https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/general-dwivedi-deepens-the-subcontinents?r=i1fws

General Dwivedi deepens the subcontinent’s nuclear pathology

The last time Pakistan was warned off just as sprightly as by General Dwivedi recently – “Decide whether want to be part of geography, history, or not” - was when General ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan replied to a question at a press conference a quarter century back. Asked after the nuclear factor, he warned that should Pakistan dare to reach for the nuclear button, “the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful.”

Operation (Op) Parakram was into its third week and the Indian military was in full gear to strike Pakistan for its temerity in sponsoring an attack on the Indian parliament. Photogenic and articulate, Paddy through his press conference pre-empted Musharraf’s landmark speech, made the following day at American behest. Musharraf craftily promised to stand down his terroristic advanced guard.

This defused the first half of what Americans call the ‘Twin Peaks’ crisis. The second ‘peak’ was in peak summer, when dastardly terrorists stormed a garrison at Kalu Chak. Infuriated, Paddy readied his three strike corps to launch from the line of march, which were then exercising in close proximity of each other in the Rajasthani desert. In the event, the Americans - having an axe to grind in not wanting Pakistan distracted from what went on to be the American ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan - sent a peace ‘mission’ to the region.

Self-deterrence as a virtue

A few years down the line, the Manmohan government too was reluctant to go to war over an equally horrendous provocation on Pakistan’s part – Mumbai 26/11. It’s clear both governments were resolved to not be deflected from India’s economic trajectory. Manmohan Singh, for his part, was also aware of the onset of the global economic downturn. Equally significantly, both were also self-deterred, given the nuclear portents of conflict.

The possibility of nuclear exchanges prompted by India’s conventional strides and, further, such exchanges getting out of hand lead to self-deterrence. The latter amounts to a certainty in doctrinal circles, with advocacy for a splendid second strike capability and intention basing on the assumption of uncontrolled escalation: the capability be expended to decisively end nuclear exchange(s) started by the other side.

Pakistan has over time acquired a second strike capability of sorts, even if not in the orthodox terms of boomers. It has instead gone for vertical proliferation, diverse hides, a bid to create a ‘missile gap’ and for innovative sub-surface platforms. This gives it confidence to declare that a MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) situation exists. India acceded to the possibility of ‘mutual destruction’ only once; otherwise mostly preening that India would survive, while Pakistan would not. India’s advantage of depth on all scores in comparison to Pakistan prompts such hubris.

However, the accuracy with which India took out Nur Khan air base when combined with a certainty of a Dhurandhar-style penetration of the Strategic Plans Division alone can generate the notion that Pakistan can be written off easily in a nuclear war. And everyone knows Dhurandhar is fantasy. When the fusillades of the United States and Israel launched twice-over only nine months apart have not been able to defang Iran conventionally, taking out Pakistan’s nuclear capability in so substantial manner as to not receive a telling counter strike – even if broken backed - is either a tricky deception or self-deception.

The good part

Indeed, General Dwivedi as army chief should really be saying quite the opposite. His tenure will be known for (other than for the pony-tailed figure in an office painting) the creation - finally and at long last - of forces for limited operations on the lines of integrated battle groups. With such forces on hand, the potential threat of crossing of nuclear redlines recedes; enabling prosecution of limited operations with greater conviction in line with the tenets of the ‘new normal’.

Deterrence of subconventional provocation by Pakistan requires the Chief to emphasise the efficacy of the new forces. Dragging in the nuclear factor, the Chief betrays under-confidence on keeping a war limited. Reference to the nuclear factor is egregious since nuclear sabre rattling is best left to Pakistanis who may wish to alert their friends, the Americans.

Does his nuclear threat signal that escalatory possibilities persist, even with the employment of the new-fangled forces? Does the contingency of Op Sindoor 2 escalating rapidly necessitate such rhetoric to warn off Pakistan against escalation? If so, is the strategic posture of constant preparedness the right one, accentuating as it does the nuclear overhang?

General Dwivedi failed to complete his scenario building. He is entirely right in envisaging Pakistan’s passage into history. For Indians that is less consequential than where does that leave us. By not engaging with that, General Dwivedi indulges in a half-truth. Pakistan claims it will ‘take half the world down with it.’ Since this was spoken on American soil, it can be set aside as Pakistan’s scare mongering. But, does India risk proportionate nuclear damage?

