Showing posts with label united nations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label united nations. Show all posts

Tuesday, 13 May 2025

 

Preserving UN Peacekeeping for a Multilateral World


https://usiofindia.org/pdf/FINAL%20USI%20Journal%20-%20Jan-March%202025.pdf

Abstract

The article posits that UN peacekeeping is under an eclipse due to the polarisation in international affairs. This may deepen in case of a retreat to isolationism of a significant supporter of UN peace operations, the United States. To ensure peacekeeping remains fit for purpose in an emerging multilateral world order, the aspirant pole countries must individually and collectively step up to shoulder a heavier peace operations’ burden not only in terms of troop contribution, but also logistics support, doctrinal input and increased proportion of financing. This will not only preserve peacekeeping as the foremost multilateral instrument of choice for the international community but will also usher in such a world order.

 

We recognize that the multilateral system and its institutions, with the United Nations and its Charter at the centre, must be strengthened to keep pace with a changing world.

Pact for the Future

Introduction

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is at a critical juncture in its chequered history. There have been no UN peacekeeping missions[1] authorized over the past decade. The mission in Mali has pulled out subsequent to withdrawal of consent by the government. The mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, though in midst of drawdown at the request of the government, has been managing yet another an upheaval in eastern Congo. The African Union is coming into its own on peacekeeping under Charter Chapter VIII in partnership with the UN,[2] with the modalities of the financing of its missions being worked out, its mission in Somalia likely to serve as prototype. The return of President Trump to the White House has begun impacting the UN on the humanitarian and development front,[3] and could also affect the peace and security dimension through attitudes the United States (US) adopts to the UN and to peacekeeping.[4]

It would appear that UN peacekeeping is no longer a ready instrument of choice of the international community. However, the hold up on peacekeeping deployments does not have any marked deficiency in peacekeeping practice at its core. Instead, the UN Security Council (UNSC) dynamics are at its root. The geopolitical positioning of the US, Russia and China – three of the significant Permanent Five (P5) – has been impacted UNSC readiness to use its peacekeeping option. Whereas there is precedent of the General Assembly deploying peace missions under the Uniting for Peace mechanism, it has not stepped up. Polarisation effects peacekeeping.[5]  

The major phenomenon in international affairs is the transition from a post-Cold War unipolar world to a multipolar world. The rise of China led by President Xi Jinping and the return of Russia under President Putin to active involvement in international developments has put the US-led West on notice. While Russian actions in Ukraine have set back Russia-US relations, US-China relations are subject to the inevitable wariness between a hegemonic power and a rising challenger. Adversarial relations imply a return to the Cold War practices in which the P5 privilege respective interests, restricting UN actions to where these do not impact such interests. Alongside, the US is retreating from liberal internationalism, which had driven its post-Cold War engagement with peacekeeping, with no guarantee other powers might step into the void.

The last decade long-hiatus in UN peacekeeping deployments was in the eighties, when resurgence of the Cold War in wake of the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan made the UNSC yet another site of the competition. It is no coincidence the last UN mission deployed – to Central African Republic – was in 2014, the year when the Russians wrested Crimea from Ukraine. The situation in Ukraine having only worsened with a war on since 2022, the effect has been on cooperation within the UNSC.

Last time, it took an outbreak of détente with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan for a resurgence in peacekeeping. The present international situation does not show signs of any such light at the end of the tunnel. Resuscitation of the instrument of peacekeeping cannot be reliant solely on the UNSC, in particular its feuding P5. The international community would be deprived of a potent option to address the myriad conflicts, ongoing and latent, if the peacekeeping instrument is not kept in good repair.[6]

This article argues that with geopolitical positioning potentially impacting the delivery of the UNSC mandate adversely, there is need for the emerging powers to step up and play a proactive role. This will demonstrate their efficacy and create space for multilateralism in line with the theme of the recent UN Summit of the Future: “multilateral solutions for a better tomorrow.” The benefit for the UN is that it would retain its credentials as the principle multilateral forum,[7] while resuscitating its premier multilateral innovation, peacekeeping.

