Thursday 27 April 2023

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/is-kicking-the-kashmir-problem-upstairs

Is kicking the Kashmir problem upstairs a solution?

Recently, two of India’s top national security experts have had this to say of the manner Kashmir is being handled by the Modi regime.

In an interview, a former intelligence hand, AS Dulat, said that he believes National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval, ought to be in charge of India’s Kashmir policy. Apparently, ‘Doval understands Kashmir and knows the solution and the way forward.’

In like vein, a former Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), General Prakash Menon, informs that,

Right now, it is the MHA that is driving the J&K agenda. Instead, the strategy should be broad-based and driven by the highest rungs of the executive powers that are far better placed to evolve approaches based on an integrated perspective…. A review of the existing approach is warranted…The larger question is whether we can transcend the narrow domestic political considerations.

Both in their own words appear to suggest that Home Minister Amit Shah must be divested of the Kashmir portfolio and the problem be taken over by the governance rung at which an integrated perspective can be conjured up and its implementation supervised.

This despite, Shah, only last October, claiming that his boss Prime Minister Narendra Modi had sorted out the Kashmir problem. Presumably, he was referring to the Constitutional caper of August 2019.

However, for two of India’s leading security watchers and Kashmir experts to independently arrive at the conclusion that all is not right - and also coincidentally proffer a similar answer - shows up the narrative plugged by the regime on normalcy in Kashmir.

Their answer is that the Kashmir - and perhaps India’s Pakistan policy also - be taken on at an appropriately higher level, which can only be at the Cabinet or Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).

While Dulat relies on personalities, plugging for colleague Doval to take over the reins, Menon – with a full term in the NSCS - seemingly calls for a scooping up of the reins at the PMO (“highest rungs of executive office”), using aegis of the NSA and NSCS.

Notable is that these observations are when India is well into the fourth decade of the insurgency in Kashmir; the problem of Kashmir itself dating to Independence.

Recent developments

The timing of their intervention is informed, in part, by to two recent developments.

One was the ambush close to the Line of Control in which five Indian soldiers were killed, and, second, was revelations in Pakistani media that the back channel was so active in 2021 that Prime Minister Modi was supposedly slated to visit Pakistan after the reiteration of the ceasefire in February that year.

The latter is not implausible, since the Pakistan Army had created the conditions by having a ‘selected’ Prime Minister Imran Khan in place. General Bajwa, Army Chief then, had set the ‘Bajwa doctrine’ going, emphasising ‘geoeconomics,’ which necessitated an outreach to India. Bajwa allowed India a bye, when it could have created much more fuss in August 2019.

India might have been game, a temple visit thrown in clinching the issue for its prime minister. Its outreach to Nawaz Sharif had flopped spectacularly, not only at Pathankot but in the Army – not in on the initiative - exiling Sharif.

This time round, it made geopolitical sense for both sides to have their backyards quiescent while each tackled more significant turmoil on respective other border: Pakistan in shepherding a post-Global War on Terror Afghanistan back to quietude, and, India, the Dragon in Ladakh.

In the event, Imran Khan – who had started off his innings by expressing warm sentiments towards India – rightly read the political winds and stymied the initiative.

While - from recent revelations - it appears Bajwa’s doctrine owed to the Army facing up to the fact of power asymmetry between India and Pakistan, Khan proved more tuned in to the continuing disaffection in Kashmir and the political price of looking away.

This begs the question whether the Doval-led backchannel with Pakistan’s military, midwifed by mutually acceptable interlocutors in the Gulf, has been efficacious.

Though a ceasefire is holding along the Line of Control, that incidents continue across it – the latest being the bespoke ambush in Poonch and Pakistani accusations – shows its limitations.

However, India was not entirely wrong in putting its eggs in Bajwa’s basket. It’s been long reckoned that India’s national security establishment needs to engage with Pakistan Army.

The conundrum was how could India’s civilian-led national security establishment engage Pakistan’s military, since it could only be at the cost of Pakistani civilian democratic forces. Abandoning its reservations on this score has evidently been to little avail.

Is the solution realistic?

On their part, the two strategists seem to suggest that ideology is contaminating strategy. Both wish the structure is set right, cauterising the policy domain from the regime’s proclivities.

Since Narendra Modi who has empowered Amit Shah to do his bidding in Kashmir, its not self-evident how they duo can be weaned away from their power trip. The two are legatees of Shyama Prasad Mukherjee.