The question must induce restraint. Deterrence of subconventional assault cannot justify nuclear risk. The nuclear factor confirmed by the Chief as significant, implies, firstly, that Op Sindoor 2 ought not to be embarked upon with the alacrity demanded by the new doctrine. And, secondly, it must be prosecuted with operational gusto reined in. Op Sindoor 2 must be allowed to fizzle out as yet another set of surgical strikes with an admixture of landward attacks. If and since, only political milage is sought then perception management can well do the rest, as has been the case in Op Sindoor.

The invoking of general nuclear deterrence by the Chief to supplement conventional deterrence of subconventional provocation means the ‘new normal’ is not robust just yet. Now that yet another train stands targeted in Pakistan’s western badlands by terrorists, expect another Baisaran. Is this dawning of reality, the impetus behind the refreshing idea: ‘talk to Pakistan’?

The bad part

Another bout as futile but as tame as the previous ones is tolerable. However, two factors – one operational and the other political – could conspire to make things worse.

The operational factor is a combine of two technological thrusts. The first is attention to air defence. Perhaps the reticence of the general on damage received by India owes to being sanguine on the showing of air defence in Op Sindoor and its tightening up since. Ensuring tolerably few nukes get through in a bedraggled nuclear counter strike by Pakistan can help with effectively calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. The second of the two is hinted by the Chief: annihilation. It is proof of preparedness for a splendid first strike levels of nuclear retaliation on India’s part. Together, the two - defensive and offensive measures - incentivize nuclear use and in the sense the Chief’s quip best conveys.

The second factor, pitched at the political level, is far more germane. Strategic discussions are liable to miss the influence of ideology. Where majoritarian ideology suffuses thinking, how it impinges on nuclear rationality is a valid question, seldom asked. How does the animus at the heart of the dominant ideology against The Muslim of Akhand Bharat impact?

The nuclear command authority (NCA) is peopled by ideologically minded members and serviced by an ideologically committed national security adviser (NSA). The regime has taken care to successively appoint an ideologically vetted chief of defence staff, whose functions include being military adviser to the NCA. It can reasonably be inferred that the prior billet under the NSA serves to socialize incumbents.

Importantly, ideology shapes notions on Indian resilience. With the majoritarian ideology’s thirty year-long creep across the land, now engulfing even Bengal, the expectation is that a shared national spirit will hold Bharat together. Gone is the framework in which dominant ethnic groups across the land forged a constitutional contract with the Union, that could have served to instill self-deterrence. Self-regarding ethnic groups that make up India would not allow the Center such power as to compromise their security. That interregnum in the national narrative is now long past.

The two aspects taken together – one, a political belief in Indian resilience enhanced by an ideology nationally subscribed to; and, two, operational confidence – if misplaced - in nuclear first strike and an incipient sudarshan chakra, can swing nuclear use decisions in a dangerous direction.

This is compounded by a mirroring on the other side. A jihadist general has decluttered decision making there. He has taken care to sift the nuclear delivery forces, aiming for greater certainty on nuclear ordnance getting through.

By highlighting escalatory possibilities, the soon-to-retire army chief has inadvertently put India wise to the nuclear risks embedded in the ‘new normal.’ The viral clip featuring the General at ease with the thought of genocide is his unintended legacy.

 https://thewire.in/security/india-moves-from-retaliation-to-restraint-in-its-post-operation-sindoor-doctrine

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-india-must-not-hanker

In the immediate aftermath of Op Sindoor, India perhaps for the first time articulated a strategic doctrine, adopting as the ‘new normal,’ swift and sure retaliation to Pakistani terror provocations. Not only have pronouncements been aplenty since, but military activity has also picked up. On the face of it, it would appear that a radical disjuncture has been brought about by Op Sindoor.

Understandably then, a recent commentary , predicting an opportunity for peacemaker Trump to tote up his Nobel chances, cries ‘Wolf!.’ The author thinks that in the next round the Indians, believing that the nuclear card is Pakistan’s way of instigating American peace initiatives, are likely to go for objectives across the Line of Control (LC). To him, this could lead up to ‘uncontrolled escalation.’ How real is the danger?

The doctrinal shift

An imagined strategic continuum has a defensive segment at one end and compellence at the other, with deterrence in-between. The deterrence segment can be further split into two - defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence. Prevailing in war involves compellence.

Over the years, India has moved from the defensive segment, where it was in Nehruvian India, to defensive deterrence under his more combative daughter, Indira Gandhi. But, the hangover from General Sundarji’s days of mechanised warfare simulation is long over. Limited War thinking dawned close on the heels of nuclearisation, with the Kargil War. In its wake, the cold start doctrine was whistled up.