The continuing validity of peacekeeping

For now, some conflicts are being addressed by the UN through the medium of Special Political Missions (SPM).[8] A peacekeeping option on the table helps make for success of SPMs’ peacemaking endeavours by offering peacekeeping as a means to ensure and support implementation of agreements arrived at. A peacekeeping mission, by definition, creates and sustains a secure environment that, to begin with, helps with humanitarian relief, and over time helps sustain a peaceable environment for furthering peacebuilding. Early peacebuilding - known in theory as structural peacebuilding - is enabled by multidimensional peace operations. This is necessary to lay the foundation for prevention of relapse into conflict, setting the stage for development and cultural peacebuilding.[9]

UN peacekeeping, having traversed much ground across multiple conflict zones, now has a thoroughly practiced repertoire.[10] Peacekeeping has come a long way since its beginning at the cusp of the Cold War in what has come to be known as traditional peacekeeping. It has since traversed into second generation or wider peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War and, this century, has been engaged in integrated, multidimensional peace operations. This owed to the shift in the types of conflict from inter-state to internal conflict. However, lately, inter-state conflict appears to have rekindled, which alongside continuing internal conflict, puts a premium on UN’s operational expertise.

To be sure, peacekeeping has had its troughs, but has a credible record of learning alongside.[11] In fact, it was its setback in the mid-nineties that led up to the progressive professionalization of peacekeeping,[12] beginning with the Brahimi report. Training infrastructure and networks are now highly evolved and variegated.[13] Though the last official doctrinal product is some 15 years old, doctrinal evolution has kept the UN peacekeeping doctrine contemporary and adaptable. The command and control aspect, at both strategic and operational levels, has come a long way. Gender balance, geographic representation and enhancing quality of leadership are a continuing focus. Technology and best practices absorption are a key area of upgrades. The civilian component, both substantive and support, now has both expertise and depth. The troop and police contributing countries (T/PCC) are conscious of the quality of capability offered.[14] The Chinese – a P5 member – are upping their game also as a TCC.

A challenge foreseen is the financing of operations.[15] This is attenuated by the fresh approaches that the new US administration may take as it settles in. However, the UN has faced financial troughs earlier, such as in the in the mid-sixties over the costs of the Congo mission. In President Trump’s second term there may be financing issues that unsettle peacekeeping. This could prove an opportunity for the Chinese to up its act. Since opening up space for China might not be in US interest, it is possible that peacekeeping may not see the financial turbulence apprehended. Instead, a competition to stay engaged by both the powers so as not to concede space to the other could benefit peacekeeping. Even so, developing countries with adequate financial muscle, as India, could increase their contribution on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies and personnel contributions beyond their assessed share.

Even as the unipolar moment is decisively over, fresh winds buoy multilateralism. That a multipolar world is on the horizon is visible in the effervescence of the Global South, in the G20 and the expanding footprint of groupings as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Peacekeeping offers scope for multipolarity advocating countries to show their salience in their peacekeeping presence and contribution.

The UN is looking for enablers and the latest in technology. This is an area for emerging powers to displace UN leaning on Western countries for niche subunits. This would not only be reflective of multipolar world but also usher in the reality. It would help fill in any vacuum that possible US disengagement might create. A case to point is equipment such as surveillance drones, mine clearing innovations,[16] soft-skinned and armoured vehicles from its atmanirbhar program could be offered to the UN or its agencies service in UN missions.  

Making peacekeeping fit-for-purpose in a multipolar world is a potential site for contenders for a permanent seat in the UNSC to make their mark. The UN Charter requires that those selected for the UNSC are distinguished by their contribution. Countries as India could then make credible demands at the intergovernmental negotiations in the General Assembly move to text-based negotiations. Power dynamics, that otherwise mostly have the Western bloc to the fore, will shift to privilege the interests of the non-West. Getting to the horseshoe table needs such fresh pathways.

Ushering in multilateralism

Peacekeeping has demonstrated its flexibility and relevance through all phases of contemporary history. Lately, inter-state conflicts have also been witnessed. Peacekeeping, particularly it’s preventive deployment variant, calls out for a relook in such circumstance. The grievous damage that recent conflicts have wrought makes recovery and reconstruction and peacebuilding all the more necessary. The increased involvement of other states in conflict zones is making peacemaking more complex, putting to naught years of efforts by successive mediators. Cumulatively, the interplay between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding has got more complex.[17] A wider ideational engagement than the hitherto reliance on Western sources for doctrinal next-steps is required.

