https://www.dropbox.com/s/b7rnxkq853j7so1/Book%20X%20%281%29.pdf?dl=0

My tenth book - Ebook


South Asia at a strategic crossroad


by

Ali Ahmed



Book X – eBook compilation of writings on

www.ali-writings.blogspot.in

October 2017-March 2019




For those who speak truth to power




Foreword

The themes in this book compilation remain the same as in my earlier nine books, specifically, India-Pakistan strategic equations, nuclear and conventional doctrine, counter insurgency, Kashmir, military sociology and minority security. I have remained engaged with the major issues in national and regional security in South Asia over the year and half over which I wrote these commentaries. The book thus provides a source under one cover for appraising and understanding the ideas and events that have swirled in the cup of strategic affairs. It is particularly pertinent as it has been put together prior to the 2019 national elections in India, enabling voters to reprise the recent past and make up their minds as to whether they feel secure and are convinced that their country’s security is in safe hands.

The undercurrent in the pieces collated here is that national security has suffered under the the regime subscribing to cultural nationalism. Its view of security through ideological blinkers has endangered India and imperiled the region. This was brought to a head in the India-Pakistan crisis of February 2019. While a set of articles dating to the period present this case, the commentaries in the run up over the preceding year appear to predict the oncoming crisis in their coverage of the dangerous – if not reckless – manner national security in India has been run under its current minders.

The election mindedness of the ruling dispensation, with a view to further the cultural nationalist project on a reset of India along right wing lines, has been the over-riding factor and has quite naturally influenced strategic thinking and action. I record in these essays that this influence has been baleful at best. Strategic vacuity has been on full display for anyone caring to look and not be swayed by the compliant media and majoritarian extremists in the strategic community.

I remain indebted to my editors who have courageously accepted my contributions for publication. This has been despite the environment being one of intimidation, where dissidence and sedition are mistaken as synonyms. My insights – if any – on these pages only build on the back of observations and work of straight talking liberal thinkers and activists, who have stood up in difficult times to be counted and spoken truth to power. I believe their effort has firmly contained the right wing lurch of India, but there is much still to be done to reverse the tide of political and strategic toxicity. The book hopes to make a difference.

The book’s 72 commetaries are divided into 4 parts. The Strategy pages cover the issues arising in India-Pakistan relations, developments in Kashmir, internal security under assault by cultural nationalists and politico-military strategy. The Nuclear pages comprise articles on nuclear doctrine. The Military pages are devoted to the army that figured more often than usual in the headlines in the period owing to the visibility of its chief in the media. Finally, I cover the issue of security of India’s Muslim minority in the last part.




Contents

The Strategy pages

· Post poll national security options
· The National Security Agenda for the Next Government

· Can Shah Faesal bring the winds of political change to Kashmir?

· What is the difference between 'defensive offence' and 'offensive defence'?
Lessons learnt from the Balakot strike

· Balakot: Divining India’s strategy from its messaging
Where does the needle point?

· Pulwama: The counter attack

· India and Pakistan must de-escalate the current crisis

· Understanding India's land warfare doctrine

· Options before India to respond to the Pulwama terror attack

· Putting the army’s land warfare doctrine in the dock
· Why There Has Been No Military Response on Pulwama So Far

· Reminding The Political Class Of Clausewitz's First Injunction
· The Army's land warfare doctrine

· The land warfare doctrine: The army's or that of its Chief?

· Operation Kabaddi Revealed But Only Partially

· What do the echoes of Operation Kabaddi really say

· Kashmir: More of the hammer in the coming year

· Kashmir: Need for a peace process

· Kashmir: Towards peace with dignity

· Governor, 'root causes' matter

· Why the events in J&K are not good for democracy in the state
· Divide and kill

· Ajit Doval's platter: Centralisation with a purpose

· Making security a voter consideration
· India-Pakistan and the tussle of escalation dominance

· India-Pakistan: How dangerous are the waters?

· India-Pakistan: Ideology trumps strategy

· India on the brink

· Kashmir: When politics contaminates strategy

· India's spooks: Getting too big for their boots?

· Another disastrous idea from the Modi-Doval stable

· Decoding the Logic Behind the Shelving of India’s Mountain Strike Corps
· The army's two impulses in Kashmir: Human rights Doctrine and departures

· Human Rights: All so unfortunately ho-hum

· To fail Kashmir is to fail India
· Kashmir Peace Initiative: Depriving Pakistan Army Of A Lifeline

· What normalising the Sangh means for national security

· India’s military: Preparing for war in the nuclear age

· The Doval Scorecard
· India's internal security unravels

· A police wallah as proto Chief of Defence Staff

· War in 2018?

· Spiking possibilities: What is the army chief up to?



The nuclear pages

· India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Strategic Direction or Drift?

· Modi May Say Otherwise, But India Is Still Short of ‘Survivable Nuclear Deterrent’

· Modi at the Helm: Whither Nuclear Decision-making?
What nuclear weapons have done to us

· Are India’s nuclear weapons in safe hands?



The military pages

· Contextualising the army chief’s news making

· Selectivity in military justice

· Command responsibility in relation to good faith

· Opening up the cantonments: Army in the cross hairs of the right

· The army chief as regime spokeman?

· The Hindutva project and India's military

· Budget let down further strains army-government relations

· A revolt of the generals?

· A political army or an apolitical one?

· Dissension in the top brass?

· The General is at it again

· The Army: Introspection is warranted
The Chief has spoken; but is the Chief listening?



The Muslim minority pages

· Nailing the lies in name of national security

· Consequences for India’s minority of the gathering war clouds after Pulwama
· George Fernandes keeps his date with Gujarat carnage martyrs

· The minority security problematic

· Finally, the IS bogey laid to rest

· PM Modi's version of Rajdharma

· The army’s robustness in aid to civil authority: Lessons from the Gujarat Carnage

· On the Strongman myth

· A national security mess

· Noting the spokesperson-minister’s remarks

· An officer and gentleman: Worthy of a Muslim's ambition

· The 'incident': Nothing but political

· Is there an Indian 'deep state'?

· The dissident terror narrative

--

http://thebookreviewindia.org/evolution-of-indias-afghanistan-policy/

BOOK REVIEW

Avinash Paliwal, My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal

The title says it all. India’s approach to Afghanistan has little to do with Afghanistan. It has everything to do with Pakistan. This tells us something about India, about how we see ourselves, which is essentially in relation to our Siamese twin, Pakistan. This is not quite how we project ourselves—as a regional power and emerging great power, measuring up against China and a strategic partner of the US. India comes across as just another country attempting to set itself off against its neighbours. Since in our case—and in this case—it is Pakistan, a country perpetually on the brink of failed state status, this is evidence that we are not quite the power we make ourselves out to be. It is no wonder that our Afghan policy—essentially out to sabotage what Pakistan is up to in Afghanistan—is mostly a step behind. Avinash Paliwal’s book tells it like it is: the fragility of thinking in our national security policy making establishment and the dangers that can only accrue.

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Paliwal describes the making of India’s Afghanistan policy as an offshoot of our Pakistan policy. This is of a piece with our Pakistan-centric Kashmir policy. It is also true of our wider defence policy, which while having China in the sights rhetorically, has Pakistan in its cross hairs. What is worse is that this policy does not emerge from—as imagined—from a cool-headed survey of the threats and opportunities in the strategic environment and the geopolitics of the region, but from a political battle between partisan lobbies within the national security establishment. In the case of Afghanistan, Paliwal has it that there are the ‘partisans’ and the ‘conciliators’ battling to control policy.

Partisans are out to wreck what Pakistan has set out to do in Afghanistan. Conciliators for their part are keen to ensure that India’s interests are protected, even if Pakistan gets an edge in the bargain. The partisans appear to derive their angst and passion from their Pakistan animus, while conciliators wish to use Afghanistan as a leverage in their soft-line version of India’s wider Pakistan policy. The outcome of the tussle in the corridors of South Block appears to be dependent on which of the two sides gains an edge in bureaucratic politics, assisted respectively by the internal political configurations.

Paliwal, of course, makes his more-nuanced case soberly and with due regard to theory, relying on the public policy processes’ theory: Advocacy Coalition Framework. The theory has it that core beliefs of participants in the policy making processes influence their policy beliefs. The core beliefs are formed at their formative stage, under the influence of social conditioning beginning from childhood. These in turn form policy core beliefs, which is the basis for their input to policy making. Advocacy coalitions are built up from likeminded policy stakeholders and participants. To Paliwal, ‘policy change occurs when advocacy coalitions (like the partisans and conciliators) with different belief systems and resources interact with each other’ (p. 18).

In order to trace India’s policy in Afghanistan since the end seventies that witnessed the Soviet invasion, he divides the period into several segments and discusses the role of the partisans and conciliators in each duration. The period of the Soviet intervention witnessed a tussle over how critical should India be. Then came the period of scramble for Kabul between the Mujahedeen and the holdover of the earlier regime under Najibullah. The inconclusive debate in India over the levels of support to give Najibullah led to his eventual incarceration in the UN compound after an aborted bid to flee Kabul bound for Delhi. The following period was on whether India should open up lines to the Taliban, the answer to which depended on the perceived (by the two schools) nature of the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan. Thereafter was the Karzai period with the ‘global’ (read the West’s) war on terror (GWOT) providing context. The period witnessed a return of the Taliban, emboldened by US President Obama’s intent to draw down and withdraw the United States’ (US) forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s mission from Afghanistan by 2014. In the event, the International Security Assistance Force continues in Afghanistan with US President Trump upping the ante with his Afghan policy speech of end August. In effect, the tug of war between the partisans and conciliators is set to continue.

This time round it is easy to surmise that the partisans would win. Their core beliefs appear to be shaped by a conservative upbringing that lends itself to nationalist (cultural and hyper) policy prescriptions. The continuing stand-off at a heightened level over the past three years implies a vigorous proxy war, not only in Afghanistan, but—if Pakistan is to be believed—in Pakistan too, with a tit-for-tat rationale from Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir. The dangers are obvious. Paliwal needs being read to reappraise the manner is which policy formulation takes place in New Delhi.

He discerns India’s Afghanistan policy as stemming from the tug of war between the partisans and conciliators over three divergences: striking a balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan, meaning balancing Pakistan’s sway in Afghan affairs; international political environment, such as, at varying times, the GWOT or the Obama exit strategy and determining India’s place in it; and finally, domestic Afghan politics, to include the balance between the Pushtun and non-Pushtun ethnic groups. He explains India’s meander between these shoals along these lines, making for a fascinating reading.

