The strategic doctrine of an Assertive India

Published in Agni July 2015

India is a status quoist power. This is easier to establish in terms of its approach to territory. It appears to have reconciled to the fact that some of its territory is occupied by neighbours, Pakistan and China. While rhetorically it is inclined to see the return of this territory, it has not taken any military or political steps to bring this about. However, it would not like to see any more territory lost to neighbours and on this count has a credible military in place. However, is India politically a status quoist power?

Politically, it is an emerging power. A regional power, it is now also a power of reckoning in Asia. This can be easily seen from the busy diplomatic schedule of the new prime minister in his first year. Its growing economic clout, self-evident from the finding that it has displaced China as the fastest growing economy, is being translated into political power. Its growing economy is also enabling military power, with it being the largest importer of weapons over the past decade and having its defence budget touch $40 billion this year. This makes India’s position as a regional power unassailable, thereby partially sustaining the proposition that it is politically a status quo power.

However, India is also demonstrating assertiveness as a power under the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in Delhi. The strategic refrain of the political forces currently in government when in opposition during the preceding United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime was that India was not measuring up to its weight. It was constantly reactive and on the back foot. Such arguments came to a head in the wake of the 26/11 attacks in which India did not respond militarily. When elected via a majority in the lower house for the first time in two decades, the government has attempted to distance itself from the strategic policies of its predecessor.

The most visible manner it has done so is in the way it cancelled the talks with Pakistan last August and engaged in a prolonged standoff with that country on the Line of Control (LC). Even while engaging China, it is clear from its stance with Japan, the US, Vietnam and Australia that it is hedging its options even if not part of the containment of China. The recent outreach by the prime minister into the Indian Ocean Region, backed by rhetoric of India as a security provider, indicates the direction of the future. Cumulatively, these are suggestive of an Assertive India.

This means that it is not quite a status quoist power politically, but would like to see a change in the status quo with India acknowledged as a pre-eminent power in the region and one with a continental role in Asia. The former implies distancing from Pakistan decisively and the latter implies measuring up to China, if not substantially, at least nominally and perceptually. Therefore, the short answer to the question is that politically India can be counted as a quasi-revisionist power.

It is a truism that the strategic doctrine of a status quoist power is different from that of a revisionist power. The former tend towards the defensive and defensive-deterrent end of the doctrinal continuum, whereas the latter’s strategic doctrine can be situated towards the offensive and offensive-deterrent ends. The continuum can be imagined with defensive at one end and compellence on the other, with defensive-deterrence, offensive deterrence and offensive, as three mid-course stops (See Figure A below).

Figure A: Strategic doctrine in theory

This framework informs this review of India’s strategic doctrine. A discussion of strategic doctrine is a necessary prelude to discussing military doctrine since the former informs and determines the latter. An offensive strategic doctrine finds expression in and is reflected by offensive military doctrines.

The popular image is that India is a status quoist power and its strategic doctrine is one of defensive deterrence. However, there are two very diverse adversaries that India contends with. Therefore, it has a differentiated strategic doctrine: in effect two strategic doctrines. With respect to China, India would readily accept that it moved from a defensive strategic doctrine to a defensive-deterrent one. At the conventional level the mountain strike corps is evidence a credible defensive-deterrent doctrine. At the nuclear level, the long range Agni series and the efforts for a ‘boomer’ underway indicate firming in of such a doctrine. India’s foreign policy confabulations with the US, Japan, Australia and Vietnam are also indicative of this. This is the case for the moment.

However, taken cumulatively, the three – conventional, nuclear and foreign policy – enable a potential turn towards an offensive-deterrent strategic doctrine. An invulnerable second strike capability, a deepened strategic relationship with partner US and maturing of the mountain strike corps in terms of equipment and infrastructure needs met, could by end of the decade position India at a juncture of choice between the defensive-deterrent and offensive-deterrent. It is here that the preceding discussion on India’s positioning as a status quo or revisionist power comes in. A revisionist India, one with a self-image of an Asian power, if not a great power itself, would want an Asian balance of power reflecting this image. This would imply greater involvement in the strategic games afoot in Asia, pitching it at odds with China and in the US camp, even if today the refrain is one of multi-alignment. An offensive-deterrent can be envisaged once all the enabling elements are in place. The current defensive-deterrence is for the interregnum (See Figure B below).

