https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/Preventing-an-Afghanistan-Redux-in-Somalia.html
Abstract:
The article argues that an
effective peace intervention results from a balance between the three sides of
the peace triangle formed by peacekeeping (security), peacebuilding
(development) and peacemaking (political settlement). It examines the situation
in Somalia to highlight that in case peacemaking is neglected, it is likely
that Somalia may fall to the al Shabaab on the draw down and departure of the
African Union peace enforcement force. It therefore recommends a political
prong of strategy to complement the military prong to address the challenge al
Shabaab poses in Somalia.
An earlier article in this journal had made the case that for returning peace to a conflict afflicted area, a modicum of balance is desirable between the three sides of the peace triangle – peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.[1] During the lifecycle of any peace intervention, the center of gravity at a particular point in time and conflict circumstance will shift between the three sides. However, the three must be so poised that together they can contain and roll back a conflict. Operational Art in a peace operation lies in leveraging the three sides in a manner that the resulting balance mid-wife success. Somalia suggests itself as a case study for application of this hypothesis.
Somalia has been site of peace
enforcement for some 15 years now. In the mid to late 2000s, the de-facto
control of Somalia by the Islamic Courts was wrested away from it by
intervention of Ethiopia to instal a transitional federal government, that had
been formed in 2004 with the support of the regional organisation, the Inter
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).[2]
Meanwhile the Islamic Courts’s administration mutated, with its militant youth
wing forming the al Shabaab. In 2007, Ethiopian intervention was substituted by
an African Union (AU) peace enforcement operation, African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM).[3]
Over the 2010s, the AMISOM progressively wrested control of territory from the
al Shabaab, even as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was installed in
Mogadishu and federal member states (FMS) were formed. In 2013, the United
Nations’ (UN) Political Office in Somalia was transformed into a special
political mission, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to assist with
statebuilding and peacebuilding.[4]
The al Shabaab’s association with the al Qaeda initially, and later the Islamic
State (IS) in the 2010s, led to its figuring on the UN terror entity sanctions’
list since 2010.[5]
This effectively placed it out of bounds for a peacemaking outreach. Thus,
while peace enforcement and peacebuilding proceeded, peacemaking was not in
evidence. The imbalance between the three sides of the peace triangle
visualised in relation to Somalia continues till today.
Somalia today has a follow-on
mission to the AMISOM, the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), in place
since April 2022. Assessing that instability has reduced considerably and
security sector reform initiatives were in hand to upgrade the Somali National
Army (SNA) and police, in 2021, the ATMIS is expected to drawdown and depart
within 30 months. The ATMIS is to assist the SNA regain government control
through joint operations and capacity building, even as it draws down while the
SNA gains strength and confidence.[6]
Despite considerable progress with both statebuilding and peacebuilding by
UNSOM, the situation does not lend confidence to the assumption that the SNA
will hold up on departure of foreign forces. In other words, peacemaking
absent, peacebuilding and peace enforcement has not been well served.
A scenario as obtained on the
departure of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces
from Afghanistan stares Somalia in the face. There is scope for the
international community and the regional bodies to reappraise the three sides
of the peace triangle in the two fraternal missions in place, ATMIS and UNSOM.
While ATMIS is assisting with provision of security, UNSOM, integrated with the
rest of the UN family of agencies, funds and programs (AFP) and in league with
allied actors, concentrates on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Missing in the
menu is peacemaking. In light of the recent precedence in Afghanistan, this
deficit might yet sabotage not only the long-standing peace intervention, but
Somalia itself. Consequently, the question explored here is whether an
Afghanistan-like future can be escaped by Somalia, and, if so, how.
Background
Somalia has been in an unsettled
situation since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, it was stable
only in its first decade under democratic government. In the sixties, the first
democratic turn-over of government in post-colonial Africa was witnessed in
Somalia. However, as typical for the era, Siad Barre installed himself in power
in a military coup, whereupon Cold War dynamics took over. The two superpowers
switched clients in the Horn of Africa, with the US supporting Somalia against
Soviet and Cuba-backed Ethiopia. In late seventies, a war broke out over Oromia
in Ethiopia, an area occupied by Somali ethnic groups. Within Somalia, Siad
Barre also asserted his authority with ruthless suppression in Somaliland, the
erstwhile British colonial possession that in 1960 had merged with the
Italy-colonised Somali territory to forge Somalia. The end of the Cold War pried
loose the US umbrella over Siad Barre.