As is their wont, they’ve carried it rather far. To them, inflicting humiliation on Kashmiris is the ideological imperative. Amit Shah has proved an able instrument.

Doval has obediently done his bit, using his knowledge of Kashmir in providing security oversight. To expect better of Doval is to be unmindful of both the man and his circumstance.

Dulat informs of Doval making a difference in Kashmir when he took over the handling of Kashmir under Dulat’s supervision. Hagiographies credit Doval with the use of proxy groups to neutralise terrorist groups there then.

Lately, he intrumentalised the Army, putting in place Army Chief General Bipin Rawat to set the stage for the August 2019 Constitutional blood-letting. That there was no uprising owes to his able crafting of the security grid. He took ownership of the measures with a televised biryani repast on Kashmir’s empty streets.

It is not known if Doval represented against the regime going too far in its reengineering of Kashmir’s ‘integration’, as a truncated Union Territory. It’s difficult to buy Satya Pal Malik’s version – he was then governor - that fear of a police rebellion required that statehood be discontinued to allow internal security be directly handled by Delhi.

In Dulat’s profile of Doval in his book, Doval comes across as a practitioner merely lending his expertise to political incumbents. Dulat neglects that Doval exerted every sinew to get the present dispensation into position during the Manmohan Singh interregnum.

Even relatively mild Sushma Swaraj is credited with sotto-voce suggesting to Pakistani interlocutors to hold out from clinching a deal with Manmohan Singh, holding out better prospects when her party came to power.

Doval was the de-facto shadow NSA. As intelligence czar, it is unbelievable that he was not privy to the actuality behind the terror that India witnessed in those years, both in the hinterland and behind the fake encounters in Gujarat where Narendra Modi’s built his image as a strongman.

He, and his right-wing cohort, outflanked national security minders as they went about sabotaging the Manmohan Singh’s national security establishment efforts at rapprochement, incidentally an initiative inherited from Vajpayee.

Doval is not merely an opportunist - as Dulat makes him out to be - but a Believer.

Besides, in the rumoured institutional strains between Shah and Doval, Doval is a distant second. While knowledge of Modi’s secrets explains the relative proximity of each with Modi, Shah’s delivery of electoral dividend makes his hand stronger.

Modi is not about to chop off his right hand, Shah, by empowering Man Friday, Doval. National security is not about to displace parochialism. 

Secondly, politics determines policy. A majoritarian polity impels a policy of a particular kind, in this case visiting deprivation on the minority. Doing so in its demographic strongholds is particularly satisfying.

In concertina-ridden Kashmir, the vulnerable populace is easy prey; and where the right wing has the electoral upper hand, as in Assam and Uttar Pradesh, fixers inflict damage with impunity. Bengal and Kerala are out of reach, but not for want of trying.

Externally, even the touted diplomatic and strategic wizard, Dr. S Jaishankar, admits to finding dealing with Pakistan ‘difficult’. If proficiency is in delivering results under extraordinary circumstance, Jaishankar falls short.

Surely, cross-border terrorism is not holding up Jaishankar as much as is ideological encumbrance, a salient a political factor. Afterall, he famously coined the regime’s legitimising phrase: the correcting of historical wrongs.

Effects of the structural deficit

Though wishful in expecting policy to be sanitised of politics, the two national security experts are right in one sense: their pointing to the structural weakness undermining India’s Kashmir policy.

The problem predates the regime and has always been compounded by the political factor.

The outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir saw India with neither structure for nor a culture of rational policy making.

With Mandal embroiling politics, the VP Singh government and its successor, was ill-placed to measure up to the challenge. The response to the Rubaiya Sayeed kidnap and Governor Jagmohan’s over-reaction in late January, against the advice of his Adviser Ved Marwah, is a case in point.

At the Centre, the shenanigans for personal and political reasons of successive Kashmir focal points are well known, be it George Fernandes and later Rajesh Pilot; the latter often upstaging his senior minister.

To an interview question posed by me while on an academic field trip, the joint secretary on the Kashmir desk in North Block rued lack of a Kashmir policy in New Delhi.

Not only was India on the backfoot in the proxy war, but the simultaneous turn to liberalisation took precedence. The right wing, gaining traction on the back of the Ayodhya agitation, restricted any thought of negotiated settlement, either externally or internally.  

