support from the United States and China and to pressure it to concede would be
in
full
swing. These offensive actions cumulatively could prompt nuclear use brought on
by
political
and psychological reasons rather than strategic rationality. This may happen
even
if the
threshold were “high” to begin with. Since the Pakistani military is in control
of the
arsenal
and has been known to privilege military over political considerations, such as
at
Kargil,
its resort to nuclear first use is not impossible to visualize.
The
disjuncture between the conventional and nuclear doctrines can be resolved by a
movement
in either. In case of the conventional doctrine being changed, then the
question
of
provoking a nuclear reaction would not arise. Pakistan is suitably deterred at
the conventional
level
from attacking India. A defensive doctrine would remain untested, which
by
implication means there would be no question of crossing the nuclear threshold.
In such
a
case, having an expansive doctrine of nuclear retaliation, such as massive
retaliation or
inflicting
unacceptable damage, is of little consequence, since push would never come to
shove.
This was the case in the early period of covert and recessed nuclearization.
Nuclear
deterrence
was based on city-busting and unacceptable damage. The possibility of this
transpiring
was remote in light of India’s defensive posture of awaiting a Pakistani attack
and
then launching strike corps in counteroffensive. This can be replicated in case
of a
move
toward a defensive conventional warfare doctrine.
However,
India wishes to keep its conventional might honed so as to be able to deter
Pakistan
at the subconventional level through punishment for crossing the proverbial
threshold
of tolerance of proven malleability. The coincidence in Pakistan’s acquiring a
nuclear
capability and the breakout of proxy war leads India to believe that Pakistan
has
utilized
its nuclear card to prosecute proxy war. Overt nuclearization made the Kargil
intrusion
possible
for Pakistan. The traditional adventurousness of Pakistan requires dampening
by
India keeping its conventional card handy. A reversion at the conventional
level to a
defensive
doctrine may also not be readily forthcoming for reasons of military corporate
interest,
as budgets and size is involved, and shift in Indian strategic culture toward a
more
assertive
one. However (as will be seen later), there is a move away from proactive
offense
as
envisaged in Cold Start to “contingency operations” to helpmakemilitary power
relevant
once
again.
A
change in nuclear doctrine toward a more flexible nuclear retaliatory doctrine
is
worth
exploring irrespective of the changes in conventional doctrine. India envisages
that
a
conflict fought in the conventional domain should be controlled. On the other
hand, if
the
nuclear threshold is crossed, control is virtually jettisoned and higher order
retaliation
takes
over. Even if not massive, causing unacceptable damage could result in
receiving
like
punishment. In case there is to be reconciliation between the two doctrines in
keeping
with
limited-war tenets, then moving away from massive punitive response and promise
of
unacceptable damage is necessary. Critics would have it that nuclear war cannot
be
kept
limited. Escalation may yet result, but would inevitably be the case if
limitation is
not
considered at all in the first place. India’s present nuclear doctrine leads
inevitably to
undesirable
escalation.
The
draft doctrine provides an opening. It does not mention the nature of the
retaliation
during
wartime,
restricted as it is to the projection of the posture in peacetime.63 For inconflict
deterrence
posture to be different from a peacetime posture is understandable, and
has,
through its subtle wording, been considered in the draft. The nature of the
deterrent
posture
in wartime not having been reflected on indicates that other options have not
been
ruled
out. The draft, in not overly restricting the political head’s nuclear options,
had
potentially
ruled in a flexible nuclear doctrine. Since the draft has been a precursor for
the
officially
adopted doctrine there is an element of continuity between the two.64 Besides,
theory
mandates acceptability of departures from doctrine in practice as warranted.
A
candidate position was advanced by Bernard Brodie and taken up in the Indian
context
by Krishnaswamy Sundarji.65 It has not
received the attention it otherwise deserves.
Given
the stature of both, the silence surrounding the option they preferred speaks
for itself.
Their
position was that nuclear war must be terminated at the lowest
possible nuclear use
threshold. The understanding
behind this is that sustaining nuclear damage is not useful,
even
if inflicting it makes some sense in some circumstances. By this logic,
finishing
Pakistan
is no compensation for receiving unacceptable damage in return. A
nuclearweapons
employment
strategy of commensurate response, at least for early, lower order
nuclear
first use, is preferable. This would deter first use since such a response is
guaranteed
by
self-deterrence caused by the fear of receiving unacceptable damage in
counterretaliation
being
ruled out. The operational translation of this is in the option of quid pro quo
and
quid
pro quo plus. The deterrence of this is in its higher credibility. It caters
for the entirely
understandable
operation of self-deterrence in political-level nuclear decision making.