Precedence of peacekeeping flexibility and resilience indicates that it can adapt to the challenges of the times,[18] such as from new domains as information and challenges therein of mis/disinformation and hate speech. It has been able to draw on regional capabilities in sequential, parallel and hybrid operations, such as of the African Union and the African regional communities in southern and western Africa. It has adjusted to out-of-area interventions by bodies as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It has managed transitions taking on an interim administrative role. It has been relied on by UN-authorized and arbitrary coalitions, as in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, and by the NATO in Kosovo, to oversee the aftermath of the peace enforcement. The pragmatism that underpins peacekeeping keeps it resilient and responsive to the nuances of the discrete challenges thrown up over the years. Its record suggests that it must be retained as instrument of choice in a multilateral world.

Multilateral engagement will bring fresh thinking and innovation, especially from the hitherto under-represented ones as Africa and Latin America. Since multilateralism-enthused countries are also rising in economic stature, the financing aspect can be revisited, so as to balance the onus that is currently on developed countries. The adage, ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune,’ is also applicable to the UN. Greater voice for a wider cross-section of powers allow for a larger peacekeeping budget to insulate against financial vagaries. 

A greater sense of ownership in the developing world will revitalize the C34 forum. This can potentially dispel reservations that Russia and China have regards peacekeeping. Their fuller support in the UNSC will then be forthcoming. It would also balance the perceived asymmetry in the Security Council in which three of the P5 are of the Western bloc. It would rekindle UN credibility, that’s taken a beating in Israel’s war in Gaza.

Mutually-empowering engagement of rising powers with peacekeeping helps with democratizing of global governance, even as the structures catch up through UNSC reforms in their own good time. Such engagement distances peacekeeping from the perception that is seemingly an instrument of the West, making it proximate to the developing world and its concerns. This would have a positive tactical level effect on the security of peacekeepers, who may otherwise unwittingly be taken as proximate to the West and liable to be targeted by forces inimical to the West. A broad-basing of support in a larger body of ‘friends of peacekeeping’ will ensure makes for easier accorded host state consent to missions. Host states will be more sanguine that they are not subject to a re-colonising agenda. They would prove less obstructive in terms of imposing movement restrictions on missions or be more forthcoming with consent.

Keeping peacekeeping ticking

Upcoming forums must be appropriated by multilateralism-persuaded countries. The Pact for the Future adopted at last year’s Summit of the Future has mandated a review of peace operations.[19] This is a decade on since the last comprehensive report on peacekeeping, that of the High-Level Panel, popularly known as the ‘Hippo report’.[20] The interested countries, in which number principal TCCs, can participate in the exercise both individually, as also as part of collectives. Placing peacekeeping renaissance on the agenda of collective forums will create momentum and critical mass for broad-basing international peace and security ownership away from being held hostage by powerplay in the UNSC. This will enhance the outcome of the forthcoming biennial Ministerial in Berlin.[21] 

A recent think-piece from the Department of Peace Operations, The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities,[22] lends direction to the reforms ahead, as do publications from think tanks, such as, Future of the Pact.[23] The former study shows the versatility of peace operations in the listed range of the 30 functional capabilities of peace operations. While multidimensional peace operations undertook these functions as mandated, the thrust appears to be to make operations manageable by niche interventions, such as electoral support, security sector reform or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) assistance. This will keep operations modular, nimble, smaller, and so, less costly.

However, multidimensional peace operations with a large footprint must not be thrown out with the bathwater. With countrywide presence and visibility, these serve a purpose in stabilization and extension of state authority. By deterring spoilers, they help with protection of civilians. They serve as an embarrassing witness, helping prevent atrocity crimes. A heavier footprint is necessary to access and surveil remote areas and reduce extent of ungoverned spaces. Peacebuilding activity is given incidental security cover by their very presence and humanitarian protection assured. The peacebuilding architecture is also due for an upgrade, a timely opportunity to rethink the relationship between the two.

Imagining counter factual possibilities

Continued resort to peacekeeping over the past decade could have made a constructive difference to the conflict and their outcomes. To be sure, peacekeeping could not have been applicable in tackling the Islamic State (IS) episode, requiring as it did peace enforcement. However, though a counter factual, it can be argued that the drawdown and departure from both Iraq and Afghanistan of the coalitions could have witnessed successor peacekeeping operations. If a peace operation in Syria had got off the ground after the brief three-month long SPM there, it could have created a new reality supportive of the several rounds of talks as part of the peace process. The long-running conflicts in Libya and Yemen could also have been suitably addressed, with a preventive impact on current-day turmoil in Sahel and in the Red Sea respectively.

