https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/khalid-kidwai-doth-protest-too-much?r=i1fws

Khalid Kidwai doth protest too much, methinks

Khalid Kidwai spent the better part of his address (55min) at a recently concluded international non-proliferation conference in Islamabad extolling the virtues of nuclearization for Pakistan. Kidwai chaperoned the Pakistani arsenal in its fledgling years after the Chagai tests, putting in place the mainstay of Pakistan’s deterrence, its Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine. Since operationalizing Pakistan’s nuclear capability has been his life’s work, his indulgence in self-congratulations can be excused.

Whereas in the early days of Pakistan’s doctrine-making, Kidwai had explicitly pegged the nuclear threshold somewhat high, ambiguity surrounds current nuclear thresholds envisaged by FSD. The FSD was itself a doctrinal response to India’s ‘cold start’ doctrine that sought to reclaim space on the spectrum of conflict for limited military operations below the nuclear threshold. FSD rested on the shoulders of a short-range low-yield tactical nuclear weapon, the Nasr. It halted ‘cold start’ in its tracks.

Khalid believes that FSD has even pulled up Modi’s India short. To him, the strategic shift under the Modi regime has come a cropper. Successive Indian rejoinders to terror attacks have indeed been considerably attenuated, be it in September 2016, February 2019 or May 2025; respectively, merely one-night, two-day and four-day affairs.

Despite the certainty of a higher quotient of violence set to attend the next round, Kidwai is spurred into desiring Pakistan go beyond its currently favoured ‘quid pro quo-plus’ response, to a double-plus (“severe and unforgiving”) one. Even if his talk at the conference is discounted as deterrence rhetoric and designed to influence international participants - or as typical Pakistani posturing (though Kidwai is not Punjabi!) - it bears scrutiny. Afterall, Kidwai in retirement continues as adviser to the national command authority (NCA). His word may have a field marshal’s ear.

Querying Kidwai’s narrative

At the bespoke conference, another senior adviser on national security and fellow general to boot, had this to say: “It (South Asia) is a nuclear flashpoint owing to India’s ultra-nationalist tendencies as a result …of Hindutva’s rise and consolidated through the Brahmanist capture of the ballot box. The ideology espouses hegemonic ambitions of an imaginary continuity of Akhand Bharat. (41:30).” Clearly, the fizz in Indian political culture and its impact on strategic culture has spooked its neighbor.

To be sure, the army there has uses for such justifications for its nuclear capability and sabre rattling: to keep its military atop the political structure there, especially when challenged from the street and the periphery. For national cohesion, the army chief when yet a general, had zealously invoked the two-nation theory. Propping up of the Hindutva bogey helps with furthering the army’s institutional interests, but is at an operational risk of misreading Indian conflict strategy.

In his operational reflections, Kidwai drew attention to India’s nuclear submarine on patrol with its complement of mated nuclear missiles. India’s recent operationalizing of its triad – the basis of its ‘no first use’ (NFU) pledge - is counter-intuitively presented as enabling first use options for India. Contrary to the verities of nuclear theology, he – surprisingly for and old nuclear hand - takes boomers as weapon systems “pointing towards India adopting a first strike posture (1:24:59),” by deeming whether these are means for first strike or second strike “irrelevant.” Whereas being eminently survivable, boomers are pursued instead for the invulnerable second strike capability they furnish. An assured ability to strike back after absorbing a first strike is the fundamental of nuclear deterrence thinking, dating back to the cold war.

Kidwai conveniently forgets an implicit threat he once made. He signaled that Pakistan’s ballistic missiles could reach India’s island territories, implying Pakistan could degrade India’s second strike assets in their very pens. Taking cue, if India has since put one out to sea it makes sense. A ballistic missile submarine reportedly figured in naval deployment in 2019. Kidwai must introspect his role is in conjuring up this self-created threat for Pakistan.

