https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/keep-walking-general-oberoi-1315746

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General Oberoi: On One Leg and a Prayer

In a ‘personal mini account’ penned a decade back, Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi recounted his life in uniform and out of it. Its fullness was testified by the title, No Commas; No Pauses; No Full Stops. The details were to follow in a fuller biography, which he was reportedly working on with assistance of his grand-daughter, recently returned with a Masters’ degree from King’s College London. Since the ‘mini account’ whets the appetite for more, the forthcoming book can be expected to further illumine the trajectory India’s post-Independence military.

Given the historical shortage of access to official thinking - routinely made available in public archives in other democratic countries - biographies are one way to tap into India’s strategic turning points. While this route may suffer the drawback of selective and partial perspective, regrettably the attentive public will soon be deprived of even this vestige. The regime’s threat to turn off pensions is out to stifle even sanitized recollections. The outcome will be fewer resources with levels of General Oberoi’s blunt-speak, allowing space for strategic mythologizing to take over.

General Oberoi will be known for many things – not least of which is his post-retirement stewardship of the War Wounded Foundation. He along with three contemporaries – Lt Gen ‘Yogi’ Sharma, Lt Gen Pankaj Joshi and Maj Gen ‘Kartoos’ Cardozo - rose through the ranks despite the war-attributable disability, or rather because of it spurring each on to super the challenge. While this shows the army in good light, each had to contend with individual sceptics making each journey remarkable.

A significant innings of the general was his appointment as founder-director of the Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). His credentials as a ‘soldier-scholar’ were the right mix to take the Indian army into the twenty-first century. Operation Parakram had just wound down and an early lesson learnt was that the limited war window - espied first after the Kargil War - needed to be exploited. Following the footsteps of the air force, the army set up CLAWS with a view to take forward doctrinal thinking. The second edition of the official army doctrine was articulated even as the center was set up. General Oberoi, as head of the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) had overseen the writing up of its first doctrine in 1998. He was thus a default choice. Interestingly, the general rues the pretension that the 2004 doctrine was the first iteration of doctrine!

Outstanding in his ‘soldier’ credentials is that as an infantry officer he was picked to convert a mechanized division into an armoured division, becoming only the second infantry officer to lead one; Sundarji being the first. His three-star commands were of a strike corps and of the Command tasked for offensives, the Western Command. Besides, he had headed the operations branch and had overseen it as vice chief.

He conceptualised the map exercise portion of Exercise (Ex) Brasstacks, receiving the second highest distinguished service medal, rare at one-star level. He later participated in its final version – exercise with troops – as a brigade commander. He followed through as the operations chief with Ex Brahm Astra and, later when at Chandimandir, with Ex Divya Astra. Since the nuclear shadow loomed larger in the period pockmarked with crises ranging from Kashmir to Kargil, conventional doctrine had to delicately keep pace with strategic developments. The general, along with contemporaries as Lt Gen ‘Shammi’ Mehta, thus helped birth the current limited war doctrine, which in its latest avatar has Rudras and Bhairavs at vanguard.

The scholar part of his ‘soldier-scholar’ tag is equally significant. This feature of his personality was noticeable early with his figuring on the prestigious competitive list of the top twenty for the year-long defence staff course. He underwent the National Defence College-equivalent course meant for budding brass-hats at Carlisle. Earlier, he’d tenanted the horizon-widening post as defence attaché in Malaysia. He had a longish tenure at Shimla, heading the training command, since his generation of general officers was lucky to have their years in service extended by two years. This spared him the usual merry-go-round that the ARTRAC chair usually witnesses, allowing him time for reflection.

This author was witness to two instances of the general’s eye for innovation in the period. One was his interest in the infantry assault technique to unlock deliberate defences such as exist in the obstacle-ridden terrain along the Pakistan border. The technique harks back to the German storm troopers of the First World War. In the Indian context the technique was perfected by an officer who had served under the general in his battalion command days (incidentally the first company commander of this writer). It was put out as an ARTRAC training note. Co-incident with the Kargil War, a just-in-time pamphlet on multipronged assaults in mountains adapted the technique to the terrain.

