https://thewire.in/security/is-modi-regime-conditioning-armed-forces-dissent-subversion

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/the-armys-bombshell-into-the-domestic

The army’s bombshell into the domestic sphere

At a seminar at an intellectual hub of the Indian army, a general speculated that the Pahalgam attack may have been a ‘trap’ set by Pakistan to get India into striking back.

Discounting that the converse could be speculated on equally plausibly, what detains us here is what the general goes on to say.

This is especially so since it is not self-evident from what the military informs on his talk. It also seems to be a departure from what the seminar was about to begin with.

Reportedly, he said that, “countries inimical to New Delhi have been trying to replicate what happened in Bangladesh, in India. The yearlong farmers’ protest, the agitation against CAA and the situation in Manipur, (he said,) was part of a larger ploy to destabilise the country and to prevent it from being ‘Viksit Bharat’ by 2047.”

In short, in a seminar advertised as on ‘disruptive technologies and future warfare’, when - per the military - he is ‘exploring how technology synchronises strategic communication across services’, he instead indulges in what’s but plain and straight-forwardly political-speak.

The text has not yet been made available in the open domain, being perhaps in the compiling stage of the seminar proceedings, it is hard to grasp how the political line he plugs fits in with his topic ‘Weaponsing the Narrative’.

Apparently, slides showcasing anti-CAA (Citizenship Amendment Act) protests and Manipur were trotted out by the general to depict these instances ‘as part of information warfare,’ that accompanies so-called ‘colour revolutions’ instigated from without for regime change.

He brings into military’s seminar rooms a conspiracy theory – that an erstwhile global hegemon is out to sabotage the regime, using the instrument of democratic agitation by motivated stakeholders ranging, in his imagination, from farmers to the usual suspects, Muslims, and - not to forget - Kashmiris.

In effect, the general does ‘weaponise the narrative’, but against democratic dissent provoked by the regime’s missteps and ideological propensities.

This brings up the question if a serving general can indulge in blatant political-speak and if the military should be lending a forum for such purpose.

Reportage from the first edition of the Ransamwad has the usual coverage of the usual worthies. The only other talk that found mention in the media was of this general, indicating that even an otherwise compliant media picked up the sound of a potential bombshell.

It is not known if the military was similarly sensitive. Was it privy to the content of what the general was to say prior? Has it taken umbrage against the forum being abused?

The troubling thing is that the military may by now be inured against seeing the general’s obvious politicking as such.

This can be on two unedifying counts: one, that it is likeminded, and, two, that it is too wimp, under the ministrations of this regime for over a decade, to roll-back the well-regarded penetration of such thinking within the military.

The first would not surprise.

Afterall, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) earned his blue-eyed status by seconding his ethnic kin, the then army chief, on the anti-CAA agitations. The army chief in question went on to be his predecessor as the first CDS.

Since his chair (which incidentally per rumours is to fall vacant next month) is open to all three-stars, it is unlikely this politically garrulous two-star general is auditioning for it. From his current and previous appointments its evident he has been put to pasture, so may only be signalling for less.

Greener pastures lie ahead for such voluble generals, from joining regime-friendly retired brass-hats on their breezy speaking circuits. Recall when last heard, the general was busy using info-war techniques on Kashmiris disaffected by the hollowing out of Article 370. His then boss at Chinar Corps, a self-styled info-warrior, is doing fine by this yardstick out of uniform.

Of the second, the army’s genuflection to ‘apolitical’ has singularly failed to deter. No wonder, the video on an ‘apolitical’ army was withdrawn once. Generals shooting their mouths off is no longer unknown.

Whereas it can be argued that they are doing their info-war turn, it is excusable at a stretch if and only if no Indian community or legitimate stakeholder is disparaged in the bargain.

The army has no business lending its reputational weight to pejorative inuendoes such as wanton claims that anti-CAA protests were ‘part of information warfare’.

The subtext is that Muslim and liberal participants in the protests were stooges of a proverbial ‘foreign hand’, which, in this case, is shorthand for our friendly neighbour – to where protestors have ad infinitum been invited to migrate.

Since this was reportedly part of the slides of the presentation – and not off-the-cuff answer to a question as the other nonsensical mouthings of the general are – it has seeming imprimatur. In hindsight, his earliest appearance appears portentous.