If peace operations were not held in abeyance in the UNSC, it was possible to visualize a pre-war insertion also in eastern Ukraine in a preventive deployment mode.[24] Even at this juncture, Ukraine is a candidate location for a peace intervention, as the prospects of a ceasefire have increased lately.[25] Indeed, today, Syria, Yemen and Sudan could benefit from deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation to help recoup their broken societies and polities.

An illustrative case is of the UN Mission in South Sudan.[26] Six years of relative peace since signing of the peace agreement have witnessed a power-sharing in the government, with consensual extensions in the interim period till elections in end 2026. This is plausible response to the financial crisis brought about by the stoppage in oil flows owing to the civil war in neighbouring Sudan. Since the government is balancing the geopolitical extant in Africa, it is pressurized by Western countries over the election timeline. This makes an already fragile security situation, tenuous. Increased engagement with peacekeeping in its operational detail by a larger set of countries persuaded by the multilateral principle would prevent such use of peacekeeping operations by powerful states for their foreign policy purposes by, for instance, weaponizing criticism of the interim government.[27] It will give South Sudan greater breathing space and UNMISS a modified mandate of state capacity building support, arguably more relevant to its current circumstance.

Under the circumstance of the deadlock in the Security Council and the inattention to peacekeeping as a viable and desirable instrument over the past decade, it is possible to visualize that the impunity of Israel’s actions in the areas of operation of the UN inter-positioning operations along the Blue Line and on the Golan. It also explains in part the nonchalance with which the Rwandese trespassed into the area of operations of the stabilization mission in Congo, in close and direct support of the M23 rebel outfit. It would be fair assessment that the dwindling of the UN’s clout has been an enabling condition for such blatant actions. The corollary is stark: the UN needs revitalization.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping is an efficacious peace intervention in conflict environments. It must be preserved from the vagaries of geopolitics reflected in UNSC dynamics. Emerging powers could step up to preserve it as a desirable practice in a forthcoming multilateral world. Doing so will not only see further evolution of peacekeeping but also help construct such a multilateral world. India, as a leading advocate for the UN, peacekeeping and a multilateral future, has a significant role to play in mobilizing support on these lines.[28] It must use the multilateral forums it is part of to energise support for peacekeeping with other likeminded actors. Alongside, it must increase its contribution in all dimensions of peacekeeping beyond its forte of boots on ground. The downswing in UN peace interventions must be taken as an opportunity to forge a desired future.



The author would like to thank the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, for an opportunity to present the thoughts in the paper at a presentation on 13 Feb 2025.



[1] The terms ‘peacekeeping missions’ and ‘peace operations’ are used interchangeably here.

[2] UN, Resolution 2719 (2023) Adopted by the Security Council at its 9518th meeting, on 21 December 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4031070?v=pdf&ln=en

[3] Richard Gowan, “Stefanik’s Senate Confirmation Hearings”, 15 Jan 2025,

https://www.justsecurity.org/106397/stefanik-confirmation-hearing/

[4] World Politics Review, “The Trump Administration’s Approach Could Make or Break UN Reform”, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/trump-administrations-approach-could-make-or-break-un-reform

[6] Richard Gowan, “The U.N. May Regret Getting Out of the Peacekeeping Business”, World Politics Review, 16 Jan 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/un-may-regret-getting-out-peacekeeping-business

[8] Department of Political Affairs and Peacebuilding, “Special Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements”, https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world

[9]The 2025 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture”, UN,

 https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2025-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture

[13] Koops et. al., “Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century” in eds. Koops et. al., The Oxford Handbook UN Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 608-613

[16] UNISFA, “Mine clearing bot”, Blue Sentinels, Vol. 3 (9 Nov 2024), https://unisfa.unmissions.org/beacon-0

[17] Ban Ki-moon, Resolved: UN in a Divided World (Noida: Harper Collins, 2021), 315-328

[18] Berma Goldewijk and J. Soeters, “Peace operations and ‘no peace to keep’”, in Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies (New York: Routledge, 2020), 265-68.