The wellsprings of the doctrinal makeover lay in three sources. At the external level, Pakistan - instrumentalising Kashmir - remained a problem. Tackling it in the nuclear era involved pulling one’s punches. Thus, the doctrine posited several limited-depth offensives from a ‘cold start’ across a wide front.

At the internal level, riding on the back of an economy unleashed by liberalisation, India saw itself as an emerging power. Cultural nationalism, in its shaping of Indian strategic culture, infused an offensive content into the doctrine. During the Manmohan years the offensive content provided cover for the parlays underway with Pakistan. Later, with the advent of the Modi, it was presented as the strategic shift, heralding rupture of his era with the past .

At the within-the-box organisational level, the military exerted to stay relevant in the nuclear era. It trimmed its sails, divining space below the nuclear threshold for use of force. It hoped to thereby deter Pakistani subconventional provocations, without itself provoking at the nuclear level.

India thus shifted from a strategic doctrine of defensive deterrence based on a combination of denial (defensive battle) and punishment (strike corps counter offensives) towards offensive deterrence (proactive offensive).

Over the three terms of this regime, the strategic shift appears to have run its course. Not only has India responded to terror provocations by military action thrice over, but after Op Sindoor, claims to have upped its act. Its newly minted strategic doctrine collapses terror perpetrators with state sponsors and promises reflexive retribution. Evidently the two previous reprisal surgical strikes did not work. It is moot whether this formulation would signify a transit into compellence.

The gingerly conduct of Op Sindoor itself has pointers on strategic restraint continuing: petitioning Pakistan in wake of the terror camp strike; keeping own air out of action for three crucial days; and throwing in a parting punch, after knowing the Americans had already corralled Pakistan. More recently, official reticence was visible in the two days it took to officially recognise the recent Delhi blast as a terror incident.

The next round

While India dallied for two decades over Cold Start-ordained Integrated Battle Group (IBG) activation, Pakistan went ahead with tactical nukes and nuclear doctrinal moves. Almost in acknowledgement, Op Sindoor was altogether kept a stand-off engagement. Further, post Op Sindoor, the move is towards a scaled down version of IBGs, comprising Bhairavs, Rudras and Shaktibaans. It is apparent, while earlier India stepped back from corps level offensives, now it has done so also from sub-divisional-sized IBGs, in favour of mini-IBGs.

Noteworthy is the critique of IBGs that they signify an inability to work with an Order of Battle. Formations and units are available for operational tasking as per the flow of a campaign. What then is the necessity for objective-specific IBGs answering to a chain of command through the threat of a confidential report? What happens to IBGs after first phase objectives? Do sanskritic nouns function as force multipliers? Aware of its limitations, India appears to have settled for bites instead of mouthfuls, nibbles instead of chunks of enemy territory and fighting capacity.

Fortuitously, this is all for the good since the nuclear factor has taken to looming larger. It has acquired formidable portents with President Trump’s ‘favourite field marshal’ taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, one which Trump alleges continues to be polished up.

This year’s biggest military exercise was in wake of Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s mentions of Karachi and Sindh. Anyone would believe that an exercise that featured a Rudra brigade being put through its paces and an amphibious landing must indicate intent to follow through on Singh’s threats. However, the exercise had no mention of any nuclear angle. Instead the usual desultory practice of decontamination drills, carrying a hint of the nuclear backdrop sensitivity, were instead practiced in another - multinational - exercise.

This can imply three things: one, the use of the Rudra brigade suggests India does not intend to trigger any redlines; two, a more ambitious capability demonstrated through the amphibious landing, is to deter Munir from upping the conventional ante; and, three, absence of the nuclear angle suggests a belief that Pakistani symmetric escalation is stayed by a strengthened Indian Triad.

Dangers arise if India finds itself wrong on any of the three counts. One, the escalatory quotient in use of Bhairavs and Rudras depends on the objectives set. If on the LC, the objectives are proxy war and defensive posture relevant, it would not be escalatory. However, those that lend an offensive advantage could lower the other’s redlines. Bhairav’s launched elsewhere across the border can also instigate escalation.

Two, the new Chief of Defence Forces Munir’s propensity to hold out may lead to components intended to signal escalation dominance - such as the amphibious elements - getting sucked into the fight. Also, mission creep, inadvertence and accidents do happen.

Finally, Munir’s bombast of taking ‘half the world down’ with him is plausible not only because of what Pakistan would do with its nuclear weapons, but equally in light of the promise in the Indian nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation.

These are unintended outcomes that India ought to avoid. It must be cautious against venturing past offensive deterrence into compellence. This is not a tall order for a regime that reckons its not an era of war. It must be receptive to third party off-ramps. With peace deals reckoning with underlying causes of war as much as proximate ones, it must know that Kashmir will figure on the negotiation table, especially in case of nuclear clouds.