His invite to the forum can easily be seen to be complacence on part of organisers, mistaking the general’s service in Pakistan, where was an attaché, and in Kashmir, where he was the info-war minder, as relevant background.

However, it cannot be ruled out that there is a politicised cabal out to polarise professional spaces, who may serve as conduits to forces outside. It stands to reason that where the majority is somnolent politically, it takes but a few political entrepreneurs in uniform to reset the organisation’s compass.

If so, spring cleaning is overdue.

The timing of the general’s presentation made at a location housing the army’s largest officer presence suggests that it is no coincidence, but could well be a considered opportunity by forces-that-be to implant a skewed perspective into the military’s mind.

Two ingredients of the scenarios posited by the general exist current day.

Exponentially strained relations with the a ‘strategic partner’ exist at a time when the regime facing its most significant convergence of challenges, from a potential backlash to voter disenfranchisement possibly aggravated by ‘tariff wars’.

Does it anticipate democratic direct action ahead, that it wishes to pre-emptively delegitimise? Is the regime conditioning the military into believing that democratic dissent amounts to subversion? Does it wish to inoculate the military with diversionary opiate prior?

There is no call for the military to view the events where people have taken to the streets such as in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and, indeed, in Pakistan, with any prejudice. When institutional checks and balances breakdown, people tend to democratically even the playfield.

There is no call for a military to have a position on any disturbances a government encounters. It has to stick to the rule-book, irrespective. Its role does not require an ideological overlay.

On the contrary, having such blinkers on will turn it into just a more muscular version of the Khakis in khaki-chaddis in Delhi and Manipur during respective crises.

Instead, as antidote to the good general’s potion, it may like to timely reprise lessons from its showing in Gujarat.

The theoretical problem with ‘weaponizing narratives’ the general surely elided in his talk is that some among the intended targets are domestic, including voters. ‘All is fair in love and war’ is not wholly applicable in such cases.

A practical problem is that Operation Sindoor continuing, and the next possibly five-year war promised as ‘soon’, the domestic space can only continue in the line of fire of the regime’s information war.

This, when it is steadily losing its mojo, can only escalate, catching not only the common citizen in its crosshairs, but its most vulnerable ones – the minority - at that.

Since influence operations are the flavour of the season, the military must in the current circumstance tread tenderly (p. 27). It needs reminding that its existence is over double that of a self-important entity currently celebrating its centenary.

https://m.thewire.in/article/books/who-dares-win-joshi-is-great-that-said-theres-more

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/joshi-is-great-that-said-theres-more

Joshi is great; that said, there’s more.

Reviewing 'Who Dares Wins'

General Joshi interests on two counts. He is an authentic ‘Kargil War Hero’, as the book cover puts it.* More interestingly, he was the commander of the northern theatre during the Chinese incursion.

His autobiography is worth a read on the first count, on tactical level leadership, for it tells of the making of the war hero.

However, a reader would be disappointed if she wishes to know more about the Chinese actions in Ladakh during his time there. Presumably his current position as head of the China think tank of the external affairs ministry prevents him from being more informative.

Alternatively, the blanket on information access - that has been a feature of the Modi regime - perhaps kept the general reticent on that most consequential operational level command he held.

Reportedly, a few years back an order was put out restraining members of security services from discussing matters in their operational ken after demitting office; though it is uncertain if that covered the military. There were threats of stoppage of pensions too.

One problem with this regimen is the free pass given to the regime’s narrative on security incidents. Ordinarily, such narratives can only be self-interested and in case of the populist authoritarianism on in India, self-centered.

The downside is that it deprives the primary principal in the principal-agent relationship – the Voter – a grasp of whether ‘all is well’ with Indian security.

Absent a fuller perspective – brought about by a liberal information order as befits a democracy – the Voter is handicapped. This explains Mr. Modi recent surpassing of Indira’s record in number of days at the helm.

To be fair, a self-styled ‘apolitical’ army might not wish to put out a narrative that might show up the governmental one. Sure, the civilian masters of the military have the ‘right to be wrong;’ but its not for the military to conceal it.

