Service think tanks must not be conduits for political ideology

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/service-think-tanks-must-not-be-conduits

In the fitness of things, a think tank under the circumstance of political dominance of particular party and ideology may require to lean a particular way. Practical people deem this reasonable: sway with the wind, rather than break for being unbending. There may be issues as release of funds that require a certain amount of virtue signalling to unlock; there may be pressures, tacit and upfront; and there may be a lilt to strategic culture to pay obeisance to.

However, such liberties cannot be taken in think tanks of the armed forces. This is a corollary to the popular adage: the military is apolitical. Think tanks affiliated to respective service and one jointly accredited, act as gatekeepers of institutional ethos. If they dilute their vigil on what gets on to their agenda - such as partisan positions or politically-polluted stances - then they end up as a conduit for propaganda. An assembly line of contaminated input can potentially change the military’s organizational culture, making it susceptible to politicisation.

A service-affiliated think tank has autonomy. Autonomy is to enable creativity and innovation, so that the service stands intellectually stimulated. The think tank is an institution in itself, but answerable to its clients; incidentally also paymasters. Presence of an ideological slant in a think tank’s products must raise eyebrows. Should a centre appear to be providing an opening to the military’s intellectual space for propaganda, it has to be examined for motives. If it is absentminded and lethargic, it must stand cautioned. If a wilful participant, it has to be outed. If complicit from being like-minded, a spring-cleaning is warranted.

It suits interested parties targeting the think tank and the military to undercut the apolitical character of the military as a preliminary step to politicization: setting up of the armed forces as yet another instrument of partisan political purpose. Therefore, instances of such deviance from the standards of political propriety and intellectual probity must be pointed out in good faith, lest service think tanks betray public trust and that of their clients, the armed forces.

Examples of departures

Here the army-affiliated think tank, the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), is taken up to see if the centre is manifestly cognizant of its role in respect of keeping the army apolitical. Two of its issue briefs and two programs it conducted are considered. The intent is that timely cautioning would strengthen editorial watchdogs and vetting procedures of organisations it collaborates with, making the think tank less of an ‘easy meat.’ It is important to do so when institutional strength is dissipating rapidly across the board.

In an issue brief, the author, a long-retired major general uses the Delhi terror blasts to launch into an ideology-tinged overview of Muslim separatism historically, which in his mind’s eye continues up to the current day. Academic concerns over complexity and historical accuracy do not hold up this whatsapp uncle. Wholly mindful that assuming Muslim professionals exhibit potential for terrorist acts, he deliberately seeks to undo the progressive and professional success of the Muslim middle class. He recommends a stringent internal security regime, including covert, deniable ‘unobtrusive’ actions on his menu. Though knowing the outcome of such a regime will only further marginalise Muslims and undercut democratic freedoms, he remains undeterred. The paper’s title ‘India’s real enemy’ points to India’s Muslims. He wishes for a ‘War ‘that has no rules of morality or concern for human rights’.’ Taken along with the din and exaggerations over individual criminal behavior marginalizing Muslims, such legitimizing tracts are mischievous and dangerous.

The second ‘issue brief’ is by a retired lieutenant general. The paper is on regional political parties in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), tracing their alleged ambivalence towards the Indian state from independence till after the bifurcation of the state. Targeting political parties, the author is in the footsteps of a former chief - who as candidate chief of defence staff - opined on a political party in the North East. The author, though once a commander in Badami Bagh, appears blind to the salience of identity in the makeup of human beings and communities. There, not only did he run multiple shows in an army auditorium for days on end of The Kashmir Files, but - tone deaf - also had Kashmiris over for a view. As a former head of the army’s publicity wing, he is surely well aware of limits and guardrails. Even if these are not fully applicable to him in his retired capacity, he must know that these apply to the CLAWS. That the paper was published with a CLAWS imprimatur shows the clout of such high-profile social media stars.