The second instance was in regard to a paper I wrote on educating army officers. Fresh from sabbatical, I pompously advocated that the liberal arts and science educational curriculum at the academies be substituted with hard-core military studies (p. 62). He called me up to Shimla for presenting the paper to the concerned staff. Gratifyingly, and testimony of his attention to detail, some advocated subjects soon started figuring in professional military education curriculum, such as international humanitarian law which was includ by when I underwent the senior command course at the war college. Now, of course, the emphasis is on technology, though one hopes this is not at the cost of understanding war through the more befitting political science lens.

His character-building legacy for officers is of forthrightness. He’d demonstrated this repeatedly, once requesting to be replaced in a senior appointment in military operations directorate, owing to a run-in with someone at headquarters. Later, as military operations head, he yet again bid to be posted out. He stepped down at CLAWS too after contesting restrictions on the autonomy of the fledgling institution. No details of the disagreements figure in his biography prequel, held in reserve for his intended (now posthumous) biography.

From his trenchant critique of the bureaucracy, it can be reasonably surmised that his tiffs were with defence ministry bureaucrats, who - at the time - were known to have authority without responsibility, a characterization by one of their own, ‘Subbu’ Subrahmanyam. To the general, the bureaucracy suffers a ‘feeling of inadequacy or fear their lack of knowledge will stand exposed.’ Today’s incorporation of the military into the ministry and the nascent concept of fusionism owe in part to the fulminations of the military veterans on the bureaucracy forming an intervening layer between the military and the political leadership, redefining civilian control away from political control.

The current generation of brass-hats must contend with the downside of the resulting proximity: the ideological adhesive inherent in fusionism. It has already led to a manipulative and transactional relationship with the military, expanding grey areas on roles such as of a recent tasking of the air force for distributing exam papers. This gives rise to the question if military is signalling ideological compliance, such as by tweaking dress codes, going overboard on perception management or in rhetorical genuflection to viksit’ism, to receive a bounty of sorts?

His legacy on this in his own words, is: ‘There is a moral somewhere here; if you feel strongly about a wrong, do not keep mum and hesitate because of a perceived notion that you are deliberately inviting harm to yourself. One should take action and if there are adverse consequences, so be it!’

An ongoing debate, the general participated in – if not quite precipitated - is on jointness. In his book, he recalls a heated debate with Air Marshal Vinod Patney – who as the most decorated military officer ever was no spring-chicken in the art of repartee. At the Western Command war game in the presence of a bemused defence minister, the debate on the respective roles of land and air forces in prosecuting war can be credited with kicking off the impetus to ‘think purple.’

On the nuclear aspect, the general breathed fire. As an armoured warfare exponent, he required a water-tight nuclear umbrella allowing mechanized pincers to do their thing. To this end, he favoured the official nuclear doctrine, that promises visiting down annihilation for any nuclear first use. Inherent in this is the risk of conventional provocation of indeterminate nuclear thresholds. This threat has receded somewhat lately with operationalization of the limited war doctrine, keeping off nuclear redlines by relying mostly on stand-off delivery of ordnance by drones and missiles. Recent reports on a set of operationally-ready nuclear warheads have set off calls for a doctrinal revision. If conventional war is subject to limitation, surely nuclear war – decidedly more dangerous - also merits like attention.

His military thinking rested on firm foundations laid with the legendary Jangi Paltan, with which right on commissioning he participated in liberating Daman. Come 1965, he was injured in the leg while chasing Pakistani infiltrators in the Dachigam forest near Srinagar. His fellow officer on that patrol, Lt Raut, was fatally injured; testifying to the two sticking to the well-regarded dictum for young officers: lead from the front. The leg amputated, only further energised him into higher endeavour.

As a middle-piece officer, he was the first second-in-command of a new raising. He earned his first distinguished service award in command of the same unit, a rare distinction. The unit’s record has been such as to earn it a tenure at the Rashtrapati Bhawan, where it looks to belatedly celebrate its golden jubilee (full disclosure: it is the unit this author was commissioned into). He went on to tenant the appointment of ‘colonel of the regiment,’ an post threatened with obsolescence under the decolonizing rationale. Both a good and successful officer, he validates the motto most Indian officers live by: ‘karam hi dharm.’