Figure B: Situating India’s strategic doctrine

In respect of Pakistan, the 1965 War fifty years back was the juncture at which India moved decisively away from a defensive strategic doctrine. The subsequent war in 1971 is evidence of an offensive inflection in India’s strategic doctrine before it once again settled back into one of defensive-deterrence. In the eighties and nineties, India’s posture was one of conventional deterrence by denial through its holding formations and punishment in the form of counter offensive by its strike corps. Its nuclear posture was one of NFU and minimum deterrence, implying counter value targeting but only in retaliation. The Kargil War and Operation Parakram resulted in a shifting away from defensive-deterrence. The question is whether this is a shift to offensive-deterrence or to an offensive strategic doctrine.

In the NDA period the shift towards offensive was made, with changes in both the nuclear and conventional doctrines. The nuclear doctrine that preceded the conventional doctrine created space for conventional operations by positing ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation in case of Pakistan going nuclear even in face of conventional pressure by India. The conventional doctrine – dubbed ‘Cold Start’ - was made proactive and offensive. Even if mindful of potential nuclear thresholds, the nuclear deterrent posture was to enable heightening of any such thresholds. Together the two spell an offensive strategic doctrine rather than an offensive-deterrence one. The NDA displaced soon thereafter led to the new offensive strategic doctrine being still born. Hypothetically, the NDA could if reelected could have employed the ‘carrot and stick’ strategy to get Pakistan to heel, by using the two doctrines – military and nuclear – as stick while the Vajpayee opening up to Pakistan was the carrot.

In the event, the UPA decade led to a step back from the offensive strategic doctrine to offensive-deterrence. The strategic doctrine was influenced by neo-liberalism, the wider strategic philosophy of the government. Even though there was no change in the declaratory doctrines, both conventional and nuclear, the government less than enthusiastic in respect of both. There was no political imprimatur to the conventional doctrine and the government was less than forthcoming on equipment demands, as the preparedness profile of the army in wake of 26/11 demonstrated. At the nuclear level, the critique of the ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation formulation was allowed to play out, discrediting the nuclear doctrine. The nuclear status quo did not matter since the government did not have an offensive strategic doctrine involving ‘Cold Start’ conventional offensives in first place. It was not a defensive-deterrent strategic doctrine either in light of the unmistakable offensive content in conventional doctrine and continuity in nuclear doctrine despite its lack of credibility.

Further at the nuclear level was continuing work on missiles and warheads which when viewed against the discredited ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation formulation meant a move away from the ill-thought out formulation. As to whether the move away was back to the safety of the earlier mantra of ‘punitive’ nuclear retaliation or further to not discounting a nuclear warfighting is moot and can only remain unknown for lack of evidence. The latter - a move towards nuclear warfighting involving lower order retaliation for lower order nuclear first use by Pakistan, such as employment of nuclear armed Nasr – cannot be ruled out owing to such a response being non-escalatory and assured.

This indicates an offensive-deterrent strategic doctrine was in play in the UPA period as seen from the two doctrines – conventional and nuclear. This finding is buttressed by the fact that there was no move in the Manmohan Singh years to coerce Pakistan, despite some grievous terror attacks targeting Indian interests such as at Mumbai and Herat. Even the intelligence game, cited frequently by Pakistan as targeting it, was caliberated at a level to sensitise Pakistan to its underbelly with a deterrent intent in respect of its proxy war in Kashmir. It was therefore not an offensive strategic doctrine.