Therefore,
envisaging the possibility of limitation, even in nuclear exchange, would bring
the
nuclear doctrine in consonance with the limited-war principles.
The Conventional-Nuclear Interface
That
dangers of escalation to the nuclear level have apparently been taken on board
is
evident
from limitation brought about by the need to avoid triggering envisaged nuclear
thresholds.
These are taken along four dimensions: military attrition, territorial losses,
economic
viability,
and internal stability. Yet, concerted offensive action by the Indian military
would
simultaneously nudge all four thresholds directly and indirectly. The
cumulative
physical
and psychological impact could unhinge and lower the nuclear retaliation
threshold.
To
obviate such breakdown in nuclear deterrence, India’s nuclear deterrence is
based
on “assured
retaliation,” with the proviso that such reaction could well be of higher order
or
massive levels. Staying of Pakistan’s nuclear hand with the promise of
escalation to
unacceptable
levels of damage helps provide space for the offensive posture of Cold Start.
This
explains India’s adaptation of the nuclear deterrence concept to its purpose
and circumstance.
India
believes nuclear weapons deter the use of nuclear weapons and not war.
Thus,
India has built in a scope for war, albeit a limited one.
Indian
doctrinal evolution has quite naturally met with innovative moves on Pakistan’s
part.
One is in terms of vertical proliferation and the second its high-profile
deployment
of
tactical weapon systems, such as the unveiling of the Nasr.66 The latter signals a lower
nuclear
threshold, while the former suggests an ability to return any Indian counter
strike
of
unacceptable proportions by gaining a second-strike capability through sheer
numbers.
Pakistani
actions have made the nuclear level part of the subconventional-conventional
problematic.
The implication is that the three levels can no longer be seen in isolation.
Nuclear
war-fighting strategies, by making nuclear war appear thinkable, make them
less
likely. Unrealistic deterrence strategies do not deter. In any case, upon the
breakdown of
deterrence
the realm is not one of nuclear deterrence but of nuclear employment. Ending
the
confrontation
at the lowest level of nuclear exchange makes eminent sense. To overinvest
in a
society’s capacity for postconflict recovery, as is the case in the Indian
doctrine, is
to be
overly optimistic. While conventional limitation can help prevent escalation
into the
nuclear
domain, it cannot be assured. Likewise, nuclear limitation may not prove possible,
but
just as conventional limitation is planned for, so can one plan for nuclear
limitation. Is
such
limitation possible in a South Asian conflict setting?
The
answer to the question is not certain. Given the propensity of conventional
escalation
in the
absence of an explicit limited-war doctrine, the nuclear angle may come to the
fore
unexpectedly. Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur highlight this, stating, “Indian
doctrinal
changes
increase the likelihood that Indo-Pakistani crisis will escalate rapidly, both
within
the
conventional sphere and from the conventional to the nuclear level. . . . In
the nuclear
realm,
India’s Cold Start strategy would likely force Pakistan to rely more heavily on
its
strategic
deterrent.”67 Since the
nuclear doctrine for its part is in favor of higher order
nuclear
punishment being meted out in case of nuclear first use against India, the
likelihood
of
nuclear escalation is virtually built into doctrine.
In
India’s case, acknowledging this is essential since its growth makes it not
only more
vulnerable,
but, having more to lose, it would also be subject to self-deterrence. Arguing
for
limitation is not to argue for war-fighting, but for credibility of deterrence.