The Somali state dissolved in
famine. The story thereafter is more familiar, with India deploying a brigade
under UN Chapter VII auspices as part of an upgraded peacekeeping operation, UN
Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The preceding operation, UNOSOM I, had a
mandate to widen humanitarian access. Met with anarchy, the international
community temporarily deployed a US-led peace enforcement operation, Unified
Task Force (UNITAF).[7]
It was to contain the clan violence, which it succeeded in doing by enforcing
an elitist peace by deterring the warlords through a display of military might.
The hand over from UNITAF to UNSOM II saw warlords back in action, targeting in
infamous incident Pakistani peacekeepers. American forces outside the UN
framework went after the warlord responsible, Farah Aideed, who incidentally
had been Somali ambassador in Delhi for three years. The Black Hawk incident
resulted. Withdrawal of Americans soon thereafter scuttled the UNSOM II.[8]
Somalia fell out of the
international radar, with the international community fatigued by international
humanitarian intervention post contemporary instances in Bosnia and Rwanda. A
lesson from the American-led ‘global war on terror’ was on the dangers of persistence
of ungoverned spaces. The federal government of Somalia (FGS) that initially
functioned out of Baidoa and moved to Mogadishu, when the security situation
was stabilised by AMISOM. Since 2012, when the FGS was finally emplaced
formally, it has had two iterations of elections. Its most recent election in
2022 returned the first president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to power.
President Mohamud has set the SNA
to undertake operations in conjunction with ATMIS and the clan militias against
al Shabaab.[9]
The idea is to soften the al Shabaab and create conditions for talks from a
position of strength for the FGS. The idea of using clan militia is reminiscent
of the Iraqi Awakening in which Iraqi Sunnis were used to wrap up the al Qaeda
in the Sunni Triangle in 2007-08. However, it is predictable that as an
insurgent group with demonstrated resilience against the AMISOM over past 15
years, the al Shabaab will melt away only to re-emerge elsewhere and by night.[10]
Amply clear is that a solely military approach will not suffice.[11]
Consequently, President Muhamud’s intention to follow through with talks ‘at
the right time’ is a promising opportunity.[12]
It gives peacemaking an opening to make a debut, with international community
support.
Desirability
Whether to talk to the Taliban
was a perennial question through the 2010s.[13]
Consensus had it that military operations needed complementing with a talks
outreach, even as peacebuilding by provincial reconstruction teams, proceeded
alongside. In the event, talks did come about in Doha. The anticipated upgrade
to the Afghan National Security Forces was slow in coming, as a result the
Taliban were less eager at the talks table, awaiting the departure of the
foreign forces. The fears were confirmed in their take-over of Kabul last year.[14]
Given such a possibility in Somalia, it is only desirable that every effort be
made to avoid an Afghanistan redux.
A perspective is that talking to
terrorists is not a strategic move. Terrorists will take advantage of talks for
gaining legitimacy. This will make them get ahead of the government in the
stakes for peoples’ hearts and minds, especially since the FGS is hampered by
allegations of corruption, clan-ism, incapacity and association with external
powers. Terrorist entities are strategic players and might through talks take
power they have been denied militarily. Regional states, as Uganda and Kenya
that have borne the brunt of al Shabaab out-of-area terror attacks, would be
unwilling to treat it as a legitimate interlocutor.
The constraint is that the ATMIS
is slated to depart in the middle term. Under financial pressure, the European
Union - that largely funded it so far - is downsizing the budget. The prominent
regional state, Ethiopia, has been beset with internal security issues. Initially,
when AMISOM was being inducted, a move to plant a hybrid or UN peace operation
instead had been struck down. It is uncertain if the international community
would reappraise this decision. The feeling of ‘community’ in the international
community has been considerably strained in wake of the Ukraine War. There is a
recession looming and the prospects of funding another giant UN mission are not
appetising. This inability to up the ante militarily implies that a ‘politics
first’ approach must compensate.
The lesson from the Afghanistan
experience is thus, not against talks as much as to use talks productively.