In light of FSD’s predisposition for nuclear first use, India cannot but consider rescinding its NFU as an option in favour of preemption. This explains India’s canisterisation even of land-based missiles and tactical nuclear weapons (45min). Such development indicates that India having relevant assets at hand for nuclear first use does not require to dual task boomers. Clearly, Kidwai’s brainchild, the FSD, in putting Pakistan in India’s nuclear crosshairs is proving increasingly counter-productive in securing Pakistan.

While the Indian nuclear doctrine does posit ‘massive’ retaliation, developments since its promulgation suggest a wider menu on the table. Agreeing with Kidwai that since mutual assured destruction is inevitable in massive and equally telling counter-strikes, the doctrinal threat is at best appropriate for deterrence, not nuclear employment.

It’s doctrinaire proponent, K Subrahmanyam, held that combative phraseology was essential to ward-off an uppity opponent (likened by him to ‘irrational’ ‘children,’ presumably with Pakistan in mind), stating: “If the side which… has an image of being a risk-taker, that will have certain negative impact on others. The logical step for the rival side is enhance its image of punishing capability further, so that the risk-taker will not be in any doubt of the pain and suffering in store for him if he were to resort to nuclear weapons first.”

But a doctrine is not quite strategy. FSD can be met nuclear toe-to-toe by India; even if and especially if its fuse is set at ‘zero meters’. FSD can at best deter ‘large scale’ war it was designed for, not the kind of war India is looking to fight. Kidwai’s take that Pakistan is “dealing with irrational actors bordering on lunacy, driven entirely by the radical religious ideology of Hindutva, and hubris and hate mongering of the Indian leadership (1:11:30),” would compel his advice in the NCA to be for an upping of the ante at an untold risk for Pakistan.

Kidwai’s counterpoise for the New Normal

India has forged a New Normal. India holds that Pakistan’s reference to its nuclear card is but ‘nuclear bluff.’ Undeterred, India intends conflating terrorist and military targets into one target list, in a step-up from the opening round of Op Sindoor. Though India’s newly released land warfare doctrine is not in the open domain as yet, it may be informed by its long-held thinking echoed by its new chief on the relevance of territorial gains in the concept of victory.

Pakistan is not only embroiled on its western front, but has also sent troops and assets to secure its new-found ally, the Saudis. So, it is difficult to envisage the Kidwai-promised conventionally-executed double-plus counter. To compensate, it has taken care to place its strategic forces under unified command, that of its chief of defence forces (CDF). The CDF now exercising tight positive control calms earlier worries over delegation. By implication, FSD does not cover the lower reaches of the conventional level of the spectrum of conflict, at which surgical strikes and localised border skirmishes play out.

Pakistan need not necessarily overturn the trend of limitation visible in recent limited military conflicts. Indeed, Pakistan has historically under-played its hand. In 1947, it bogged down on the outskirts of Srinagar. In 1965, it did not push on either at Akhnur or Khem Karan. In 1971, it kept the western front inactive. At Kargil, it dismally pulled out under American watch. It has been unable to capitalize on proxy war. After Uri, it pretended nothing happened. In Op Swift Retort, its strafing of ground targets kept off military objectives. In Op Sindoor, it remained on the hotline, even as its airbases were pummeled.

Pakistan’s generals know they exaggerate Hindutva’s expansionism. India’s way to viksit bharat is through amrit kaal, which cannot be waylaid by wider conflicts or conflict escalation. Through surgical strikes and alleged proxy war, Modi’s India is at best keeping Pakistan on the backfoot in relation to Kashmir and prospectively its relationship with its minority. The surgical strikes are low-cost investments for high domestic political dividend. It cannot afford to chance wider war with its two-front connotations, evident from the first night of Op Sindoor.

FSD made irrelevant

Consequently, FSD - designed to deter major war - really has had nothing to deter. After the example of Russia in Ukraine and the United States against Iraq earlier and Iran now, it is indeed “not an era for war.” With military operations-other-than-war at the interface of subconventional-conventional levels, India has arrived at its own sub-war answer.

