https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-nuclear-portents-are

Op Sindoor 2: Nuclear portents are darker than General Chauhan puts it

Once while serving (19:34) and a second time when retired (37:41), former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Chauhan held forth that limited military operations like Operation (Op) Sindoor will unlikely escalate to the nuclear level. He assumes that Pakistan cannot escalate twice-over: first to the conventional level and thereafter also to the nuclear level.

In both talks, he noted that space for conventional operations owes to three factors. One is India’s No First Use doctrine, which - self-servingly - allows India scope for exercise of its conventional advantage over Pakistan. It does help keep the nuclear threat in abeyance, allowing India the option of limited war.

The second is that there is no threat of capture of territory in primarily non-contact - if kinetic – operations, such as Op Sindoor. This precludes tactical nuclear weapons’ use by Pakistan, allowing India greater scope for standoff, non-contact operations.

The third is that the onus for escalation on to the conventional level is in the hands of Pakistan, and once exercised, Pakistan loses out on also taking the war to the nuclear level. He believes that the escalation to the conventional level by Pakistan makes the ‘notion of escalating into the nuclear domain slightly difficult’ (38:30).

This infeasibility of a second step by Pakistan - having taken the first – presumably allows India the rationale and legitimacy to proceed with conventional operations with greater vigour. Trifle complacently, he concludes, ‘So, we are quite sure that we should be able to manage that.’

Dangerous possibilities

To Chauhan, Op Sindoor led to a ‘falsification’ of the notion that nuclear weapons deter all kinds of conventional conflicts. This is strange, considering that a limited war fought within a year of nuclearization of South Asia – at Kargil – put paid to the notion right at the outset.

Speaking of space for conventional operations (36:58), he noted that while Pakistan through its full spectrum deterrence (FSD) doctrine tries to diminish this space, India – for its part – is constantly at expanding that space. The Indian cold start doctrine, and lately, the dynamic response doctrine (cold strike) are testimony. Now, the doctrinal tussle continues as the real thing.

Chauhan believes that, ‘in future… it’s going to be a combination of contact and non-contact warfare (57:00),’ with additional space for conventional operations squeezed out of the other, newer domains of operations: cyber, space and cognition. In light of the escalated violence, it is not clear why Pakistan will abjure from FSD.

Busting the assumption

Chauhan makes the case that by initially restricting targeting to terror camps in Op Sindoor, India kept the conflict at the subconventional level. This is only partially true, since conventional ordnance was hurled across borders by conventional armaments. Amounting to an armed attack on a sovereign state, it can hardly be said to be subconventional. At best, the operation can be characterized as one at the subconventional-conventional interface. Only Op Sindoor’s first phase meets the definition in the army’s subconventional operations doctrine:

“Sub conventional operations arena comprises armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful coexistence amongst states and below the threshold of war. These include militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism either employed as part of an insurrectionist movement or independently. Border skirmishes also fall within this category (p. 8).”

However, the subsequent days of Op Sindoor can be characterized as medium-intensity ‘operations other than war’ (OOTW), that can be cached in the term subconventional operations. The army defines OOTW as: ‘OOTW encompass a wide range of activities where military power is used for purposes other than large scale combat operations (p. 15).’

The operations on the last day arguably took the conflict into the ‘large scale’ realm, which per the air chief were conducted over a 1200 km-wide front with 200 km in depth, and, per his vice chief, used 50 long-range, precision-guided munitions. This amounts to a limited war, which on the spectrum of war is subset of conventional war (p. 12). The army defines such a war thus: ‘Conventional war conforms to the traditional image of war and is fought to achieve strategic and military objectives…. It may be total or limited in terms of duration, the range of weapon systems employed, scope, objectives and its ultimate outcome (p. 15).’

Chauhan’s claim that Pakistan escalated to the conventional level is a case of ‘the chicken or the egg.’ If limited conventional war is taken as Pakistan’s launch of Op Bunyan um Marsoos, then it must be recalled that India had already blinded a proportion of Pakistan’s surveillance and air defence capability in earlier strikes, shaping of the battlefield for the large scale strikes of the following day.

Curiously, in the recent laudatory documentary the air operations’ chief lets on that the air force’s crack at Pakistani airfields preempted Op Bunyan um Marsoos, saying, “Toh us raat yani ki dus ki subah, is se pehle ki voh hamla kar sake, hum hamla kar chuke the unki major air fields, radar sites aur command and control set up par (“That night or morning of 10^th, even prior to their strike, we had already attacked their major air fields, radar sites and command and control set up”).”