One troubling aspect that nags as one reads along is the lengths to which the side that loses out on policy making subverts the policy in the implementation phase. While the Afghan policy was largely worked by diplomats and intelligence practitioners, and to a lesser but consequential extent Indian military intelligence staffers, there appears to have been a vertical divide between the hardliners and softliners. How much did this influence the implementation phase of strategy is interesting to speculate on. For instance, if MK Narayanan was a hardliner and was at odds with Manmohan Singh’s softline policy, how much does this account for dissonance in India’s Afghan (and at one remove, Pakistan) strategy? Can it explain how the Pakistan policy fell through in the Manmohan years? There was little efficacy in the Afghanistan policy either in the period, since the Taliban resurfaced and has since gained control over some 40 per cent of the territory.

Paliwal’s book justifies the praise on its cover by notable South Asianists. He has brought his earlier experience in journalism to bear recounting India’s participation in the recent moves of the Great Game. His interviews with 65 key players make the book come alive with detail and nuance. Besides there is ample evidence of a sound thesis on which the book is based, including 85 pages of notes and select bibliography. The book is a must-read for the attentive public in South Asia and students of international politics, security and peace studies.

http://thebookreviewindia.org/a-historical-sweep/

Book Review 

Armed Forces and Insurgents in Modern Asia, Kaushik Roy and Sourish Saha

The book is a product of collaboration between an unlikely duo: a history professor at Jadavpur University and a bio-statistical consultant for pharmaceutical companies based in the US. It began in a conversation over coffee at Kolkata’s Park Street in which the two discussed governance, poverty and armed rebellions in India, with the discussion expanding to include comparisons and contrasts with the experience of insurgency and counter-insurgency across the globe. In the event, the two restricted the scope of the book that emerged to Asia. They intended the book as a ‘sort of reference book for researchers’ (p. vii). The bibliography at its end covering 19 pages makes this claim plausible.

Professor Kaushik Roy’s academic contribution to Indian military history has included many works of considerable length and depth over the past decade. While the division of labour between the two authors is not known, the book’s introduction bears an academic’s stamp in its synthesis of thinking on insurgencies and their counter. Thoughts on rebellion ranging from Clausewitz to Mao and counter-insurgency thinking from Kitson to Kilcullen are touched upon. It is a sound background chapter on which to base the rest of the book, backed as it is by 82 footnotes citing the well regarded sources on the subject.

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There are eight chapters covering sequentially the insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Vietnam, North East India, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Iraq. The authors acknowledge that this is not an exhaustive coverage of Asian internal conflicts since some significant ones such as the Maoist insurgency against the Kuomintang and the Japanese; the several sites of insurgency in South Asia such as Punjab, Kashmir and Balochistan; Turkey’s engagement with the Kurdish question; the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, do not find mention. In a way, it is a subjective selection on studies included, but these suffice to give a taste of various aspects of rebellions, how militaries have coped and statecraft. This is therefore a useful introductory volume for students not only of internal conflict as a phenomenon but specific insurgencies covered such as that of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.

The volume succeeds in bringing out the scope of insurgencies—its multiple forms and variants ranging from nationalist inspired such as in Vietnam to current day religious inspiration of the Islamic state in the Levant. Alongside, there are several models of state counter action such as imperial policing with militaries exhibiting a constabulary ethic to an annihilationist model persued by the Sri Lankan army against Prabhakaran’s beleaguered Tigers in 2009. The authors are agnostic on how success obtains to an insurgent and a counter-insurgent, but lay out the factors that influence the balance. For instance, the situation had turned decisively against the terrorist tactics adopted with the 9/11 attacks. This enabled the Sri Lankans to turn the screw without anyone, including India stepping up to bail out the Tigers. However, an annihilationist model has not succeeded elsewhere, howsoever much the ordnance delivered has been upped, for instance in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The book’s historical sweep covers a century from early last century to the current day. For instance, the chapter on India’s North East contrasts the British approach to pacifying the North East with Independent India’s approach. Since there is a lot of ground to be covered, there is a tendency to compress the material, with the time span of India’s military involvement in the North East from the mid-fifties to today being covered in a mere three pages. Sometimes this ends up as a staccato barrage of facts and figures, which is difficult to systematically put together analytically.

The readers can engage selectively with the book, dividing it into chapters of individual interests. Some are topical in that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan continue unabated. The chapters therefore are a useful backgrounder, covering as they do the historical background to how the current day imbroglio came about and the current status of the insurgency itself. This is a rather ambitious project, but the authors make no claim to comprehensive treatment, but to bring to the fore the salient features and some nuances in the light of space constraints. For instance, in their chapter on Iraq they discuss the efficacy of the ‘surge’ that is credited with ending the earlier Sunni rebellion contrasting the two theories on its end, whether it can be attributed to American upping of their numbers under Petraeus leadership or of Sunni tribes themselves rolling back the Baathists and Al Qaeda elements within them.

The concluding chapter carries a view on the future of insurgencies and their counter. They highlight the dangers of urban insurgency, with the location being along seaboards in the light of global littoralization. Then there are the problems of weak, dysfunctional and failed states tackling population growth, slow economic development, social divisions, inadequate governmental penetration of areas and weak polity. The headlines-making Islamist terror also figures as a threat that will persist into the future. What is certain is that Kilkullen’s concept of ‘war among the people’, forged late last century in the face of the fissiparous wars in the Balkans, shall remain relevant into the future.

The book would be of interest to students of strategic and peace studies. Practitioners in uniform might like to broaden their understanding of their own experience by taking a look at examples from outside. Policy makers will find comparisons possible between the sites of insurgency useful, as also any best practices that can be gleaned from the case studies. By this yardstick, the book could find a place on bookshelves on internal armed conflict.

The book is also a contribution to Asian studies and development of an Asian perspective. This is all for the better since Asia is the least integrated continent in the world. It being the most populous and spread over multiple subcontinents, it is also the most militarized and has raging across it the most significant of today’s conflicts. For instance, Islamism—that is prophesized to figure in future conflicts—has a presence ranging from its Mediterranean shore to the Pacific. It is therefore important to begin seeing Asia as one, so as to emulate Africans who urge ‘African solutions to African problems’. On this count, the book appears a step in the right direction.

A Handy Reference Book

http://www.thebookreviewindia.org/articles/archives-4458/2015/May/5/a-handy-reference-book.html

NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA: KEYWORDS AND CONCEPTS 
By Rajesh Rajagopalan  and Atul Mishra 
Routledge, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 306, Rs. 850.00

VOLUME XXXIX NUMBER 5 May 2015

The book is a long awaited one on three counts. One is that it fills a gap in South Asian strategic affairs litera¬ture and on that score will be valued by stu¬dents and initiates among the attentive pub¬lic. The second is that its explication of the well chosen entries is such that it settles some of the misconceptions that have attended strategic terms. Third, there has been a re¬current demand for a shared vocabulary and common understanding of it, for use both within the Indian strategic community and with interlocutors across the border. In do¬ing this, the book does not neglect ‘western’ definitions even as it adapts them to Indian and regional usage and conditions, a case in point being ‘massive retaliation’.

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The book, compiled under the tutelage of nuclear authority and realist theoretician, Professor Rajagopalan, is potentially a valu¬able resource. It carries a short history of the nuclear trajectory of both South Asian states as its introduction. It begins with expand¬ing the set of abbreviations in the nuclear field and goes on to a brief chronology. It wraps up its 229 pages of terms and their definitions with 17 pages of select bibliog¬raphy. The reading list does not restrict it¬self to the region, but includes classics such as Freedman’s Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Neither does it ignore nuclear pacifists in its inclusion of Bidwai and Vanaik’s On a Short Fuse and N. Ram’s Riding the Nuclear Tiger. It’s over 400 entries cover personalities, nuclear installations, doctrines, equipment, legal regime and organizations. This way it puts between one set of covers a thought¬fully compiled and competently written, comprehensive overview and detail of nuclear matters in the region. However, its effort could have been enhanced by an index for ease of consultation.
Perhaps its next edition, suitably dis¬tanced in time, say, five years on, could in¬clude a section with terms having relevance outside the region. The US could be repre¬sented for instance by reference to its Nuclear Posture Review and Strategic Defence Re¬views. Those who tend to think that India weighs in with China and should not be bracketed with Pakistan may also want in-clusion of China specific terms such as Jin class and Chengdu Military Region. This of course risks offsetting the book’s current ad¬vantages: that it is not bulky as to weigh-down a student satchel and is within the price range not entirely off-putting for stu¬dents. Also, some minor glitches could be removed such as its placing of HQs 12 Corps in Bhatinda and extending its calendar of events of the past four years from its cover¬age of a mere two pages.
The book is important in the sense that any book dealing with nuclear issues is. There are too few books dealing with the subject, as a result there is not enough concern over the fact that the region is now indubitably into the nuclear age. Whereas the world managed to get by without any of its 60000 warheads at the peak in the last eighties be¬ing fired in anger or panic, the dangers from regional nuclear arsenals, numbering over 200 warheads today, are not any less. After Mumbai 26/11, it will take but a few jihadis to set off a conflagration. Two South Asia hands in the US whose work figures in the bibliography, Tellis and Perkovich, have in a senate testi¬mony early this year indicated as much.
It is reckoned that a regional nuclear war involving half this number would result in two billion deaths worldwide, resulting not so much from the direct effects of blast, heat and radiation, but from dust clouds blank¬ing out the sun. Nuclear winter should not be the region’s answer to global warming. There is simply not enough apprehension in the two states on this score, evident from the book including a reference to CNDP (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace) in the abbreviations but carrying only a perfunctory entry on a nuclear peace move¬ment in South Asia and of knowledgeable peace mongers such as Parvez Hoodbhoy or more lyrical activists as Arundhati Roy.
Arguably, the peace lobby is equally Subrahmanyam and the IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses). However, while there are references to the agitations surrounding Jaitapur and Kudankulum, the lack of space for the former is only reflective of the lack of attention the peace lobby com¬mands in the region in general. It may re¬quire growing into a movement before it fig¬ures in proportion to its importance. This needs happening soon, lest parts of the coun¬try end up as the Nanda Devi mountain fast¬ness, rightly covered in the book.
The book is also useful in its coverage of nuclear energy. Over the past decade, the in¬terconnected issues of energy, foreign and stra¬tegic policy have been so beclouded as to be under virtually a radioactive nuclear overhang. With its very first entry on the 123 Agree¬ment, the book throws some light on the In¬dia-US nuclear deal that appears to have brought the two ‘estranged democracies’ to¬gether. With China looming, this relation¬ship can only grow, even if Obama’s visit over Republic Day has not helped dispel the haze surrounding the deal. The book can assist the lay reader in appreciating the headlines bet¬ter and arrive at their own conclusions on the desirability—or indeed otherwise—of the nuclear route to energy sufficiency.
To Nehru the nuclear complex was part of the modern temples of India. After Chernobyl and Fukushima, these are no more ‘holy cows’. Nehru, alongside left scope for what Oppenheimer, quoting the Bhagwad Gita, observed on witnessing what he (Oppenheimer) had wrought: ‘the radiance of a thousand suns’. On this score, the book’s non-inclusion of Nuclear Zero amounts to a shortfall.
Neither the Strategic Plans Division (‘Directorate’ in the book) nor the National Disaster Management Authority (surpris¬ingly omitted) can save the region, and the globe, in case a sub conventional trigger sets up a conventional push to nuclear shove. Tightly-coupled, crises-ridden systems such as South Asia need light the book helps pro¬vide. And a little more to appreciate the find¬ings of the Vienna Conference on the hu¬manitarian consequences of nuclear ex¬changes: ‘The only assurance against the risk of a nuclear weapon detonation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.’