The discussion brings one up to the current Modi era. The question is whether in light of the projection of itself as a decisive government that is strong on defence, the strategic doctrine is one of offensive-deterrence, offensive or one of compellence. What is Assertive India’s current strategic doctrine? What are the potential strategic doctrines for the future?

There is no question that a qualitative change has taken place with the advent of BJP to power with a parliamentary majority for the first time in a quarter century. This along with the government’s year long distancing from its predecessor in terms of optics and its projection of the prime minister as a decisive leader are indicative of a different India from hitherto fore. In its first year it has concentrated on strengthening fences, even more so than on the economy. In fact it would appear that the economic card of ‘Make in India’ has the defence industrial sector as key. Its foreign policy activism, being tough with Pakistan and taking a stand on the border issue with China are evidence of an Assertive India. The National Security Adviser (NSA) has articulated the intelligence possibilities of Balochistan, if only to deter Pakistani interference in Kashmir. The ‘terror boat’ incident off the Gujarat coast at the turn of the year indicates preparedness. It has hinted at organizational changes in the offing, such as the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the previous government ignored despite its own committee, the Naresh Chandra Task Force, advice on the matter.

The strategic doctrine of the government has remained unarticulated so far. This is of a piece with India’s strategic culture and precedence. It can only be inferred from statements of higher appointments and actions on ground. The measures that make for an Assertive India are suggestive of a shift in strategic doctrine from the offensive-deterrent to an offensive strategic doctrine. Is this reflected in military doctrines: nuclear and conventional?

In the campaigning season last year, it was suggested that the nuclear doctrine would be up for revision. However, since India, as part of its hedging against China is also courting Japan, nuclear doctrine revision has been shelved. This does not mean that it is not underway, in that while declaratory doctrine could remain unchanged, the operational doctrine could be tweaked. With Prahaar posing as India’s answer to Pakistan’s Nasr, it can be taken that India potentially has lower order retaliatory strikes to Pakistani nuclear first use. Its movements towards operationalising the boomer on both fronts - nuclear power and nuclear armed submarine – enable it to move beyond the ‘massive’ formulation since it will by end decade have invulnerable second strike capability.

On the conventional front, the go-ahead to the Army on the LC can be taken as reinforcing conventional deterrence. While the measure was useful from point of view of deterring proxy war action during election season in Kashmir, it also is a message of offensive action on India’s part in case it is provoked by mega-terror attacks. In the event, that India has not been challenged so far is a positive. Also, feelers from the Pakistani army are largely that it is not averse to Nawaz Sharif taking the India relationship further. The downside is of a commitment trap in which India is forced to match its rhetoric and Mr. Modi is to live up to his image when and if tested by just such a terror attack the strategy is designed to deter. Will India in this case behave differently from the Manmohan Singh government when faced with 26/11?

Based on the foregoing the plausible answer to this question is affirmative. It would appear that India may take coercive action in such a case. This need not necessarily be military led. India’s NSA’s intelligence background enables prioritization of other instruments of response. The suggestions in Pakistan of an Indian hand behind Pakistani discomfiture from terror attacks indicate that this lesser known option is a live one. During the Manmohan years a constant refrain from former intelligence officials was underdevelopment of this option. The usual reason cited was that this was taken off the table by Inder Gujral who had excised the capability. That Mr. Manmohan Singh had ineptly allowed Balochistan to figure in his Sharm es Shaikh declaration with Zardari had made his reaching out to Pakistan after 26/11   a dead initiative. It had been pilloried in intelligence circles. Therefore, now that the national security elite and environment is more receptive and Pakistan revealed as more vulnerable after the Peshawar terror attack, it can be expected that the intelligence option figures prominently. Plausible deniability that Pakistani hid behind in the heyday of its proxy war is a card that can now be turned against it. Diplomatically, Mr. Modi’s shuffle of bureaucratic hand in the foreign ministry alongside enables a diplomatic offensive. Obama’s Republic Day visit on invitation to India and Mr. Modi’s impending China visit can help with isolating Pakistan.