Both antagonists were loath to share power in Afghanistan, making talks
infructuous. In Somalia, the al Shabaab is a nationalist outfit. Somalis are
nationalist and - unlike in most places in Africa - are relatively homogenous
as an ethnic group inhabiting a defined space. As with the Taliban, it is not
only religious extremism that drives it, though Wahabbi influence has impinged
on the Sufistic culture in Somalia.
Somalia provides a timely
opportunity to test the UN’s freshly minted motto, ‘primacy of politics’,[15]
intended to get to peace through peaceful means. For long, other actors have
tried to address their respective troubles in Somalia. Europe, contending with
a migration influx from Africa, funded the AMISOM. The AMISOM, among others
from as far away as Senegal, comprised troops from neighbouring countries
seeking to tackle terrorism at its origin. However, alleged human rights
violations and collateral damage by peacekeepers has partially alienated
Somalis.[16] The
US, fearing homeland terror from its Somali diaspora immigrants, intervenes
militarily through its Africa Command base nearby, while at times causing
civilian casualties.[17]
Somalis have thus been subject to pursuit of aims of others on their land and
at their cost. The UN’s shift to people-centric peacekeeping makes it
inescapable that peacemaking must proceed apace to rescue people from the cycle
of violence.
Feasibility
The UN has a policy guiding
political approaches to armed groups. There is no proscription on such outreach
intended to end violence. Any such outreach would have to ascertain if the al
Shabaab wants to travel away from terror tag. Continuing humanitarian and
peacebuilding support can act as incentive, particularly as Somalia faces its
fourth year of drought. For now, the areas it controls have restricted
humanitarian access. The possibility of exiting the terror list – as was the
case with elements of the Taliban – is another carrot to influence the al
Shabaab. The reputational risk from a rebuff or the talks going awry in an
egregious terror incident would have to be factored. The FGS will require
forging a consensus and a joint front with the FMS on talks.
There are multiple forums that
can act as lead: the UN, the regional organisation and the FGS itself. If the
FGS wishes to be in the lead, then capacity building support for both parties
and logistics facilitation might be necessary. The regional organisations –
both AU and the IGAD – are well experienced, though financing might yet be
required. External actors – such as from the Nordic or Gulf states – could lend
a hand. The multiple special envoys for the Horn of Africa would require a
coordination forum. The UN is better positioned to play a supportive as against
a protagonist role. Its mission on the country for the last ten years indicates
its political capacity, while the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) that
supported the AMISOM and, now supports the ATMIS and elements of SNA, can help
with the logistics – particularly with helicopter support to access al Shabaab
areas.
Taking cue from the Doha talks
with the Taliban, the talks would require first ending the violence – an issue
not taken up at Doha which resulted in continuing violence even as talks
proceeded. This is especially important in Somalia to urgently open up the
humanitarian space. Besides, the instrumental use of violence by both sides
tends to influence the negotiations negatively. The table then becomes yet
another battlefield. Violence at ebb, talks could dwell on a road map on the
progressive co-option of the al Shabaab. Usually, an agreement spells out a
transition period of power sharing, followed by an election. The ongoing Constitution
review and the reform in election system away from being clan-based to ‘one
person one vote’ can see al Shabaab participation. The national reconciliation program
underway could post-conflict also cover al Shabaab controlled areas.[18]
The period of transition might
require overseeing. Since the AU mission may be too closely associated with
neighbouring countries, it may require substitution. Political momentum in the
talks could perk up Troop Contributing Countries willingness to contribute blue
berets and boots on ground in a monitoring and protective role respectively. A
lean mission, with a civilian component including civil affairs and human
rights officers with a pronounced national staff complement, can be foreseen. A
clear timeline culminating with the next elections or as agreed in a
comprehensive peace agreement can serve as focus for an exit strategy and
handover to the UN Country Team.
A role for India?
India is in the midst of taking
up its destined role as a leading state. It has been member over last two years
of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It has recently taken over chair of the
G-20. India has to seize opportunities to supplant UNSC declinist veto-holding
pen holders, Britain and France. Envisaging a greater role for itself as a security
provider in the ocean that bears its name is a first step.