Finally, in the context of the times, it is worth mention that the general was a model secular being. Not only did he court and win his wife, Daulat - herself a product of an inter-religious marriage - but though exposed to the travails of Partition as a young boy, he did not allow its memory to becloud his humanity. He was scathing on prejudices that are at full tide today.

The general walked into the sunset last week. As a privileged recipient of a signed copy of the limited edition No Commas…, I can only pass on the exhortation personally inked by him: ‘Keep Walking!’

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Toting up legacies of two generals poised to fade away

Two generals are in their legacy period: General Chauhan just handed over the chief of defence staff baton, while General Dwivedi is doing his farewell rounds. Both have been around at a consequential time operationally and in terms of developments in civil-military relations. A look at what they leave behind is timely, though the last word on either cannot be pronounced just yet.

The lucky general

General Chauhan’s retiring a second time round is a notable first. This is the second precedent he sets for his successor, General Subramani. It seems that the route that’s proved lucky for both – through the national security council secretariat as military adviser to national security adviser (NSA) – serves to ideologically vet and socialize CDS candidates. General Subramani took care to reference the ‘honourable prime minister’ in his inaugural address to the press.

Despite this advantage, General Chauhan’s legacy can be summed up in one sentence: Just prior to demitting his chair after some four years and one extension, General Chauhan sent up a proposal on theaterisation to the ministry. Presumably in his prior billet as military adviser, he’d have been privy to the thinking of both, his regimental mate, General Rawat as CDS, and of ethnic kin, Ajit Doval as NSA. Yet he was left out in the cold; yet another case of political abdication and attempt at firing from uniformed soldiers, which in this case at least turned out a blank.

If anything must be laid at Chauhan’s door, it was his inability to goad on his mentor, the NSA, and political master, the raksha mantri. Even that is not so much his personal cross to bear as much as commentary on the military’s heft in the national security system. That said, till the ministry pronounces on the recommendations, his legacy cannot be figured out in full; and in the event, credit - if any - will be shared by his successor if he can pull it off in his tenure.

Since General Chauhan had command authority only over a few fledgling outfits (notably the Strategic Forces Command takes its marching orders from an unelected civilian, the NSA), it’s his first-among-equals position as chair of the chief’s committee on which his showing must be gauged. He can be credited with limiting Op Sindoor, given that it had non-military objectives at the outset; included a peaceful outreach when underway; and was stopped promptly, once the air force got even. The last he may have to share with Trump! Even so, the political leadership thought it prudent to consult some veterans too on the last evening, betraying either goose bumps or under-confidence in the uniformed leadership.

A good thing was the CDS admitting to losses suffered in the air, albeit doing so on foreign soil and somewhat economically for a democratic country. A bad thing was letting pass the targeting of the Nur Khan air field, though the escalatory potential of such adventurism was known prior, particularly since he himself is an acknowledged nuclear expert and is the military adviser to the nuclear command authority.

As the deterrent value of Op Sindoor remains uncertain, no definitive acclaim can be accorded. Given that Op Sindoor persists as Op Sindoor 2.0, it is clear that Op Sindoor itself is a self-acknowledged failure of the regime. Therefore, if it was at all a strategically sustainable step is questionable. That it resulted in the limbo of indefinite duration dubbed the ‘new normal’, shows up a deficit in strategy making, attributable directly to NSA Ajit Doval. Given that the regime already wants to walk back from the posture – with its backers calling for talks with Pakistan - is a telling commentary on myopic strategy making. As principal military adviser to the raksha mantri, the general must have had a say; so, must bear with his share of the scrutiny. However, domestic political aspects having more to do with it – keeping Pakistan in the doghouse is good for keeping Indian Muslims on the backfoot, both together constituting the Other in the regime’s world view - General Chauhan can be let off, but not wholly.

