Awards: The final nail in the military’s ‘apolitical’ coffin?

https://m.thewire.in/article/politics/by-a-largesse-of-military-awards-the-regime-is-using-the-armed-forces-to-bolster-modis-image

The army chief rightly observed that the perception of victory amongst common folk in Pakistan in its counterpart of Operation Sindoor, Op Bunyan al Marsoos, has been fostered by the elevation of its army chief to five-star rank.

The observation holds good for the Indian side too. With seven Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medals (SYSM) dished out at Independence Day, a perception of a splendid victory is sought to be manufactured.

To the credit of some recipients of the largesse, they sheepishly acknowledge their role as confined to the operations rooms, disavowing from the hyperinflation in awards.

In other words, it is not a citations ‘push’ but a ‘pull’ from top that resulted in the surfeit.

Not acknowledging the downing of Indian aircraft, including a Rafale, dented the regime’s image. The belated claim by the air chief that India went one up by accounting for six Pakistani aircraft in the 4-Day War, has not quite made up for that deficit. Doling out largesse is its answer.

Admittedly, going beyond the call of duty is laudable. But going beyond the call of the duty of obedience most certainly is not.

As a subordinate institution to its political overlord, the military eventually must comply – as indeed it has in this instance.

In this case, the regime is using the military yet again to bolster its image as strong-on-defence, and that of its leader, Narendra Modi, as a Warlord. It’s not for the military to facilitate this.

Though Mr. Modi has surpassed Indira Gandhi’s record of number of days in office as also the number of speeches delivered at Red Fort, he does not have a 1971 War-like splendid victory to his credit.

A 1971 War redux is impossible in the nuclear age – recall the field marshal (FM) next door reminding everyone that he would take half the world down with him in case provoked down that route.

An equivalent victory must therefore be contrived. Since, per the army chief, there is only information war to war these days, winning the war of narratives is all that is needed.

Op Sindoor was to serve the purpose of image building. Mythmaking around it needs more doing. Awards inflation is one such measure.

If General Chauhan is to be believed, the important thing is how resilient a Service is. By their cornering of the top awards, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has done well by this yardstick.

Obviously, its leadership bounced back from the ambush by a certain Aurangzeb the first night. Aurangzeb was waiting for his date with military history, sleeping on a mattress in the air operations room since terror struck Baisaran. In the event, the IAF on the last night made up for the first.

But does that merit the numbers of higher war-time distinguished service awards toted up?

It another matter whether Op Sindoor was ‘war’ to begin with. It’s normalized by now for higher leadership in command of operationally active formations to take home the second of that series.

Interestingly, the IAF middle order collected most Vir Chakras, awarded for war-time gallantry in face of threat, risk and the enemy.

This was indeed the case on the first night when these pilots persisted with their tasks, even in face of some of their colleagues falling out about them - if reports of Indian planes downed are to be believed.

The tactical changes made and the air defence suppression done on the last night might have mitigated the threat and risk. The weaponry in all cases was stand-off and technology-heavy. Also, the lesson from the Varthman episode well learnt, in no instance did any plane of either side cross the border or Line of Control (LC).

So, air defence targeting apart, Vir Chakras for trashing Pakistani airfields from well within own territory might not easily fit the bill. Technical skill in releasing ordnance is recognized with the Vayu Sena Medal (VM), of which there were many won, a list that should have been longer.

In contrast, only five of the 12 pilots of aircraft that went across the LC during Operation Bandar received the VM.

Is the defence ministry going the home affairs way in devaluing awards?

Recall Advani perversely handed out the Ashok Chakra to each of seven police men who unfortunately perished while manning the parliament gate during the terror strike that December, along with disbursing a crore rupees to each.

Questionable also is the handing out of higher war-time distinguished service awards for those who were ‘left out of battle’ as it were.

The operationally-ready posturing of the other two Services would have weighed on FM Munir’s decision to throw in the towel. Evidence for this is the Pakistani side at the military operations’ chiefs talks during the draw down asking for the withdrawal of one operationally threatening army formation.

Thus, there was both a demonstration of force and a display of more to come. The latter goes by the term escalation dominance. Pakistan seemingly got the message.

However, Munir may have had other inducements, including President Trump’s supposed intervention. That he has been handsomely compensated, with no less than a luncheon at the White House, and a twice-over trip to the United States - that has since had some Indian strategists green with envy.

Unfortunately, quite like with deterrence, it can never be definitively known if the posturing did the trick. Clearly, Munir’s considerations were less operational than strategic.

Therefore, seven Sarvottams dished out is an overkill, particularly when contrasted with only three awarded prior – to, namely, the commander of the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the air and land operational commanders of the Kargil War.

Even Hari Kumar, the architect of the Balakot strike, did not figure in the medals, though as history knows, Modi went on to a ‘splendid victory’ of a different sort, one at the polls.

And, if this is the score in what is arguably not a ‘war’, what might the military wish-list include in war itself? If awards are so liberally distributed, then wouldn’t these lose their sheen.