A potential tendency for leaning towards the right on CLAWS’ part is reinforced by its recent engagements. At one CLAWS-organized seminar, it had Member of Parliament Mr. Tejasvi Surya over as key speaker, presumably because the seminar was to interest youth into national security affairs. He took care to note, ‘we lost our temples and our libraries were burnt (27:19).’ He condescendingly concludes by subtly peddling caste (26:30): that India’s national building principle has civilisationally always been to entrust security to the ‘wise’ (read brahmins) and the ‘strong’ (read kshatriyas). There is no call for a service think tank to be raising the profile of politicians. It needs being mindful that the credibility of the uniform can be (ab)used for white-washing of political resumes short on commitment to constitutional currently upstanding principles of secularism and fraternity.

Another questionable seminar had CLAWS as co-host, where the veteran speakers it whistled up had an opportunity to rub shoulders with civilian speakers such as a general secretary of the ruling party, among other majoritarian ideology-endorsing notables and ruling party apparatchiks: ‘distinguished scholars and policy visionaries’ in a CLAWS endorsement.

Treading with due caution

For ‘nationalist’ politics to seek to influence the military is not a new phenomenon. In the last BJP dispensation at the turn of the century, there were a surfeit of such contributions by veterans in military publications. This author had taken up cudgels on several occasions with editors of professional journals. In a salutary instance, a self-correction on part of an institution led to the withholding of the second part of an article by a veteran (p. 3).

The second outbreak was in the Modi era, with one writer going overboard: “One of the best Facebook posts from abroad by a known staunch critique of Prime Minister Modi says, “Indians are lucky to have Narendra Modi as their Prime Minister in this time of need!!”. Innocuously timed with the Tablighi Jamaat episode during Covid days, an article on its website egregiously noted, “the terrorist with fidyan (sic) mind set on getting infected will try spreading it to the target groups by intermingling with them…. He however, may take care not to infect the group/community whose support or sympathy he continues to seek in achieving his larger aim.” My observations were met with the director pulling rank!

The facilitation of a majoritarian ideology into the military’s cognitive space by its think tank is problematic. A complicit think tank lending its services for ideological ends calls for overhaul. The exercise of self-regulation and self-correction is compounded if a director is appointed based on his political posturing. A service think tank was once headed by a bhakt, placed by a chief who went on join the ruling party just ahead of last elections. One think tank head went on to a leadership position in an amply-funded right wing think tank, associated at one remove with the regime’s chief security honcho, Ajit Doval.

A feigned slip of tongue is all it takes to identify a majoritarian streak. Substituting the term ‘anti-nationalists’ with ‘poly-nationalists’ (9:20-10:20), the head of CLAWS at a ‘nationalist collective’ of a rabid media group explicates the right wing stereotype of those with a liberal and leftist world view. They, to him, ‘break the fabric of our country and lead us to our detriment and also pose problems for us in the future and our lofty goals of viksit bharat 2047 and in the process our own development of people of India.’ The think tank head believes in ‘one nation, one people’ (9:13); negating the ‘unity in diversity’ principle that has held good for decades. The notion neglects the nature of the proposed oneness; which - to this think tank head - is decidedly nationalist: read majoritarian.

Normalizing of majoritarianism makes it institutional ‘common sense;’ thereby preventing picking up the cues of politicization. Ideological blinkers tend to blind. When in listing only J&K, North East and Left Wing Extremism as internal security challenges, CENJOWS was blind to Hindutva extremism as a significant threat. Indeed, subscription to an ideology misrepresents challenges to the ideology as national security threats when the distinction between a political formation and the nation is lost sight of, a phenomenon liable to occur in a majoritarian setting.

The political cultural shift towards majoritarianism is demanding of a makeover of strategic culture in a particular direction. A think tank’s legitimate domain is the latter. Change if any must be organic and not by arbitrary diktat or – worse - by stealth. A service think tank is not an instrument of information operations targeting the internal, domestic space either of the polity or the military. Its uniformed minders must find the moral courage – albeit in difficult times – to rein political propensities of those in safari suits running it. National security demands speaking truth to power, requiring that think tanks nurture the moral capital to do so, at the very least, in-house.