This implies that the military option is not necessarily the default option. The Cold Start doctrine is now into its second decade and can be expected to be considerably practiced. The equipment shortfalls are being remedied by the government with one of its first major decisions last August clearing Rs 17000 crores of acquisitions. Since this will take time to materialize, India’s military option can be expected to take a back seat so as to avoid a repeat of the post 26/11 scenario in which its army chief reportedly pointed to equipment shortfalls on being asked after a military response. A military option is particularly risky in terms of outcomes. Inability to prevail could lead to escalation impetus from within the Indian side. This would imperil over the long term the developmentalist plank of the government. It would also expose it to embarrassment if it exposes lack of strategic finesse. The military reforms such as levels of jointness necessary for such operations have not been undertaken yet. There are no indicators in open domain as to whether the government has ironed out the issues roundly critiqued in both the conventional and nuclear doctrines. It is hardly likely to chance the military instrument with unrevised doctrines it has not had time to familiarize itself with. It would also be more difficult to sustain diplomatically. The China factor cannot be discounted. Therefore, the military option can better serve to deter rather than be deployed if it comes to the crunch.

What is the potential strategic doctrine of the new regime? Once all the military cards are on the table in terms of doctrinal revision, organizational reform and equipment acquisitions, possible by end decade and in the prospective second term of the current NDA government, it is possible for India’s strategic doctrine to move up a notch. On the Pakistan front, this could be from the offensive strategic doctrine today to a coercive and compellent strategic doctrine. For China, an explicit offensive-deterrent can be envisaged with acquisitions in the offing in terms of mobility and firepower for the Mountain Strike Corps. The direction of India’s US relationship, including its military-technology prong with US displacing Russia as India’s largest arms exporter, is such as to make primarily for a force projection capability. This is in keeping with US’ expectations of India in the relationship, currently couched in the security provider framework. This will be the culmination of Assertive India and signal its ‘arrival’ as a Great Power.

To sum up, this article has made the case of a shift up the strategic doctrinal continuum by India. In the UPA period, India placed at the interstices of defensive-deterrent and offensive-deterrent juncture of the spectrum. In the second NDA period, an Assertive India has been posited. The implication of this is a movement in strategic doctrine up one notch to an offensive strategic doctrine in respect of Pakistan and offensive-deterrent in respect of China. The multiple defence related measures in place by the new government suggest a potential movement towards a compellent doctrine in respect of Pakistan and an explicit offensive-deterrence in relation to China.
Previous governments have not been inclined to articulation of strategic doctrine. This owed to India’s unstated strategic doctrine being slightly more reliant on force than India’s strategic professions would have it. India’s present government has no such inhibitions. Therefore, its stepping up to acknowledge the strategic doctrine attributed here to it is possible to envisage. This should be encouraged by calls for a national security policy white paper or open domain periodic strategic reviews. This will serve deterrence, besides conditioning the government to the underside of the offensive-compellent direction it appears headed.  

  

INDIA-PAKISTAN: CONTRASTING DOCTRINES

Agni, http://fsss.in/publications.htm

Introduction

Khalid Kidwai, after retiring end last year from his decade and half stewardship role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as head of its Strategic Plans Division, presented a holistic picture of Pakistan’s nuclear direction at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015.[2] He candidly admitted that Nasr, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear missile system, was part of its ‘full spectrum’ nuclear capability buildup designed to deter conventional operations by India, along with a ‘healthy’ conventional capability balance. In his view, it was to stump Cold Start since to him nuclear weapons were an extention of conventional weapons and would be used to supplement conventional capability. He rationalized this by referring to its deterrence value in this was aimed  at closing what was to India a gap below the nuclear threshold in which it could employ its conventional advantage. His emphasis on deterrent role of nuclear capability was probed by his interlocutor, Peter Lavoy, as to whether Pakistan would dissociate itself from militant groups since such linkages were destabilizing, as they prompted India to rely on its conventional forces.  In answer, Kidwai seemed to justify the connection between the military and militants.