Its strategic moves in the
Indo-Pacific theatre have not been at the cost of the western Indian Ocean. It
has been a player in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since inception of the
joint naval operations. Managing security along Indian Ocean Rim in proximity
of the Horn of Africa to South West Asia - and the scene of conflict in Yemen –
is significant. The strategic weight of the region is seen in the setting up of
bases in close proximity to each other by the US and China. The risk of instability
multiplying, such as in the increased presence of Islamists southwards along
the African coast in Mozambique, must be acknowledged.
Since India is now a pragmatic
power, balancing China in Africa will not be far from its concerns. Africa is a
site for power competition that India cannot find India missing-in-action. In taking
a proactive role, India would only be returning to its historical role as an
important rimland naval power, evidenced by communities originating in Horn of
Africa resident across the Deccan and the Malabar coast. India must step up to
complete a task left unfinished when in 1995 its navy evacuated troops of the UNOSOM
II.
India, lending a hand as a ‘friend
of the mediation’ through appointing a special envoy, would enable India to
push for consensus in the UNSC on a light footprint mission to arrive at and help
implement any agreement reached. It can lead with boots on the ground. It could
contribute to the humanitarian Somalia Trust Fund or bilaterally increase
humanitarian support
Conclusion
Peace operations cannot be done
in a political vacuum. In Somalia, absence of a political prong of strategy to
tackle the al Shabaab has resulted in the insurgency persisting. Current-day
dire humanitarian straits compel a political outreach to the al Shabaab. By all
means care must be taken not to empower terrorist affiliates, but this
apprehension can be mitigated by enlightened design of the mediation or
facilitation, taking on board the lessons of the peace process in Afghanistan.
The terror tag to groups must be amenable to revision now that international terror
has subsided considerably. An outreach can in a first step influence the group
to distance itself from terror. The FGS is already contemplating a political
solution. Once the regional organisations have bought into this line of action,
the UN could lend a hand by including the remit in its next resolution on
UNSOM. This will pave way for UNSOM to acquire political teeth and to transform
into a short-duration, light-footprint peacekeeping mission overseeing
induction of al Shabaab into the Somali national mainstream. The Somalia case
study validates the hypothesis that all three sides of the peace triangle need
ministration in varying degrees during the lifecycle of a peace intervention,
failing which, peace is liable to prove elusive. Peacemaking must be added to
the peace repertoire Somalia to complete the peace triangle.
Words - 3002
[1] Ali Ahmed, ‘Operational Art in Peace
Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle’, USI Journal, Vol. CLII, No. 628,
April-June 2022, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/?sf_paged=2
[2]
For a brief history, see https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Civil-war
[3] For background on AMISOM, see https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.
[4] For background on UNSOM, see https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unsom.
[5] Al
Shabaab figures on the sanctions list
available at https://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/consolidated.htm#alqaedaent
[6] For details on ATMIS, see https://atmis-au.org/
[7] For background on UNOSOM I and
UNITAF, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom1backgr2.html
[8] For background on UNOSOM II, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosom2backgr2.html
[9] ‘Somalia
Military Makes Gains in Large-scale Offensive Against Al-Shabab’, VOA,
26 September 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-makes-gains-in-large-scale-offensive-against-al-shabab-/6764305.html
[10] ‘Somalia
and al-Shabab: The struggle to defeat the militants’, BBC, 24 August
2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62644935
[11]
International Crisis Group, ‘A Strategy for Exploring Talks with Al-Shabaab in
Somalia’, Podcast, 30 June 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/strategy-exploring-talks-al-shabaab-somalia
[12] ‘Somalia
will talk to Al-Shabaab when time is right: President’, The Guardian, 6
July 2022, https://guardian.ng/news/somalia-will-talk-to-al-shabaab-when-time-is-right-president/
[13]
For a backgrounder, see https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war
[14] For a background on the NATO mission
in Afghanistan, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
[15]
United Nations, ‘Report Of The Independent High-Level Panel On Peace Operations’,
2015, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations
[16]
Human Rights Watch, ‘The power these men have over us’, 8 September 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces
[17]
Amnesty International, ‘US military sheds some light on civilian casualties
from shadowy war in Somalia’, 27 April 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/us-military-sheds-some-light-on-civilian-casualties-from-shadowy-war-in-somalia/
[18]
For UNSOM activities, see https://unsom.unmissions.org/political-affairs
