INDIA-PAKISTAN:
CONTRASTING DOCTRINES
Agni, http://fsss.in/publications.htm
Introduction
Khalid Kidwai, after retiring end
last year from his decade and half stewardship role in Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program as head of its Strategic Plans Division, presented a holistic
picture of Pakistan’s nuclear direction at the Carnegie International Nuclear
Policy Conference 2015.
He candidly admitted that Nasr, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear missile system, was
part of its ‘full spectrum’ nuclear capability buildup designed to deter
conventional operations by India, along with a ‘healthy’ conventional
capability balance. In his view, it was to stump Cold Start since to him
nuclear weapons were an extention of conventional weapons and would be used to
supplement conventional capability. He rationalized this by referring to its
deterrence value in this was aimed at
closing what was to India a gap below the nuclear threshold in which it could
employ its conventional advantage. His emphasis on deterrent role of nuclear
capability was probed by his interlocutor, Peter Lavoy, as to whether Pakistan
would dissociate itself from militant groups since such linkages were destabilizing,
as they prompted India to rely on its conventional forces. In answer, Kidwai seemed to justify the
connection between the military and militants.
This prelude brings out the
linkage between Pakistan’s strategic doctrine and its military doctrines –
subconventional, conventional and nuclear - as also brings to fore the
interaction between the doctrines – strategic and military - of the two states,
India and Pakistan. Clearly then, any examination of these doctrines cannot be
done in isolation but instead has to be done collectively and in their
interaction with the doctrine of the other side. This paper attempts to make
such an examination. It first looks at Pakistani doctrine and the Indian
perspective of the doctrines. It then looks at Indian doctrines and their
inter-dependence with Pakistani doctrines. It finally tries to work out the
opportunities that exist for doctrinal exchanges between the two states for
strategic stability, conflict management and conflict resolution.
Pakistan’s doctrines
Unlike in most states in which
strategic doctrine is a governmental prerogative, Pakistan’s strategic doctrine
is one made by its military. The military aims to create the conditions for
resolution of the Kashmir question, which to it is one of self-determination.
With military deterrence in place, politicians are to get on with resolving the
issue with India. Deterrence is therefore the declaratory strategic doctrine.
The manner this is worked is by nuclear deterrence covering both nuclear and
conventional levels. Nuclear weapons are to make up for the conventional
asymmetry with India, even if a conventional balance, though not parity, is
sought to be maintained. With deterrence in place at the conventional-nuclear
level, at the subconventional level, proxy war through militants is to
incentivize Indian interest in resolution of the Kashmir question. Strategic doctrine
is therefore not merely one of deterrence as Pakistan presents it, but of
offensive deterrence, with Pakistan being offensive at the subconventional
level through use of proxies and at the nuclear level by a tacit ‘first use’
doctrine.
At the nuclear level, ‘full
spectrum’ capability implies having second strike capability not in the
traditional invulnerable sense of a ‘boomer’, but through other measures such
as vertical proliferation, dispersion, secrecy, using diesel electric
submarines etc. It also has nuclear weapons and delivery systems enabling
operational level and a ‘shoot and scoot … quick response’ tactical level
nuclear weapons capability. Not adhering to No First Use and intending to
deploy its nuclear capability in conflict, it has different options of nuclear
first use. This facilitates graduated escalation, thereby incentivizing avoidance
of value targeting for India. A conflict going nuclear in this manner can, with
minimum damage possible, be expected to focus international attention on its
earliest termination. The post conflict phase would then inevitably include pressure
for resolution of the ‘root causes’ that include Kashmir.
The nuclear doctrine is easily
placed in the offensive category. It does not adhere to NFU; it deploys
tactical level nuclear weapons and is a warfighting nuclear doctrine. In
addition, the extension of ballistic missile ranges to about 3000m with the
Shaheen III is intended to cover all of India’s landmass and its island
territories, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands where Pakistan
apprehends a prospective location for long range ballistic missiles and
strategic submarines. Khalid Kidwai justifies this as an attempt to degrade
India’s second strike capability.