Not meant to, the FSD has patently not “reinforced deterrence at all levels.” Forcing the choice of escalation onto Pakistan, India - not unreasonably - expects Pakistan to be self-deterred by the very logic of FSD: “It generates strategic deterrence effects for which it was conceived, i.e. deterrence against all-out war (1:2:53).” What demonisation of the other side, as indulged in by the Pakistani generals quoted, would do to nuclear decision making is worth a pause.

Like the FSD, its progenitor and propagandist, once prisoner-of-war Khalid Kidwai would do well to do as illustrious generals eventually do: fade away.

 

A run-up presentation and the final one at the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, 20 Oct 26

First 13 minutes; QnA at 54min-58min, 1h07.30min-1h13min mark 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAylfaPxDts

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/a-run-up-presentation-and-the-final

 https://thesvi.org/svi-international-webinar-on-nuclear-deterrence-and-strategic-stability-in-south-asia-on-december-20-2022/

SVI International Webinar on “Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability in South Asia” on December 20, 2022

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOvuYAB-SPM

1h29min to 1h48min 

3. Second Session: Crisis Escalation, Nuclear Deterrence and Doctrinal Shifts in South Asia. 

3.1 Crisis Escalation and Drivers of Instability

The first speaker of the second session was Dr Ali Ahmed (Independent Security Analyst, India) who shared his views on “Crisis Escalation and Drivers of Instability”. He started by saying that the focus of his presentation would be the element of “stability” instead of instability. He said that crisis is not a situation of pre-violence alone. It can be said that crisis would also play out during conflict while violence is ongoing. Therefore, his presentation focused not so much on the nuclear aspect of crisis, but on crises that occur in other non-violent or pre-violence phases. The second point of his presentation was “the drivers of instability”. He said that though there are drivers of instability but states should also remember that there are dirvers of stability too, and they need to be reinforced, and we need to also factor-in, when we take into account the holistic picture. As a methodology Dr Ali Ahmed used “levels of war” and “levels of analysis” to see what kind of cycle develops. Before going into details of his presentation, he said that his views entail a little bit of subjectivity.

He explained levels of war, sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear; he also showed a slide on levels of analyses, which included international, national, sub-national, regional, organizational and personality/individual. He said the complexity in this equation is at which level the crisis has been pitched. The actors at various levels of analyses will be forming and influencing the crisis, which will resultantly impact the crisis outcome. He went on and explained the drivers of instability at the international level. According to him, Ukraine War and Sino-US conflict act as drivers of instability at the international level. At the regional level, Dr Ahmed highlighted three drivers of instability from the Indian perspective, which were two-front war, Chinese factor and extremism. The next level explained by the speaker was “inter-state level”, where drivers of instability were “Indo-Pakistan relations”, the military balance between forces of both states and political dynamics. At the “national level” in India, economic downturn, political Hindutva and social polarization were considered drivers of instability. At the “organizational level”, Dr Ali Ahmed considered aggressive doctrines, the politicization of issues at an organizational level and restructuring at military organizations as a source of instability. At the “personality level”, three personalities can influence the situation: political leadership, advisors and military leadership (Brass hats). These personalities and their actions determine how the national and organizational levels play out.

Following on, the speaker merged the identified drivers of instability at levels of war and analyzed the impacts of such a situation. First of all, while analyzing international-level drivers of instability with levels of war, he said that there is very little efficacy of international-level drivers to affect what happens at the sub-conventional/conventional level of conflict in South Asia. However, if India and Pakistan go up on the escalation ladder, then international concerns will be heightened, which speaker believed is good. At a regional level, South Asian nuclear rivals will be left to deal with each other. He said that there is exhaustion at the international level due to the periodic recurrences of crises at the regional level in South Asia. Hence, both countries will be left alone to fight it out at the conventional level of war until we start touching the nuclear threshold. At the inter-state level between India and Pakistan, what whole cycle of drivers of instability at different levels of war churn out is difficult to determine. At the National level, Hindutva is here to stay; therefore, at the lower levels of war India might wish to present a muscular image but as we go higher, it would like to disengage to dissipate crises. At an organizational level, we might expect a little bit more pushing and shoving, but there is recognition of the fact that nuclear level is not to be ventured into, which is valid for both states.