To the extent this version of events holds water, India too is implicated in upping the ante to the conventional level. Thus, neither the sequence of events nor definitional exercise vindicates Chauhan’s theorizing.

Indeed, exercising a choice in favour of escalation by either side cannot be discounted, since each side would continue to have agency in conflict. Therefore, the nuclear step is but a decision away; which if made in the ‘free hand’ environment existing on both sides, can spell radioactive trouble.

Rationally, Pakistan would to begin with resort to nuclear signaling with only if forced on the back-foot by India – which, taking Chauhan’s description of a future military conflict as guide, can only be a matter of time in a conventional war. Therefore, even if Pakistan reaches to brandish its nuclear card, it cannot be an isolated act, shorn off context, with the onus solely on it. Instead, India could well be stoking a risk to itself.

Never be too sure

The three operations – the one post-Uri, at Balakot and Op Sindoor – reinforce the Indian belief that a conflict can play out at the subconventional-conventional interface. India’s preparedness through partial and creeping mobilization of forces on the borders and the Line of Control discourages Pakistan from responding with contact warfare. Pakistan is thus restricted to a level of Indian choosing, at which India believes it demonstrated a marked advantage in Op Sindoor.

Such a perception does not account for Pakistan having kept its powder dry for most part in this exchange. The likelihood of Pakistan staying in the fight for longer next time, may make for an imitation of recent conflicts elsewhere: no victor, no vanquished. Such a circumstance can multiply political pressures within India, as a self-regarding stronger power that ought to have made short work of its weaker adversary.

Saving face is also important institutionally for a professional military. Take the case in Op Sindoor, when under the cover of a ‘free hand,’ the military continued to pummel Pakistan through the forenoon, even after it had assessed that it had already prevailed by early morning on the last day. The only rationale for this can be that the air force was given a greater leeway to get back at Pakistan after it lost aircraft to a Pakistani aerial ambush.

Pakistan has been known for its ambushes: Kargil, Op Swift Retort and the opening phase of Op Sindoor. Its next one may well be springing a contact war, escalating India’s launch of a limited military conflict into a limited, conventional war. The aim could be to force an outcome it desires: talks. Though only intended to deter, Indian readiness for this – seen in mobilizations of varying extent since Op Trident of the mid-eighties - makes a wider conventional war inevitable; setting stage for the nuclear backdrop to foreground itself.

This is not to forget the hardy perennial of human affairs, Murphy’s law on inadvertence; an instance of which in Op Sindoor was the alleged glitch in the Indian military operations’ hotline to its Pakistani counterpart. Chauhan – in a first - admits to the play of inadvertence in Op Sindoor. Warning against taking the nuclear angle lightly (59:00), he requires that next time round nuclear sites be taken out of the target list, such as the Nur Khan air base. As regards Kirana hills, he alleges the strike was unintended. Rightly, he cautions that ‘one will have to be more careful in future… so there cannot be such mistakes.’ His very sane observation is that in the heightened pace of operations errors and miscalculation can only elicit further wrong decisions. It is moot if the targeting was on account of nuclear signalling or ignorance on India’s part; both of which demand accountability.

The notion of victory

While it can be readily accepted that to begin with every effort of the military will be towards war limiation and its early termination, it’s a Clausewitzian verity that escalation is intrinsic to conflict. The military needs reminding of its own doctrinal rendering of two decades back: ‘War is prosecuted by the employment of strategy which aims at breaking the enemy’s will to fight. Disengagement from war is difficult because it develops its own dynamics and pace, which in themselves are unpredictable and could spin out of control (p. 13).’

Chauhan at his new perch as head of a well-endowed and privileged think tank in the national capital has his work cut out: either better explain why Pakistan cannot escalate twice-over or rethink his quip, ‘we are quite sure that we should be able to manage that.’

 https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/general-dwivedi-deepens-the-subcontinents?r=i1fws

General Dwivedi deepens the subcontinent’s nuclear pathology

The last time Pakistan was warned off just as sprightly as by General Dwivedi recently – “Decide whether want to be part of geography, history, or not” - was when General ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan replied to a question at a press conference a quarter century back. Asked after the nuclear factor, he warned that should Pakistan dare to reach for the nuclear button, “the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful.”

Operation (Op) Parakram was into its third week and the Indian military was in full gear to strike Pakistan for its temerity in sponsoring an attack on the Indian parliament. Photogenic and articulate, Paddy through his press conference pre-empted Musharraf’s landmark speech, made the following day at American behest. Musharraf craftily promised to stand down his terroristic advanced guard.