At the conventional level, the
doctrine is not an offensive one. The conventional equation with India has
changed over the past two decades with India having the edge of one strike
corps over Pakistan. It can be argued that Pakistan’s was an offensive doctrine
half a century ago, but no longer. In the 1965 War, it launched Operation Grand
Slam and also the thrust by 1 Armoured Division into Khem Karan. However, in
the 1971 War it was largely defensive and did not strike in the west in order
to save its East, even though it could have done so in the west. In the
seventies and eighties, it was credited with an offensive conventional doctrine
and intent to make quick gains relying on interior lines of communication and
proximity to the border of its military bases. However, conventional asymmetry
under circumstance of US aid cut off in the nineties and a raging proxy war in
Kashmir made resort to offensive respectively difficult and unnecessary. Pakistan’s
conventional doctrine can therefore be seen to be one of defensive deterrence
in that it maintains a capability to be able to blunt India’s conventional
offensives, while attempting through strategic posturing to make quick gains of
its own.
At the subconventional level its historical
proxy war penchant easily enables characterizing of its doctrine as an
offensive doctrine. While it has for
tactical reasons owing to the situation to its west restrained itself over the
last decade, it has the capability to up the ante. This continues to exist due
to the population in Kashmir continuing to be alienated from India to an
extent. It has the capability to up the proxy war ante in India with mega
terror attacks, witnessed twice over last decade. However, its alleged attempt
at expanding proxy war possibilities in the Indian hinterland have not been met
with any success, allegations of minority perpetrated terrorism in India being
highly exaggerated. India’s subconventional response measures continuing in
place and its counter infiltration posture strengthened by the LC fence have
influenced Pakistan strategy (as distinct from doctrine). India has indicated
no desire to settle outstanding differences Pakistan’s way and it has instead,
in Pakistan’s view, subject Pakistan to a reverse proxy war. Pakistan’s
subconventional doctrine has consequently shifted in its focus – temporarily –
towards Afghanistan, launch pad of India’s alleged proxy war against Pakistan;
but remains offensive. Even its subconventional level responses are offensive;
witness Pakistan army’s tackling of terror in its west.
India’s doctrines
India’s strategic doctrine,
though unwritten, can be seen to be moving from defensive deterrence to
offensive deterrence and in relation to Pakistan is arguably one of
compellence. India, though pledged to a bilateral and peaceful settlement to
the Kashmir dispute, is unable to countenance politically the implications for
sovereignty over the Valley. It has therefore had to deter Pakistan from militarily
changing the status quo. However, rising power asymmetry in India’s favour and
its ambitions have led to India wanting to transcend the region. It is
therefore moving from offensive deterrence to compellence, visible in the
deepening conventional military asymmetry, intelligence-led reversal of proxy
war at the subconventional level and a variegated nuclear capability enabling
both first strike potential, if it’s BMD and spy satellite capabilities are
taken seriously, and an invulnerable second strike capability by decade end. Pakistan,
seeing the writing on the wall and going downhill, is expected to fall into
line. This bespeaks of compellence and is reflected in its military
doctrines.
Whereas its conventional
capability based on counter offensive capability enabled defensive deterrence,
it was unable to extend conventional deterrence to the subconventional level. The
nuclear factor had intervened with Pakistan checkmating India’s conventional
capability and gaining thereby impunity at the subconventional level. India’s
has been a defensive subconventional level response thus far aimed at
containing the proxy war. It appears to have covertly launched its proxy war in
Baluchistan as early as last decade. Pakistan’s complaint found mention in the
Sharm es Shaikh joint statement and has more unambiguously been repeated half
decade down the line with the Pakistan army leveling a direct accusation this
year.
The shift to the offensive is
readily visible at the conventional level. The Cold Start doctrine was
advertised as ‘proactive strategy’. The capability has been created within the
pivot corps for offensive operations with integrated battle groups. Strike
corps continue to practice in exercises multiple obstacle crossings along
multiple axes. The shift from defensive deterrence to offensive was to end
Pakistani impunity at the subcoventional level. Pakistan’s nuclear cover is
given short shrift with one chief saying that they are not for warfighting but
are ‘a strategic capability and that is where it should end.’