However, this approach to ‘apolitical’ betrays a limited understanding of the principal-agent relationship.

While the government (here regime) is the principal and the army the agent in the principal-agent relationship of subordination, the army must know it is an institution of the State.

The State is run per the Constitution. The Constitution makes the regime accountable to the people - the ultimate principal. Thus, people exercise accountability through their power of the Vote.

Inadequate information on which to base their choice debilitates the Voter.

Hence, the Voter cannot be the target of and subject to information war - the feature of nascent emphasis in the current-day changed character of war.

The notion that all it takes is to win the war of narratives amounts to believing that the nature of war itself has changed. Worse is to ‘win’ the narrative war internally. This is absurd.

Since security concerns are existential in nature, it is of categorical imperative status that people are furnished reliable information on security.

That is the national interest and national security, as distinct from regime interest and security.

A mistaken conflation of the two appears to be at hand, resulting in a novel understanding of political subordination of the military.

A government is run by a political party voted to power may be less than forthright on security matters – using the security of information as cover. This enables hiding of shortcomings and projection of falsity as reality.

Absent State institutions playing their intended role with a commitment to Constitutional verities, the opposition, the attentive public, ‘armchair strategists’ and the Voter are deprived of the benefits of the democratic checks-and-balances schema.

To the extent the military is participant, it is complicit in the ‘dismantling of India’s democracy.’

Memoirs of officials serve a very useful purpose in fleshing out the record. They illumine areas independently, if not quite disinterestedly. Admittedly, memoirs are but a perspective and may be self-exculpatory; and yet, they constitute the drops that make up the ocean.

By this yardstick, Joshi’s memoir is half-baked. It is a useful tactical level take of the Indian fighting man.

However, for the next quarter century, a reader might have to be content with Joshi’s promise of a sequel. He says it will be a sanitized version, as Operation (Op) Snow Leopard - quite like Op Sindoor - continues indefinitely.

Joshi is only being practical. Recall, his then boss, Army Chief Naravane’s memoirs were aborted.

The upshot will be that readers won’t get to know anything more than the official version. Joshi puts this out as gospel in the couple of paras he devotes to what - to some - amounts to a significant setback.

He recounts how he witnessed as early as 5 May the first Chinese incursion, in this case a PLA helicopter making for Galwan but which scooted back on spotting the Indian one, in which Joshi was taking a ride.

Joshi admits to a challenging situation that required ‘deft handling’. Enumerating the ‘transgressions’, including at Galwan, he pats himself of the back – “We handled them well.”

To be sure, Galwan triggered due planning and preparation for the launch of a ‘quid pro quo operation (QPQ)’ in the Rezang La-Rechin La complex on the Kailash ranges, on either side of the Pangong Tso and also further to the north.

He appreciatively writes: “We completely took the PLA by surprise, brought them back to the negotiation table and forced them to beat a hasty retreat. This was Operation Snow Leopard.”

Whereas a show of force was warranted and its execution commendable, it, firstly, took rather long in coming, and, secondly, its effects were not exploited – any gains given up even before Joshi demitted uniform. There is no word on the latter.

As theatre commander, Joshi had the wherewithal in-situ for securing Indian territorial integrity. The Indian military’s pivot to the China front having begun a decade earlier, quite like at Kargil which - is not dissimilar - he ought to have echoed Ved Malik: “We’ll fight with what we have.”

Providentially, as a self-acknowledged China-hand, and a Mandarin speaking one at that, he was the right man in the right place at the right time. He’d done time in Beijing as defence attaché.

All his three star-commands were in Ladakh, successively at Tangtse, Karu and Leh. He took over command after a stint as chief of staff, just as the Chinese reportedly marched up from their annual exercise for lodging on the Indian side.

The buck stopped with Joshi.

Joshi has the correct appreciation of operational command, calling it ‘a major transition’. To him, ‘officers who have operated at the tactical level for thirty-five years of their career are suddenly catapulted to the operational and strategic level of warfare….’

He prepared for the transition by reading up the likes of aggressive ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis’ autobiography.

So, what held Joshi back?

Whereas he has an appreciative word for this other two corps commanders, there is nary a mention of his commander in Leh. Was there any dissonance on the response? Can Covid-19 be held responsible? If his hands were tied, did he remonstrate? Or does he buy into the Jaishankar’ism: ‘they are a larger economy’?