In his conclusion, he said that as states climb up the escalatory ladder along those levels of War, the cycle is mostly negative, the drivers of instability might become more cautious, they may decelerate, and the drivers of stability kick in. But that’s the conundrum, when it is hunky-dory at the lower levels we indulge ourselves in crisis and during this constant struggle both states could move towards the upper levels. Therefore, the two states shouldn’t really be complacent that nothing was going to happen at that level.

 

Deterrence Dynamics and Escalation Risks in South Asia

Lessons from the May 2025 Military Conflict

Summary of paper presented online at the Strategic Vision Institute’s Islamabad Non-Proliferation Conference in Islamabad on 20 October 2026

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/deterrence-dynamics-and-escalation

A pre-conference video of the same is at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_wXKooDZ4unZqBwF_89RE0oqi5WXHuE9/view?usp=drive_link

The premier lesson from the limited military conflict in May 2025 between India and Pakistan is that limitation was possible since both sides were agreeable on keeping the conflict limited and the conflict witnessed a third party involvement, that of the US, in the background. Even though the third party’s supposed role and its effect was rejected by India, the direct communication channel it prompted between the two sides operation’s branches led to cessation of hostilities.

The takeaway then for any future iteration(s) of limited military conflict between the two sides is that the two aspects must be present for limitation – the two sides tacitly agreeing on limitation and a third party’s non-intrusive facilitation. Both may not be possible in future – with India rejecting a third party role and in either side’s concept of victory either initially kept expansive or expanding under conflict conditions.

Emerging Trend of the Unilateral Use of Force and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

The international order has witnessed outbreak of conflicts that have loosened the grip of international law against use of force. The likelihood of future iterations of limited use of force between the two sides is likely. This has implications for deterrence stability between the two, since – as seen from past iterations of limited military conflict – not only has outbreak occurred thrice over but has been at a higher order of violence. Since India wishes to bolster conventional deterrence of subconventional provocations by Pakistan, and Pakistan wishes to constrain Indian conventional advantages by manipulating perceptions of its nuclear threshold, there is a built-in potential escalatory dynamic.

Deterrence instability can arise at the conventional-nuclear interface if both get more ambitious in seeking more from respective level of deterrence manipulation (India at the conventional and Pakistan at the nuclear) than either ought to under strategic rationality. This can occur if the initial concept of victory is incorrect or is revised upwards as the limited military conflict unfolds.

Limited Conventional War under the Nuclear Overhang and Escalation Risks

The levels of conflict are taken here as: competition-limited military conflict-limited conventional war-conventional war-limited nuclear war-total war. There is scope to keep below ‘war’ with greater intensity, scope and duration of non-contact limited military conflict than witnessed in May ’25. Escalation is when this ‘buffer’ of a wider May ’25-like limited military conflict is expanded with an extension of non-contact warfare to unacceptable levels, such as by targeting civilians and civil infrastructure; prompting the outbreak of contact warfare.

Escalation risk is higher in the drawing down of nuclear overhang even as India asserts conventional advantage. This is heightened when there is revision in the concept of victory to go with the higher level of war; when under the uncertainties that attend war - such as unsettling breakthroughs prompting over-reaction - there is an unforeseen dynamic taking hold; and in the political level playing to the domestic gallery.

However, there are escalation dampeners too such as third parties invigorated to intervening with greater vigour; adherence to the May ’25 lesson on wisdom of limitation; and that escalation is an exercise of ‘choice’ rather than a default outcome.

Limited military conflicts and risk of Conventional-Nuclear Entanglement

The May ‘25 targeting of Nur Khan, Sargodha and Kairana hills was potentially escalatory, in that it was suggestive of nuclear signaling on India’s side – that it is unimpressed by Pakistan’s nuclear card as part of its intent to demonstrate it is not deterred by ‘nuclear blackmail.’ Pakistan, for its part, plausibly denied calling up its NCA. However, the contretemps energized US peace intervention. Pakistan has since separated its rocket forces from its strategic forces.