At the ground level, the structure in place was for coordination, not unity of command. A Unified Headquarters (HQ) under the Adviser Home at best served for information exchange, rather than operations; the army sending a colonel from the Sub Area to attend its meetings.

With a return to elected government, the Unified HQ continued in place but with two security advisers, the Corps Commanders north and south of the Pir Panjal respectively, who reported up their channel to an Army Commander headquartered within the state.

Even then, the structural deficit persisted, with the security buck stopping with the Home Ministry, even though the lead counter insurgency force was the Army that reported to the Defence Ministry.

This was compounded by a factor typical to Indian civil-military relations, in which the doctrinal and operational space is ab-initio conceded by civilians to the military. The role of ministries was merely to ensure the human rights issue did not get to fore-front.

The Vajpayee years saw dialogue and peace initiatives rolled out, recounted in another book by their protagonist, Dulat, then adviser on Kashmir in the PMO. But, prime minister-in-waiting LK Advani scuttled these in respect of Pakistan at Agra, though he did follow up dutifully on the internal one later, holding a couple of rounds of dialogue with separatists.

Manmohan Singh took the openings he inherited forward, but with circumspection. He did not bring the energy to bear on Pakistan and Kashmir that he brought to mating with the United States (US).

He didn’t have the political heft to supersede kinetic means with non-kinetic measures, relying on economic incentives to sugar-coat political paralysis. Political inattention led to the Special Interlocutor model failing, in both its single (NN Vohra) or committee (three interlocutors) format.

As a result, the possibilities were overtaken by circumstance – that witnessed Pakistani President Musharraf wobbling and the outcome in the Mumbai terror attack. India’s Pakistan policy hasn’t recovered since.

The current impasse

In the Modi era, the multiple chains of command persist. Malik now says that had he been approached, he would’ve prevented Pulwama by providing an airlift to the central police. It begs the question why his Adviser Home was not sacked for not stepping up.

In its Dineshwar Sharma iteration, the Special Interlocutor model was decisively wrecked by the duplicity with which it was set up – to fob off the US then engaged in disentangling from Af-Pak.

At the Centre, vacillation over an outreach to Pakistan continues. Learning the hard way that merely networking the civilian side in Pakistan was not good enough, India has had Doval engage the Pakistani Army.

The structural factor has undercut what Doval might have promised in the backchannel. If Malik is right, Modi does not bother much about Kashmir, leaving it to his chief lieutenant, Shah. The home minister holding the keys, Doval is left out in the cold.

Pakistan has – not unreasonably - held out for restoration of statehood in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), something the regime can only countenance if its ambition of installing a Hindu Jammuite in power materialises.

The latest gambit towards this end having self-destruct – Ghulam Nabi Azad with the release of his autobiography passing into history – the regime stands stumped on next steps. Further, Malik has thrown the cat among the pigeons, linking an aspirant for the post - long resident in the PMO - to corruption.

The ‘solution,’ isn’t

A problem of privileging the way out of the strategic cul-de-sac proffered by the two well-meaning strategists – kick the problem upstairs - is that it undercuts the Constitutional cabinet system of governance by placing an unwarranted onus on an NSA.

While the first incumbent juggled advisory and operational streams in his position by retaining principal adviser post along with being NSA, the current NSA has gone on to displacing the Cabinet Secretary from the National Security Council (NSC) structure, styling himself as head of the Strategic Policy Group.

Even so, the NSC cannot displace the Cabinet Committee on Security, the hats worn by the membership – even if identical - being different. Accountability requires working the self-given structures.

Inability or unwillingness to do so should reflect on the leadership quotient of the incumbent prime minister. Gujarat cadre chelas and Hindutva-sanitised busybodies are reminiscent of the ‘committed’ bureaucrats of Emergency yore.

Therefore - though not spelt out in the recommendation of General Menon - the higher body that requires stepping up should be the CCS, with the Cabinet Secretariat – currently displaced by the centralised PMO - playing its part.

It is well-nigh possible India had given itself a Westminster cabinet system it has since been unable to work. To be sure, remedies required must be found. It cannot however be upended by willy-nilly supplanting it covertly with a presidential system.

Any alternative reliance on a sub-par national security establishment – as demonstrated in the case study above on Kashmir – shall prove untenable.

What’s to be done?