A lasting impact of his tenure is in his introduction of the concept of fusion into the discourse and in practice. Though the concept is nothing new, it caught steam on General Chauhan’s watch. He went a step further aping China in recommending that the military and defence stakeholders be ideologically convergent. With no clarity on the ideology he had in mind or whether he was referring to a work ethic or a patriotic sentiment, it cannot out-rightly be said that he was only plugging atmanirbharta. A danger is that fusionism, though visualised as securing and enhancing civilian stakeholder participation in national security, may well turn out the other way round, it being a two-way street; for instance, military involvement in moving competitive exam papers about!

The less lucky general

There is precedence in a serving chief not making it to CDS. General Naravane – by his showing in handling the Chinese and in being sceptical on agnipath - had perhaps ruled himself out of the running. General Pande retired when the CDS post already had an incumbent. For now, coup-proofing concerns and a continuing continental mindedness rule out sister service nominees for CDS. Therefore, General Dwivedi not making it is comment-worthy: a four-star chief is thought not fit, while his own three-star vice chief retiree is. The only thing distinguishing General Subramani from the competition is the ‘soldier-scholar’ tag; which arguably suited his last appointment better, considering that its first incumbent was also dubbed likewise.

Ordinarily, the Chief ought to go down in history for enabling at long last a structural innovation envisaged two decades back. He has overseen the raising of integrated battle groups, which would allow the land war component to take the battle to the enemy. With the army restricting itself to stand-off fire assaults and air defence in Op Sindoor, it felt the need to fast-track a capability to launch conventional limited attacks, which at the next crisis could help it respond in quick time to either a terror atrocity or the adversary’s upping the ante.

However, the General’s last verbal scrum with Pakistan – on nuclear portents of a conflict - suggests that while the intention of war limitation is there, there is little confidence in it. Since this is a work-in-progress, the final word on the measure – whether it proves an escalatory first step up the proverbial ladder or a slip into a morass – can only be kept in reserve.

It also has another underside: that the army is not quite lacchak – for want of an apt word - enough to respond to crisis outbreak. It intrigues as to why the army needs tailored forces when its units and formations should be able to combine into employable forces in a reasonable time-frame. To do away with what weighs the army down, such as ‘bull’ and superfluous housekeeping, appears not to have been explored. For now, he can only be known for keeping up the din on Op Sindoor.

Chiefs are expected to be political savvy enough to serve as an institutional guiding light. In General Dwivedi’s case, it is cannot be said with any certainty if he is complicit with the regime’s political project or merely lax. The former is not unlikely, given his - soundly criticized - move of replacing the painting in his office on the 1971 victory with one depicting a fantasy battlefield, the notable feature of which is a saffron-clad figure directing military forces.

Distressingly, the figure has since been reproduced elsewhere, most strikingly in the headquarters of the more consequential of operational commands. At the photo-op site at its headquarters – that lately witnessed the American ambassador pose - the backdrop has a looming statue in precisely the same commanding posture as the one in the painting, overshadowing the Chakra and the full-length profiles of the nation’s two field marshals. The figure depicts Chanakya, with the hall bearing his name.

It is to invoke an imagining that the armed forces go to battle along lines thought up by a strategically-minded national security establishment. It indicates the fusionism the military desires, in which a whole-of-nation approach to national security is directed by a political body with access to Chanakyan counsel: materializing the motto of the defence staff college: ‘to war with wisdom.’

Notwithstanding this, the symbol can well instigate an alternate imagining in light of a caste-infused social reality, in which a brahmin orders kshatriyas about. The military cannot be party to the conditioning that goes into social reordering, through making such symbols unremarkable. If an unwitting participant, the military is still liable to be called out – as here.

In salute

To be sure, both generals were reputedly fine human beings. General Chauhan also lived simply, going by the manner his cottage gate at the center of Lutyen’s Delhi has not been ‘done up’ with public monies as that of other brass-hats. This is not a factor to be dismissed lightly in a milieu that has decidedly coarsened. Both retained and demonstrated character qualities instilled by their common alma-mater, the academies. General Dwivedi just made his last visit to his squadron, proudly handing it the academy banner for topping the league table.