India-Pakistan: Visualising the next round

India-Pakistan: Visualising the Next Round

http://www.eurasiareview.com/08022015-india-pakistan-visualizing-next-round-oped/

At the Council on Foreign Relations last week two South Asia watchers Amb. Robert Blackwill and Stephen Cohen were asked the ‘unthinkable question’: ‘What happens if there’s another Mumbai attack?’ Both replied that there would be a ‘vigorous’ India reponse that would most likely be military. Both suggested that this owed to the personality of the new Indian prime minister and the sentiment within India.

After the initial promise of an opening up to Pakistan in Nawaz Sharif’s India visit of May last year, India has since August been tough on Pakistan. It has engaged in an exchange of firing on the Line of Control and if Pakistani allegations are to be believed also been supporting Pakistani insurgents, Baloch and the Pakistani Taliban, from across the Afghanistan border.

In so far as this hardline stance has been tactical it appears to have borne fruit. Former ISI head and Track II presence, Mahmud Durrani, is reported to have met India’s National Security Adviser Doval and its new foreign secretary, Jaishankar, in what might have been an attempt to seek out India’s position on a resumption of talks. The Pakistani ambassador in Delhi is also meeting Jaishankar. More significantly, the new regime in Delhi has managed to ensure that there has been no terror attack out to test it, besides one in Kashmir designed to disrupt elections there.

The advantage of the hardline is that it sends the unambiguous message that India would go military in its response. This is to deter any adventurism in Pakistani national security establishment. This can be reasonably be expected to be registered by the army and its intelligence agency since they are busy in rolling back the jihadi strongholds using the outrage against the terror attack on a school in Peshawar to good purpose.

However, the danger is in ‘rogue’ and ‘out of control’ terrorist elements taking advantage of India’s response to create regional instability. Profiting from resulting Pakistani nationalist and religious reaction to any Indian action, they may seek to expand their space once again in Pakistan that is currently being attenuated by Pakistani military and legal action.

How can India achieve its aim without presenting terrorists with their desired opportunity?

The likelihood of such an attack is low since the Peshawar terror attack is being taken as a watershed. Therefore, there is unlikely to be any sponsorship relying on plausible deniability from within the establishment. It would be remarkably difficult to mount a major attack without such tacit and covert support as attended the 26/11 attack in Mumbai.

In the hypothetical case that a terror attack does occur, the breadcrumbs’ are unlikely to lead either clearly or directly to the Pakistani establishment. India will have to reckon with this when it considers its response.

In light of the new government having invested in building up an image of itself as distinct from its predecessors in terms of decisiveness, it would require taking action. Whereas its predecessors, both the United Progressive Alliance and the National Democratic Alliance regimes earlier, have considered and rejected a military response, it is widely expected that Mr. Modi may be more willing to take military action. Even if Mr. Modi’s self-image does not push him towards taking military action, there are other ‘pull factors’ that may incentivise such a decision.

The military options he has are probably more fleshed out than earlier. The Indian army has given itself the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and over the last decade has been able to practice it. These exercises have likely kept in mind the criticism directed at Cold Start and it possibly has a menu of non-escalatory options. Since 26/11, major arms acquisitions that have placed India on the top of the table of arms importers have helped with modernisation. With an intelligence czar and old Pakistan hand as NSA, India possibly has the levels of intelligence and synergy necessary to execute a variety of strikes including counter terror and counter military by land, air and intelligence means.

Where can India proceed with such military action? Firstly, terror camps are an obvious target. The ones across the Line of Control (LC) are well known. These can be hit by artillery and those further in depth by air. Secondly, military objectives along the LC are next. With Pakistani military embroiled over the past half decade on its western border and the decade long relative quiet on the Line of Control, there are gaps and weak spots that Indian military can take advantage of, do a ‘reverse Kargil’ of sorts.

Thirdly, in the IB sector, the plains do not lend themselves for such action given the developed terrain and terrain obstacles along their length. However, a mechanised foray in the less-escalatory desert sector is possible. Between the two, military action in the plains sector will bring home the dangers more speedily to Pakistan and its Punjabi elite.

India’s strategic priority of economic development suggests a limited military action. Therefore, in its choice of options it will likely favour the least escalatory one. The military action will be such as to leave Pakistan without a plausible rationale for an escalatory counter. For instance, if military objectives on the LC are taken, then India may likely go in for those that help it improve its defensive posture, rather than expose Pakistan to further Indian offensive. Alongside, if India does not mobilise, then Pakistan would not be pushed into an over-reaction.

Finally, the military action needs to be such as to drive a wedge between the establishment and its potential jihadi support base by making the establishment weigh in favour of a ‘Pakistan first’ strategy rather than a religious ideological one. This can be best done by quick retraction of forces in order that Pakistani military bears down on the jihadists who provoked the situation at the cost of Pakistani security.

Pakistani reaction for its part will be to threaten escalation to get international pressure to bear on India as also help reopen the Kashmir issue. It will have to be seen to be robust enough a counter to assuage nationalist upsurge in Pakistan. This will keep the religious right wing from taking political advantage. Pakistan would also not like to see international pressure clamp down on it instead for fear of escalation. Therefore, a rational counter on its part will likely be non-escalatory.

This analysis suggests that fears of consequences, possibly nuclear, are slightly exaggerated. Both states will pitch their (re)actions to project escalatory possibilities without actually going over the threshold. This will facilitate crisis diplomacy. To fine tune this both states need to have a meeting of minds through means such as the Durrani mission. This will have the welcome effect of placing both states on the same side with respect to the expanding jihadi threat from the west

A Contemporary Record
Ali Ahmed

The Book Review, October 2012

ARMED CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA 2011: THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF
TRANSFORMATION
Edited by D. Suba Chandran and P.R. Chari
Routledge, New Delhi, 2012, pp. 297, `795.00

The book under review is the fifth Annual Report on Armed Conflicts in South Asiabrought out by the think tank, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. The Institute’s idea and practice of taking out annual reports is laudable. Over a period of time, these can serve as a reliable contemporary record, besides being useful for students, academics, policy makers and practitioners over the immediate term. The previous editions have been welcomed, no doubt prompting and enabling continuing of the series.

It is perhaps in genuflecting to peace studies that the editors have chosen to include the term ‘Transformation’ in the subtitle. Suba Chandran details why this has been done in his leading chapter in the second part of the book (pp. 137-38) in referring to the concept of some significance for peace studies. He goes on to say that his contribution ‘focuses on negative conflict transformation and conflict decay’ (p. 138).

This goes against the grain of the definition from the Berghof Handbook he reproduces while launching into his chapter: ‘actions that seek to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of conflict by addressing its root causes over the long-term, with the aim to transform negative ways of dealing with conflict into positive, constructive ones.’

It is therefore with good reason that the editors use the term ‘transformation’ in the subtitle rather than ‘conflict transformation’. What they appear to have in mind are the changes in conflicts for better or worse brought about by conflict dynamics when they use the term ‘transformation’. Where a conflict goes downhill, Chandran typifies it as ‘conflict decay’. This departure from peace studies theory concept of conflict transformation explains the possibility of transformation as a ‘threat’, phrased in the subtitle thus: The Promise and Threat of Transformation.

Since the editors have chosen to adapt the term transformation to their purpose, an opportunity to examine South Asian conflicts in the ‘conflict transformation’ framework has been passed up. The volume could have proved innovative, given that most such analyses, including some essays appearing in the book, are from an international relations and strategic studies framework. Conflict transformation, on the other hand, as a field of study in peace studies concerns itself with structural, behavioural and attitudinal changes required to move towards ‘just peace’. The potentiality of conflict transformation of conflicts endemic in South Asia could have been broached. This is testimony to the marginal presence of peace studies as an academic discipline in India, despite fledgling academic centers such as that of this reviewer and of institutions such as the IPCS to which the editors are affiliated.

The book is in two parts. The first has chapters by experts well conversant with the conflicts each has been called upon to elaborate on: Afghanistan, FATA and Khyber Pukhtun-khwa, J&K, North East and the Naxal movement in Central India. The second part is titled ‘Conflict Transformation and Early Warnings’. Though the part falls short of the promise of looking through the conflict transformation lens as obtains in theory, the part is a useful prospective look at conflict potentiality for escalation and de-escalation in J&K, North East, Central India and of fundamentalist violence in South India. It also has chapters on Nepal and Sri Lanka. It is debatable whether violence on account of religious revivalism needs to figure in a book on armed conflict, for that would amount to suggesting that terror incidence in South India, the locale covered in the essay, is of the order of an armed conflict. A definitional exercise at the outset by the editors could have dispelled this observation, even one reproducing a discussion from a previous edition of the series.

The impression a reader carries away is that conflict management is all that is being attempted by the State. This can at best help mitigate or end violence. The shortfalls in delivering on this limited ambition often as not end up sustaining the violence. Clearly, conflict resolution, the effort towards sustainable peace by ending of structural and cultural violence, is not on the cards, leave alone conflict transformation, taken as a step at a deeper level than even conflict resolution. This is a sobering insight on the capacities of the States in South Asia, including India that is popularly taken as an incipient great power. The significance of this observation deepens in the light of P.R.Chari’s negative take on trends in his intro-ductory chapter. He reflects on the ill-effects of globalization, on the uncertainty of the ‘demographic dividend’, decline in the rule of law, and finally disputes over depleting resources.

