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Strategic culture: Rajnath Singh tests the waters on next steps

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Speaking as the ‘yajman’ (‘chief patron of religious rituals’) at the second anniversary of the Ayodhya temple consecration, India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh, said, “Ram is humble. Ram is virtuous. Ram is compassionate. But where necessity arises... Ramji takes on the role of vanquishing the wicked there as well. During Operation Sindoor, we worked under that same inspiration of Lord Ram.” For him and his colleagues in the Cabinet Committee on Security to draw on their shared cultural wellsprings during Op Sindoor is unsurprising.

At the event, Singh was present in his personage as Raksha mantri. He prayed, “May this flag of Sanatana Dharma continue to fly as long as the sun and the moon endure. May Lord Ram guide us all on the path of duty.” This is a natural corollary to cultural nationalism subscribed to by Singh. Rajnath Singh legitimates such subscription, thus:

No social movement is born suddenly from zero. It emerges from the consciousness of society, grows within society and takes shape while changing itself according to the changes in society. And when the movement progresses, it determines the direction of society. The temple construction movement has also been such a movement which not only shook history, but also gave direction to the present and laid the foundation for the future.

There are three higher-order problems with such formulation. One is the proximity it betrays of state and religion; the second is the partisan role of the state in the contested space of religion in a diverse society; and the third is implications for rationality and modernity that an anachronistic uptick in religion implies. Instead, here Singh is met at his own level.

When humility, virtuousness and compassion are notable in their absence from the regime’s repertoire, its claims to being inspired by a deity cannot be taken at face value. It shows instead the appropriation by political Hinduism – cultural nationalism - for legitimation of a bellicose turn to strategic doctrine. The changed visual depiction of the Lord - itself a step succeeding the makeover of widely loved Lord Hanuman – presaged this. As for the ‘movement,’ it stands forever tainted with the demolition of a mosque and a judicial sleight of hand that handed it the proceeds of its handiwork. Whether such a shady start can or should secure the future direction of society is debatable.

This is of a piece with Rajnath Singh’s belief system, which holds that, “Lord Ram is not merely an embodiment in stone, wood or soil, he is the centre of our culture and faith.” To him, “Lord Ram is our identity as well as that of our country.” The primacy of religion as identity carries significance for the ongoing (re)shaping of Indian strategic culture. Given the stranglehold the regime has acquired over all institutions, not least over those in the domain of national security - including lately the military - the regime cannot but be expected to pitch for strategic culture’s evolution in a certain direction. Hardly organic, the illegitimacy of this impulse must not be missed.

Strategic theory visualises three hierarchical platters in strategic discourse. The upper platter is somewhat amorphous, comprising the national ethic or ideology informing strategic doctrine or approach to the use of force. The second platter consists of guidance, the somewhat diffuse defence policy and military doctrines. The lowest platter has the tangible products: grand strategy and strategy. A hierarchical layering ensures pathways and guardrails are provided by the higher, prolix layer for the next lower, progressively more concise layer. Together and over time, these ideational tracts - along with implementation outcomes - shape strategic culture.

Strategic culture defined loosely is the historically-informed attitudes to power and behaviour of a nation in regard to the use of force. The location of the national ethic at the apex of the process makes it a consequential piece. Miscuing it potentially renders askew the whole strategic edifice. The debate in India over absence of strategic products – as the national security strategy - owes to the contestation over the national ethic. The Constitution - that drew on the ideals of the freedom movement - has mostly served for convergence in thinking on national security. However, witnessed in the Modi era is an attempt to lend an authoritative stamp on the national ethic, riding on the back of religion.

This owes to the unacknowledged political project furthered by the regime. There is a duality at play. While the Constitution is bowed to at one side, it is surreptitiously shredded at the other. The security domain - relied on by the regime for legitimation and sustenance - cannot escape such a game-plan. The harnessing of strategic culture to the regime’s purpose is yet another measure towards such an end.

Strategic culture is being constructed afresh through official diktat in the regime’s image. With a self-regard of being strong-on-defence it is eking out vignettes and aphorisms from ancient texts on India’s martial grandeur, seen by it as having been eclipsed for the past 1200 years. The regime is seeking Kautilyan thinking as revetment for its security policies. Barring exceptions, Bollywood has also largely been sequestered in its manufacture.

This is unexceptionable in itself, since the regime can well pitch for an assertive strategic doctrine and condition public sentiment accordingly. Afterall, its detractors back the robust counterpoise that has historically rivalled Chanakyan thinking, the Ashokan security perspective that prevailed through vast tracts of Indian history and geography. In this debate between ‘shanti and shakti,’ the problem is when gods are invoked to lend ballast to the regime’s preferred strategic doctrinal choice.

Referencing religion – as Rajnath Singh attempts - implies that the regime wishes not merely to steal a march over its opposition, but to outpoint them in perpetuity. Since the majoritarian game-plan does not necessarily have in mind the shaping of the external security environment as much as the domestic, this is fraught. Therefore, the parallel political project cannot be lost sight of in appraising the strategic field in India. Scholars are liable to arrive at anodyne appraisals of strategic culture if the duality is not sufficiently appreciated.