Firstly, the advisory aspect to the NSA and NSCS must be leveraged for drawing up strategy, policy advocacy within the system and coordination. To compensate for an inability to strategise, it cannot attempt substitute ministries. It must instead displace coteries, kitchen cabinets and extra-Constitutional influencers, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

Secondly, India could review the Malaya model in which there was unity of command in counter insurgency. Over preceding decades, the Governor or the elected government in J&K – which ever was in saddle - could have been vested with the mandate and resources to deliver peace, including through compassionate dialogue.

Even if the proxy war element was not present, the model has proved useful in Assam, Tripura and erstwhile Andhra Pradesh. By over-emphasising proxy war in Kashmir for self-exculpatory reasons (as Jaishankar continues to do), India has shot itself on both feet - internally (it won’t talk to ‘terrorists’) and externally (it won’t talk to terrorist sponsors).

Thirdly, Prime Minister Modi just has asked bureaucrats to keep check on politicians; in his mind’s eye, only those differently persuaded. The corollary is that institutions of governance are free to balance ministers like Shah and an overzealous PMO.

It’s a wonder that a couple of personages from an economic advisory position to their eternal credit resigned on a point of policy divergence. But, no one in the national security system has taken cue, be it over missteps as the Constitutional sleight of hand over Article 370, Citizenship Amendment bill, impunity for Hindutva’s lackeys, Ladakh, Kashmir, Rafale or Agnipath.

If Doval was indeed a suitable substitute for Shah, the sound of his thumping the table for a different policy plank on any of these has been remarkably muted.

Fourthly, personalities matter. But making a fetish of this has pushed India down the road to authoritarianism. A compliant national security system has acquiesced in the usurpation of authority, spin doctoring the coup for public consumption. Recall also, the Pegasus was bought with intelligence funds. Reverting to democratic good health requires resuscitating institutional strengths, not relying on personalities.

Finally, politics cannot be wished away from policy sphere. The voting public can take note of the effects. It will strengthen democracy if we recognise and boot out unworthy incumbents. If we don’t, we can only deserve who and what we get.  

Friday 21 April 2023

 

https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/Preventing-an-Afghanistan-Redux-in-Somalia.html

https://www.usiofindia.org/pdf/20230421113049.pdf

Preventing an Afghanistan redux in Somalia

USI Journal CLIII No. 631, Jan-Apr 2023, pp. 79-87

An earlier article in this journal had made the case that for returning peace to a conflict afflicted area, a modicum of balance is desirable between the three sides of the peace triangle – peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.[1] During the lifecycle of any peace intervention, the center of gravity at a particular point in time and conflict circumstance will shift between the three sides. However, the three must be so poised that together they can contain and roll back a conflict. Operational Art in a peace operation lies in leveraging the three sides in a manner that the resulting balance mid-wife success. Somalia suggests itself as a case study for application of this hypothesis.

Somalia has been site of peace enforcement for some 15 years now. In the mid to late 2000s, the de-facto control of Somalia by the Islamic Courts was wrested away from it by intervention of Ethiopia to install a transitional federal government, that had been formed in 2004 with the support of the regional organisation, the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).[2] Meanwhile the Islamic Courts’s administration mutated, with its militant youth wing forming the al Shabaab. In 2007, Ethiopian intervention was substituted by an African Union (AU) peace enforcement operation, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[3] Over the 2010s, the AMISOM progressively wrested control of territory from the al Shabaab, even as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was installed in Mogadishu and federal member states (FMS) were formed. In 2013, the United Nations’ (UN) Political Office in Somalia was transformed into a special political mission, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to assist with statebuilding and peacebuilding.[4] The al Shabaab’s association with the al Qaeda initially, and later the Islamic State (IS) in the 2010s, led to its figuring on the UN terror entity sanctions’ list since 2010.[5] This effectively placed it out of bounds for a peacemaking outreach. Thus, while peace enforcement and peacebuilding proceeded, peacemaking was not in evidence. The imbalance between the three sides of the peace triangle visualised in relation to Somalia continues till today.

Somalia today has a follow-on mission to the AMISOM, the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), in place since April 2022. Assessing that instability has reduced considerably and security sector reform initiatives were in hand to upgrade the Somali National Army (SNA) and police, in 2021, the ATMIS is expected to drawdown and depart within 30 months. The ATMIS is to assist the SNA regain government control through joint operations and capacity building, even as it draws down while the SNA gains strength and confidence.[6] Despite considerable progress with both statebuilding and peacebuilding by UNSOM, the situation does not lend confidence to the assumption that the SNA will hold up on departure of foreign forces. In other words, peacemaking absent, peacebuilding and peace enforcement has not been well served.