Currently
excessive
promises detract from credibility. A tit-for-tat response is in order,
particularly
at the
lower levels of the nuclear ladder that can at best be expected to come into
play in
the
first instance. That this limitation has not been thought through in India’s
case owes to
the
nuclear doctrine having preceded the conventional doctrine. The subsequently
released
conventional
doctrine could instead have been formulated taking the nuclear doctrine as
the
principal parameter. That this has not been done is evident from only
tangential and
inferential
references to both limited war and the nuclear backdrop being made, as against
an
explicit discussion. If limited war is an option to tame Pakistan, and levels
of ingress into
Pakistan
can lead to a nuclear response, then the nuclear doctrine needs to be
reformulated
away
from the promise of default punitive retaliation of unacceptable levels. A
flexible
nuclear
retaliation strategy, one dependent on the opprobrium quotient of enemy nuclear
first
use, is the direction to move toward. This means that there is scope for
limitation in
both
conventional and nuclear doctrines. That such thinking has positive prospects
can be
seen
in India’s sensible move away from Cold Start. Therefore, even if the nuclear doctrine
is not
amended, the worry of it being tested is less.
The Demise of Cold Start
The
state of preparedness along the tenets of conventional doctrine has been
articulated by
the
former army chief thus: “A major leap in our approach to conduct of operations
[since
then]
has been the successful firming-up of the cold start strategy [to be able to go
to war
promptly].”68Yet, even as the army appears to have readied
itself after requisite restructuring
and
practice, the latest and possibly final movement in the limited-war doctrine is
its death
knell
struck by the General V. K. Singh. He unambiguously stated, “There is nothing
called
‘Cold
Start.’ As part of our overall strategy we have a number of contingencies and
options,
depending
on what the aggressor does. In the recent years, we have been improving our
systems
with respect to mobilisation, but our basic military posture is defensive.”69 This
movement
away from Cold Start indicates that the army has registered the criticism it
has
come
under. A writer involved with the doctrinal process at the Army War College
writes
that, “a
manoeuvre doctrine and a limited-war concept face practical questions about how
they
relate to India’s broader national security concerns.”70
Reservations
on answers at the conventional level for problems at the subconventional
level
have been voiced equally vigorously within the military. This has set the pace
for
the
change currently playing itself out. A disconnect between military force
application
and
political objectives arises. In a situation where both India and Pakistan are
armed with
nuclear
weapons, conflict avoidance must be a political objective. This is learning the
lesson
voiced
by Bernard Brodie early on in the nuclear age as the very first and foremost
lesson.71
The
strategy has consequently shifted in light of the logic that since restricted
conventional
space
is available, military preparations must focus on the “feasible” forms of war.
This
comprises
punitive strikes but without recourse to posturing of strategic reserves. It
can
thus
be seen that even as the Cold Start doctrine was being operationalized,
thinking on the
next
doctrinal step was already underway.
This
review of the life cycle of Cold Start suggests that the earlier higher profile
of the
doctrine
had utility for posturing. The offensive doctrine served to cover for the
shortfalls in
terms
of equipment in the process of being made up. The pieces having fallen into
place over
time
with exercises conducted and equipment acquisitions, it is possible to
underplay the
doctrine
now. The higher profile enabled deterrence in terms of instilling fear in
Pakistan on
the
possibilities of Indian reaction. This covered for the period when the doctrine
was being
tested.
Its present state of operationalization gives the military confidence in it
enough to
find
discussion on it expendable from a deterrence point of view. The current
movement is
for “operations”
depending on the “contingency.” This is suggestive of moving a step away
from
limited war itself. The acknowledgment is that the escalatory potential of
limited war
makes
it a less than appealing option for the political decision maker when
confronted with
live
situations, as occurred during Mumbai 26/11.72 The window that appeared to exist
between
the subconventional and nuclear planes is not as wide as was first thought.
This
reevaluation
may result in a decisive move away from limited war to short, sharp military
engagements
not amounting to war. This may be more in keeping with war avoidance,
critical
in the nuclear age.
Conclusion
India’s
security at the turn of the century was under considerable stress. The internal
security
problem
continued and the nuclear breakout in South Asia had only drawn India into the
Kargil
War. India’s doctrinal response was in both realms, nuclear and conventional.
However,
the
two were treated as distinct since the nuclear level was kept largely insulated
from
the
military. The debate around both doctrines, nuclear and conventional, was
catalyzed
by the
Kargil War. The draft nuclear doctrine was released in the month following the
war
and
the military took a leaf out of Pakistan’s book to get out of the Sundarji era.
The two
doctrines
have been extensively analyzed in professional circles, the strategic
community,
and
the media. In the backdrop of the debate has been the events unfolding since
9/11. That
both
have remained untested owes much to the deterrence that the two doctrines
provided.