Singh makes evident the regime’s favouring of an ideology-driven national ethic. While cultural nationalism can and will influence the national ethic, it cannot supplant the Constitution. Only a Hindu Rashtra could anchor a national ethic in Sanatan Dharma. For now, doing so will elide the necessary consensus. The electoral verdict clipping the regime’s wings was on the basis of its gunning for the Constitution in the event of an ‘abki baar, char sau paar.’ The distancing by the seers from the spectacles at Ayodhya signifies the illegitimacy of the regime’s political project. Simply put, the ‘movement’ is not quite the place to rummage about for the national ethic.

As befits an democratically obedient military, the military has rightly addressed itself to constructing a strategic culture in line with an assertive strategic doctrine. Notwithstanding civil-military fusion, the mentioned upper platters of the strategic process are largely civilian mandated and must be politically-led. Rajnath Singh’s trial balloon – there was no ministry press release on the remarks – shows up potential next steps in reconstructing strategic culture. The military would be wise in not mistaking reiterations as marching orders. As the military drafts its vision document – part 1 is due out soon – it is hopefully wary of the regime seeking to fire from its shoulders

 

https://m.thewire.in/article/politics/viksit-bharat-needs-a-potion-from-indias-intellectual-architects

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Viksit Bharat needs a potion from India’s ‘Intellectual Architects’

While denying bail, a court termed two of some ten incarcerated Muslim political prisoners as ‘intellectual architects’. These Muslim youth have been hosted in the regime’s jails for over five years now for their ideology-inspired political activity in defence of the world’s largest - albeit internally differentiated - minority anywhere, India’s Muslims.

On the other hand, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) , intones, “(J)ust as blood is indispensable to the human body, so is ideology for a nation.” Pertinently, he left out mentioning which one he had in mind.

His saying this in the precincts of a temple trust – that had also been patronized with a visit by his predecessor - gives a hint. For backdrop was the photo of a protagonist of the Ram Temple movement that at the crux metamorphosed into one of demolition.

Earlier, the CDS in his book had required that the armed forces be imbued with political ideologies, saying, ‘(I)t (civil-military fusion) fuses military professionalism with political ideologies.’

Putting the two statements together, it is evident the CDS is plugging for a particular ideology.

How is that one ideology gets its adherents interminable tenures in jail while another gets to fuse with military professionalism?

Gauging which one should be India’s lifeblood and be subscribed to by the military cannot be left to the CDS. His credentials are not just restricted to being ethnic kin of the national security adviser and his deceased predecessor, but include his repeated demonstration of his ideological affiliations.

His most recent mouthings may well owe to his three years in office coming to a close this month. When appointed, his tenure was - insensibly phrased for such orders - set to be ‘till further orders’. By reminding the regime of his continuing as an adherent he is perhaps auditioning for an extension till he gets to 65 next year. Little wonder he took care to praise his mentor, Ajit Doval.

Instead, gauging which of the two – Hindutva (left unsaid by the good general) and liberalism (subscribed to by the imprisoned youth) – is better for national security requires stacking up the two with national security as yardstick.

How has Hindutva fared?

Hindutva’s tentacles reach down from political culture into strategic culture. Hindutva-infused national security strategy has been operational for the last quarter century. The intervening years of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) were also similarly influenced, with besieged Manmohan Singh constantly looking over his shoulder, wary of a deep state.

Lately, India’s relations with external powers, be it China or America, and with most neighbours, especially Pakistan and Bangladesh, have plumbed. The primary external threat has see-sawed between Pakistan and China, and in fisticuffs with both, India has not come out indubitably with flying colours. Even Op Sindoor’s hype fades when aircraft losses are toted up.

Allegations are that the current thaw along the China front has been bought by Indian concessions, predating Trump’s rollout of tariffs. And, Op Sindoor supposedly continues indefinitely. Neither indicates a secure neighbourhood.

Any discussion on internal security cannot but begin with Kashmir, which even if dormant has shown its disruptive potential in the Baisaran incident. Little is likely to change in Manipur, even if subject now to a belated prime ministerial visit. Chhattisgarh has seen the militarizing of central armed police and paramilitary to an illegitimate extent.

Worse, a chasm has opened up between the State and India’s principal minority community. Inter-community relations have been vitiated by the bruising impact of Hindutva politics of marginalizing the minority. The security dimension stems from the opportunity this provides for invective against the beleaguered minority such as return to phrases from thirty years ago as ‘bleeding India by a thousand cuts.’

A bleaker future

Diplomatic maneuvers and economic gains lacking uplifting heft, Hindutva continues to rely on polarization. Its next frontier is Bengal, where it is willing to put national cohesion at stake using the demographic bogey.

This is of a piece with its alienating communities on the geographic periphery as Sikhs, with gratuitous friction; southerners, by elevating Hindi; and, indeed also peaceable Ladakhis, by ignoring legitimate claims for sixth schedule protections.