This prelude brings out the linkage between Pakistan’s strategic doctrine and its military doctrines – subconventional, conventional and nuclear - as also brings to fore the interaction between the doctrines – strategic and military - of the two states, India and Pakistan. Clearly then, any examination of these doctrines cannot be done in isolation but instead has to be done collectively and in their interaction with the doctrine of the other side. This paper attempts to make such an examination. It first looks at Pakistani doctrine and the Indian perspective of the doctrines. It then looks at Indian doctrines and their inter-dependence with Pakistani doctrines. It finally tries to work out the opportunities that exist for doctrinal exchanges between the two states for strategic stability, conflict management and conflict resolution.

Pakistan’s doctrines

Unlike in most states in which strategic doctrine is a governmental prerogative, Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is one made by its military. The military aims to create the conditions for resolution of the Kashmir question, which to it is one of self-determination. With military deterrence in place, politicians are to get on with resolving the issue with India. Deterrence is therefore the declaratory strategic doctrine. The manner this is worked is by nuclear deterrence covering both nuclear and conventional levels. Nuclear weapons are to make up for the conventional asymmetry with India, even if a conventional balance, though not parity, is sought to be maintained. With deterrence in place at the conventional-nuclear level, at the subconventional level, proxy war through militants is to incentivize Indian interest in resolution of the Kashmir question. Strategic doctrine is therefore not merely one of deterrence as Pakistan presents it, but of offensive deterrence, with Pakistan being offensive at the subconventional level through use of proxies and at the nuclear level by a tacit ‘first use’ doctrine.

At the nuclear level, ‘full spectrum’ capability implies having second strike capability not in the traditional invulnerable sense of a ‘boomer’, but through other measures such as vertical proliferation, dispersion, secrecy, using diesel electric submarines etc. It also has nuclear weapons and delivery systems enabling operational level and a ‘shoot and scoot … quick response’ tactical level nuclear weapons capability. Not adhering to No First Use and intending to deploy its nuclear capability in conflict, it has different options of nuclear first use. This facilitates graduated escalation, thereby incentivizing avoidance of value targeting for India. A conflict going nuclear in this manner can, with minimum damage possible, be expected to focus international attention on its earliest termination. The post conflict phase would then inevitably include pressure for resolution of the ‘root causes’ that include Kashmir.

The nuclear doctrine is easily placed in the offensive category. It does not adhere to NFU; it deploys tactical level nuclear weapons and is a warfighting nuclear doctrine. In addition, the extension of ballistic missile ranges to about 3000m with the Shaheen III is intended to cover all of India’s landmass and its island territories, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands where Pakistan apprehends a prospective location for long range ballistic missiles and strategic submarines. Khalid Kidwai justifies this as an attempt to degrade India’s second strike capability.     

At the conventional level, the doctrine is not an offensive one. The conventional equation with India has changed over the past two decades with India having the edge of one strike corps over Pakistan. It can be argued that Pakistan’s was an offensive doctrine half a century ago, but no longer. In the 1965 War, it launched Operation Grand Slam and also the thrust by 1 Armoured Division into Khem Karan. However, in the 1971 War it was largely defensive and did not strike in the west in order to save its East, even though it could have done so in the west. In the seventies and eighties, it was credited with an offensive conventional doctrine and intent to make quick gains relying on interior lines of communication and proximity to the border of its military bases. However, conventional asymmetry under circumstance of US aid cut off in the nineties and a raging proxy war in Kashmir made resort to offensive respectively difficult and unnecessary. Pakistan’s conventional doctrine can therefore be seen to be one of defensive deterrence in that it maintains a capability to be able to blunt India’s conventional offensives, while attempting through strategic posturing to make quick gains of its own.