In
keeping with its image as senior service, to set the terms of the debate and to
overcome
its embarrassment at Kargil and in Operation Parakram, the army came up with
the
Cold Start doctrine. It has been short-lived, having been found wanting as a
usable
option,
particularly in wake of the horrendous terror attacks in Mumbai in late
November
2008.
The key shortcoming is its inability to prevent escalation due to its continued
reliance
on
strike tactics. In not explicitly articulating how limitation is to be brought
about, it has
not
quite proved a limited-war doctrine. However, it did serve as the basis for
some of the
organizational
initiatives and restructuring during the course of last decade. The current
movement
is toward accommodating to the economy-centric grand strategic imperatives
of war
avoidance, toward conventional force application for retributive ends not
involving
mobilization
or traditional offensives.
Over
the last decade, the two doctrines have been only partially in sync. The
expansive
promise
in India’s nuclear doctrine was to lift Pakistan’s nuclear threshold enough to
enable
disciplining it through punishment administered at the conventional level.
Pakistan
has
responded along the nuclear and subconventional level. It has projected a low
nuclear
threshold
and is likely to adopt an Iraq-style counter to Indian presence on its
territory. In
concentrating
on the early phases of the conflict, Cold Start did not have the answer for
either.
In its scheme, political will was required to compensate. Incidentally, its
emphasis
on a
quick start in the wake of provocative incidents was to prevent the political
class
developing
second thoughts and cold feet. The nuclear doctrine’s longstanding focus on
unacceptable
damage made it less than credible to the kind of nuclear challenge Cold Start
would
have provoked. The reconciliation seems to have been arrived at in the movement
in
conventional
doctrine. The positive aspect is that the change taken to its logical
conclusion
would
make the nuclear level recede further in the backdrop.
The major
contribution of Cold Start has been to enable the military to finally
appreciate
the
compulsions of the nuclear era. The Cold Start phase can be seen as a necessary
stepping
stone to help it transit from war deterrence to war avoidance. But the
transition
has
only begun recently. While the intent has been voiced by the top brass, the
necessary
organizational
and doctrinal steps have yet to be taken. That these steps will be held
hostage
to institutional impulses and parochialisms for a while longer is axiomatic.
Given
this,
irrespective of developments on the conventional front, India’s nuclear
doctrine needs
to
keep moving away definitely from the formulation “massive” and, preferably,
also its
fixation
with “unacceptable damage.”
Notes
1. HQ
Army Training Command (ARTRAC). Indian Army
Doctrine (Shimla: HQ ARTRAC,
2004).
2.
Robert Osgood’s definition of limited war is: “A limited war is one in which
the belligerents
restrict
the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do
not demand
the
utmost in military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be
accommodated
in a
negotiated settlement” (Osgood, Limited
War: The Challenge to American Strategy [Chicago:
University
of Chicago Press, 1957], 1–2). Osgood revisited the definition after the
Vietnam War,
writing,
“Limited wars were to be fought for ends far short of the complete subordination
of one
state’s
will to another’s, using means that involve far less than the total military
resources of the
belligerents
and leave the civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely
intact” (Osgood,
Limited War Revisited [Boulder:
Westview Press, 1979], 3).
3. The
Kargil War in 1999 was a limited war confined to a particular sector of the
Line of
Control.
The “twin peaks” crisis, Operation Parakram of 2001–02, was intended as an
exercise in
coercive
diplomacy and its success, or otherwise, was predicated on the threat of war
posed by the
mobilization
of India’s military might. The November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai, known as
26/11,
brought
on a crisis, defused in the event by India’s resort to the strategy of
restraint.
4. Ali Ahmed,
“India’s Strategic andMilitary Doctrines: A Post-1971 Snapshot,” USI Journal,
vol.
139 no. 578 (2009): 494–517.
5.
Kamal Kapoor, “Indian Military Doctrine—TheWay Ahead,” War College Journal, vol. 38,
no. 2
(2010): 3–7.
6. HQ
ARTRAC. Fundamentals, Doctrine, Concepts—Indian Army
(Shimla: HQ ARTRAC,
1998).
7.
Ibid., 11.
8.
Ibid., 50.
9.
Ibid., 11.