[20] “Report of the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations”, UN, 19 Jun 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp

[21]United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025”, UN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/united-nations-peacekeeping-ministerial-2025

[22] Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities”, 1 Nov 2024, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/study-on-future-of-peacekeeping-new-models-and-related-capabilities

[23] SCR, Future of the Pact: Recommendations for Security Council Action”, 20 Dec 2024,  https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/future-of-the-pact-recommendations-for-security-council-action.php

[24] Ali Ahmed, “Conflict Prevention-Peacemaking-Preventive Deployment: A triangle whose time has come?,” https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/conflict-prevention-peacemaking-preventive?utm_source=publication-search

[25] The Hindu, “Russia opposes Western peacekeepers in Ukraine”, 30 Dec 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/russia-opposes-western-peacekeepers-in-ukraine/article69044434.ece

[26] Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), South Sudan: RJMEC Quarterly Report: December 2024”, 20 Jan 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/rjmec-quarterly-report-status-implementation-r-arcss-1st-october-31st-december-2024

[28] “Letter dated 25 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council”, UN, 25 Nov 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3996440?v=pdf

 

Friday, 7 April 2023

 https://www.usiofindia.org/publication-journal/Preventing-an-Afghanistan-Redux-in-Somalia.html

Abstract:

The article argues that an effective peace intervention results from a balance between the three sides of the peace triangle formed by peacekeeping (security), peacebuilding (development) and peacemaking (political settlement). It examines the situation in Somalia to highlight that in case peacemaking is neglected, it is likely that Somalia may fall to the al Shabaab on the draw down and departure of the African Union peace enforcement force. It therefore recommends a political prong of strategy to complement the military prong to address the challenge al Shabaab poses in Somalia.


An earlier article in this journal had made the case that for returning peace to a conflict afflicted area, a modicum of balance is desirable between the three sides of the peace triangle – peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.[1] During the lifecycle of any peace intervention, the center of gravity at a particular point in time and conflict circumstance will shift between the three sides. However, the three must be so poised that together they can contain and roll back a conflict. Operational Art in a peace operation lies in leveraging the three sides in a manner that the resulting balance mid-wife success. Somalia suggests itself as a case study for application of this hypothesis.

Somalia has been site of peace enforcement for some 15 years now. In the mid to late 2000s, the de-facto control of Somalia by the Islamic Courts was wrested away from it by intervention of Ethiopia to instal a transitional federal government, that had been formed in 2004 with the support of the regional organisation, the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).[2] Meanwhile the Islamic Courts’s administration mutated, with its militant youth wing forming the al Shabaab. In 2007, Ethiopian intervention was substituted by an African Union (AU) peace enforcement operation, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[3] Over the 2010s, the AMISOM progressively wrested control of territory from the al Shabaab, even as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was installed in Mogadishu and federal member states (FMS) were formed. In 2013, the United Nations’ (UN) Political Office in Somalia was transformed into a special political mission, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), to assist with statebuilding and peacebuilding.[4] The al Shabaab’s association with the al Qaeda initially, and later the Islamic State (IS) in the 2010s, led to its figuring on the UN terror entity sanctions’ list since 2010.[5] This effectively placed it out of bounds for a peacemaking outreach. Thus, while peace enforcement and peacebuilding proceeded, peacemaking was not in evidence. The imbalance between the three sides of the peace triangle visualised in relation to Somalia continues till today.

Somalia today has a follow-on mission to the AMISOM, the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), in place since April 2022. Assessing that instability has reduced considerably and security sector reform initiatives were in hand to upgrade the Somali National Army (SNA) and police, in 2021, the ATMIS is expected to drawdown and depart within 30 months. The ATMIS is to assist the SNA regain government control through joint operations and capacity building, even as it draws down while the SNA gains strength and confidence.[6] Despite considerable progress with both statebuilding and peacebuilding by UNSOM, the situation does not lend confidence to the assumption that the SNA will hold up on departure of foreign forces. In other words, peacemaking absent, peacebuilding and peace enforcement has not been well served.

A scenario as obtained on the departure of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces from Afghanistan stares Somalia in the face. There is scope for the international community and the regional bodies to reappraise the three sides of the peace triangle in the two fraternal missions in place, ATMIS and UNSOM. While ATMIS is assisting with provision of security, UNSOM, integrated with the rest of the UN family of agencies, funds and programs (AFP) and in league with allied actors, concentrates on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Missing in the menu is peacemaking. In light of the recent precedence in Afghanistan, this deficit might yet sabotage not only the long-standing peace intervention, but Somalia itself. Consequently, the question explored here is whether an Afghanistan-like future can be escaped by Somalia, and, if so, how.