Consequently, its best that where a teaser will do, don’t hanker after a trailer, and where a trailer is enough, just forget the movie.

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/in-the-hype-around-new-war-old-war?r=i1fws

In the hype around New War, Old War is back

Among his earlier speaking engagements post Operation (Op) Sindoor, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan highlighted the ‘foremost’ challenge today as simultaneous preparedness for two types of war: the New War, as evidenced in the non-contact operations of the recent four-day India-Pakistan and eleven-day (Israel+US-Iran) wars; and for Old Wars, as being fought in Ukraine, with an admixture of New War.

He held that in light of the India-Pakistan conflict as the first one between two nuclear powers, military preparedness was necessitated across the spectrum of conflict from subconventional to nuclear levels. In his words, the potential for escalation ‘quickly and rapidly’ was present across the board.

Nevertheless, he reckoned that there is space for conventional operations. He espied scope for expansion of this scope, amplified by newer the non-kinetic domains of cyber, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cognition.

Whereas the incidence of New War (New Age Warfare in the words of the prime minister) is self-evident from Op Sindoor, the persistence of Old War cannot be missed. The raksha mantri has talked of an avenue of approach from Sir Creek to Karachi. The army is raising Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions as instruments of the Old War, presumably to make this possible.

The CDS acknowledges that even as Op Sindoor was conducted in terms of the New War paradigm, mobilization along Old War lines was underway. A general informed that at least one Indian offensive formation was threateningly poised to have a go at Pakistan by the end of the four-day crisis. The army chief’s commendation of railway officials suggests that much was whirring in the background. In the event, the New War was ‘paused’ within four days, short-circuiting the outbreak of Old War.

In short, New War is not undertaken in isolation. Old War is needed to protect the flanks. Since New War is experienced as a game of chess – per the army chief - much is dependent on the moves of the opposite side. Old Wars remaining relevant, nuclear-use considerations are back into the reckoning.

The CDS took the opportunity to ‘clarify’ and give his ‘take’ on this. His views are significant, since he is the military adviser to the nuclear command authority, sitting in its executive council chaired by the national security adviser.

To him nuclear weapons are ‘meant for deterrence, not warfighting.’ In the same breath, he recalled a tenet from India’s new strategic doctrine: India will not be bothered by ‘nuclear blackmail.’

Perhaps the CDS will clarify someday the distinction between ‘deterrence’ and ‘blackmail’, lest in the former be mistaken for the latter when Pakistan resorts to nuclear signalling, as it apparently did on the last day.

Sharing his ‘take’ of the nuclear aspect, the CDS had it that space for conventional operations during Op Sindoor owed to three factors. One, India’s ‘no first use’ (NFU) nuclear doctrine allowed for such space, as it pushed back the nuclear awning. Two, by taking the first step-up into the conventional level with Op Banyan e Marsoos, Pakistan deprived itself of the option of taking another step up, the nuclear step. And, finally, since no territory traded hands, Pakistan’s nuclear card was rendered redundant.

The CDS’ first point makes sense, but only from stand point of the stronger – Indian - side. Having a conventional edge, India wouldn’t like to foreground nuclear weapons. In contrast, Pakistan – being weaker – would constrict the conventional space by pulling on the nuclear awning; and definitely so as part of psychological operations. If and since this would complicate the Indian reading of Pakistani intentions, to be dismissive of nuclear threats is to rather too risk acceptant.

Further, as the CDS must know, firstly, some – particularly in Pakistan - think that the NFU is not worth the paper it is written on. Also, there are nuclear development tendencies that show up India as vacillating on NFU.

Finally, it is not so much Indian NFU that is of consequence to the space for conventional conflict, but the Pakistani ambiguity on nuclear first-use. It would not do for Indian assumptions on the scope for conventional conflict to, in the event, be found to be mistaken.

As regards the second, the CDS does not elaborate on why he thinks Pakistan cannot up the ante twice-over. It retains the option for asymmetric response at both levels. The opportunity for the second upping of the ante by Pakistan could have come in case it had not heeded President Trump’s incentives to desist.

Pakistani strategic culture suggests it is liable to respond, and with alacrity at that. At the tactical level, it is known for counter attacks. Recall, citations written out for a Pakistani junior-leaders conduct in counter attacks by Indian commanders. At the operational level, Op Swift Retort is an example. Even in Op Sindoor, Pakistan spurned India’s olive branch of the first night, launching Op Banyan e Marsoos. At the strategic level, it did a Kargil, ostensibly in reply to India’s capture of Siachen.