There is a decided nonchalance in India’s reception of Nasr. The answer to it
is taken to be at the nuclear level even as offensive conventional operations
envisage even strike corps operations. In one report, a strategic command (as
distinct from strategic forces command) is to be operationalised, perhaps based
on Central Command, for coordinating deep battles of strike corps on enemy
territory.
Counter intuitively the nuclear
doctrine is offensive. The NFU in the doctrine is taken as reflecting defensive
deterrence. However, since NFU is merely a declaration of intent and that the
doctrine envisages ‘massive’ retaliation for inflicting punitive levels of
nuclear damage make it less defensive than it is advertised. Taken in relation
to the conventional doctrine it is decidedly more offensive than India would
admit to. As seen, the conventional doctrine is an offensive one. In light of
Pakistani projections of a low nuclear threshold, there is need to pull up the
nuclear threshold so as to create the necessary gap for conventional operations
below the threshold. This is attempted by promising a massive counter strike,
presumably counter value to any form of nuclear use against India or its troops
anywhere, including on enemy territory. Therefore, the declaratory nuclear
doctrine in conjunction with the offensive conventional doctrine is offensive.
Together they reflect and express a strategic doctrine of compellence.
Additionally, since both the
subconventional doctrine of 2006 and conventional doctrine of 2004 were revised
without mention in the open domain even by way of a press release in 2010 and
2013 respectively,
there is no guarantee that the declaratory nuclear doctrine of 2003 continues
as India’s nuclear doctrine.
The logic of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation does not stand strategic scrutiny in
the more likely circumstance of nuclear first use by Pakistan of lower order
nuclear first use. The findings on the global climate effects of even a
regional nuclear war since the doctrine was adopted in 2003 suggest that it is
unimplementable (to use Admiral Bhagwat’s phrase). Therefore, it is well nigh
likely that India may have an operational doctrine distinct from its
declaratory doctrine. In effect, India may be contemplating a quid pro quo and
quid pro quo plus response, for which it has the capability.
The doctrine-strategy link
There is apparently a doctrinal
contest on between the two states. At the subconventional level, India has
turned the tables on Pakistan, if Pakistan’s protestations of being on the
receiving end of India’s intelligence operations are taken at face value. At
the conventional level, India’s proactive doctrine has led to Pakistan
reviewing its conventional counter in the exercise series Azm e Nau and going
in for tactical nuclear weapons. The latter was to plug the gap between the
subconventional and nuclear levels that India wanted to use for its
conventional operations. At the nuclear level, both doctrines at a declaratory
level continue as offensive doctrines.
India questions Pakistan’s
resolve for lower order first use by continuing with its conventional exercises
involving strike corps such the one this year that tested the integrated battle
groups (IBG) of a pivot corps in South Western Command and a strike corps of
Western Command. The exercise area being the same in general area Suratgarh and
the dates in late April suggests that the two exercised together with the pivot
corps providing the launch pads for the strike corps in the area captured by
its IBGs.
This implies the strike corps, not needing to get involved in the break in
battles, would be able with its complement of forces to strike deeper. This is
to challenge Pakistan’s resolve to follow through on its deterrent promise of
nuclear first use. Alongside, it can be imagined that the two other strike
corps would also be in action and so would an assortment of pivot corps IBGs,
such as Gurj Division that also practiced its paces this year.
In turn, Pakistan questions
India’s threat to ‘call its bluff’ and its follow through with ‘massive’
nuclear retaliation. Pakistan’s coverage through Shaheen III of possible sites
of strategic assets as far away as the Andaman and Nicobar islands is to
degrade the ability and intent of ‘massive’ retaliation, thereby discouraging
it. The interactivity between the two doctrines is evident. India’s ‘massive’
nuclear retaliation postulation has led to damage limitation thinking in
Pakistan in its acquiring ballistic missiles of the appropriate range. The aim
is perhaps to encourage a shift towards proportionate response on India’s part,
thereby reducing any damage that may accrue on account of its nuclear first
use. The unconsidered fallout of Pakistan’s action - advertised by no less than
Khalid Kidwai as intended to deny India a second strike capability - is to make
‘massive’ nuclear retaliation appear more promising to India under the logic of
‘use them, lose them’.