Background

Somalia has been in an unsettled situation since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, it was stable only in its first decade under democratic government. In the sixties, the first democratic turn-over of government in post-colonial Africa was witnessed in Somalia. However, as typical for the era, Siad Barre installed himself in power in a military coup, whereupon Cold War dynamics took over. The two superpowers switched clients in the Horn of Africa, with the US supporting Somalia against Soviet and Cuba-backed Ethiopia. In late seventies, a war broke out over Oromia in Ethiopia, an area occupied by Somali ethnic groups. Within Somalia, Siad Barre also asserted his authority with ruthless suppression in Somaliland, the erstwhile British colonial possession that in 1960 had merged with the Italy-colonised Somali territory to forge Somalia. The end of the Cold War pried loose the US umbrella over Siad Barre.

The Somali state dissolved in famine. The story thereafter is more familiar, with India deploying a brigade under UN Chapter VII auspices as part of an upgraded peacekeeping operation, UN Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The preceding operation, UNOSOM I, had a mandate to widen humanitarian access. Met with anarchy, the international community temporarily deployed a US-led peace enforcement operation, Unified Task Force (UNITAF).[7] It was to contain the clan violence, which it succeeded in doing by enforcing an elitist peace by deterring the warlords through a display of military might. The hand over from UNITAF to UNSOM II saw warlords back in action, targeting in infamous incident Pakistani peacekeepers. American forces outside the UN framework went after the warlord responsible, Farah Aideed, who incidentally had been Somali ambassador in Delhi for three years. The Black Hawk incident resulted. Withdrawal of Americans soon thereafter scuttled the UNSOM II.[8]

Somalia fell out of the international radar, with the international community fatigued by international humanitarian intervention post contemporary instances in Bosnia and Rwanda. A lesson from the American-led ‘global war on terror’ was on the dangers of persistence of ungoverned spaces. The federal government of Somalia (FGS) that initially functioned out of Baidoa and moved to Mogadishu, when the security situation was stabilised by AMISOM. Since 2012, when the FGS was finally emplaced formally, it has had two iterations of elections. Its most recent election in 2022 returned the first president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to power.

President Mohamud has set the SNA to undertake operations in conjunction with ATMIS and the clan militias against al Shabaab.[9] The idea is to soften the al Shabaab and create conditions for talks from a position of strength for the FGS. The idea of using clan militia is reminiscent of the Iraqi Awakening in which Iraqi Sunnis were used to wrap up the al Qaeda in the Sunni Triangle in 2007-08. However, it is predictable that as an insurgent group with demonstrated resilience against the AMISOM over past 15 years, the al Shabaab will melt away only to re-emerge elsewhere and by night.[10] Amply clear is that a solely military approach will not suffice.[11] Consequently, President Muhamud’s intention to follow through with talks ‘at the right time’ is a promising opportunity.[12] It gives peacemaking an opening to make a debut, with international community support.

Desirability

Whether to talk to the Taliban was a perennial question through the 2010s.[13] Consensus had it that military operations needed complementing with a talks outreach, even as peacebuilding by provincial reconstruction teams, proceeded alongside. In the event, talks did come about in Doha. The anticipated upgrade to the Afghan National Security Forces was slow in coming, as a result the Taliban were less eager at the talks table, awaiting the departure of the foreign forces. The fears were confirmed in their take-over of Kabul last year.[14] Given such a possibility in Somalia, it is only desirable that every effort be made to avoid an Afghanistan redux.

A perspective is that talking to terrorists is not a strategic move. Terrorists will take advantage of talks for gaining legitimacy. This will make them get ahead of the government in the stakes for peoples’ hearts and minds, especially since the FGS is hampered by allegations of corruption, clan-ism, incapacity and association with external powers. Terrorist entities are strategic players and might through talks take power they have been denied militarily. Regional states, as Uganda and Kenya that have borne the brunt of al Shabaab out-of-area terror attacks, would be unwilling to treat it as a legitimate interlocutor.