As for the third point, since the gap in the non-contact domain can only get wider, Pakistan will be tempted to ‘escalate to deescalate’ at both levels, conventional and nuclear.

When at the conventional level, its response could suck in Indian Rudras and Bhairavs in a tit-for-tat manner. Even if not tasked with objectives to ‘seize and hold,’ but only to retrieve on meting out destruction, their operations necessarily entail stepping across.

Mission creep setting in can manifest in territorial gains in ground operations as a measure of ‘victory.’ Essentially escalatory, measures designed to secure escalation-dominance will play out — horizontally, with the navy joining in; and vertically, with the Rudras reinforced by strike-corps “motherships.”

These are the ‘facts’ the CDS – in his interaction at the event - committed to providing a compliant media and pocket think tanks for future conflicts, in the expectation that those would then be stitched-up and purveyed as a winning narrative.

Willy-nilly, the debates of a decade back, on limiting war in a nuclear backdrop, must find resonance today.

That both India and Pakistan believe that the next step – the nuclear one – could take place is clear from their recent rhetorical exchange. This should concern.

Expectedly, the field marshal next door initiated the exchange, on a trip during which he famously supped with the president of the United States. The Indian army chief’s belated reply was reminiscent of - if less theatrical than - late ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan’s famous quip in Op Parakram. In turn, a reminder from Pakistan has it that ‘cataclysmic devastation’ would be mutual.

The good part is that the exchange foregrounds the nuclear factor.

A new-fangled strategic doctrine was drummed up in immediate wake of Op Sindoor, criticism when criticism was rife on the halt to Op Sindoor. It is plausible that the onset of the ‘new normal’ may well be internal domestic posturing, to offset the criticism – which, incidentally, was from the regime’s own constituency.

However, the new doctrine sets up a commitment trap. A new feature of the doctrine is the renouncing by India of any intermediaries to retard conflict, evident in the blindsiding of Trump this time round. This complicates extrication, dangerous when it is well known getting into a conflict is easier than getting out of one.

Also, the doctrinal tenet of ignoring nuclear blackmail might not be so much to deter at the nuclear level than at the subconventional level. It is India playing ‘chicken’ to defer, if not deter, the next terror atrocity. However, it can only work if other measures are taken, such as a draw down in any Indian intelligence activity on the far side of Pakistan. And, awareness of this prerequisite is not evident.

The final word is on General Chauhan’s dusting up of what General Ved Malik brought out over a quarter-century back. The space for conventional war has always been present. After all, such space prompted India’s Cold Start doctrine in first place.

Even though Pakistan has a proto-first use nuclear doctrine, there is no call for it to be first on the draw early in the hostilities. Arguably, it can see off India’s shallow-thrusts – be it with Rudras or heavier and more potent integrated battle groups - without the use of nukes, though it has niche nuclear weapons for just such a contingency.

Since a limited war is always possible in the nuclear shadow, the military’s promises of ‘no restraint’ does not encourage. The threat of embroilment will loom large, expanding the compulsions for nuclear first use for both sides. While for Pakistan it may be to pre-empt a debacle, for India it might be for pre-emption.

Note the escalatory tendency in each of the three Indian strikes on Pakistan so far. Each has been more lethal than the last. The last led to a bona-fide conventional turn, with three iterations in the exchange. The start next time can only be at a higher level of violence, placing escalation management out of reach, without the benefit of intermediaries to act as a wet blanket. In light of meagre returns, admitted to by the army chief, the risk is inordinate.

Consequently, the shift from deterrence to compellence is premature. The CDS’ ruling out of nuclear warfighting, by way of which limitation can be ruled in, only a cataclysm is the alternative. The CDS noted continuing vulnerability to long range precision strikes; never mind the impending sudarshan chakra.

This makes for plausibility of the mutual assured destruction paradigm in South Asia, one Pakistan pitches for and India dodges accepting. Reconciling this doctrinal divergence may yet secure the subcontinent.

For military brass-hats to lend ballast to the new doctrine and over-sell Op Sindoor smells of political gameplay. With Bihar polls at hand, they’d be well advised to leave the usual banter with Pakistan to their political boss, Rajnath Singh.

If instead, this is their way of catching up with Pakistani head start in the war of narratives, the feedback here is that the two sides are in a comical overstretch. Sobriety demands a step back, an expectation more of the Indian military since it has a reputation to protect.

The military would do well to instead save its ‘take’ for behind closed doors and, there, keep it sombre.