Counter-intuitively, Pakistan profits from entanglement, with entanglement seen as bolstering deterrence by building in inadvertence. Pakistan’s preemptive dis-entangling effort is good for signaling non-nuclear intent; thereby indicating a readiness to meet India at its professed level of continuing with limited military conflict(s). The projected drawn-down nuclear awning incentivizes against Indian conventional targeting of nuclear complex. Pakistan is thus mindful of uncertainties at nuclear level, indicating it is sensitive to Indian indication that it will ignore nuclear signaling in its ‘new normal’ strategic doctrine.

In any case, in regional setting, threat of conventional-nuclear entanglement is exaggerated, as both states – not having the capability for LOW - can await impact to reveal the nature of the attack; thereby, do not have to be held to Cold War or superpower relevant nuclear theory and jargon. Even so, references to entanglement are in Pakistan’s deterrence brief since projecting nuclear dangers helps secure Pakistan’s nuclear capability from Indian conventional degradation; an effort the Indian side will profess to deny, though in practice take the threat onboard.

Integration of New Technologies and Non-linear Escalation Pathways

Effects of new technology heighten the scope and intensity of a conflict, allowing for both escalatory and non-escalatory possibilities – since as mentioned escalation though an intrinsic tendency of conflict in general is equally a matter of ‘choice’. Consequently, technological upgrade can well function to up-the-ante as much as allow limiting conflict by reassuring a side. In a multi-domain conflict, disadvantage that could have resulted in upping of the ante can be offset by technology-facilitated advantages in another domain; thereby, enabling limitation. For instance, both sides offset their respective setbacks in May ’25 with information operations in the cognitive domain targeting respective national audiences that each prevailed, thereby mitigating impact of their respective setbacks (India on the first night and Pakistan on the last night of their four-day limited military conflict). In brief, tech upgrades in air defence will empower both to stay the distance, while targeting of air defences will be escalatory if a disarming effort; offensive air munitions may prove escalatory in damage inflicted, as was the case with use by both sides in May ’25; cruise missiles and UAS use may lead to escalatory infrastructure busting, such as by Pakistan of dams on Kashmir rivers seen as violative of IWT; and non-kinetic warfare will assume significance if AI-powered cyber attacks target civilian infrastructure.

Non-linear escalation pathways will also kick-in such as grey zone, intelligence operations and proxy war expanding, under uncontrolled conditions with autonomous actors use the opportunity to their own purposes. Overall, the cumulative impact could be an in-conflict redefinition of concept of victory. The dual-faced nature of cognition warfare that can also target domestic space enables national mood manipulation, ruling-in de-escalation by taming street power. Pakistan in particular could manipulate third party intervention propensities with information operations directed without.

Summary

Limited military conflict is likely to continue as a policy choice for both sides, with May ‘25 lessons on limitation well-learnt. Info war targeting respective domestic audience can fill in for any deficits, as was found efficacious by both sides in May ’25. This enablement of use of force will disincentivize strategic engagement for resolving problems as it provides both with a substitute in use of force for negotiated settlement. This suits the vested interests of both sides’ politically dominant lobbies.

However, limited military conflict is liable to escalate in a future iteration(s), with escalatory risks stemming from uncertainties in the dynamics of conflict and from contact warfare. Ambitious aims may derail initial concept of victory and third party efficacy may be limited, given India evincing disinterest. Even so, the critical nuclear-conventional interface will unlikely to be breached since brown sahibs are equally capable of strategic good sense. It can however be threatened if limited conventional war is allowed to proceed to becoming a full-blown conventional war.

Strategic good sense is in not using a risky pathway to get to a mutually sought dividend. If such a military risk is run then only a grand strategic dividend must be an outcome. Such a dividend is belied by continuing of limited military conflicts, but may be possible in case of war itself. Therefore, resolving the resulting paradox – that war alone can deliver grand strategic dividend but cannot be chanced - is the principal challenge for the strategic communities of both sides.