A scenario as obtained on the departure of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces from Afghanistan stares Somalia in the face. There is scope for the international community and the regional bodies to reappraise the three sides of the peace triangle in the two fraternal missions in place, ATMIS and UNSOM. While ATMIS is assisting with provision of security, UNSOM, integrated with the rest of the UN family of agencies, funds and programs (AFP) and in league with allied actors, concentrates on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Missing in the menu is peacemaking. In light of the recent precedence in Afghanistan, this deficit might yet sabotage not only the long-standing peace intervention, but Somalia itself. Consequently, the question explored here is whether an Afghanistan-like future can be escaped by Somalia, and, if so, how.

Background

Somalia has been in an unsettled situation since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, it was stable only in its first decade under democratic government. In the sixties, the first democratic turn-over of government in post-colonial Africa was witnessed in Somalia. However, as typical for the era, Siad Barre installed himself in power in a military coup, whereupon Cold War dynamics took over. The two superpowers switched clients in the Horn of Africa, with the US supporting Somalia against Soviet and Cuba-backed Ethiopia. In late seventies, a war broke out over Oromia in Ethiopia, an area occupied by Somali ethnic groups. Within Somalia, Siad Barre also asserted his authority with ruthless suppression in Somaliland, the erstwhile British colonial possession that in 1960 had merged with the Italy-colonised Somali territory to forge Somalia. The end of the Cold War pried loose the US umbrella over Siad Barre.

The Somali state dissolved in famine. The story thereafter is more familiar, with India deploying a brigade under UN Chapter VII auspices as part of an upgraded peacekeeping operation, UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The preceding operation, UNOSOM I, had a mandate to widen humanitarian access. Met with anarchy, the international community temporarily deployed a US-led peace enforcement operation, Unified Task Force (UNITAF).[7] It was to contain the clan violence, which it succeeded in doing by enforcing an elitist peace by deterring the warlords through a display of military might. The hand over from UNITAF to UNSOM II saw warlords back in action, targeting in infamous incident Pakistani peacekeepers. American forces outside the UN framework went after the warlord responsible, Farah Aideed, who incidentally had been Somali ambassador in Delhi for three years. The Black Hawk incident resulted. Withdrawal of Americans soon thereafter scuttled the UNSOM II.[8]

Somalia fell out of the international radar, with the international community fatigued by international humanitarian intervention post contemporary instances in Bosnia and Rwanda. A lesson from the American-led ‘global war on terror’ was on the dangers of persistence of ungoverned spaces. The federal government of Somalia (FGS) that initially functioned out of Baidoa and moved to Mogadishu, when the security situation was stabilised by AMISOM. Since 2012, when the FGS was finally emplaced formally, it has had two iterations of elections. Its most recent election in 2022 returned the first president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to power.

President Mohamud has set the SNA to undertake operations in conjunction with ATMIS and the clan militias against al Shabaab.[9] The idea is to soften the al Shabaab and create conditions for talks from a position of strength for the FGS. The idea of using clan militia is reminiscent of the Iraqi Awakening in which Iraqi Sunnis were used to wrap up the al Qaeda in the Sunni Triangle in 2007-08. However, it is predictable that as an insurgent group with demonstrated resilience against the AMISOM over past 15 years, the al Shabaab will melt away only to re-emerge elsewhere and by night.[10] Amply clear is that a solely military approach will not suffice.[11] Consequently, President Muhamud’s intention to follow through with talks ‘at the right time’ is a promising opportunity.[12] It gives peacemaking an opening to make a debut, with international community support.

Desirability

Whether to talk to the Taliban was a perennial question through the 2010s.[13] Consensus had it that military operations needed complementing with a talks outreach, even as peacebuilding by provincial reconstruction teams, proceeded alongside. In the event, talks did come about in Doha. The anticipated upgrade to the Afghan National Security Forces was slow in coming, as a result the Taliban were less eager at the talks table, awaiting the departure of the foreign forces. The fears were confirmed in their take-over of Kabul last year.[14] Given such a possibility in Somalia, it is only desirable that every effort be made to avoid an Afghanistan redux.