It bears reminding that they have weathered the most challenging era in terms of civil-military relations, geopolitical quakes and regional conflict outbreaks. It cannot be said with any conviction that anyone else could have done any better. The nation owes the two much for managing their political masters while keeping the family silver relatively intact.  

Service think tanks must not be conduits for political ideology

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In the fitness of things, a think tank under the circumstance of political dominance of particular party and ideology may require to lean a particular way. Practical people deem this reasonable: sway with the wind, rather than break for being unbending. There may be issues as release of funds that require a certain amount of virtue signalling to unlock; there may be pressures, tacit and upfront; and there may be a lilt to strategic culture to pay obeisance to.

However, such liberties cannot be taken in think tanks of the armed forces. This is a corollary to the popular adage: the military is apolitical. Think tanks affiliated to respective service and one jointly accredited, act as gatekeepers of institutional ethos. If they dilute their vigil on what gets on to their agenda - such as partisan positions or politically-polluted stances - then they end up as a conduit for propaganda. An assembly line of contaminated input can potentially change the military’s organizational culture, making it susceptible to politicisation.

A service-affiliated think tank has autonomy. Autonomy is to enable creativity and innovation, so that the service stands intellectually stimulated. The think tank is an institution in itself, but answerable to its clients; incidentally also paymasters. Presence of an ideological slant in a think tank’s products must raise eyebrows. Should a centre appear to be providing an opening to the military’s intellectual space for propaganda, it has to be examined for motives. If it is absentminded and lethargic, it must stand cautioned. If a wilful participant, it has to be outed. If complicit from being like-minded, a spring-cleaning is warranted.

It suits interested parties targeting the think tank and the military to undercut the apolitical character of the military as a preliminary step to politicization: setting up of the armed forces as yet another instrument of partisan political purpose. Therefore, instances of such deviance from the standards of political propriety and intellectual probity must be pointed out in good faith, lest service think tanks betray public trust and that of their clients, the armed forces.

Examples of departures

Here the army-affiliated think tank, the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), is taken up to see if the centre is manifestly cognizant of its role in respect of keeping the army apolitical. Two of its issue briefs and two programs it conducted are considered. The intent is that timely cautioning would strengthen editorial watchdogs and vetting procedures of organisations it collaborates with, making the think tank less of an ‘easy meat.’ It is important to do so when institutional strength is dissipating rapidly across the board.

In an issue brief, the author, a long-retired major general uses the Delhi terror blasts to launch into an ideology-tinged overview of Muslim separatism historically, which in his mind’s eye continues up to the current day. Academic concerns over complexity and historical accuracy do not hold up this whatsapp uncle. Wholly mindful that assuming Muslim professionals exhibit potential for terrorist acts, he deliberately seeks to undo the progressive and professional success of the Muslim middle class. He recommends a stringent internal security regime, including covert, deniable ‘unobtrusive’ actions on his menu. Though knowing the outcome of such a regime will only further marginalise Muslims and undercut democratic freedoms, he remains undeterred. The paper’s title ‘India’s real enemy’ points to India’s Muslims. He wishes for a ‘War ‘that has no rules of morality or concern for human rights’.’ Taken along with the din and exaggerations over individual criminal behavior marginalizing Muslims, such legitimizing tracts are mischievous and dangerous.

The second ‘issue brief’ is by a retired lieutenant general. The paper is on regional political parties in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), tracing their alleged ambivalence towards the Indian state from independence till after the bifurcation of the state. Targeting political parties, the author is in the footsteps of a former chief - who as candidate chief of defence staff - opined on a political party in the North East. The author, though once a commander in Badami Bagh, appears blind to the salience of identity in the makeup of human beings and communities. There, not only did he run multiple shows in an army auditorium for days on end of The Kashmir Files, but - tone deaf - also had Kashmiris over for a view. As a former head of the army’s publicity wing, he is surely well aware of limits and guardrails. Even if these are not fully applicable to him in his retired capacity, he must know that these apply to the CLAWS. That the paper was published with a CLAWS imprimatur shows the clout of such high-profile social media stars.