At the subconventional level its historical proxy war penchant easily enables characterizing of its doctrine as an offensive doctrine.  While it has for tactical reasons owing to the situation to its west restrained itself over the last decade, it has the capability to up the ante. This continues to exist due to the population in Kashmir continuing to be alienated from India to an extent. It has the capability to up the proxy war ante in India with mega terror attacks, witnessed twice over last decade. However, its alleged attempt at expanding proxy war possibilities in the Indian hinterland have not been met with any success, allegations of minority perpetrated terrorism in India being highly exaggerated. India’s subconventional response measures continuing in place and its counter infiltration posture strengthened by the LC fence have influenced Pakistan strategy (as distinct from doctrine). India has indicated no desire to settle outstanding differences Pakistan’s way and it has instead, in Pakistan’s view, subject Pakistan to a reverse proxy war. Pakistan’s subconventional doctrine has consequently shifted in its focus – temporarily – towards Afghanistan, launch pad of India’s alleged proxy war against Pakistan; but remains offensive. Even its subconventional level responses are offensive; witness Pakistan army’s tackling of terror in its west.

India’s doctrines

India’s strategic doctrine, though unwritten, can be seen to be moving from defensive deterrence to offensive deterrence and in relation to Pakistan is arguably one of compellence. India, though pledged to a bilateral and peaceful settlement to the Kashmir dispute, is unable to countenance politically the implications for sovereignty over the Valley. It has therefore had to deter Pakistan from militarily changing the status quo. However, rising power asymmetry in India’s favour and its ambitions have led to India wanting to transcend the region. It is therefore moving from offensive deterrence to compellence, visible in the deepening conventional military asymmetry, intelligence-led reversal of proxy war at the subconventional level and a variegated nuclear capability enabling both first strike potential, if it’s BMD and spy satellite capabilities are taken seriously, and an invulnerable second strike capability by decade end. Pakistan, seeing the writing on the wall and going downhill, is expected to fall into line. This bespeaks of compellence and is reflected in its military doctrines. 

Whereas its conventional capability based on counter offensive capability enabled defensive deterrence, it was unable to extend conventional deterrence to the subconventional level. The nuclear factor had intervened with Pakistan checkmating India’s conventional capability and gaining thereby impunity at the subconventional level. India’s has been a defensive subconventional level response thus far aimed at containing the proxy war. It appears to have covertly launched its proxy war in Baluchistan as early as last decade. Pakistan’s complaint found mention in the Sharm es Shaikh joint statement and has more unambiguously been repeated half decade down the line with the Pakistan army leveling a direct accusation this year.

The shift to the offensive is readily visible at the conventional level. The Cold Start doctrine was advertised as ‘proactive strategy’. The capability has been created within the pivot corps for offensive operations with integrated battle groups. Strike corps continue to practice in exercises multiple obstacle crossings along multiple axes. The shift from defensive deterrence to offensive was to end Pakistani impunity at the subcoventional level. Pakistan’s nuclear cover is given short shrift with one chief saying that they are not for warfighting but are ‘a strategic capability and that is where it should end.’[3] There is a decided nonchalance in India’s reception of Nasr. The answer to it is taken to be at the nuclear level even as offensive conventional operations envisage even strike corps operations. In one report, a strategic command (as distinct from strategic forces command) is to be operationalised, perhaps based on Central Command, for coordinating deep battles of strike corps on enemy territory.

Counter intuitively the nuclear doctrine is offensive. The NFU in the doctrine is taken as reflecting defensive deterrence. However, since NFU is merely a declaration of intent and that the doctrine envisages ‘massive’ retaliation for inflicting punitive levels of nuclear damage make it less defensive than it is advertised. Taken in relation to the conventional doctrine it is decidedly more offensive than India would admit to. As seen, the conventional doctrine is an offensive one. In light of Pakistani projections of a low nuclear threshold, there is need to pull up the nuclear threshold so as to create the necessary gap for conventional operations below the threshold. This is attempted by promising a massive counter strike, presumably counter value to any form of nuclear use against India or its troops anywhere, including on enemy territory. Therefore, the declaratory nuclear doctrine in conjunction with the offensive conventional doctrine is offensive. Together they reflect and express a strategic doctrine of compellence.