The lack of capacity of States suggests that peace studies needs being taken seriously as a subject area. Insights from conflict resolution and conflict transformation can help with a non-Statist answer to root causes and conflict dynamics. Answers anchored in the people are necessary since conflicts are now ‘among people’ (Rupert Smith). Therefore solutions should also be ‘people to people’ (P2P) centric. Currently the academic field draws principally on conflicts in the Balkans and Africa for insights. Its generic insights are sustainable in this region’s setting. A theoretical prism that can be applied fruitfully is that of ‘protracted social conflict’. It is perhaps the perspective that privileges State interventions and power centric approaches that is sustaining the conflicts in the region. The Institute can live up to expectations prompted by its name, by deploying its Annual Report to bring about this change of perspective. This will help widen the field, attract students to its fold and over time create conflict resolvers in numbers and quality necessary to tackle conflicts of the future

The Post 26/11 Regional Strategic Predicament

Ali Ahmed

December 3, 2008

http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ThePost26-11RegionalStrategicPredicament_AAhmed_031208

Evidence gathered in the aftermath of by far the most deadly terrorist attack in Mumbai indicates conclusively that the attack was planned by the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba. The attack on Mumbai was executed by a well trained and indoctrinated suicide squad comprising of ten Pakistani terrorists. This testifies to the long gestation planning and preparation that can only have been made possible by the resources of a well established terrorist organization. The recruitment was from Punjab, training was in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and maritime training was conducted in Karachi. A physical reconnaissance of the target area was then conducted, and after an aborted attempt to carry out the attack during Diwali, the terrorists were launched by the Lashkar operative, Zaki ur Rahman, from Karachi on November 23, 2008.

To have an organization with such capability within a country means that there has been an abdication of internal policing by the state and a loss of monopoly over force – a primary characteristic of statehood. This is an index of Pakistan’s slide to failing state status. And given the growing extent of ungoverned spaces in FATA and NWFP, Pakistan is poised on the brink of state failure. Given the Pakistan Army’s inability to tackle the neo-Taliban in these areas and the government’s approach to the IMF for a bail out make it apparent that Pakistan does not have the capacity to cope with the internal challenges confronting it. It may therefore not be prudent for India to rely on Pakistan for rolling back the Islamist threat emanating from within its borders.

India’s demarche has required Pakistan to act and be seen as acting against terrorist groups within its territory. India is in a strong position to press the issue since it has been at the receiving end of a proxy war for about two decades in Jammu & Kashmir. Terrorism sponsored by the ISI has been witnessed since the Mumbai bombings of March 1993. Lately these have increased in number and spatial spread to various parts of the country as well as the Indian embassy in Kabul. There is a case for all these attacks being taken cumulatively as amounting to an ‘armed attack’. India is thus in a position to legitimately undertake appropriate actions in self-defence to include military measures. In case Pakistan’s response against terrorists based in its territory is not adequately firm, India could then up the ante by unilateral military action. For additional legitimacy it could approach the UN Security Council to apprise it of the threat to international peace and security originating in Pakistan and which Pakistan is was unwilling or unable to do anything about.

India’s demarche demanding the handing over of those involved in anti-India terrorism has not been received well in Pakistan. While the civilian government appears willing, it does not have control over the country’s India and security policies and is therefore unable to deliver on its promises. In the earlier case of Operation Parakram, despite mobilization of troops India was unable to coerce Pakistan to hand over the twenty terrorists demanded. It is possible that prevarication would greet India this time around as well, with Pakistan blackmailing the United States with the threat that it would divert its attention from ongoing anti-Taliban operations towards its eastern front. India would require instead to put pressure on the US to have Pakistan deliver on its demands. The visit of Condoleezza Rice would be an opportunity to get the US onboard.

The approach should be one of convincing the US and, indeed, Pakistan also, on the long term threat posed by the Islamists to Pakistan. The awareness about this threat within Pakistan is apparently fairly high. That is why Pakistan has been avoiding a confrontation and is likely to continue to do so even in the face of Indian pressure. Its fear is that this may result in a civil war. Should this threat stay Pakistan’s hand, then India may require to determinedly convince Islamabad of Indian support in such a confrontation. Besides, Pakistan would be assured of the support of the international community in such an event. This would strengthen its hands against Islamists and hardliners in the state apparatus such as in the Army and the ISI. The outcome therefore would be along the lines as obtained in Algeria in the 1990s. Most Islamic states have successfully resorted to force of varying levels against Islamists. Since these negative forces have to be eventually confronted in any case, seizing this opportunity to do so would be in Pakistan’s interest.

Thus far Pakistan has been circumspect in its fight against Islamism both in the form of home grown Islamists or the neo-Taliban. This policy has had the rationale that Pakistan should not sacrifice its strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir in what is popularly seen as someone else’s war. This position is a carry over from the Musharraf era. The democratic dispensation and the new Army leadership have since been more assertive in operations against Taliban elements. There has also been appreciable restraint in infiltrating terrorists into Kashmir to disrupt the polls there, even though there have been more violations of the ceasefire this year, testifying to attempts at infiltration being foiled by alert Indian forces on the Line of Control.

However, the Islamist threat within Pakistan, of which anti-India terrorism is an expression, has not been addressed. The logic is perhaps that opening up an internal front to tackle these elements amidst the ongoing turmoil to the North West may not be prudent. Pakistan may not be able to see the necessity of opening up this front for it has not itself been subject to attack. Instead it has managed to direct the Islamist anger outwards and may consider that it has found, in such action, a strategic instrument to cut a growing India down to its own troubled size. This could well be how the ISI, and the Army, may be tempted to interpret the outcome in Mumbai.

The alternative approach is Indian military action. The argument in this respect could be that unless forceful action is taken against anti-Indian Islamists, terrorist attacks on India in future cannot be ruled out. The perception of success in the Mumbai attacks is likely to spur these groups to greater adventurism. Future attacks are thus a probability, particularly if the reaction of India or of the Pakistani authorities proves to be weak. This would make it politically impossible for the Indian government to remain inert against the mounting public anger. Such reasoning could eventuate in a limited retributive military action on Pakistani territory, which could assume the form of attacks against known Islamist strongholds such a Muridke and/or other terrorist facilities in POK. This could well provoke Islamist reaction against the Pakistani state, thus triggering a civil war. Indian military action could be even more implacable in the form of the Limited War strategy called Cold Start. Since both military approaches have escalatory potential, it would be well if Pakistan were to be responsive to India’s concerns and forcibly restrain the Islamists through a long term policy course correction.

Military means are available but useful only in so far as they are not used. Their ready availability is a useful tool to focus the attention of the United States and Pakistan on the necessity of taking visible and tangible action in accordance with Indian demands. Indian restraint in the face of provocation has buttressed its case politically and diplomatically. It could in the interim think through the spectrum of military options available to it, which could be in line with the aims of the international community in the ongoing and overarching global war on terror. This may be in the form of air and missile attacks on select Islamist targets such as camps. These attacks should be launched after informing Pakistan and as a form of overt signalling of Indian resolve, and should seek to avoid collateral damage. This would degrade any escalatory potential and provide Pakistan the incentive to take action against the Islamists in the name of a ‘Pakistan first’ strategy.

From the Mumbai attack it would appear that an aim sought by the Islamists was to profit by setting off a regional crisis. The idea was perhaps that such a crisis would push Pakistan finally over the brink and make the Islamist agenda appear as the only feasible alternative for the hapless people of Pakistan. Such a plot line would require great political sagacity on the part of India to navigate through the crisis. India has in the past repeatedly demonstrated its strategic wisdom, even in the face of internal criticism. This time it has a more difficult situation on hand, with not only Pakistan requiring to be addressed but also the United States and, more importantly, the angered Indian nation. The necessary defensive measures such as a new investigation agency, additional NSG hubs, guarding of the sea front and improved policing have rightly been announced and are already underway. Of the offensive measures, the preferred option for India is to work patiently through a collaborative strategy with even a reluctant Pakistan on board. Even if the Indian response were to involve military force, this should eventuate in bold Pakistani action against its home grown Islamists. The other two options of unilateral action, and worse, of inaction, in the current regional strategic 

South Asia: Pakistan holds the key

by Ali Ahmed

April 23, 2012

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/04/23/south-asia-pakistan-holds-the-key/

India and Pakistan are at the cusp of another opportunity for moving forward on in their relationship. President Zardari was recently on a pilgrimage visit to India. His Army Chief, in wake of the avalanche tragedy at the Gyari military base in Siachen, has declaimed in favor of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Even as India has welcomed both the visit and the pronouncement, it is worth interrogating if this may prove yet another lost opportunity.

India’s security establishment is concerned with the impact of the outcome inSouth Asiaof US-NATO draw down by 2014. The recent attacks in Kabul and elsewhere, the exhaustion of ISAF contributing countries, including most recently Australia, revelations of abuses by foreign troops, talks with the Taliban, etc., spell to India’s security managers an attempted return to center stage of the Taliban. This is seen to be in Pakistani interests, and therefore consequently against Indian interests.

The fallout on Kashmiris the foremost concern. The expectation is that with the western front taken care of Pakistan will resume its provocations in Kashmir, enabled by the disaffection in Kashmir persisting despite favorable conditions over the past year and half. This accounts for the military’s position against diluting its presence there and against any amendment to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

Given the apprehended possibility, there are two options India has. One is to preempt by engaging Pakistan seriously. The second is to build capability to cope with the outcome, while engaging Pakistan perfunctorily. The former option has merit but is unlikely to be operationalized as the government lacks the political capital to follow through in the sunset of its tenure. Therefore the latter is the default option.

India’s position as the world’s largest arms importer over the latter half of the last decade is set to continue into this one. It has taken care of the Chinese front by raising two defensive divisions. Paramilitary units specific to Jammu and Kashmir now number 66, thereby enabling India to pull out any conventional troops tied down on the counter insurgency grid. In keeping with a proactive and offensive doctrine, it now has these available for administering punishment on Pakistan in case of resumption. Covering of gaps in conventional hardware amounting to debility in its conventional deterrent have been fast tracked by the Cabinet Committee on Security after the ongoing spat between the bureaucrats and brass over this and other issues. The friction is another reason that will hold the government back from challenging the security establishment’s strategic positions.

In effect, India will be in ‘wait and watch’ mode, leaving the initiative with Pakistan.Pakistan, for its part, has a significant opportunity for unlocking the status quo. The Gyari avalanche that accounted for 140 servicemen can be used by it for progress on the Siachen front, widely seen as a low hanging fruit.India is in a position of advantage there that it is loath to lose without an acknowledgement by Pakistan of the front line held. Therefore, if Kayani is to put his money where his mouth is, he can easily acknowledge the existing reality on the ground as prelude to mutual demilitarization of Siachen. This can serve to lend momentum to more intractable issues in the composite basket, such as Jammu and Kashmir.

Indiahas the pieces in place for progress. The confidential report of the three interlocutors that had been tendered in last fall has apparently been examined by the home ministry. A constitutional commission is reportedly to be appointed to address the main grievance of Kashmiris that their autonomy had been arbitrarily imposed on by extension of Indian laws to the state through manipulation of state governments. Further, the home minister has let on that the ministry is contemplating introducing three amendments to the AFSPA for the legislature’s contemplation.

These initiatives can easily prove stillborn, since the conditions to see them through have not been created by political action. In case Pakistan, which sees itself as acting on behalf of Kashmiris, wants a suitable closure, it can seize the chance by unlocking the status quo. Action on the Siachen front is that chance.