The constraint is that the ATMIS is slated to depart in the middle term. Under financial pressure, the European Union - that largely funded it so far - is downsizing the budget. The prominent regional state, Ethiopia, has been beset with internal security issues. Initially, when AMISOM was being inducted, a move to plant a hybrid or UN peace operation instead had been struck down. It is uncertain if the international community would reappraise this decision. The feeling of ‘community’ in the international community has been considerably strained in wake of the Ukraine War. There is a recession looming and the prospects of funding another giant UN mission are not appetising. This inability to up the ante militarily implies that a ‘politics first’ approach must compensate.

The lesson from the Afghanistan experience is thus, not against talks as much as to use talks productively. Both antagonists were loath to share power in Afghanistan, making talks infructuous. In Somalia, the al Shabaab is a nationalist outfit. Somalis are nationalist and - unlike in most places in Africa - are relatively homogenous as an ethnic group inhabiting a defined space. As with the Taliban, it is not only religious extremism that drives it, though Wahabbi influence has impinged on the Sufistic culture in Somalia.  

Somalia provides a timely opportunity to test the UN’s freshly minted motto, ‘primacy of politics’,[15] intended to get to peace through peaceful means. For long, other actors have tried to address their respective troubles in Somalia. Europe, contending with a migration influx from Africa, funded the AMISOM. The AMISOM, among others from as far away as Senegal, comprised troops from neighbouring countries seeking to tackle terrorism at its origin. However, alleged human rights violations and collateral damage by peacekeepers has partially alienated Somalis.[16] The US, fearing homeland terror from its Somali diaspora immigrants, intervenes militarily through its Africa Command base nearby, while at times causing civilian casualties.[17] Somalis have thus been subject to pursuit of aims of others on their land and at their cost. The UN’s shift to people-centric peacekeeping makes it inescapable that peacemaking must proceed apace to rescue people from the cycle of violence.

Feasibility

The UN has a policy guiding political approaches to armed groups. There is no proscription on such outreach intended to end violence. Any such outreach would have to ascertain if the al Shabaab wants to travel away from terror tag. Continuing humanitarian and peacebuilding support can act as incentive, particularly as Somalia faces its fourth year of drought. For now, the areas it controls have restricted humanitarian access. The possibility of exiting the terror list – as was the case with elements of the Taliban – is another carrot to influence the al Shabaab. The reputational risk from a rebuff or the talks going awry in an egregious terror incident would have to be factored. The FGS will require forging a consensus and a joint front with the FMS on talks.

There are multiple forums that can act as lead: the UN, the regional organisation and the FGS itself. If the FGS wishes to be in the lead, then capacity building support for both parties and logistics facilitation might be necessary. The regional organisations – both AU and the IGAD – are well experienced, though financing might yet be required. External actors – such as from the Nordic or Gulf states – could lend a hand. The multiple special envoys for the Horn of Africa would require a coordination forum. The UN is better positioned to play a supportive as against a protagonist role. Its mission on the country for the last ten years indicates its political capacity, while the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) that supported the AMISOM and, now supports the ATMIS and elements of SNA, can help with the logistics – particularly with helicopter support to access al Shabaab areas.

Taking cue from the Doha talks with the Taliban, the talks would require first ending the violence – an issue not taken up at Doha which resulted in continuing violence even as talks proceeded. This is especially important in Somalia to urgently open up the humanitarian space. Besides, the instrumental use of violence by both sides tends to influence the negotiations negatively. The table then becomes yet another battlefield. Violence at ebb, talks could dwell on a road map on the progressive co-option of the al Shabaab. Usually, an agreement spells out a transition period of power sharing, followed by an election. The ongoing Constitution review and the reform in election system away from being clan-based to ‘one person one vote’ can see al Shabaab participation. The national reconciliation program underway could post-conflict also cover al Shabaab controlled areas.[18]

The period of transition might require overseeing. Since the AU mission may be too closely associated with neighbouring countries, it may require substitution. Political momentum in the talks could perk up Troop Contributing Countries willingness to contribute blue berets and boots on ground in a monitoring and protective role respectively. A lean mission, with a civilian component including civil affairs and human rights officers with a pronounced national staff complement, can be foreseen. A clear timeline culminating with the next elections or as agreed in a comprehensive peace agreement can serve as focus for an exit strategy and handover to the UN Country Team.

A role for India?