India does not need to look any further than its neighbour to know where it should not venture. The friendly neighbourhood FM took home a medal. But then, let’s remind ourselves, he is only catching up with us.

An army chief here had atypically helped himself with a distinguished service award. The Leetul Gogoi controversy he dived headfirst into shows up the underside of messing with the straight and narrow on awards.

Since the situation in Kashmir – notwithstanding the vacation of Article 370 - triggered it all, worth noting is all three brass-hats heading formations in Kashmir received awards for their showing.

The army commander is an SYSM recipient. Though new in the chair, taking over the week following the terror attack, that he was the army’s Strategy head at New Delhi prior, implies his award could do with closer scrutiny: Why, in face of a war onset, there was no effort at protecting civilians along the LC, resulting in casualties? Was this deliberate: to raise war temperatures? What was his advice on the conciliatory opportunity emerging with Kashmiris on the streets protesting the terror attack on their touristic lifeline? Did he advise against the dragnet in which some 3000 were picked up?

The Chinar Corps commander certainly did not merit the list. In the chair since last year, how is it that he concurred with the removal of the central police post from Baisaran? Why did he lend army engineers for the Israel-like demolition of houses of purported militants? Did he respond to allegations of torture of graziers on the Pir Panjals? How is it that the Pahalgam perpetrators were allowed to get away for this long? What was the content of the aborted press briefing that was to take place on the killing of the three, to whom Amit Shah attributes the Pahalgam massacre?

The two must know if and to what extent the official narrative on Pahalgam and the subsequent killing of the perpetrators misleads. What was the handing over brief of the former army commander? Did he take home any secrets that the nation must be apprised about?

Awards have a purpose beyond the obvious.

The run-away Modi-endorsed hit, The Kashmir Files, has a scene in which a character remarks that a Padma award has been handed out to the military man for keeping him quiet, for he knows too much and perhaps also knows the truth. The regime is no less crafty than that screen writer.

Into the second decade of serving its current political master, the military must have figured out Modi’s management repertoire.

Personalized loyalty, unleavened by institutional integrity and purpose, is the hallmark. The political Principal’s journey is littered with those who stood by their Constitutional roles falling by the way side; even while those who fell in line have been elevated beyond their competence levels.

Quite like other institutions of governance, the military has been recipient of like attention of the regime. The military appears now more subservient than subordinate.

The air chief’s carte blanche is evidence: “A key reason for success was the presence of political will. There were very clear directions given to us. No restrictions were put on us… If there were any constraints, they were self-made.”

The awards are rewards for falling in line; with the sanctity of awards unhinged alongside – another nail for good measure.

The military must expect more nails will be hammered into its ‘apolitical’ coffin. The regret is that the din will not alert the dead.

 https://open.substack.com/pub/aliahd66/p/whats-really-colonising-the-military?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=i1fws

https://thewire.in/security/whats-really-colonising-the-military-mind

What's really colonising the military mind

The military’s implementing of Prime Minister Modi’s decolonization dictum was on display yet again, this time in the renaming of Fort William as Vijaydurg.

Possible hypothesis on the name change are:

· A benign view of the military’s alacrity is that India’s is an obedient military, subordinate to the civilian masters.

· The army has read the tea leaves and is selective of the battles it picks. It perhaps intends to ride out such punches, if not the regime itself; bowing to the wind better than being blown away.

· Its strategic in allowing the regime some leeway, for the regime’s attention for its organizational projects. The three services are in a competition to bend. When the navy has been rather supple, can the army be far behind? Though the Air Force came up with the ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ tune for Beating Retreat, it is not quite neck-in-neck, since the Air Chief is against airing dirty linen.

· Maybe the army is periodically throwing the regime some bones.

· It’s also not impossible that its leadership comprises believers, over-eager as are nascent converts.

· Perhaps the commanding general in Kolkata is currying regime’s favour, quite like the current Chief of Defence Staff did once from the same perch, pronouncing on a student agitation.

Why fret?

Irrespective of which of these holds water, the army’s alacrity can be laid down to the army leadership being from the Great Indian Middle Class. It’s been brain washed for some thirty years, the duration the army incubated the current leadership.

It appears the regime may be close to having the military leadership it wished for and the budding Hindu Rashtra, a military it deserves.

Sensibly, the regime is proceeding post-haste to redo the military. It wishes the military to first shed its past skin, so that it can slip into the one it has in store.

The regime having time on its side, it is not possible to expect the military to take a stand.

It can be expected to continue down its ‘apolitical’ road, oblivious that under the circumstance of the Chanakyan – surreptitious, stealthy, subterranean, surely – assault on India’s verities, to be apolitical is political.

For now, the military is best advised to be go slow, shirk, disrobe leisurely.

What’s at play?

If ‘Vijaydurg’ is its substitute for ‘Fort William’, then it must engage more intimately with alternatives thought up for it.

The alternate chosen is out of sync with the people and the place, as pointed out by a former army chief, a local to boot.