A perspective is that talking to terrorists is not a strategic move. Terrorists will take advantage of talks for gaining legitimacy. This will make them get ahead of the government in the stakes for peoples’ hearts and minds, especially since the FGS is hampered by allegations of corruption, clan-ism, incapacity and association with external powers. Terrorist entities are strategic players and might through talks take power they have been denied militarily. Regional states, as Uganda and Kenya that have borne the brunt of al Shabaab out-of-area terror attacks, would be unwilling to treat it as a legitimate interlocutor.

The constraint is that the ATMIS is slated to depart in the middle term. Under financial pressure, the European Union - that largely funded it so far - is downsizing the budget. The prominent regional state, Ethiopia, has been beset with internal security issues. Initially, when AMISOM was being inducted, a move to plant a hybrid or UN peace operation instead had been struck down. It is uncertain if the international community would reappraise this decision. The feeling of ‘community’ in the international community has been considerably strained in wake of the Ukraine War. There is a recession looming and the prospects of funding another giant UN mission are not appetising. This inability to up the ante militarily implies that a ‘politics first’ approach must compensate.

The lesson from the Afghanistan experience is thus, not against talks as much as to use talks productively. Both antagonists were loath to share power in Afghanistan, making talks infructuous. In Somalia, the al Shabaab is a nationalist outfit. Somalis are nationalist and - unlike in most places in Africa - are relatively homogenous as an ethnic group inhabiting a defined space. As with the Taliban, it is not only religious extremism that drives it, though Wahabbi influence has impinged on the Sufistic culture in Somalia.  

Somalia provides a timely opportunity to test the UN’s freshly minted motto, ‘primacy of politics’,[15] intended to get to peace through peaceful means. For long, other actors have tried to address their respective troubles in Somalia. Europe, contending with a migration influx from Africa, funded the AMISOM. The AMISOM, among others from as far away as Senegal, comprised troops from neighbouring countries seeking to tackle terrorism at its origin. However, alleged human rights violations and collateral damage by peacekeepers has partially alienated Somalis.[16] The US, fearing homeland terror from its Somali diaspora immigrants, intervenes militarily through its Africa Command base nearby, while at times causing civilian casualties.[17] Somalis have thus been subject to pursuit of aims of others on their land and at their cost. The UN’s shift to people-centric peacekeeping makes it inescapable that peacemaking must proceed apace to rescue people from the cycle of violence.

Feasibility

The UN has a policy guiding political approaches to armed groups. There is no proscription on such outreach intended to end violence. Any such outreach would have to ascertain if the al Shabaab wants to travel away from terror tag. Continuing humanitarian and peacebuilding support can act as incentive, particularly as Somalia faces its fourth year of drought. For now, the areas it controls have restricted humanitarian access. The possibility of exiting the terror list – as was the case with elements of the Taliban – is another carrot to influence the al Shabaab. The reputational risk from a rebuff or the talks going awry in an egregious terror incident would have to be factored. The FGS will require forging a consensus and a joint front with the FMS on talks.

There are multiple forums that can act as lead: the UN, the regional organisation and the FGS itself. If the FGS wishes to be in the lead, then capacity building support for both parties and logistics facilitation might be necessary. The regional organisations – both AU and the IGAD – are well experienced, though financing might yet be required. External actors – such as from the Nordic or Gulf states – could lend a hand. The multiple special envoys for the Horn of Africa would require a coordination forum. The UN is better positioned to play a supportive as against a protagonist role. Its mission on the country for the last ten years indicates its political capacity, while the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) that supported the AMISOM and, now supports the ATMIS and elements of SNA, can help with the logistics – particularly with helicopter support to access al Shabaab areas.

Taking cue from the Doha talks with the Taliban, the talks would require first ending the violence – an issue not taken up at Doha which resulted in continuing violence even as talks proceeded. This is especially important in Somalia to urgently open up the humanitarian space. Besides, the instrumental use of violence by both sides tends to influence the negotiations negatively. The table then becomes yet another battlefield. Violence at ebb, talks could dwell on a road map on the progressive co-option of the al Shabaab. Usually, an agreement spells out a transition period of power sharing, followed by an election. The ongoing Constitution review and the reform in election system away from being clan-based to ‘one person one vote’ can see al Shabaab participation. The national reconciliation program underway could post-conflict also cover al Shabaab controlled areas.[18]

The period of transition might require overseeing. Since the AU mission may be too closely associated with neighbouring countries, it may require substitution. Political momentum in the talks could perk up Troop Contributing Countries willingness to contribute blue berets and boots on ground in a monitoring and protective role respectively. A lean mission, with a civilian component including civil affairs and human rights officers with a pronounced national staff complement, can be foreseen. A clear timeline culminating with the next elections or as agreed in a comprehensive peace agreement can serve as focus for an exit strategy and handover to the UN Country Team.