This is in Pakistan’s interests. 9/11 created the circumstance for India to gain ascendancy over proxy war. Pakistan cannot now push India onto the backfoot. It has home grown problems it needs to address. Even if bomb attacks are fewer these days, the political prominence of extremist forces, such as through formation of the Difa e Pakistan Council, headed among others by Hafiz Sayeed, who carries a $10 million US bounty, is a signifier of troubled times ahead. Paradoxically, these can only become more acute in case an outcome in ‘AfPak’ seemingly favorable to Pakistan, in a negotiated return of the Taliban. In other words, the interim is a window for opportunity also for Pakistan.

This brings to fore Kayani’s apt ruminations during his trip to monitor rescue efforts at Gyari: “We in the army understand very well that there should be a very good balance between defense and development. You cannot be spending on defense alone and forgetting about development.” What needs doing is operationalizing this fairly self-evident bit of common sense. Kayani will be surprised how farIndiacan make the initiative go.

This is because India stands to gain as much asPakistan. Externally, its power ambitions and trajectory have been greatly aided by the stability in relations with Pakistan since the ceasefire of November 2003. Détente with Pakistan can release it from being tied down to the region, enabling its aspiration for an Asian role. Internally, there can be something to show for the government as elections loom nearer in terms of gaining ground both with Pakistanand in Kashmir. The invite from Zardari forIndia’s Prime Minister therefore has greater consequence forNew Delhithan it is letting on through its attitude of studied caution.

The ball therefore is in Kayani’s court. Since he cannot possibly pursue Hafeez Sayeed asIndiawould like at the cost ofPakistan’s internal stability, he could instead turn the tragedy in Siachen into an opportunity forPakistanand widerSouth Asia.

South Asia: Of War Clouds and Silver Linings

by Ali Ahmed

June 20, 2011

http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/06/20/south-asia-of-war-clouds-and-silver-linings/

Prospects are not bright for Dr. Manmohan Singh traveling to Islamabad on Mr. Gilani’s invitation extended at Mohali during the latest spot of ‘cricket diplomacy’. The foreign secretaries are to meet this week to set the stage for the foreign ministers meeting next month. This follows a round of the line ministries involved in the restarted dialogue having met over the past two months. At these meetings the two sides merely restated their positions and agreed to meet again.

A utility that such talks have is that they serve as a buffer for India to register its disapproval in breaking off talks in case a terror attack with Pakistani markings crosses its proverbial ‘threshold of tolerance’. It follows that the two countries are not out of the woods yet, the latest spat being the ‘aggressive maneuvers’ at sea between respective naval ships participating in international anti-piracy operations. Talks must be seen in the backdrop of the possibility of conflict. This article discusses the backdrop.

The Indian prime minister has ruled out recourse to military force. This is sensible since it would divert India from its economic trajectory, besides having unforeseen domestic effects for Pakistan that India may not wish to initiate. Yet there is strong advocacy in India’s strategic circles for an assertive Indian reaction to Pakistani provocation. The government has shown itself responsive to this, with the home minister and the minister of state for defense admitting to the possibility. While this may be to take advantage of the deterrent effect of such rhetoric, it may in the event of crisis prove a commitment trap.

The possibility of another terrorist inspired crisis is ever present. The conditions that prompted 26/11, that emerged from the testimony of David Headley, are present today. In case 26/11 was state sponsored, then Pakistan is once again being pressured to go into North Waziristan. It could do with a diversion. The revelations make India inclined towards military action. Pakistani reliance on Indian maturity, or ‘strategic passivity’, is to over-invest in a preferred perception of the adversary. If it was not state sponsored, then the non-state actors have only increased their capacity and autonomy since. In case military pressure builds on them with Pakistani state participation, they could engineer a diversion.

The juncture is appropriate therefore to reappraise prospects of war. Towards this end, two factors need examining. The first is if India can withstand the impulse to punish Pakistan. In case of another terror attack, India would have recourse to continuing its ‘strategy of restraint’ or to responding militarily. Indian military reaction by itself would not spell ‘war’. Its military doctrine seems to have worked in a suitable response option at the subconventional level itself. While being seen to be ‘doing something’, it may be restricted to the least escalatory level such as surgical strikes, etc.

War would instead be brought on by either inadvertence or deliberate ‘disproportionate’ reaction by Pakistan. The first is an ever present possibility in conflict. Measures need be in place, such as diplomatic channels, third party links, etc, to keep the other side informed of limited intentions. As for the second, India will have little control. But even then, escalation control measures could prove deterring for Pakistan to deliberately up the ante.

The bright side is that currently, between the two – inadvertence and choice – Pakistan will unlikely want a war, since in-conflict political dynamics in Pakistan would likely move the state more towards the jihadist deep end. While factions in the Pakistan Army may welcome that, this may not be true for the Army leadership looking out for the military’s corporate interest and the wider national interest.

Having acknowledged that, even as India goes about its military reaction, it would be bringing into place deterrence measures against escalation. These could be misperceived in Islamabad as signs of an imminent offensive. India’s disowned doctrine, ‘Cold Start’, lends itself to such a reading. Therefore, even if India has forsworn Cold Start, it may be stampeded into Cold Start. It may go into Cold Start mode if it, in turn, misreads Pakistani emerging reaction as eventuating into a disproportionate one. This is not unlikely given the perception that the Pakistani military lacks strategic sense and may resort to offensive counter action compelled by a convergence of strategic and organizational culture. Their recent demonstration of a capability advertised as a tactical nuclear one, will under the circumstance make South Asia appear to well-meaning observers and strategic partners of both states as the ‘most dangerous place on earth’.

The lesson for the two states is stark. India waged limited war at Kargil, mobilized during Operation Parakram, and exercised restraint after 26/11. It is left with the military option of subconventional response this time. The onus next time round will be less on India than on Pakistan. India has acquired a fund of understanding of its position by repeatedly investing in restraint over the past. It can afford to expend from this by offensive action. Pakistan instead would lay itself open to capture by fundamentalist-nationalist forces, set off by Indian military action.

In other words, as against prior crises points, Pakistan has more to lose this time. Therefore, Pakistan would need to blink. This it would not be politically able to do in the circumstance of crisis. It could instead do so in anticipation. At a minimum, it needs extra self-regulation, exercising control over its rogue elements and over its ‘strategic assets’. At a maximum it could signal its fresh intent by ensuring Kashmir stays peaceful through the summer or by legally ‘going after’ the 26/11 accused.

The forthcoming opportunities of engagement over successive months the two sides must put into place conflict avoidance measures. The confidence building exercise that the talks represent will only withstand buffeting of crisis in case these prove robust. India might even be incentivized for a trip of Dr. Manmohan Singh across. The war cloud can yet acquire a silver lining.

Af-Pak
IPCS Special
Report
87
DECEMBER 2009
A Strategic Opportunity for South Asia?

http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR87-Final.pdf

AF-PAK
A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY FOR SOUTH ASIA?
ALI AHMED
Research Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi
INTRODUCTION
“This is certainly decision-time in
Afghanistan and for Afghanistan. A
number of critical decisions will be made
over the next weeks. Together, they will
determine the prospects for success in
ending a conflict that has become more
intense over the last months.”
- UN envoy for Afghanistan, Kai Eide,
briefing the Security Council
 (29 September 2009)
Obama inherited a war. He has described it
as ‘one of necessity’.
1
 He allowed the
troop ‘surge’ under General Petraeus, a
carry over of the Bush years, to go
through, even as his administration carried
out a review of the situation in its initial
months.
2
 In March, in a white paper,
3
he
outlined his Af-Pak strategy, to be
spearheaded by Richard Holbrooke on the
political side and Petraeus on the military.
He is currently in the midst of fulfilling his
campaign promise of taking the Taliban-al
Qaeda problem to its logical conclusion.
4
                                             
1
“Afghan mission is 'war of necessity', says
Obama.” IBN Live
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/afghan-mission-is-warof-necessity-says-obama/99426-2.html
2
“McCain and Obama on Afghanistan.” Time.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,
1823945,00.html
3
“White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's
Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan.”
www.whitehouse.gov/assets/.../AfghanistanPakistan_White_Paper.pdf. Also see,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-NewStrategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/
4
Indicating American determination, Obama has
said: ‘We will target al Qaeda wherever they take
root; we will not yield in our pursuit; and we are
The present juncture of contemplation of
the strategy has been brought about by the
commanding general in Afghanistan,
McChrystal, who has reported realistically
on the situation in Afghanistan back to the
Pentagon.
5
 The 66 page report,
6
 under
consideration of the White House, has led
Obama to review the Af-Pak strategy.
7
The
run-off elections of 7 November 2009 have
given Obama the time to think through the
McChrystal proposals, as also ensure that
the regime that is installed in Kabul after
the elections will be  a ‘credible partner’
with the capacity to deliver the
international role expected of it.
8
 The
resulting strategy would help protect the
achievements from their US$80 billion
expenditure better. This would also be
ballast as the Democrats contemplate
Congressional elections next year and
Obama faces prospects of the next election
later in his presidency.
                                                                   
developing the capacity and the cooperation to deny
a safe haven to any who threaten America and its
allies.’ This counters the perspective that the US is
looking for a face saving exit.
5
“Is It Amateur Hour in the White House?”
Newsweek. http://www.newsweek.com/id/215991
6
Bob Woodward. “McChrystal: More Forces or
'Mission Failure'.” Washington Post. 21 September
2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.
html for a pdf copy of the unclassified report.
7
“Obama seeks advice on Afghanistan.” BBC.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8295272.stm.
Also see,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Reado
ut-from-the-Press-Secretary-on-the-PresidentsNational-Security-Meeting-on-Afghanistan-andPakistan
8
“Obama's chief of staff links troop surge to
'credible Afghan partner.” Guardian. 18 October
2009Special Report 87
December 2009
2
The McChrystal reports states, "Failure to
gain the initiative and reverse insurgent
momentum in the near-term (next 12
months) -- while Afghan security capacity
matures -- risks an outcome where
defeating the insurgency is no longer
possible." Implicit in this statement is the
likely pattern of operations with the 40,000
troops reportedly requested for stabilizing
the military situation in favour of the
USFOR–A (US Forces Afghanistan) and
ISAF (International Security Assistance
Force) in the first year and thereafter,
rolling back the insurgency. This implies a
likely spike in the levels of violence in
Afghanistan, where this strategy will
unfold. It will also entail Pakistan doing
‘more’ in terms of rolling back the
Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban
leadership and al Qaeda on its side of the
Af-Pak region.
The paper analyzes the situation and the
likely manner in which it is set to unfold.
The paper first takes a look at the dangers
of a military pursuit of the Pakistani
Taliban, leadership of the Afghan Taliban
and the al Qaeda, to the stability of
Pakistan. Thereafter, it surveys American
options and recommends a political
approach which goes beyond merely
opening up to the ‘moderate’ Taliban. It
then dwells on India’s options and
concludes in favour of a proactive Indian
involvement.
It recommends reaching out to the Taliban,
including the hardcore Taliban, to forestall
the destabilization of Pakistan due to the
expansion of a counter offensive against
Pakistan’s military into Pakistan’s
heartland by the Pakistani Taliban. The
paper recommends a politically
predominant strategy for the international
community to prevent such a risk from
materializing. For India to favour a
strategy which takes Pakistani interests
into account, Pakistan will have to
reciprocate in a similar manner by ending
proxy war and preserving Indian interests
in Afghanistan. This can be achieved
through a dialogue between the two states,
one that is delinked from the presently
‘paused’ composite dialogue. The
argument here challenges mainstream
strategic thinking that privileges the
military option.  It hopes to widen the
debate on approaches available to the
international community and makes
constructive suggestions on India’s
options. An innovative Indo-Pak approach
to Af-Pak could help unlock the current
impasse, since as the McChrystal report
states, the face-off between the two states
‘is likely to exacerbate regional tensions
and encourage Pakistani counter measures
in Afghanistan and India.’
9
I
THE PAKISTAN SCENE
After having swept away the Pakistani
Taliban encroachment from within the
vicinity of Islamabad,
10
 Pakistan is
presently attempting to roll up the
Pakistani Taliban-al Qaeda combine in
South Waziristan. With the Tehrik e
Taliban chief, Baitullah Mehsud killed in a
drone attack,
11
 the leadership disarray
within the Pakistani Taliban is being
exploited in this offensive. Two divisions
of Pakistan Army, along with an armoured
brigade, face an estimated 10,000 hardcore
Taliban militants plus 6,000 battlehardened Uzbeks and al-Qaeda’s Arab
                                             