This defused the first half of what Americans call the ‘Twin Peaks’ crisis. The second ‘peak’ was in peak summer, when dastardly terrorists stormed a garrison at Kalu Chak. Infuriated, Paddy readied his three strike corps to launch from the line of march, which were then exercising in close proximity of each other in the Rajasthani desert. In the event, the Americans - having an axe to grind in not wanting Pakistan distracted from what went on to be the American ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan - sent a peace ‘mission’ to the region.

Self-deterrence as a virtue

A few years down the line, the Manmohan government too was reluctant to go to war over an equally horrendous provocation on Pakistan’s part – Mumbai 26/11. It’s clear both governments were resolved to not be deflected from India’s economic trajectory. Manmohan Singh, for his part, was also aware of the onset of the global economic downturn. Equally significantly, both were also self-deterred, given the nuclear portents of conflict.

The possibility of nuclear exchanges prompted by India’s conventional strides and, further, such exchanges getting out of hand lead to self-deterrence. The latter amounts to a certainty in doctrinal circles, with advocacy for a splendid second strike capability and intention basing on the assumption of uncontrolled escalation: the capability be expended to decisively end nuclear exchange(s) started by the other side.

Pakistan has over time acquired a second strike capability of sorts, even if not in the orthodox terms of boomers. It has instead gone for vertical proliferation, diverse hides, a bid to create a ‘missile gap’ and for innovative sub-surface platforms. This gives it confidence to declare that a MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) situation exists. India acceded to the possibility of ‘mutual destruction’ only once; otherwise mostly preening that India would survive, while Pakistan would not. India’s advantage of depth on all scores in comparison to Pakistan prompts such hubris.

However, the accuracy with which India took out Nur Khan air base when combined with a certainty of a Dhurandhar-style penetration of the Strategic Plans Division alone can generate the notion that Pakistan can be written off easily in a nuclear war. And everyone knows Dhurandhar is fantasy. When the fusillades of the United States and Israel launched twice-over only nine months apart have not been able to defang Iran conventionally, taking out Pakistan’s nuclear capability in so substantial manner as to not receive a telling counter strike – even if broken backed - is either a tricky deception or self-deception.

The good part

Indeed, General Dwivedi as army chief should really be saying quite the opposite. His tenure will be known for (other than for the pony-tailed figure in an office painting) the creation - finally and at long last - of forces for limited operations on the lines of integrated battle groups. With such forces on hand, the potential threat of crossing of nuclear redlines recedes; enabling prosecution of limited operations with greater conviction in line with the tenets of the ‘new normal’.

Deterrence of subconventional provocation by Pakistan requires the Chief to emphasise the efficacy of the new forces. Dragging in the nuclear factor, the Chief betrays under-confidence on keeping a war limited. Reference to the nuclear factor is egregious since nuclear sabre rattling is best left to Pakistanis who may wish to alert their friends, the Americans.

Does his nuclear threat signal that escalatory possibilities persist, even with the employment of the new-fangled forces? Does the contingency of Op Sindoor 2 escalating rapidly necessitate such rhetoric to warn off Pakistan against escalation? If so, is the strategic posture of constant preparedness the right one, accentuating as it does the nuclear overhang?

General Dwivedi failed to complete his scenario building. He is entirely right in envisaging Pakistan’s passage into history. For Indians that is less consequential than where does that leave us. By not engaging with that, General Dwivedi indulges in a half-truth. Pakistan claims it will ‘take half the world down with it.’ Since this was spoken on American soil, it can be set aside as Pakistan’s scare mongering. But, does India risk proportionate nuclear damage?

The question must induce restraint. Deterrence of subconventional assault cannot justify nuclear risk. The nuclear factor confirmed by the Chief as significant, implies, firstly, that Op Sindoor 2 ought not to be embarked upon with the alacrity demanded by the new doctrine. And, secondly, it must be prosecuted with operational gusto reined in. Op Sindoor 2 must be allowed to fizzle out as yet another set of surgical strikes with an admixture of landward attacks. If and since, only political milage is sought then perception management can well do the rest, as has been the case in Op Sindoor.

The invoking of general nuclear deterrence by the Chief to supplement conventional deterrence of subconventional provocation means the ‘new normal’ is not robust just yet. Now that yet another train stands targeted in Pakistan’s western badlands by terrorists, expect another Baisaran. Is this dawning of reality, the impetus behind the refreshing idea: ‘talk to Pakistan’?