The two paras are but ‘haan mein haan milana’ with the regime; the upshot is that a 1962 Henderson Brookes-like report is kept in abeyance. Accountability – no strong point of the regime – cannot be exacted.

Consequently, General, a self-exculpatory sequel may please be dispensed with. (Another general of his cohort has already brought out a sequel of his self-eulogy, this time on transitioning from ‘war-room to boardroom’).

Instead, critical biographers and military thinkers are alerted to a prospective subject: the ji-huzoor interpretation of ‘apolitical’ by Joshi’s leadership cohort.

Clearly, under this regime the military qua institution is not pulling its national security weight.

Whereas the question earlier in Indian civil-military relations (CMR) was of bureaucratic inter-positioning stifling the military, now the key question is the extent political interests and compulsions of the regime - if not its narcissist numero uno - are trammeling the military’s institutional role.

By now enough instances have accumulated of the military’s misconstruing political subordination with subservience.

After all, what else is new-fangled terminology as Udbhav, Bhairav, Rudra, Op Mahadev, Op Shivshakti meant to signal?

Joshi’s mentor on operational and strategic intricacies, along with the current-day Chief of Defence Staff, trashed the notion of raids across the LC prior to Modi’s advent.

The claim of destroying a seminary in Balakot, and downing an F-16 in the bargain, is another. Then came the famous waving of an anti-tank mine on national television to abort the Amarnath yatra, setting the stage for the vacation of Article 370.

Joshi’s characterising the Chinese incursions as ‘transgressions’ also amount to as much. There is also no mention in the book of the Agniveer scheme, the antecedents of which can be seen as long term response to the intrusions.

Lately, it’s the withholding of information relevant to forming an assessment on the regime’s showing in Op Sindoor. It took a middle-rung naval officer speaking at a seminar abroad to inadvertently spill the beans.

It is not known since when has a Lieutenant Governor taken on responsibility for an ‘All OK’ in the military’s Area of Responsibility, which surely covered Pahalgam. A record of prevarication puts under cloud the passing off of the three terrorists killed as the perpetrators at Baisaran.

How the generation of military leadership of which Joshi is a self-acknowledged leading light coped with regime onset and consolidation bears serious CMR reflection.

He clearly earned his spurs at the tactical level, brought out well in the strong first half of the book. A recently promoted lieutenant colonel, he took over officiating command in the midst of battle – his commanding officer was hors-de-combat due to high altitude effects.

His meeting the challenges at the academies, grooming in the unit and his career gaining traction are well handled. His progression was unremarkable for a good and successful officer – sound course gradings, grounding within the unit, exposure in an instructor tenure, the staff course rigmarole and a UN outing.

Fortuitously, he was also physically well prepared. Gaining weight during his tenure in Angola, h’d just shed 10 kilos in anticipation of a call for interview for the post of Adjutant of the military academy, a appointment that requires if nothing else a ramrod bearing.

Fit, young and belonging to the unit, he was the man of the moment, for the anointing under fire. Joshi credits officers as Vikram Batra, a stolid junior leadership, subunit bonding and the combat support provisioned for the unprecedented success (two Param Vir Chakras in one operation) of his team. He was also well-knit with the formation, being a ‘blue eyed boy’ of a charismatic divisional commander.

Nothing must be allowed to take anything away from his service to the nation, to the army and his unit.

It would be too much to expect his generation of professionally-imbued officers to have withstood the deinstitutionalization of the military that beset it as they reached higher ranks.

At best they may be arraigned for not applying peer pressure to rein in political entrepreneurs in uniform - who functioned as conduits for political contamination of the military. Such individuals were artfully placed in charge by the regime and therefore out of reach.

This is especially so when no other institution has been left standing (witness antics of no less than a recently retired Supreme Court chief justice).

It would be churlish to mar Joshi’s upstanding record with taxing him with the responsibility of preserving institutional integrity. Not being legend cannot detract from being great.

*: YK Joshi, Who Dares Wins: A Soldier’s Memoirs, Gurugram: Penguin 2024, pp. 240, Rs 699.