A role for India?

India is in the midst of taking up its destined role as a leading state. It has been member over last two years of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It has recently taken over chair of the G-20. India has to seize opportunities to supplant UNSC declinist veto-holding pen holders, Britain and France. Envisaging a greater role for itself as a security provider in the ocean that bears its name is a first step.

Its strategic moves in the Indo-Pacific theatre have not been at the cost of the western Indian Ocean. It has been a player in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since inception of the joint naval operations. Managing security along Indian Ocean Rim in proximity of the Horn of Africa to South West Asia - and the scene of conflict in Yemen – is significant. The strategic weight of the region is seen in the setting up of bases in close proximity to each other by the US and China. The risk of instability multiplying, such as in the increased presence of Islamists southwards along the African coast in Mozambique, must be acknowledged.

Since India is now a pragmatic power, balancing China in Africa will not be far from its concerns. Africa is a site for power competition that India cannot find India missing-in-action. In taking a proactive role, India would only be returning to its historical role as an important rimland naval power, evidenced by communities originating in Horn of Africa resident across the Deccan and the Malabar coast. India must step up to complete a task left unfinished when in 1995 its navy evacuated troops of the UNOSOM II.

India, lending a hand as a ‘friend of the mediation’ through appointing a special envoy, would enable India to push for consensus in the UNSC on a light footprint mission to arrive at and help implement any agreement reached. It can lead with boots on the ground. It could contribute to the humanitarian Somalia Trust Fund or bilaterally increase humanitarian support

Conclusion

Peace operations cannot be done in a political vacuum. In Somalia, absence of a political prong of strategy to tackle the al Shabaab has resulted in the insurgency persisting. Current-day dire humanitarian straits compel a political outreach to the al Shabaab. By all means care must be taken not to empower terrorist affiliates, but this apprehension can be mitigated by enlightened design of the mediation or facilitation, taking on board the lessons of the peace process in Afghanistan. The terror tag to groups must be amenable to revision now that international terror has subsided considerably. An outreach can in a first step influence the group to distance itself from terror. The FGS is already contemplating a political solution. Once the regional organisations have bought into this line of action, the UN could lend a hand by including the remit in its next resolution on UNSOM. This will pave way for UNSOM to acquire political teeth and to transform into a short-duration, light-footprint peacekeeping mission overseeing induction of al Shabaab into the Somali national mainstream. The Somalia case study validates the hypothesis that all three sides of the peace triangle need ministration in varying degrees during the lifecycle of a peace intervention, failing which, peace is liable to prove elusive. Peacemaking must be added to the peace repertoire Somalia to complete the peace triangle.

 


[1] Ali Ahmed, ‘Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle’, USI Journal, Vol. CLII, No. 628, April-June 2022, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/?sf_paged=2

[3] For background on AMISOM, see https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.

[4] For background on UNSOM, see https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unsom.

[5] Al Shabaab figures on the  sanctions list available at https://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/consolidated.htm#alqaedaent

[6] For details on ATMIS, see https://atmis-au.org/ 

[9] ‘Somalia Military Makes Gains in Large-scale Offensive Against Al-Shabab’, VOA, 26 September 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-makes-gains-in-large-scale-offensive-against-al-shabab-/6764305.html

 

[10] ‘Somalia and al-Shabab: The struggle to defeat the militants’, BBC, 24 August 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62644935

[11] International Crisis Group, ‘A Strategy for Exploring Talks with Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, Podcast, 30 June 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/strategy-exploring-talks-al-shabaab-somalia

[12] ‘Somalia will talk to Al-Shabaab when time is right: President’, The Guardian, 6 July 2022,  https://guardian.ng/news/somalia-will-talk-to-al-shabaab-when-time-is-right-president/

[14] For a background on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

[15] United Nations, ‘Report Of The Independent High-Level Panel On Peace Operations’, 2015, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations

[16] Human Rights Watch, ‘The power these men have over us’, 8 September 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces

[17] Amnesty International, ‘US military sheds some light on civilian casualties from shadowy war in Somalia’, 27 April 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/us-military-sheds-some-light-on-civilian-casualties-from-shadowy-war-in-somalia/