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/military-cannot-change-the-regimes-refrain-but-it-need-not-be-party-to-a-political-project

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-lets-have-a-jolly-good

Op Sindoor 2: Let's have a Jolly Good War!

A recap of the failures

Pahalgam was Pakistan’s answer for the Jaffar Express terror attack. The link is clear from the fulminations of then General, now Field Marshal Asim Munir, chafing under that attack. As a former intelligence chief, he knew which levers to pull.

For its part, India gave him a wide-open goal in its having earlier withdrawn the security forces’ picquet at Baisaran meadow. This unexplained vacating of a tourist-frequented site quite naturally fed speculation in the usual quarters. That there has been no accountability for this operational level failure only strengthens conspiracy theories.

Pakistan’s conspiracy narrative is understandably more vehement and holds that the Baisaran terror attack was a black-operation to provide the - albeit tenuous - legal cover for an Indian armed attack that would sans such cover amount to aggression in international law.

The higher-level failure is in the potential of the regional security environment for periodically generating such crises. The post-August 2019 situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is only superficially stable. Within J&K, the Pirpanjal – where alienation lingers - had long been activated by the Pakistanis, using the vacation of that space by the Indian redeployment to Ladakh. Thus, Baisaran, followed soon by the tango Op Sindoor-Op Banyan al-Marsoos, was only to be expected. Apparently, the return of the Uniform Force to its original areas of jungle bashing was not timely enough.

The third failure is in the security strategy adopted since the Uri episode – of reprisal from a cold start - falling short. Neither did Uri deter a Pulwama, nor did a Pulwama deter a Baisaran. That Op Sindoor continues is Indian acceptance that even Op Sindoor does not deter. No one’s been sacked for adoption of a strategy lacking imagination.

The fourth failure is to chase the mirage of dominance. India could pay heed to a lesson from the ongoing Iran War II: mere lobbing of ordnance, missile and drone strikes do not beget higher-order strategic outcomes. At best, lower-order strategic objectives as pressure points, serve for messaging and to get even can be met thereby.

Not only did Israel, later joined by the United States (US), pound Iran in Iran War I (the 12-Day War), but both have had to repeat the volleys multifold in the ongoing Iran War II (the Ramadan War). Though both arsenals have run-down, Iran is holding out, which suggests that stand-off targeting isn’t strategically efficacious, defined as begetting strategic outcomes. Russians also learnt this at an unanticipated cost in Ukraine.

Contrarily, the takeaway is that a hardening of stances results. Iran’s staying away from Islamabad for the second round of talks avers. This is of a piece with the lessons of yore: the lesson from World War II was relearnt in Vietnam that the limitations of strategic bombing outdo its utility.

Even though the US has the wherewithal to take out Iran – as US President Trump has often threatened – having the capacity does not imply it is usable. Likewise, Israel has the nuclear capability, which cannot be employed. The inference is that ‘more of the same’ also cannot work as its votaries wish. Consequently, arming with a thrust towards more in the Balakot-Sindoor tradition may be as ill-thought out as the strategy of reprisal itself.

Finally, the missing of the wood for the trees

The only satisfaction will be of masculinist retribution, an avoidable seduction. The assumption that the public is bays for it, as was the case for Op Sindoor, may be a red-herring in that such an outcry could well be a manufactured one – such as in Op Sindoor’s case with its very naming, topped by an innovative logo.

Being responsive may embellish a strongman’s image, but for the country such domestic political utility is questionable since there may be perverse incentive to keep the fraught security situation alive for more of such partisan dividend through military means.

The sine qua non of military power is to beget strategic outcomes. Desired outcomes such as administering punishment are distinct from desirable strategic outcomes: a mitigation of the security predicament and, better still, creation of conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Military power exertion is to enable a position of advantage conducive to pursuing political ends politically. By repeatedly exercising the military option without political follow up to address the incompatibility is to misuse the military instrument. Worse is the military’s collusion with such abuse of its services.