9
Stanley McChrystal. “Initial United States Forces
(Afghanistan) Assessment.” pp.2-11.
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_0921
09.pdf
10
The Pakistani Taliban had come to within 100
km of Islamabad on their takeover of the
neighbouring districts of Swat after the peace deal
of April 2009. See Harinder Singh. “Tackling or
Trailing the Taliban: An Assessment.” IDSA
Strategic Comments. July 2009.
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/HarinderSingh200709.
htm
11
“Taliban confirm commander's death.” BBC.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8220762.stm 3
fighters.
12
 Pakistan is under pressure to ‘do
more’ and has been responsive to the
extent it has been suitably incentivized.
The Kerry-Lugar bill, promising US$1.5
billion for non-military aid to Pakistan
over the next five years has been signed by
Obama.
13
Pakistan can be expected to be proactive
and on the offensive only so far as this
does not open up an internal cleavage
along ethnic lines.  This threat has
consistently brought down the vigour in its
response. It does not want a civil war on its
hands nor a divide in the Army along
ethnic lines. There is also the Islamist
angle and anti-Americanism that has kept
its enthusiasm under check. Additionally,
there is a pre-existing affinity between the
Army-ISI combine and the Taliban. The
Army would like to preserve as much
leverage in Afghanistan through the
Taliban in a post-US intervention scenario
as it can. Therefore, Pakistan will be a
reluctant participant in the forthcoming
phase of further military action against the
Taliban.
14
 As with the post-9/11 moment,
in which Musharraf was made to make a
turn around in abandoning the Taliban,
15
Kiyani and Zardari, in that order, would
require to take a decision. The present
operations in Waziristan have a limited
purpose of militarily reasserting the writ of
the state.
Earlier, with the support of the Pakistani
society largely behind them, the Army was
able to undertake the Swat operation and
                                             
12
“People continue to flee as Pak jets pound
Waziristan.” The Hindu. 14 October 2009.
13 Nirupama Subramaniam. “Hue and cry in
Pakistan over Kerry-Lugar conditions.” The Hindu.
8 October 2009.
14 Harinder Singh. “The Pakistani Taliban: An
existential or a passing threat?” IDSA Strategic
Comments. September 2009.
http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/Hari
nderSingh230909.htm
15
“US threatened Pak bombing after 9/11.” IBN
Live. http://ibnlive.in.com/news/be-prepared-to-bebombed-us-told-pak-after-911/22158-2.html
the nation could absorb the three million
temporarily internally displaced people
resulting from the operation.
16
 However,
the question is whether the antiAmericanism in Pakistani society will
permit greater freedom of military action
to the duo. Secondly, with greater pressure
being mounted by the Army against it, the
Pakistani Taliban, which has a
considerable Punjabi component, could
step up its reaction elsewhere in Punjab.
Pakistan would not like to see the
instability spreading, particularly to its
multiethnic economic hub, Karachi.
Therefore, the answer is likely to be that
Pakistan would be a reluctant participant
and may cite reasons of internal stability
for its recalcitrance.
17
 The risk is in
Americans stepping in by expanding the
footprint of their military action. Presently,
its role is confined to using technology and
stand off weapons in Pakistan with the
tacit acknowledgment of the Army.
However, an enlarged footprint could see a
more rigorous counter and public relations
backlash. Besides considerations of
sovereignty,
18
 the brunt of the reaction
would be felt by the people in Taliban’s
terrorism, ultimately forcing the
showdown the state has been attempting to
avoid. Therefore, there are limits to which
Pakistan can be pushed and there are limits
of Pakistani action against the reactionary
forces within its polity. These have proven
far stronger than the  Pakistani state can
cope with. Therefore, the gun that the
Pakistanis usually hold to their own heads
while negotiating with their western
interlocutors, should be given some
credence. Strategic prudence demands that
                                             
16
“UN agencies concerned over 'massive
displacement' in Pakistan.” UN News Center. 8
May 2009.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=3
0743&Cr=pakistan&Cr1
17
For a perspective on the threat and Pakistan’s
ability to cope, see “Q&A: Militancy in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.” BBC.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8104063.stm
18
“Pak military up in arms over US aid riders.”
TOI. 8 October 2009.Special Report 87
December 2009
4
Pakistani concerns be taken on board. No
state should be compelled to commit
suicide.
Consider the consequences of a ‘military
first’ strategy. It  is being dubbed as a
‘Pakistan first’ strategy in the US,
indicating that the US will push Pakistan
even as it contributes its technology and
firepower.
19
 Pakistan, which is critical to
the outcome of operations in Afghanistan,
is to whittle the Afghan Taliban. In
reaction, its ally, the Pakistani Taliban is
likely to take the fight into the Indus plain
and Karachi. Pakistan, the best-positioned
state to tackle terrorism, could be
destabilized, with an obvious impact on
the conflict outcome. A situation of civil
war would have massive human security
consequences. The Algerian civil war of
the early nineties and the multiple
insurgencies in Iraq are the closest
parallels. The dimensions of what will
happen in Pakistan are greater because of
the demographic factor and larger area of
spread. The safety of nuclear weapons is
another issue that has been bothering
analysts over the past year.
20
It is in this context that Pakistan is
advocating reaching out to the Afghan
Taliban. It has indicated that the Mullah
Omar faction, called the Quetta Shura, can
be brought to the table.
21
 It prefers that the
faction be accommodated in the Kabul
power arrangement, with the current power
equations being duly modified. This would
require the western powers to exit. The
security arrangements would be taken over
by the UN under a peacekeeping mission.
The Taliban for its part would be required
to provide an assurance that it would not
                                             
19
“Obama admin considering 'Pakistan First'
approach.” Indian Express. 7 October 2009.
20 Ali Ahmed. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets, India’s
Concerns.” IPCS CBRN Brief. 11 February 2009.
21 Ambassador Mehsud presented an outline of a
proposal at the USI Seminar on 'Peace and Stability
in Afghanistan: The Way Ahead’, 06-07 October
2009, New Delhi.
revert to religious extremism or harbour
international terrorists such as the al
Qaeda. The idea will not gain traction lest
the gains of the Bonn process
22
 and those
regarding funding made at Paris, London
and Tokyo, be compromised. The return of
the Taliban could lead to another blood
bath with those siding with the West,
particularly the northern ethnic minorities,
being targeted. These problems exist, but
can be addressed as part of the
negotiations. The initiative to reach out to
the core Taliban is a more immediate
concern. The deal could be worked out
over a period of time as had been the case
with other conflicts through the Paris
peace talks, Geneva Accords and Oslo
process.
II
US APPROACHES
This is particularly important for America
to consider. It already has a sense of the
issue and this has caused it to modify its
strategy, diluting its purely military angle.
There is now a political component to the
strategy that includes a political approach
to the Taliban, possibly Saudi-mediated.
23
Talks have been reported with the
‘moderate’ or ‘good’ Taliban.
24
 The aim
however, is counterinsurgency-oriented, in
that, it seeks to create a divide within the
Taliban which would enable a whittling of
its power. This has not met with any
success since the Taliban, aware of its
ascendancy at the moment, has not
cracked. The leadership of the Mullah
Omar, Hekmatyar and Haqqani factions,
                                             
22
“Bonn Agreement (Afghanistan).” Wikipedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn_Agreement_(Afg
hanistan)
23
“Source: Saudi hosts Afghan peace talks with
Taliban reps.” CNN. 5 October 2008.
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/10/05/
afghan.saudi.talks/index.html.
24
“US open to Afghan Taliban talks.” Al Jazeera. 8
March 2009.
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/03/2009
3885411963197.html5
hiding in Pakistan, is  also out of direct
reach of the US. The possibility of a
western exit, discernible by the exhaustion
of the Europeans and the latest opinion
poll in the US with 58 per cent respondents
against continuing intervention,
25
 has
possibly, in the short term, increased
Taliban’s resolve. Other than the neo-cons,
even congressional support, particularly of
democrats, for the war is denuding. This is
being played down in the US to prevent
the Taliban ‘waiting out’ the US-NATO
deployed in Afghanistan. Defence
Secretary Gates has indicated that the US
is prepared for the long haul.
However, to incentivize the Taliban to
come to the table, it is likely that there will
be a spike in violence with the additional
40,000 troops demanded by McChrystal
being used to gain a ‘position of strength’.
Just as the killing of Shamil Basayev
helped end the Chechen insurgency and
Prabhakaran’s slaying broke the LTTE
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), the
decapitation of the Taliban leadership,
reportedly hiding in Pakistan, to whittle
the Taliban, may be resorted to. The
strategy advocated by Biden is somewhat
along these lines, with the suggestion
being that the terrorists be taken out
through technological means rather than
troop-intensive counterinsurgency.
26
 The
US thinks that without taking the fight to
the Taliban, its power would be
undermined. Additionally, this would
cause a demonstration effect elsewhere
and Islamism may get a boost in claiming
that it had laid low yet another
superpower.
The credibility of NATO, in its first out of
area operation, would also be at stake.
Thus, the US, though cognisant of the
                                             