Additionally, since both the subconventional doctrine of 2006 and conventional doctrine of 2004 were revised without mention in the open domain even by way of a press release in 2010 and 2013 respectively,[4] there is no guarantee that the declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 continues as India’s nuclear doctrine.[5] The logic of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation does not stand strategic scrutiny in the more likely circumstance of nuclear first use by Pakistan of lower order nuclear first use. The findings on the global climate effects of even a regional nuclear war since the doctrine was adopted in 2003 suggest that it is unimplementable (to use Admiral Bhagwat’s phrase). Therefore, it is well nigh likely that India may have an operational doctrine distinct from its declaratory doctrine. In effect, India may be contemplating a quid pro quo and quid pro quo plus response, for which it has the capability.

The doctrine-strategy link

There is apparently a doctrinal contest on between the two states. At the subconventional level, India has turned the tables on Pakistan, if Pakistan’s protestations of being on the receiving end of India’s intelligence operations are taken at face value. At the conventional level, India’s proactive doctrine has led to Pakistan reviewing its conventional counter in the exercise series Azm e Nau and going in for tactical nuclear weapons. The latter was to plug the gap between the subconventional and nuclear levels that India wanted to use for its conventional operations. At the nuclear level, both doctrines at a declaratory level continue as offensive doctrines.

India questions Pakistan’s resolve for lower order first use by continuing with its conventional exercises involving strike corps such the one this year that tested the integrated battle groups (IBG) of a pivot corps in South Western Command and a strike corps of Western Command. The exercise area being the same in general area Suratgarh and the dates in late April suggests that the two exercised together with the pivot corps providing the launch pads for the strike corps in the area captured by its IBGs.[6] This implies the strike corps, not needing to get involved in the break in battles, would be able with its complement of forces to strike deeper. This is to challenge Pakistan’s resolve to follow through on its deterrent promise of nuclear first use. Alongside, it can be imagined that the two other strike corps would also be in action and so would an assortment of pivot corps IBGs, such as Gurj Division that also practiced its paces this year.

In turn, Pakistan questions India’s threat to ‘call its bluff’ and its follow through with ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation. Pakistan’s coverage through Shaheen III of possible sites of strategic assets as far away as the Andaman and Nicobar islands is to degrade the ability and intent of ‘massive’ retaliation, thereby discouraging it. The interactivity between the two doctrines is evident. India’s ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation postulation has led to damage limitation thinking in Pakistan in its acquiring ballistic missiles of the appropriate range. The aim is perhaps to encourage a shift towards proportionate response on India’s part, thereby reducing any damage that may accrue on account of its nuclear first use. The unconsidered fallout of Pakistan’s action - advertised by no less than Khalid Kidwai as intended to deny India a second strike capability - is to make ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation appear more promising to India under the logic of ‘use them, lose them’.

More importantly, Kidwai’s reasoning betrays a gap in his cognizance of nuclear theory. He says that  this  is to ‘deny’ India a second strike capability, little realizing that this is inherently destabilizing since it would provoke India to go in instead for the ‘massive’ counter strike or indeed attempt a first strike of its own regardless at the crunch of its NFU pledge. In fact, mutually deterrence is based on mutually assured destruction ability on both sides. If one side attempts to deny the other side such an ability, it would impose pressure on the side so denied for being, to quote General Patton, ‘firstest with the mostest’ or be consider first strike (as distinct from first use).

Likewise, there is a flaw in India’s nuclear doctrine in its use of term ‘massive’ in first place. Since, as seen, such levels of attack on a nuclear power with nuclear weapons in three digits is not feasible, India by not undertaking a review of its declaratory doctrine even after a decade of its promulgation in 2003, is compounding the earlier error of inclusion of the term. If indeed it has reviewed its doctrine and has a different operational doctrine, then this lack of transparency on India’s part is leading to vertical proliferation on Pakistan’s part.