The bad part

Another bout as futile but as tame as the previous ones is tolerable. However, two factors – one operational and the other political – could conspire to make things worse.

The operational factor is a combine of two technological thrusts. The first is attention to air defence. Perhaps the reticence of the general on damage received by India owes to being sanguine on the showing of air defence in Op Sindoor and its tightening up since. Ensuring tolerably few nukes get through in a bedraggled nuclear counter strike by Pakistan can help with effectively calling Pakistan’s nuclear bluff. The second of the two is hinted by the Chief: annihilation. It is proof of preparedness for a splendid first strike levels of nuclear retaliation on India’s part. Together, the two - defensive and offensive measures - incentivize nuclear use and in the sense the Chief’s quip best conveys.

The second factor, pitched at the political level, is far more germane. Strategic discussions are liable to miss the influence of ideology. Where majoritarian ideology suffuses thinking, how it impinges on nuclear rationality is a valid question, seldom asked. How does the animus at the heart of the dominant ideology against The Muslim of Akhand Bharat impact?

The nuclear command authority (NCA) is peopled by ideologically minded members and serviced by an ideologically committed national security adviser (NSA). The regime has taken care to successively appoint an ideologically vetted chief of defence staff, whose functions include being military adviser to the NCA. It can reasonably be inferred that the prior billet under the NSA serves to socialize incumbents.

Importantly, ideology shapes notions on Indian resilience. With the majoritarian ideology’s thirty year-long creep across the land, now engulfing even Bengal, the expectation is that a shared national spirit will hold Bharat together. Gone is the framework in which dominant ethnic groups across the land forged a constitutional contract with the Union, that could have served to instill self-deterrence. Self-regarding ethnic groups that make up India would not allow the Center such power as to compromise their security. That interregnum in the national narrative is now long past.

The two aspects taken together – one, a political belief in Indian resilience enhanced by an ideology nationally subscribed to; and, two, operational confidence – if misplaced - in nuclear first strike and an incipient sudarshan chakra, can swing nuclear use decisions in a dangerous direction.

This is compounded by a mirroring on the other side. A jihadist general has decluttered decision making there. He has taken care to sift the nuclear delivery forces, aiming for greater certainty on nuclear ordnance getting through.

By highlighting escalatory possibilities, the soon-to-retire army chief has inadvertently put India wise to the nuclear risks embedded in the ‘new normal.’ The viral clip featuring the General at ease with the thought of genocide is his unintended legacy.

 https://thewire.in/security/india-moves-from-retaliation-to-restraint-in-its-post-operation-sindoor-doctrine

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-india-must-not-hanker

In the immediate aftermath of Op Sindoor, India perhaps for the first time articulated a strategic doctrine, adopting as the ‘new normal,’ swift and sure retaliation to Pakistani terror provocations. Not only have pronouncements been aplenty since, but military activity has also picked up. On the face of it, it would appear that a radical disjuncture has been brought about by Op Sindoor.

Understandably then, a recent commentary , predicting an opportunity for peacemaker Trump to tote up his Nobel chances, cries ‘Wolf!.’ The author thinks that in the next round the Indians, believing that the nuclear card is Pakistan’s way of instigating American peace initiatives, are likely to go for objectives across the Line of Control (LC). To him, this could lead up to ‘uncontrolled escalation.’ How real is the danger?

The doctrinal shift

An imagined strategic continuum has a defensive segment at one end and compellence at the other, with deterrence in-between. The deterrence segment can be further split into two - defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence. Prevailing in war involves compellence.

Over the years, India has moved from the defensive segment, where it was in Nehruvian India, to defensive deterrence under his more combative daughter, Indira Gandhi. But, the hangover from General Sundarji’s days of mechanised warfare simulation is long over. Limited War thinking dawned close on the heels of nuclearisation, with the Kargil War. In its wake, the cold start doctrine was whistled up.

The wellsprings of the doctrinal makeover lay in three sources. At the external level, Pakistan - instrumentalising Kashmir - remained a problem. Tackling it in the nuclear era involved pulling one’s punches. Thus, the doctrine posited several limited-depth offensives from a ‘cold start’ across a wide front.

At the internal level, riding on the back of an economy unleashed by liberalisation, India saw itself as an emerging power. Cultural nationalism, in its shaping of Indian strategic culture, infused an offensive content into the doctrine. During the Manmohan years the offensive content provided cover for the parlays underway with Pakistan. Later, with the advent of the Modi, it was presented as the strategic shift, heralding rupture of his era with the past .