10. The
term is attributed to Jasjit Singh by Sumit Ganguly. See Ganguly, “Behind India’s
Bomb:
The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 80,
no. 5 (2001):
136–142.
11. P.
R. Chari, P. E. Cheema, and Stephen Cohen, Four
Crisis and a Peace Process: American
Engagement in South Asia (New Delhi:
Harper Collins, 2008), 67.
12.
Ibid., 142.
13.
Ibid., 200.
14.
Ibid., 147.
15. 1
Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear Strategy: India’s March Towards
Credible Deterrence (New
Delhi:
Knowledge World, 2009), 307.
16.
Swaran Singh, “Indian Debate on LimitedWar,” Strategic
Analysis, vol. 23, no. 12 (2000):
2179–85.
17.
Press Information Bureau, “War Not Obsolete By Nuclear Weapons: Fernandes,”
2000,
available
at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2000/rjan2000/r05012000.html (accessed
July 20,
2011).
18.
Ashley Tellis, Stability in South Asia: Prospects of
Indo-Pak Conflict (Dehra Dun: Natraj,
2000),
52.
19. V.
P. Malik. “Indo-Pak Security Relations: Kargil and After,” The Indian Express, New
Delhi,
June 21, 2002.
20. K.
Sundarji, Vision 2010: A Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century (New Delhi: Konark
Publication,
2003), 147.
21. K.
Kapoor, “Indian Military Doctrine,” 3.
22. HQ
ARTRAC, The Indian Army Doctrine, 19.
23. The
author’s doctoral dissertation in international politics at the School of
International
Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, titled “India’s Limited War Doctrine: Structural,
Political
and Organisational factors” (2012), discussed the impetus behind the doctrine.
24.
Sumit Ganguly and S. P. Kapur, India,
Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability
in South Asia (New Delhi: Penguin,
2010), 76–77.
25. For
details on the doctrine, see Gurmeet Kanwal. “India’s Cold Start Doctrine
and
Strategic Stability,” IDSA Strategic Comments, available at www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
IndiasColdStartDoctrineandStrategicStability
gkanwal 010610 (accessed March 20, 2011)
26.
Rajat Pandit, “Cold Start’ to NewWar Doctrine,” The Times of India, New Delhi,
April 14,
2004.
Praveen Sawhney attributes the term to the army spokesman, Major General D.
Summanwar
(Praveen
Sawhney, “Strategic Doctrine,” Pioneer, New Delhi, April 22, 2004).
27. HQ
ARTRAC, The Indian Army Doctrine, 50.
28.
Stephen Cohen and S. Dasgupta, Arming
without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation
(New
Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2010), 59.
29. G.
D. Bakshi, Limited Wars in South Asia: Need for an
Indian Doctrine (New Delhi:
Knowledge
World, 2010), 46.
30.
Harsh Pant, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for
Civil-
Military
Relations in India,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 33, no. 2 (2007): 248.
31. HQ
ARTRAC, The Indian Army Doctrine, 51.
32.
Ibid., 52.
33.
Ibid., 17.
34.
Ibid., 55–56.
35.
Ibid., 19.
36.
Walter Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,”
International Security, vol. 32,
no. 3 (2008/9): 165. See also Walter Ladwig, “The Challenge
of
Changing Indian Military Doctrine,” Seminar, 2009, available at www.india-seminar.com/2009/
599/599
walter c ladwig iii.htm (accessed March 30, 2011).
37.
Rajat Pandit, “Army ReworksWar Doctrine for Pakistan, China,” The Times of India, New
Delhi,
December 30, 2009.
38.
Walter Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?”, 166–67.
39. For
a discussion of the concept of stability/instability paradox in the South Asian
setting,
see
Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, “The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear
Weapons and
Brinkmanship
in South Asia,” (Washington DC: Stimson Center, Report 38, 2001).
40. P.
R. Chari. “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity
Paradox
in South Asia,” inMichael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability–Instability
Paradox,
148,
199.
41.
Kanti Bajpai, “To War or Not to War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001–02,” in
Sumit
Ganguly
and S. Paul Kapur, eds., Nuclear Proliferation
in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb,
(New
York: Routledge, 2009), 171.
42.
Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace Process, 174–75.
43. HQ
ARTRAC, The Indian Army Doctrine, 45.