A potential tendency for leaning towards the right on CLAWS’ part is reinforced by its recent engagements. At one CLAWS-organized seminar, it had Member of Parliament Mr. Tejasvi Surya over as key speaker, presumably because the seminar was to interest youth into national security affairs. He took care to note, ‘we lost our temples and our libraries were burnt (27:19).’ He condescendingly concludes by subtly peddling caste (26:30): that India’s national building principle has civilisationally always been to entrust security to the ‘wise’ (read brahmins) and the ‘strong’ (read kshatriyas). There is no call for a service think tank to be raising the profile of politicians. It needs being mindful that the credibility of the uniform can be (ab)used for white-washing of political resumes short on commitment to constitutional currently upstanding principles of secularism and fraternity.

Another questionable seminar had CLAWS as co-host, where the veteran speakers it whistled up had an opportunity to rub shoulders with civilian speakers such as a general secretary of the ruling party, among other majoritarian ideology-endorsing notables and ruling party apparatchiks: ‘distinguished scholars and policy visionaries’ in a CLAWS endorsement.

Treading with due caution

For ‘nationalist’ politics to seek to influence the military is not a new phenomenon. In the last BJP dispensation at the turn of the century, there were a surfeit of such contributions by veterans in military publications. This author had taken up cudgels on several occasions with editors of professional journals. In a salutary instance, a self-correction on part of an institution led to the withholding of the second part of an article by a veteran (p. 3).

The second outbreak was in the Modi era, with one writer going overboard: “One of the best Facebook posts from abroad by a known staunch critique of Prime Minister Modi says, “Indians are lucky to have Narendra Modi as their Prime Minister in this time of need!!”. Innocuously timed with the Tablighi Jamaat episode during Covid days, an article on its website egregiously noted, “the terrorist with fidyan (sic) mind set on getting infected will try spreading it to the target groups by intermingling with them…. He however, may take care not to infect the group/community whose support or sympathy he continues to seek in achieving his larger aim.” My observations were met with the director pulling rank!

The facilitation of a majoritarian ideology into the military’s cognitive space by its think tank is problematic. A complicit think tank lending its services for ideological ends calls for overhaul. The exercise of self-regulation and self-correction is compounded if a director is appointed based on his political posturing. A service think tank was once headed by a bhakt, placed by a chief who went on join the ruling party just ahead of last elections. One think tank head went on to a leadership position in an amply-funded right wing think tank, associated at one remove with the regime’s chief security honcho, Ajit Doval.

A feigned slip of tongue is all it takes to identify a majoritarian streak. Substituting the term ‘anti-nationalists’ with ‘poly-nationalists’ (9:20-10:20), the head of CLAWS at a ‘nationalist collective’ of a rabid media group explicates the right wing stereotype of those with a liberal and leftist world view. They, to him, ‘break the fabric of our country and lead us to our detriment and also pose problems for us in the future and our lofty goals of viksit bharat 2047 and in the process our own development of people of India.’ The think tank head believes in ‘one nation, one people’ (9:13); negating the ‘unity in diversity’ principle that has held good for decades. The notion neglects the nature of the proposed oneness; which - to this think tank head - is decidedly nationalist: read majoritarian.

Normalizing of majoritarianism makes it institutional ‘common sense;’ thereby preventing picking up the cues of politicization. Ideological blinkers tend to blind. When in listing only J&K, North East and Left Wing Extremism as internal security challenges, CENJOWS was blind to Hindutva extremism as a significant threat. Indeed, subscription to an ideology misrepresents challenges to the ideology as national security threats when the distinction between a political formation and the nation is lost sight of, a phenomenon liable to occur in a majoritarian setting.

The political cultural shift towards majoritarianism is demanding of a makeover of strategic culture in a particular direction. A think tank’s legitimate domain is the latter. Change if any must be organic and not by arbitrary diktat or – worse - by stealth. A service think tank is not an instrument of information operations targeting the internal, domestic space either of the polity or the military. Its uniformed minders must find the moral courage – albeit in difficult times – to rein political propensities of those in safari suits running it. National security demands speaking truth to power, requiring that think tanks nurture the moral capital to do so, at the very least, in-house.