25 Kristi Keck. “Reassessing Obama’s War of
Necessity.” CNN.
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/16/afghani
stan.obama/index.html.
26
“Obama Considers Strategy Shift in Afghan
War.” New York Times. 22 September 2009.
limitations of a military option in light of
its Vietnam experience, would rely on it at
least partially, to herd the Taliban to the
table. This is likely to result in a catch-22
in which the Taliban will not negotiate till
the exit strategy is on the table and the US
will not put this on the table lest it lose
face. The war is thus, set to increase before
the situation stabilizes. While the US takes
on the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan would be
required to destroy their bases in the
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal
Areas). The problem is in the linkages
between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.
That latter comprise both disaffected
Pukhtuns and Punjabis of a jihadi mindset.
They would expand the war in case they
are further constricted by military action.
Therefore, the destabilization of the
nuclear-armed state on India’s borders is a
strong possibility.
III
AN APPROACH FOR INDIA
India is alive to this possibility.
27
Some in
the strategic community in fact, would
welcome the destabilization of Pakistan.
28
Their rationale is that the Pakistani state
would only be paying a price for its own
actions over the past three decades. It
would increase the power asymmetry
between a growing India and a failing
Pakistan. It would not only ensure a
decisive de-hyphenation of India from
Pakistan, but also enable uncontested
regional hegemony by India. Lastly, in its
impact on India-China equations, it would
leave China without a consequential
partner in South Asia with which to
balance India and will lock it into a South
                                             
27
For an earlier, skeptical look at the possibility,
see C Raja Mohan. 2004-05. “What If Pakistan
Fails? India Isn't Worried...Yet.” The Washington
Quarterly. 28 (1), Winter: 117-128.
28
This was suggested controversially by Colonel
Ralph Peters in his article, “Blood Borders” in the
Armed Forces Journal in June 2006. See Shahid
Siddiqi. 2008. “Pakistan’s Balkanization.” Foreign
Policy Journal. 12 December.  Special Report 87
December 2009
6
Asian box as a regional and not an Asian
power.
The governmental line of reasoning is that
a stable Pakistan is in India’s interest.
29
However, India wishes to preserve its
strategic interests even as the global
community thinks through its options.
India would primarily like to see Pakistan
desist from using terror directed at
Kashmir or the rest of India. The most
horrific escalation of this was the Mumbai
attacks resulting in a ‘pause’ in the
composite dialogue between the two
states.
30
 India has therefore, been
attempting to sensitize Pakistan to its
concerns. This, it is attempting not only
diplomatically and through the US, but
also most likely, through intelligence
action. Such action  though does not have
official acknowledgement, but its effect
can be discerned from the vociferous
manner in which Pakistan has been
complaining of Indian interference in
Baluchistan and expansive Indian presence
and interests in Afghanistan.
31
 While the
former found controversial mention in the
Sharm El Sheikh joint statement,
32
 the
latter has been directly targeted by terror
action, such as the bombing of the Indian
embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and again
in October 2009. The ‘strategy of
containment’ of Pakistan on the one hand
and withholding from talks till it appears
responsive to India’s concerns on the
other, is, however, not an end in itself. It is
a ‘means’ to an ‘end’, the end being the
discontinuance of terror directed at India.
                                             
29
“PM’s statement in Lok Sabha on the debate on
the PM’s recent visits abroad on July 29, 2009
PMO.” PMO.
http://pmindia.nic.in/parl/pcontent.asp?id=43
30
Pia Malhotra and Aparajita Kashyap. "Resuming
The Dialogue: India, Pakistan And The Composite
Process.” IPCS Issue Brief. August 2009.
31
“India fuelling unrest by funding Taliban: Pak.”
Indian Express. 26 October 2009.
32
“Joint Statement Prime Minister of India Dr.
Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of
Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani.” MEA. 16 July
2009. http://meaindia.nic.in/
Therefore, India needs to consider the
extent to which it wishes to carry forward
the strategy of containment.
India needs to appreciate the extent to
which Pakistan can respond in its present
circumstances.
33
 Ajai Sahni characterizes
Pakistani propensity to negotiate with a
gun to its own head as a ‘skillfully
constructed nightmare fantasy.’ While
skepticism is understandable, a reality
check is in order. While it is taking on the
Pakistani Taliban and the al Qaeda, in
particular the Uzbek forces in Waziristan,
it may not be in a position to take on the
Punjabi terror groups it has nurtured. The
violence throughout October this year, as
Pakistan launched its South Waziristan
operation, only demostrates the reach of
the extremists.
34
These attacks culminated
in the targeting of the General
Headquarters itself. The message is
implicit that the Pakistani Taliban has the
capacity to expand the reach of terror into
the hitherto stable Punjab. Pakistan would
be wary of consolidation of extremists,
both Pukhtun and Punjabi, by also taking
on the anti-India jihadi terror groups.
Therefore, India requires to decide how far
compelling Pakistan will be in its interests.
Decidedly, a destabilized nuclear state on
its borders with the potential to interfere in
its internal affairs, particularly in majorityminority relations,
35
 is not in India’s
national interest. Therefore, there is scope
for India to consider the Pakistani position
on negotiation with the Taliban. Quite
                                             
33
In his “Encounters in a Nightmare”. In Ira Pande
(ed.) The Great Divide: India and Pakistan. New
Delhi: Harper Collins. p.157.
34
So far 180 people have been killed in October
alone according to “Fresh attacks rock north
Pakistan.” BBC. 23 October 2009. Along with the
GHQ, attacks have targeted the Islamabad
University and the Kamra air base.
35
The inside-outside connection is usually lost
sight of in strategic commentary. Here it is taken as
relevant to the Indian consideration. This is
particularly when rightwing forces take advantage
of the strains.  7
obviously, India would require extracting
from Pakistan the price of its cooperation.
Such concession by India to Pakistan
would require that Pakistan make a similar
concession. At the very least, it would
require giving up its use of terror as a
strategic tool directed at India in Kashmir
and elsewhere. At the same time Pakistan
would require to guarantee good behaviour
of the Taliban in Afghanistan in order that
those who have associated with the West
and India are not imposed upon by a
returning Taliban. This would enable
political space for the Taliban in
Afghanistan and also facilitate Pakistani
aims. Indian interests  can be protected in
the deal through India’s soft power, based
on its economic strength, extended to
cover the reconstruction efforts there.
36
Thus Afghanistan instead of being treated
as a space for strategic contestation should
be seen as one of strategic opportunity.
This would require wisdom and trust. The
Indian Prime Minister’s refrain is pertinent
in this regard: ‘Trust but verify’.
37
 This is
easier if each side has something to gain.
India gets a guarantee against terror,
underwritten by Pakistan, not only of
terror perpetrated by Punjabi groups, but
also the Taliban. Pakistan gets ‘strategic
depth’ in Afghanistan and some control
over the Pukhtun approach to the Durand
line. And while the Afghans get a respite
from the insurgency and
counterinsurgency, the US and NATO get
a face saving exit. The guarantees Pakistan
and Taliban are to provide have to be
factored in, in a cast iron manner. This
                                             
36
India has contributed US$1.2 billion to
Afghanistan’s reconstruction. See Foreign
Secretary’s address, “Concluding address by
Foreign Secretary at the International Seminar on
Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: The way
Ahead.” MEA. 7 October 2009,
http://meaindia.nic.in/
37
In his address to the Lok Sabha on 29 July 2009,
the PM said, ‘Trust but verify is the only possible
way of dealing with Pakistan.’
http://pmindia.nic.in/parl/pcontent.asp?id=43
would require talking through the idea first
between the states involved.
To this end, an India-Pakistan discussion,
not linked to the composite dialogue, has
been suggested here.
38
 In this, the
necessary ‘give and take’ and verifications
would require to be worked out. This is
only the first step. A parallel US-Pakistan
dialogue, along with the other interested
states, can be undertaken to evolve a
strategy towards the Taliban, culminating
in a replacement of ISAF with a UN
mission, including contributions from
members of the SAARC experienced in
UN peacekeeping, Muslim states
39
elsewhere and other UN members.
40
 The
reconstruction efforts can be jointly
undertaken by Pakistan and India, under
the aegis of the SAARC, along with other
states such as China. Pakistan will require
to allow Afghanistan a route through its
territory for access to India.
41
 This way the
drugs problem could be ended with the
Indian market becoming available for
Afghan goods, thereby, ending the
economic rationale for poppy cultivation.
The US would have  a receding and less
visible military role, and would require
underwriting its success through its
political and economic contribution. Thus,
it can be seen that several possibilities can
open up, provided the first step is
negotiated first. In principle, there is a
need to accept that the Taliban can be
engaged with.  That wider possibilities on
                                             
38
Prem Shankar Jha suggests a dialogue also
between the armed forces indicating the
ameliorative prospects of dialogue in “Double
Deadlock”. In Ira Pande (ed.) The Great Divide:
India and Pakistan. New Delhi: Harper Collins.
p.115. 2009.
39 Arif Rafiq. “A Muslim solution for Afghanistan.”
Christian Science Monitor. 6 October 2009.
40
Firdaus Ahmed. “A Strategy for Af-Pak.” IPCS
Article 2828. 9 March 2009.
http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2
828
41 Ambassador R. Sikri’s intervention at a USI
International Seminar on ‘Peace and Stability in
Afghanistan: The Way Ahead’ on 07 October 2009.   Special Report 87
December 2009
8
the India-Pakistan stand-off open up, is the
best incentive for treating this juncture as
a strategic opportunity.
IV
RATIONALE
Arguing for this first  step would require
dealing with the critique that getting the
core Taliban on board would amount to
‘appeasement’. The question that needs to
be answered is whether the Taliban will
continue to be expansionist if it returns to
power?
42
 Will this result in triumphalism
and provide a boost to the waning tide of
terror? Will terror find, yet another time, a
safe haven in Afghanistan? If the answers
to these are in the ‘affirmative’, then the
hardcore Taliban would require to be
eliminated; even if this takes time or
carries the risk of  Pakistan going under
with a considerable human cost. Recourse
to history is useful. Terrible aftermaths
have surrounded revolutions – French,
Russian, and Iranian.
43
 The fear among
neighbours and interested powers that
revolutions are expansionist and therefore,
require dissipation of their energy, have
often led to bloody interventions. While
Taliban is not in the same category, the
fear is that they too are expansionist. Also,
in history, is the manner in which the
Vietnamese were projected as communists
out for ‘salami slicing’ Southeast Asia.
Likewise, the Taliban are seen as
forerunners of an Islamist tide that could
destabilize the Middle  East, Pakistan and
Central Asia.
44
 Instability in energy and
resource-rich lands would lead to
disruption in the global economy and the
way of life of the West in particular. This
constitutes the vested interest or vital
national interest of the West. This explains
                                             