______

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/military-cannot-change-the-regimes-refrain-but-it-need-not-be-party-to-a-political-project

https://aliahd66.substack.com/p/op-sindoor-2-lets-have-a-jolly-good

Op Sindoor 2: Let's have a Jolly Good War!

A recap of the failures

Pahalgam was Pakistan’s answer for the Jaffar Express terror attack. The link is clear from the fulminations of then General, now Field Marshal Asim Munir, chafing under that attack. As a former intelligence chief, he knew which levers to pull.

For its part, India gave him a wide-open goal in its having earlier withdrawn the security forces’ picquet at Baisaran meadow. This unexplained vacating of a tourist-frequented site quite naturally fed speculation in the usual quarters. That there has been no accountability for this operational level failure only strengthens conspiracy theories.

Pakistan’s conspiracy narrative is understandably more vehement and holds that the Baisaran terror attack was a black-operation to provide the - albeit tenuous - legal cover for an Indian armed attack that would sans such cover amount to aggression in international law.

The higher-level failure is in the potential of the regional security environment for periodically generating such crises. The post-August 2019 situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is only superficially stable. Within J&K, the Pirpanjal – where alienation lingers - had long been activated by the Pakistanis, using the vacation of that space by the Indian redeployment to Ladakh. Thus, Baisaran, followed soon by the tango Op Sindoor-Op Banyan al-Marsoos, was only to be expected. Apparently, the return of the Uniform Force to its original areas of jungle bashing was not timely enough.

The third failure is in the security strategy adopted since the Uri episode – of reprisal from a cold start - falling short. Neither did Uri deter a Pulwama, nor did a Pulwama deter a Baisaran. That Op Sindoor continues is Indian acceptance that even Op Sindoor does not deter. No one’s been sacked for adoption of a strategy lacking imagination.

The fourth failure is to chase the mirage of dominance. India could pay heed to a lesson from the ongoing Iran War II: mere lobbing of ordnance, missile and drone strikes do not beget higher-order strategic outcomes. At best, lower-order strategic objectives as pressure points, serve for messaging and to get even can be met thereby.

Not only did Israel, later joined by the United States (US), pound Iran in Iran War I (the 12-Day War), but both have had to repeat the volleys multifold in the ongoing Iran War II (the Ramadan War). Though both arsenals have run-down, Iran is holding out, which suggests that stand-off targeting isn’t strategically efficacious, defined as begetting strategic outcomes. Russians also learnt this at an unanticipated cost in Ukraine.

Contrarily, the takeaway is that a hardening of stances results. Iran’s staying away from Islamabad for the second round of talks avers. This is of a piece with the lessons of yore: the lesson from World War II was relearnt in Vietnam that the limitations of strategic bombing outdo its utility.

Even though the US has the wherewithal to take out Iran – as US President Trump has often threatened – having the capacity does not imply it is usable. Likewise, Israel has the nuclear capability, which cannot be employed. The inference is that ‘more of the same’ also cannot work as its votaries wish. Consequently, arming with a thrust towards more in the Balakot-Sindoor tradition may be as ill-thought out as the strategy of reprisal itself.

Finally, the missing of the wood for the trees

The only satisfaction will be of masculinist retribution, an avoidable seduction. The assumption that the public is bays for it, as was the case for Op Sindoor, may be a red-herring in that such an outcry could well be a manufactured one – such as in Op Sindoor’s case with its very naming, topped by an innovative logo.

Being responsive may embellish a strongman’s image, but for the country such domestic political utility is questionable since there may be perverse incentive to keep the fraught security situation alive for more of such partisan dividend through military means.

The sine qua non of military power is to beget strategic outcomes. Desired outcomes such as administering punishment are distinct from desirable strategic outcomes: a mitigation of the security predicament and, better still, creation of conditions for a negotiated settlement.

Military power exertion is to enable a position of advantage conducive to pursuing political ends politically. By repeatedly exercising the military option without political follow up to address the incompatibility is to misuse the military instrument. Worse is the military’s collusion with such abuse of its services.