The shape of the future

That the military is handmaiden is clear from the manner it is fallen for the regime’s line on Op Sindoor 2. It must recall that the new-found strategic doctrine – ‘new normal’ - in relation to Pakistan was close on the heels of Op Sindoor’s last night, precluding time for any strategic thinking going into it.

The proximity in time suggests it was to placate the hardcore (‘trads’) camp-followers of the regime, who were disheartened by the calling-off of Op Sindoor. The line that the operation was put on pause was but appeasement of the voluble hard-right. For the military to thereafter keep up the din is political naivety, if not a political act in itself.

After the fact, the military has indicated that it had more up its sleeve to dish out, with both the navy and the army indicating that - interrupted by a call from the Pakistani military operations’ head - they had to keep their powder dry. Taking cue from such claims, the next round is likely to see much stand off and aerial punishment delivered. The readiness to up-the-ante is to ensure that Pakistan replies in kind rather than ups-the-ante.

If Iran could hold up against two versatile and armed-to-the-teeth foes, it can be expected that Pakistan could get back at India in kind. There is much being made of the interception at Sirsa, praiseworthy in itself, but surely incentivizes smarter Pakistani tactics. That Pakistan held out a surprise – with Chinese help - in Op Sindoor’s first night, has no doubt forewarned India. A ‘draw’ is on the cards, even if after both sides claim a ‘win’.

This begs the question whether it makes any strategic sense to persist with the military prong of strategy in relation to Pakistan. Worse is that the military prong appears entangled with the intelligence prong, wilfully handled by the national security and intelligence czar, Ajit Doval. The military prong provides cover for the intelligence prong of strategy to pursue its vile ends.

The history of the military in the lead on the Kashmir front does not enthuse. Repeated junctures of the military wrestling the Pakistani proxies to the mat were squandered by the political level’s unwillingness to progress matters politically, either domestically or with Pakistan. As a result, the problem persists.

Similar political and bureaucratic lassitude is now visible at the conventional level, though with an admixture of ideology; with each crisis merely setting the stage for the next, rather than creating conditions for talks to discontinue their recurrence.

It appears easier to unceasingly impose on Indian communities – Kashmiris and by extension Indian Muslims (or the other way around), and increasingly on Ladakhis - than take on the primary antagonist – Pakistan - militarily. For its part, Pakistan has no love lost for Indian Muslims and will fight India to the last Kashmiri.

Shaping the future

A strategically significant outcome is only possible if India were to field its fancily-named integrated battle groups in the fight. Holding these in reserve as an escalation dominance gimmick is lethargic and pusillanimous. True, it will set off a jolly good war; but the good part is it will end traditionally – in a negotiated settlement.

To be sure, it would be a risky proposition. The Pakistanis will push their information war buttons on the nuclear overhang. The good part of this would be both greater in-conflict escalation control and post-conflict international persistence in facilitating (mediation being taboo) a negotiated outcome.

The military must champion the logic of war, the rightful use of the military instrument to create the conditions for politically addressing root causes. Repeatedly addressing proximate causes – terror attacks – especially to no perceptible deterrence advantage is imbecility (famously defined as doing something repeatedly with the same vacuous results every time). To elevate this to strategy – a Pakistan-centric one – is ultimate testimony of strategic vapidity.

That such a strategy was nevertheless proclaimed by none less than the prime minister only goes to prove the domestic politics at play. Persistence of Pakistan as a foe helps the regime collapse the internal and external Other into one, for the manufacture of a unity based on a majoritarian logic. Aware of the potential for a wider war to provoke the international community’s midwifing of a settlement on Kashmir, India is fighting shy of one.

An apolitical military implies being non-partisan. Apolitical does not mean being a political ingenue. The military cannot change the regime’s refrain, but it need not be party to a political project. It’s professional responsibility at the apex level is advisory, and must be used to good effect.

The military must advocate political ends that have a sustainable strategic rationale. The changed character of war not having changed war’s nature, the military must reinsert war - traditionally envisaged - as an option for choice at the political level.