At the within-the-box organisational level, the military exerted to stay relevant in the nuclear era. It trimmed its sails, divining space below the nuclear threshold for use of force. It hoped to thereby deter Pakistani subconventional provocations, without itself provoking at the nuclear level.

India thus shifted from a strategic doctrine of defensive deterrence based on a combination of denial (defensive battle) and punishment (strike corps counter offensives) towards offensive deterrence (proactive offensive).

Over the three terms of this regime, the strategic shift appears to have run its course. Not only has India responded to terror provocations by military action thrice over, but after Op Sindoor, claims to have upped its act. Its newly minted strategic doctrine collapses terror perpetrators with state sponsors and promises reflexive retribution. Evidently the two previous reprisal surgical strikes did not work. It is moot whether this formulation would signify a transit into compellence.

The gingerly conduct of Op Sindoor itself has pointers on strategic restraint continuing: petitioning Pakistan in wake of the terror camp strike; keeping own air out of action for three crucial days; and throwing in a parting punch, after knowing the Americans had already corralled Pakistan. More recently, official reticence was visible in the two days it took to officially recognise the recent Delhi blast as a terror incident.

The next round

While India dallied for two decades over Cold Start-ordained Integrated Battle Group (IBG) activation, Pakistan went ahead with tactical nukes and nuclear doctrinal moves. Almost in acknowledgement, Op Sindoor was altogether kept a stand-off engagement. Further, post Op Sindoor, the move is towards a scaled down version of IBGs, comprising Bhairavs, Rudras and Shaktibaans. It is apparent, while earlier India stepped back from corps level offensives, now it has done so also from sub-divisional-sized IBGs, in favour of mini-IBGs.

Noteworthy is the critique of IBGs that they signify an inability to work with an Order of Battle. Formations and units are available for operational tasking as per the flow of a campaign. What then is the necessity for objective-specific IBGs answering to a chain of command through the threat of a confidential report? What happens to IBGs after first phase objectives? Do sanskritic nouns function as force multipliers? Aware of its limitations, India appears to have settled for bites instead of mouthfuls, nibbles instead of chunks of enemy territory and fighting capacity.

Fortuitously, this is all for the good since the nuclear factor has taken to looming larger. It has acquired formidable portents with President Trump’s ‘favourite field marshal’ taking control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, one which Trump alleges continues to be polished up.

This year’s biggest military exercise was in wake of Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh’s mentions of Karachi and Sindh. Anyone would believe that an exercise that featured a Rudra brigade being put through its paces and an amphibious landing must indicate intent to follow through on Singh’s threats. However, the exercise had no mention of any nuclear angle. Instead the usual desultory practice of decontamination drills, carrying a hint of the nuclear backdrop sensitivity, were instead practiced in another - multinational - exercise.

This can imply three things: one, the use of the Rudra brigade suggests India does not intend to trigger any redlines; two, a more ambitious capability demonstrated through the amphibious landing, is to deter Munir from upping the conventional ante; and, three, absence of the nuclear angle suggests a belief that Pakistani symmetric escalation is stayed by a strengthened Indian Triad.

Dangers arise if India finds itself wrong on any of the three counts. One, the escalatory quotient in use of Bhairavs and Rudras depends on the objectives set. If on the LC, the objectives are proxy war and defensive posture relevant, it would not be escalatory. However, those that lend an offensive advantage could lower the other’s redlines. Bhairav’s launched elsewhere across the border can also instigate escalation.

Two, the new Chief of Defence Forces Munir’s propensity to hold out may lead to components intended to signal escalation dominance - such as the amphibious elements - getting sucked into the fight. Also, mission creep, inadvertence and accidents do happen.

Finally, Munir’s bombast of taking ‘half the world down’ with him is plausible not only because of what Pakistan would do with its nuclear weapons, but equally in light of the promise in the Indian nuclear doctrine of massive retaliation.

These are unintended outcomes that India ought to avoid. It must be cautious against venturing past offensive deterrence into compellence. This is not a tall order for a regime that reckons its not an era of war. It must be receptive to third party off-ramps. With peace deals reckoning with underlying causes of war as much as proximate ones, it must know that Kashmir will figure on the negotiation table, especially in case of nuclear clouds.

Consequently, its best that where a teaser will do, don’t hanker after a trailer, and where a trailer is enough, just forget the movie.