The shape of the future

That the military is handmaiden is clear from the manner it is fallen for the regime’s line on Op Sindoor 2. It must recall that the new-found strategic doctrine – ‘new normal’ - in relation to Pakistan was close on the heels of Op Sindoor’s last night, precluding time for any strategic thinking going into it.

The proximity in time suggests it was to placate the hardcore (‘trads’) camp-followers of the regime, who were disheartened by the calling-off of Op Sindoor. The line that the operation was put on pause was but appeasement of the voluble hard-right. For the military to thereafter keep up the din is political naivety, if not a political act in itself.

After the fact, the military has indicated that it had more up its sleeve to dish out, with both the navy and the army indicating that - interrupted by a call from the Pakistani military operations’ head - they had to keep their powder dry. Taking cue from such claims, the next round is likely to see much stand off and aerial punishment delivered. The readiness to up-the-ante is to ensure that Pakistan replies in kind rather than ups-the-ante.

If Iran could hold up against two versatile and armed-to-the-teeth foes, it can be expected that Pakistan could get back at India in kind. There is much being made of the interception at Sirsa, praiseworthy in itself, but surely incentivizes smarter Pakistani tactics. That Pakistan held out a surprise – with Chinese help - in Op Sindoor’s first night, has no doubt forewarned India. A ‘draw’ is on the cards, even if after both sides claim a ‘win’.

This begs the question whether it makes any strategic sense to persist with the military prong of strategy in relation to Pakistan. Worse is that the military prong appears entangled with the intelligence prong, wilfully handled by the national security and intelligence czar, Ajit Doval. The military prong provides cover for the intelligence prong of strategy to pursue its vile ends.

The history of the military in the lead on the Kashmir front does not enthuse. Repeated junctures of the military wrestling the Pakistani proxies to the mat were squandered by the political level’s unwillingness to progress matters politically, either domestically or with Pakistan. As a result, the problem persists.

Similar political and bureaucratic lassitude is now visible at the conventional level, though with an admixture of ideology; with each crisis merely setting the stage for the next, rather than creating conditions for talks to discontinue their recurrence.

It appears easier to unceasingly impose on Indian communities – Kashmiris and by extension Indian Muslims (or the other way around), and increasingly on Ladakhis - than take on the primary antagonist – Pakistan - militarily. For its part, Pakistan has no love lost for Indian Muslims and will fight India to the last Kashmiri.

Shaping the future

A strategically significant outcome is only possible if India were to field its fancily-named integrated battle groups in the fight. Holding these in reserve as an escalation dominance gimmick is lethargic and pusillanimous. True, it will set off a jolly good war; but the good part is it will end traditionally – in a negotiated settlement.

To be sure, it would be a risky proposition. The Pakistanis will push their information war buttons on the nuclear overhang. The good part of this would be both greater in-conflict escalation control and post-conflict international persistence in facilitating (mediation being taboo) a negotiated outcome.

The military must champion the logic of war, the rightful use of the military instrument to create the conditions for politically addressing root causes. Repeatedly addressing proximate causes – terror attacks – especially to no perceptible deterrence advantage is imbecility (famously defined as doing something repeatedly with the same vacuous results every time). To elevate this to strategy – a Pakistan-centric one – is ultimate testimony of strategic vapidity.

That such a strategy was nevertheless proclaimed by none less than the prime minister only goes to prove the domestic politics at play. Persistence of Pakistan as a foe helps the regime collapse the internal and external Other into one, for the manufacture of a unity based on a majoritarian logic. Aware of the potential for a wider war to provoke the international community’s midwifing of a settlement on Kashmir, India is fighting shy of one.

An apolitical military implies being non-partisan. Apolitical does not mean being a political ingenue. The military cannot change the regime’s refrain, but it need not be party to a political project. It’s professional responsibility at the apex level is advisory, and must be used to good effect.

The military must advocate political ends that have a sustainable strategic rationale. The changed character of war not having changed war’s nature, the military must reinsert war - traditionally envisaged - as an option for choice at the political level.