In its rewriting history to invisibilise Muslims, the 22 pages of school syllabi devoted to a Maratha ‘empire’ can only serve to rile up identity politics amongst communities subject to raids and the chauth and sardeshimukhi by a fellow ethnic group in its militant ascent. Mythology on Hindu awakening is at the expense of fraternity.

Externally, muscular nationalism is liable to create a declaratory trap for India in the new doctrine of reflexive retaliation. Next time there will be no intercessors and the result, notwithstanding hyperbolic threats, can derail Amrit Kaal. 16 railway officials receiving the army chief’s commendation indicates that but for Trump’s intercession, if not with us, then with the field marshal next door, Op Sindoor was a close shave.

As for the ideology being military-friendly, the Agnipath scheme ought to have woken up the CDS. Since he was military adviser in the national security council secretariat and may have been consulted, his culpability won’t permit him to acknowledge the body-blow.

A military professionalism infused with Hindutva - as the CDS would have it – puts it at odds with modernity - the characteristic sorely needed in today’s tech-intensive wars.

The only gain is for the regime: military subservience where subordination would do. This is reminiscent of the indelible phrase, ‘crawled when asked merely to bend.’

The CDS mistakes such incidence of ‘subjective civilian control’ (inducing likemindedness in the military) with fusionism (breaking barriers to interactivity), the former visible in dictatorial regimes. The latter does not require political ideology for ballast, but structural change accompanied by organizational culture anchored in a modern work ethic.

In short, Hindutva puts paid to the three pillars of Indian military professionalism: secular, apolitical and professional - thereby manifestly failing the test on a criterion it touts itself on – strong-on-defence.

What of locked-away liberalism?

Liberalism starts off with a marked advantage over Hindutva on the three counts. A military imbued with liberalism is self-evidently ‘secular’. The military remains ‘apolitical,’ since liberalism inclines towards democratic alternation in power. As for ‘professional’, the record of the military in the years liberalism was politically dominant is testimony.

To the extent liberalism is in the lifeblood, it lends itself to nation-building in a diverse India. Liberalism is oxygen for India’s minorities, and, in a telling, India is a nation of minorities. Liberalism allows for dissent, with dialogue as the default conflict-resolution instrument.

It is antidote to extremism, extant today as religious majoritarianism. Hindutva, seeing diversity as a threat, steam-rolls angularities. A contrived majority is meant to preserve a micro-minority atop the social pyramid. The process itself is a national security threat, the Constitution taken as a referent.

As for the future, liberalism is the only fallback to Hindutva expending itself as it eventually must under the weight of its own contradictions. Liberalism-mid-wifed Viksit Bharat lies at the far side of such an implosion.

Viksit Bharat needs being alternatively imagined as a federated union of states of coequal, autonomous, geographically-distributed and self-regarding ethinicities.

In its external relations, such a State melds with the neighbours, who - since less-insecure - are less prickly. It can energise a regional union – an undoing of Partition as it were in an Akhand Bharat of sorts (p. 110-117).

South Asia can thus close itself from exploitation of its differences by the aspirant global hegemon, China. As a regional pole, with India as powerhouse, such an entity can then credibly press for a multipolar world.

What this means for the military is a return to reflecting India’s diversity, with constituent ethnic groups finding appropriate representation and, thereby, a sense of belonging and ownership.

This requires reversing an incipient Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan bias and nascent north India-centricity. Of 343 gentlemen cadets commissioned, a 110 were from two Uttars, Pradesh and Khand. As though it has something to hide, the military has stopped releasing disaggregated state-wise figures since.

More than lip-service to inclusivity is necessary in terms higher numbers of social, geographical and religious minorities in its ranks. It cannot be that the top two Manu-defined social groups appropriate national security, with the top providing the intellectual grist and the second the martial vigour, as sought to be depicted in the painting favoured for his office by the army chief.

A contention of ideologies in a democratic system needs a fair and level play field. Given the known propensities of Hindutva, most recently exposed in the electoral field, this is too much of an ask when a nation-wide special intensive revision is in the offing, as substitute for or to presage a post-census national register of citizens. No wonder the Muslim youth icons remain in prison.

That the Muslim ‘intellectual architects’ are in jail, their Bhima Koregaon counterparts equally put upon and liberal media heads intimidated by police calls to ‘join investigation,’ means a democratic outcome is distant.

Bharat’s electoral pretensions will persist. A benign patriarch has thoughtfully lifted the 75 year glass ceiling. A parliamentarian has already endorsed Modi for 2034 and while also named his successor. The hon’ble justices have also been streamlined despite objection, with a Gujarati chief justice set to take over in 2031.

Under the circumstance, the CDS’ uninhibited advocacy for proliferation of a particular ideology makes it easier for - and seemingly legitimizes - the military’s sipping at the ideological fount. Why he was plucked out of retirement after the CDS selection criteria was incomprehensively diluted to fill a chair kept empty for some nine months suggests itself.

It is moot which of two national security implications of Hindutva as an all-pervasive ideology - as the CDS would have it - is worse: a possible civil war or its successful suppression by a partisan military.