Linked as Vijaydurg is the great warrior general, Shri Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, it is of a piece with the army installing statues of the Maratha king at two other places, neither of which the legendary patriot had any connection with – Kupwara and Ladakh.

For its part, the navy’s statue of the Maratha king - later felled by strong winds - was at least mitigated by the navy’s roleplay as legatee to the king’s exploits at sea. (Never mind that an admiral, Kunjali, was Muslim, prompting the navy to change the name of a Colaba helipad that bears his name - and that too in the pre-Modi era!)

There is no such redeeming feature in the army’s action, with locals – less in Kupwara where they are understandably muted – querying it.

The then Maharashtra chief minister inaugurating of the one at Kupwara suggests where the funds come from, providing a clue to the intent.

It’s clear the military is being put to furthering an agenda. Its leadership – with bios invariably touting alma mater National Defence College - cannot be so naïve as to not know what that is.

The proliferation of Shivaji likeness in unlikely places owes to the appropriation of a secular, progressive, modernist and humanist historical figure by the Right Wing. (Never mind that they stand for precisely the obverse, or rather, the appropriation owes precisely to that variance.)

Shivaji’s resolute fight against Aurangzeb - Hindutva’s Darth Vader - forced the wily Emperor to spend the rest of his life campaigning austerely in the Deccan.

Shivaji’s challenge is interpreted - in the Right Wing’s worldview - as the first blow against India’s initial colonisers, its Muslims.

Thus, the name change in Kolkata is a double-blow: more obviously against British colonisers, but also, more subtly, against Muslims.

Further, in Kolkata, it helps the onslaught on a stronghold against Hindutva: Bengal, the other being the deep South.

Ideologues know best erasure is a preliminary and necessary step to rewriting history.

By erasing the part of history of Bengal and its people that gave Bengal a head-start into modernity over the rest of India, they hope to subdue it. The insertion of Hindutva icon is to recreate Partition’s divide.

On a wider note, the privileging of Shivaji is the regime’s way of ‘unifying’ India. It assumes diversity is a threat. Therefore, the emphasis on ‘One this, One that, and the ‘Other’’.

Unifying narratives, as one woven round Shivaji, are supplemented around historical figures as Mahabir Borphukan in Assam and Bhagwan Munda in Adivasi India.

The former is to build the ferment against ‘illegal immigrants’ which even Trump could envy; while the latter is against Christians, explicable when ‘British’ is collapsed with ‘Christian’.

It places a Christian ‘Other’ on par with the Muslim Other – in order to construct a Hindu identity and, in turn, unity (‘ek hai toh safe hai’).

This is increasingly necessary, troubled as the regime is by the imminent exposure, heralded by the Telangana caste census, of the Grand Indian 15:85 Faultline, wherein 15 per cent lord it over the 85 per cent majority.

A DIY kit

There are two possibilities, neither of which are edifying: one, either the army is acting in connivance; or, two, it is being dictated to.

Rajnath Singh has a former military general as principal adviser in his office, a post created for him.

The incumbent ordinarily ought to have alerted the Raksha Mantri, since he would know the military ethic, even if it evidently escapes Singh.

Its possible that the army furnishes the list of 75 prospective decolonization initiatives, while the replacement draws on back links with the Right Wing behemoth.

When confronted with criticism on his redecoration of his office annex, that witnessed the relegation of the iconic 1971 War victory painting and the plaque with the army’s leadership credo, the Army Chief apologetically accepted three ‘golden ages’: the British, the Moghul and the era before that.

However, the fort’s renaming soon thereafter suggests that while his heart is in the right place, demonstrating spine might be needed.

For that, the military must engage Ali-like in a ‘rope-a-dope’ trick, resorting to a theaterisation-like merry-go-round.

The military must vet the Replacement Dharma for any repositioning entailed in relation to the Constitution.

The regime’s innumerable protests to the contrary only aggravate suspicion that these serve as cover for its designs on the Constitution, a pre-requisite for formalizing Hindu Rashtra.

Simultaneous steps to politicise the army are a dead give-away, since these but ensure the army does not rally to a guardianship role.

Reduction of the salience of the army in the national security scheme and in national esteem is evidence.

Diminution is visible in the army being at butt of memes (‘not a game changer but a name changer’) and brasshats as bookend for politician photo ops.

Worse is in placing the military afoul of the national security interest, such as in renewed jollity with China without a reckoning over the three ‘buffer zones’ in Ladakh.

Such undercutting of the military contradicts Rajnath Singh’s homily: ‘A robust security system relies on a strong military. No nation can develop unless its military is powerful.’

The regime must be apprised to the three paradoxes its actions bestir, in order that, hopefully, it treads more gingerly:

· The more it hollows out the military, the more likely it will seek to preserve itself.

· The closer it gets to Constitutional tinkering the more the military’s guardian role comes into play.

· Disempowering the military internally, necessarily militates against empowering it externally.

Notwithstanding that, the military will do well to check on which of the hypothesis behind its name changing binge holds water, and shore up against keeling over.