India is in the midst of taking up its destined role as a leading state. It has been member over last two years of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It has recently taken over chair of the G-20. India has to seize opportunities to supplant UNSC declinist veto-holding pen holders, Britain and France. Envisaging a greater role for itself as a security provider in the ocean that bears its name is a first step.

Its strategic moves in the Indo-Pacific theatre have not been at the cost of the western Indian Ocean. It has been a player in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since inception of the joint naval operations. Managing security along Indian Ocean Rim in proximity of the Horn of Africa to South West Asia - and the scene of conflict in Yemen – is significant. The strategic weight of the region is seen in the setting up of bases in close proximity to each other by the US and China. The risk of instability multiplying, such as in the increased presence of Islamists southwards along the African coast in Mozambique, must be acknowledged.

Since India is now a pragmatic power, balancing China in Africa will not be far from its concerns. Africa is a site for power competition that India cannot find India missing-in-action. In taking a proactive role, India would only be returning to its historical role as an important rimland naval power, evidenced by communities originating in Horn of Africa resident across the Deccan and the Malabar coast. India must step up to complete a task left unfinished when in 1995 its navy evacuated troops of the UNOSOM II.

India, lending a hand as a ‘friend of the mediation’ through appointing a special envoy, would enable India to push for consensus in the UNSC on a light footprint mission to arrive at and help implement any agreement reached. It can lead with boots on the ground. It could contribute to the humanitarian Somalia Trust Fund or bilaterally increase humanitarian support

Conclusion

Peace operations cannot be done in a political vacuum. In Somalia, absence of a political prong of strategy to tackle the al Shabaab has resulted in the insurgency persisting. Current-day dire humanitarian straits compel a political outreach to the al Shabaab. By all means care must be taken not to empower terrorist affiliates, but this apprehension can be mitigated by enlightened design of the mediation or facilitation, taking on board the lessons of the peace process in Afghanistan. The terror tag to groups must be amenable to revision now that international terror has subsided considerably. An outreach can in a first step influence the group to distance itself from terror. The FGS is already contemplating a political solution. Once the regional organisations have bought into this line of action, the UN could lend a hand by including the remit in its next resolution on UNSOM. This will pave way for UNSOM to acquire political teeth and to transform into a short-duration, light-footprint peacekeeping mission overseeing induction of al Shabaab into the Somali national mainstream. The Somalia case study validates the hypothesis that all three sides of the peace triangle need ministration in varying degrees during the lifecycle of a peace intervention, failing which, peace is liable to prove elusive. Peacemaking must be added to the peace repertoire Somalia to complete the peace triangle.

Words - 3002

 



[1] Ali Ahmed, ‘Operational Art in Peace Operations: Balancing the Peace Triangle’, USI Journal, Vol. CLII, No. 628, April-June 2022, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/operational-art-in-peace-operations-balancing-the-peace-triangle/?sf_paged=2

[3] For background on AMISOM, see https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/.

[4] For background on UNSOM, see https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unsom.

[5] Al Shabaab figures on the  sanctions list available at https://www.un.org/french/sc/committees/consolidated.htm#alqaedaent

[6] For details on ATMIS, see https://atmis-au.org/ 

[9] ‘Somalia Military Makes Gains in Large-scale Offensive Against Al-Shabab’, VOA, 26 September 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-military-makes-gains-in-large-scale-offensive-against-al-shabab-/6764305.html

 

[10] ‘Somalia and al-Shabab: The struggle to defeat the militants’, BBC, 24 August 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62644935

[11] International Crisis Group, ‘A Strategy for Exploring Talks with Al-Shabaab in Somalia’, Podcast, 30 June 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/strategy-exploring-talks-al-shabaab-somalia

[12] ‘Somalia will talk to Al-Shabaab when time is right: President’, The Guardian, 6 July 2022,  https://guardian.ng/news/somalia-will-talk-to-al-shabaab-when-time-is-right-president/

[14] For a background on the NATO mission in Afghanistan, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

[15] United Nations, ‘Report Of The Independent High-Level Panel On Peace Operations’, 2015, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations

[16] Human Rights Watch, ‘The power these men have over us’, 8 September 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces

[17] Amnesty International, ‘US military sheds some light on civilian casualties from shadowy war in Somalia’, 27 April 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/us-military-sheds-some-light-on-civilian-casualties-from-shadowy-war-in-somalia/