More importantly, Kidwai’s
reasoning betrays a gap in his cognizance of nuclear theory. He says that this
is to ‘deny’ India a second strike capability, little realizing that
this is inherently destabilizing since it would provoke India to go in instead
for the ‘massive’ counter strike or indeed attempt a first strike of its own
regardless at the crunch of its NFU pledge. In fact, mutually deterrence is
based on mutually assured destruction ability on both sides. If one side
attempts to deny the other side such an ability, it would impose pressure on the
side so denied for being, to quote General Patton, ‘firstest with the mostest’
or be consider first strike (as distinct from first use).
Likewise, there is a flaw in
India’s nuclear doctrine in its use of term ‘massive’ in first place. Since, as
seen, such levels of attack on a nuclear power with nuclear weapons in three
digits is not feasible, India by not undertaking a review of its declaratory
doctrine even after a decade of its promulgation in 2003, is compounding the
earlier error of inclusion of the term. If indeed it has reviewed its doctrine
and has a different operational doctrine, then this lack of transparency on India’s
part is leading to vertical proliferation on Pakistan’s part.
The interlocking of the doctrines
of the two sides at all three levels – subconventional, conventional and
nuclear – is not conducive to security for either state or the region. With
Pakistan indicating that it is feeling the pinch from India’s intelligence
operations, it has three options. One is to revive the Kashmiri insurgency, a
problematic proposition in light of India’s control. Second, it could escalate
the proxy war in Afghanistan in order to set the conditions for reverting its
attention to its east. Third, it could resort to mega terror attacks, but runs
the risk of India’s conventional counter. This counter need not necessarily be
in the Cold Start mode, but may be infliction of harm by conventional forces to
include air attacks and possible limited forays by an IBG or two with
lightening retraction.
The prospects of escalation in
this last scenario lend pause. Since Pakistan may not be able to respond in the
air medium, being army dominated it may attempt do so on land. This could be in
the Kashmir theatre so as to create a gap in the fence briefly for influx of
terrorists to revive the insurgency. Its precautionary moves elsewhere could
trigger the Cold Start timeline. Since Pakistan would be able to cope with IBGs
by themselves, India may want to supplement with strike corps to come out on
top of the engagement. Pakistan seeing this as a test of its resolve – India’s
attempt at calling its bluff – it may be inclined from a future deterrence
point of view to exhibit its tactical nuclear weapons. With the introduction of
nuclear weapons on the battlefield, India may find itself in a commitment trap.
Escalation can ensue, particularly if Pakistan also preemptively employs its
Shaheen III. This may push India towards ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation, where
it could otherwise have settled for proportionate retaliation under the
‘flexible’ nuclear retaliatory logic. Since nuclear confidence building
measures have not proceeded to the required extent, de-escalation and exchange
termination would be dependent on diplomatic resources of the international
community.
Conclusion
Clearly, there is a case for a
doctrinal exchange between India and Pakistan. Both have exhibited deficiencies
in their understanding of nuclear doctrine with Khalid Kidwai not appreciating
the criticality of second strike ability for stability and India promising
unnecessarily a ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation and unable to step back from the
commitment trap it is in even a decade since the gaffe. Pakistan’s projection
of South Asia as a nuclear hotspot in its intent to go nuclear and India’s show of nonchalance in contemplating
first use by its adversary do not build confidence that the two states are as responsible as they
appear to themselves.
India cannot wait for its
neighbor’s initiative. Pakistan is military ruled. It has less to lose. It is living
in the past. India is the major power in the region. Its economic trajectory
can certainly withstand limited war and may even stand to benefit by it, but
even a limited nuclear war may be a little too much. India therefore must
reconcile its strategic doctrine with its grand strategy. An economy-centric
grand strategy is not in sync with a strategic doctrine of compellence. The
strategic doctrine requires being tweaked to revert to deterrence, albeit
offensive deterrence. This must then reflect in the military doctrines:
nuclear, conventional and subconventional. The National Security Council has
its task cut out.