The interlocking of the doctrines of the two sides at all three levels – subconventional, conventional and nuclear – is not conducive to security for either state or the region. With Pakistan indicating that it is feeling the pinch from India’s intelligence operations, it has three options. One is to revive the Kashmiri insurgency, a problematic proposition in light of India’s control. Second, it could escalate the proxy war in Afghanistan in order to set the conditions for reverting its attention to its east. Third, it could resort to mega terror attacks, but runs the risk of India’s conventional counter. This counter need not necessarily be in the Cold Start mode, but may be infliction of harm by conventional forces to include air attacks and possible limited forays by an IBG or two with lightening retraction.

The prospects of escalation in this last scenario lend pause. Since Pakistan may not be able to respond in the air medium, being army dominated it may attempt do so on land. This could be in the Kashmir theatre so as to create a gap in the fence briefly for influx of terrorists to revive the insurgency. Its precautionary moves elsewhere could trigger the Cold Start timeline. Since Pakistan would be able to cope with IBGs by themselves, India may want to supplement with strike corps to come out on top of the engagement. Pakistan seeing this as a test of its resolve – India’s attempt at calling its bluff – it may be inclined from a future deterrence point of view to exhibit its tactical nuclear weapons. With the introduction of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, India may find itself in a commitment trap. Escalation can ensue, particularly if Pakistan also preemptively employs its Shaheen III. This may push India towards ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation, where it could otherwise have settled for proportionate retaliation under the ‘flexible’ nuclear retaliatory logic. Since nuclear confidence building measures have not proceeded to the required extent, de-escalation and exchange termination would be dependent on diplomatic resources of the international community.

Conclusion

Clearly, there is a case for a doctrinal exchange between India and Pakistan. Both have exhibited deficiencies in their understanding of nuclear doctrine with Khalid Kidwai not appreciating the criticality of second strike ability for stability and India promising unnecessarily a ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation and unable to step back from the commitment trap it is in even a decade since the gaffe. Pakistan’s projection of South Asia as a nuclear hotspot in its intent to go nuclear and  India’s show of nonchalance in contemplating first use by its adversary do not build confidence that  the two states are as responsible as they appear to themselves.

India cannot wait for its neighbor’s initiative. Pakistan is military ruled. It has less to lose. It is living in the past. India is the major power in the region. Its economic trajectory can certainly withstand limited war and may even stand to benefit by it, but even a limited nuclear war may be a little too much. India therefore must reconcile its strategic doctrine with its grand strategy. An economy-centric grand strategy is not in sync with a strategic doctrine of compellence. The strategic doctrine requires being tweaked to revert to deterrence, albeit offensive deterrence. This must then reflect in the military doctrines: nuclear, conventional and subconventional. The National Security Council has its task cut out.

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[1]Ali Ahmed is author of India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia (Routledge 2014), On War in South Asia and On Peace in South Asia (both CinnamonTeal 2015). He blogs at www.ali-writings.blogspot.in. 

[2] ‘A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai’, Monitor 360, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 March 23, 2015, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2015.

[3] Hans M. Kristensen ‘Indian Army Chief: Nukes Not For Warfighting’, available at

http://fas.org/blogs/security/2012/01/warfighting/, accessed on 14 May 2015.

[4] Ali Ahmed, ‘Opening up the doctrinal space’, available at http://www.claws.in/1375/opening-up-the-doctrinal-space-ali-ahmed.html, accessed on 29 April 2015.

[5] Ali Ahmed,  ‘This Year’s Maneuver Season In India’, available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/11052015-this-years-maneuver-season-in-india-oped/, accessed on 12 May 2015.

[6] Ali Ahmed, ‘What This Year’s Maneuver Season in India Tells Us’, available at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/05/12/what-this-years-maneuver-season-in-india-tells-us/, accessed on 14 May 2015.