44. S.
Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security,
vol.
33, no. 2 (2008): 88.
45. HQ
ARTRAC, The Indian Army Doctrine, 44.
46. K.
Subrahmanyam. “Indo-Pak Nuclear Conflict Unlikely,” The Times of India, New Delhi,
January
2, 2002.
47.
Bharat Karnad, NuclearWeapons and Indian Security: The
Realist Foundations of Strategy
(New
Delhi: MacMillan, 2002), 677–78. Also see his “‘Sialkot Grab’ and Capturing the
‘Corridor’:
Objectives
and Tactics in a Nuclear Battlefield,” War College
Journal, vol. 34, no. 2 (2005): 1–12.
48.
Ashley Tellis, Stability in South Asia, 71.
49. K.
Subrahmanyam, Our National Security (New Delhi: Economic and Scientific Research
Foundation,
1972), 53.
50.
Rajat Pandit, “Eye on China, Is India Adding Muscle on East?” The Times of India, New
Delhi,
July 2, 2009.
51. For
a critique of the doctrine, see Walter Ladwig, “An Assessment and Overview
of the
Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine,” presented at a seminar at the Naval
Post
Graduate School, Monterey, May 2008, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/∼mert1769/
Ladwig,%20Cold%20Start%20NPS%20Paper.pdf
(accessed February 11, 2011).
52. G.
D. Bakshi, Limited Wars in South Asia, 46.
53.
Rajesh Basrur, Security in the New Millennium: Views from
South Asia (New Delhi: India
Research
Press, 2001), 95.
54.
Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, 205.
55.
National Security Advisory Board, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory
Board on
Indian
Nuclear Doctrine,” August 1999, available at
http://meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm (accessed
March
15, 2011).
56. C.
Raja Mohan, “India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race: Jaswant,” The Hindu, New Delhi,
November
29, 1999.
57.
Sethi, Nuclear Strategy, 125.
58.
Cabinet Committee on Security, “Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on
Security
on
Operationalisation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03,” available at
http://meaindia.nic.in/
pressrelease/2003/01/04pr01.htm
(accessed March 12, 2011).
59. Ali
Ahmed, “Pakistani Nuclear Use and Implications for India,” Strategic Analysis, vol.
34, no.
4 (2010): 539.
60. P.
Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety,Nuclear Stability
andNuclear
Strategy
in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network—Centro Volta,” 2002,
available
at
www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm (accessed May 15, 2011).
61.
Rajat Pandit, “IAF Plans War Doctrine to Expand Strategic Reach,” The Times of India,
New
Delhi, August 2, 2007.
62. M.
A. Khan. “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot,” Proceedings
Magazine, vol. 137, no. 3
(2011):
1,297, available at
www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-03/indias-cold-start-too-hot
(accessed
July 16, 2011).
63.
National Security Advisory Board. “Draft Report.”
64.
Scott Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrines and Command and Control
Systems,” in
Peter
Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and J. Wirtz, eds., Planning
the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2000), 246.
65. See
respectively Bernard Brodie, Strategy in theMissile
Age (California: Rand Corporation,
1959),
313; andK. Sundarji, Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century (NewDelhi,Konark
Publishers,
2003), 146.
66. The
Nasr is reputedly a tactical nuclear missile system, described by the Pakistani
Inter-Services
Public Relations press release as: “Nasr, with a range of 60 km, carries
nuclear
warheads
of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes. This quick
response
system
addresses the need to deter evolving threats.” See Manoj Joshi, “Ballistic
Missile Nasr: A
Bigger
Threat from Pakistan,” India Today, New Delhi, June 2, 2011, available at http://indiatoday.
intoday.in/site/story/pakistans-short-range-ballistic-missile-nasr-is-a-matter-of-concern-for-india./
0/140087.html?complete=1 (accessed August 23,
2011).
67.
Ganguly and Kapur, eds., Nuclear Proliferation
in South Asia, 77.
68.
Pandit, “Army Reworks War Doctrine.”
69. M.
Pubby. “No to Cold Start Doctrine, India Tells US,” The Indian Express, New Delhi,
September
9, 2010.
70. K.
Kapoor, “Indian Military Doctrine,” 5.
71.
Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 76.
72. Joshi, “Ballistic
Missile Nasr.”
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