42
“Taliban say they're no threat to other countries.”
TOI. 8 October 2009.
43
Stephen Walt. 1996. Revolution and War.
Cornell University Press.
44 Ahmed Rashid. 2001. Taliban: Militant Islam,
Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale
University Press.
their presence and resort to the military
instrument. Is their projection of the threat
correct?
Here the argument is that the image of the
Taliban, particularly one received from the
western media, is possibly self-serving and
a trifle exaggerated. It does have a
substantial element of truth, in that,
Islamists and the Taliban are an extremist
and reactionary force. This owes to their
need to define themselves completely
antithetically to their enemies, the hated,
western ‘other’. In case of an end to the
war and the resulting absence of an
‘enemy’, the Taliban  can redefine itself.
The threat they pose to Islam elsewhere is
also overdrawn. The interpretation of
Islam of both Central and South Asia is not
so weak as to succumb easily to the
Taliban’s version. The Muslim populations
of Pakistan, India and Central Asia are not
amenable to extremism, but instead are
forward looking. Therefore, any threat of
expansion or Talibanization is much less
likely than is feared. In India, the origin
and sustenance of both problems that are
likely to be affected, that is, Kashmir and
India’s minority management, have a
largely internal dimension. The threat of
aggravation from outside is overdrawn, as
is restricted at best to tactical issues such
as training, logistics etc., as against any
strategic linkage. The government has yet
again launched an initiative to talk to the
dissidents in Kashmir.
45

The major point is that defeating them
would be inordinately costly. Among the
problems faced by Obama and in the
European capitals are scarce resources and
inadequate time.
46
 Since the outcome of
conflict is always uncertain, there is no
guarantee of a victory in such a conflict.
The Iraq model can be taken as a counter
argument, in that, the Iraqis were turned on
                                             
45
“Hurriyat to talk to Centre after consultation with
others.” TOI” 7 October 2009.
46
“Afghanistan 'under resourced' for years: US.”
TOI. 1 September 2009.  9
the al Qaeda in their midst through the
‘awakening’ campaign in the Sunni
Triangle.
47
 However, the dimension of the
problem here is much bigger, in that,
Pakistan is more than four times the size of
Iraq in terms of both, size and population.
With the ‘home front’ of the West
weakening, in terms of the peoples’
support for the war, their governments
would be hard put to stay the course if the
situation gets worse. Since the elimination
of the Taliban and the remaining al Qaeda
is not a possibility, military force could be
applied for arriving at a ‘position of
strength’ from which to negotiate. Will
this happen? The Taliban has been
resurgent over about  four years now. It
would require considerable degradation of
its fighting capabilities for the West to
gain an upper hand. This would require
great exertion in military power in a time
compressed dimension. The human costs
ought to serve as a deterrent, particularly
in light of the Pakistani state’s incapability
to handle the aftermath of the earthquake
in POK in 2005 and the presently
internally displaced people from Swat.
These only provided an opportunity for the
Islamists to gain ground and public
sympathy, thereby, further tying the
regime’s hands in  acting against them.
Therefore, the outcome is once again
open-ended and fraught with uncertainty.
The campaign would be interrupted by
cataclysmic events. An example is that
while no one may miss or mourn Mullah
Omar, the death of Osama bin Laden as a
martyr could lead to an emotional
upheaval with unpredictable consequences
in the course of the war.
Finally, it bears mention that the
seemingly far-fetched option of Indian
military intervention, alongside the
international community, has also been
                                             
47 Aaron Glantz. “Petraeus' Testimony. FPIF. 8
April 2008. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5136
discussed by the strategic community.
48
This ‘boots on ground’ approach involves
cases in which Pakistan does not commit
itself or there are unforeseen events within
Pakistan such as a rightwing coup. It can
only grow stronger in case of more bomb
attacks against Indian interests in Kabul
such as the one on the embassy on 8
October 2009.
49
 In such circumstances,
commentary has it that the international
community may rely on India.
Interestingly, at the time of the writing of
this paper, India and the US are
participating in a joint military exercise in
which their mechanized troops will
undertake counterinsurgency operations in
a semi-urban terrain.
50
 This is perhaps with
a view to send a signal to the Pakistani
establishment that the international
community has additional options,
including the possible containment of
Pakistan. This could  bring forth greater
commitment from Pakistan since it would
not want its traditional foe to gain any
leverage against it or get any closer to the
US. However, in case the envisaged
circumstances were to come about, then
the possibility of India participating in
anti-Taliban operations might become
more real. Interoperability for this has
been built up over the years of military
engagement with the US.
51
 Since the
capability exists, the decision to use it may
well be a positive one. The consequences
and implications would then undoubtedly
be thought through, but the dangers will
remain. The argument that not acting may
bring about worse dangers would be used
to convert sceptics. Time pressure may
                                             
48
C Raja Mohan. “Debating India's stand on
military aid to Afghanistan.” Indian Express. 7 July
2009.
49
“Kabul blast outside Indian Embassy.” BBC. 8
October 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8296137.stm
50
“Indo-US military tango next week.” TOI. 8
October 2009.
51
Firdaus Ahmed. “Military cooperation with the
US: A mixed bag.” India Together.
http://www.indiatogether.org/2008/oct/fahusind.htmSpecial Report 87
December 2009
10
undercut a wholesome debate. Therefore,
it is best that this direction of strategic drift
also be questioned in terms of its
implications on internal politics, on civilmilitary relations, on militarization and,
most importantly, if Indian military
participation would help or heal.  
V
CONCLUSION
The moot question is ‘Can the Taliban be
moderated by engagement?’ This is not
infeasible. Even prior to their ostracism,
they were attempting to gain international
legitimacy. In control of two-thirds of
Afghanistan, they had been canvassing for
recognition and support. It is there
religious extremism
52
 and association with
Bin Laden - fallouts also of the lack of
openings elsewhere - that deprived them of
this. There is a degree of correspondence
between them having been denied support
and their extremism, as was demonstrated
in their destruction of the Bamiyan statues.
While this is indeed indicative of the type
of regime they had and could be expected
to revive, it bears recall that a decade has
passed since. Their interest is selfpreservation and a return to power. They
would also like to see Afghanistan’s
reconstruction. They will not be able to
militarily go about this since the might of
the international community is arrayed
against them. Their power has been
considerably degraded and would continue
to wane as long as defiance continues.
Their reliance on the Pakistani Taliban has
brought about costs that their host society
may be unwilling to bear. Their associates
in the Pakistani establishment and ISI are
also keen that the war end and the western
military depart the region. This can only
happen if the Taliban be prodded to act
maturely and rationally. The Saudi regime
could convince them to participate,
particularly if it underwrites the resulting
                                             
52
See Ahmed Rashid. 2000. Taliban: Islam, Oil and
the New Great Game in Central Asia. London: IB
Tauris. pp.82-95.
regime economically.
53
 In return, the
Taliban could sever ties with the al Qaeda
that is anathema to the Saudis. Therefore,
there are advantages for the Taliban to
talk.
In case they are offered a return to a share
of power and assistance with
reconstruction, in return for their
reconstructing their  ideology, it would
appear a fair bargain. The presence of
other groups in the power sharing
arrangement would further balance out the
Taliban. The argument here is that when
approached as equals and not as losers in
the war, they may find this acceptable. To
get them to accede to talks, as a first step,
the exit of the western powers and their
replacement by blue helmets over time
could be promised to be taken up in the
negotiations. The details of this
changeover can be worked out, with a
phased approach, beginning with
relegation of the US to military bases
initially and, thereafter, a winding down
over a mutually acceptable period.
It needs be said that the al Qaeda problem
is on the wane. After eight years of
relentless military and intelligence
operations, the al Qaeda has been
considerably degraded.
54
  It  is  not  a  force
that can be completely eliminated since its
ideology holds sway elsewhere, even if it
is not militantly pursued. The wellsprings
of support are also to be found in the angst
against US policies in the Middle East.
Therefore, it needs reconsideration if the
UN mandate, permitting the US-led
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ can
continue indefinitely.
55
 The US cannot
                                             
53
“Karzai Sought Saudi Help With Taliban.” New
York Times. 30 September 2008.
54
 “Britain Lowers Al Qaeda Threat Levels.”
Reuters. 20 July 2009.
55 On 23 March 2009 the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) had its mandate
renewed by UN Security Council resolution
1868. The annual resolution in March every year by
the Security Council forms the mandate for the UN
Mission in Afghanistan and defines the priorities of 11
have a blank cheque of indefinite
presence.
56
 That would be a return to a
colonial era and permitting ‘Infinite
Justice’, as Operation Enduring Freedom
was originally called. Instead, there is a
need to move to other ways to resolve the
al Qaeda phenomenon. These essentially
involve Obama and the US making good
on his Cairo speech.
57
 There is a need to
marry the Holbrooke mission in Af-Pak to
the Mitchell mission for the Middle East,
58
for results on this score. The bottomline is
that by continuing military action, the US
would overstay its welcome. Instead, a
move towards a political approach would
help it disengage militarily, thereby,
depriving the nationalist energy from
under-gridding the counter it has faced
from the Taliban.
India requires asserting its growing power
with a vision that accompanied its freedom
struggle and also needs to privilege it
economic over military power.
Outsourcing security in the region to a
superpower militates against its emerging
power credentials and negates is anticolonial heritage.
59
 Instead, it needs to
innovatively take a  lead in engaging
Pakistan in churning out a regional
solution, under perhaps the rubric of the
SAARC. Pakistan’s idea of taming the
Taliban’s nationalist credentials can be a
useful start point. Doing so would make
for a ‘win-win’ situation for all. This way
                                                                   
the Mission. For the mandate, see
http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=17
42
56
Jha, n.38, p. 112.
57
For text see New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04o
bama.text.html
58 Daniel Pipes blog. “George Mitchell's Return to
Middle East Diplomacy.”
http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2009/01/georgemitchells-return-to-middle-east
59 Mainstream thinking exemplified by writings of
analysts such as C. Raja Mohan is for a
Washington-New Delhi meeting of minds on
‘finding answers to deepening threats emanating
from Pakistan ("The Great Nuke Game.” In Ira
Pande (ed.) The Great Divide. p.138).’
the Taliban would be weaned away from
its propensity to extremism and violence;
Pakistan would feel more secure; and India
would be less threatened by their
combined action. It would enable Pakistan
and India to exercise a joint initiative in
which Pakistan has the political lead
compensated by India’s soft power.
60
 It
could herald a wider rapprochement. In
such a positive and proactive turn, it would
gain stature and come to be acknowledged
not only as a regional power, that it
already is, but an Asian power. Helping
break the Af-Pak impasse through
constructive contribution to a solution for
the US-led international community can be
India’s moment of arrival.
                                             
60
China’s expanding footprint in Afghan
reconstruction bears mention here. See C. Raja
Mohan. “The Great Game Folio: Plan B.” Indian
Express. 21 October 2009.