From the archive, 8 Feb 2005

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

OFFENSIVE AIR POWER IN J&K?

 “Offensive air power has been used in the past to control and eliminate insurgent movements.”

 Group Captain SS Deshpande writing on “Employment of Offensive Air Power against Insurgencies” in the Autumn 2004 issue of Trishul (pp. 19-27), the journal of the DSSC, opens his argument with the above assertion.  Among the ‘insurgent movements’ he lists as ‘eliminated’ thus number ‘Somalia in 1920, Malaya in 1948-60 and Mau-Mau in Kenya in 1952-60’.  Other ‘victories’ include Afghanistan, Kosovo, Gulf War II and ‘containing the insurgency in Iraq’.  Without questioning the logic that informs the characterising of some of these conflicts as ‘insurgencies’ and the nature of the ‘victory’, we move from his introduction direct to his conclusion with regard to J&K extracted below :-

“India needs to introduce offensive air power in order to root out the insurgents…Air power has the potential to play a significant role in containing and eliminating the insurgency in J&K.”

Since, the author invites greater debate ‘among military men and aviators’ to ‘generate fresh approaches’ and  ‘create greater awareness’ to alter ‘conventional defensive mindsets’, it is important to engage with the issues raised in the author’s advocacy of offensive air power as ‘corner stone of any offensive strategy in J&K.’ The appropriate forum for this being the PRATIVIDROHI, a counter terrorist’s journal, an attempt is made here to address the issues raised by the aviator. 

From the author’s ‘theorising and academic study’ in the initial part of his essay, it emerges that offensive air power has greater potential against insurgencies in the third phase of Maoist classification, that of Strategic Offensive.  He however also regards it as an asset in the second phase of Strategic Stalemate.   He expects this would help ‘retain strategic initiative and reduce the violence to the level of the first phase’ (Strategic Defensive).    Against outside state support he prefers airpower to ‘coerce’ the neighboring state even in the ‘initial stage itself’.  In so far as an ‘enemy offensive’ as part of its ‘final push’ is concerned the utility of air power is too obvious to require the explication provided by the author.

In his analysis offensive air power has increasing utility beginning with the second phase of an insurgency.  It bears reflection whether the situation in J&K has ever been of the order as to characterise it as a ‘Strategic Stalemate’.  Secondly, even if it can be deemed as having amounted to as much in localized areas, such as for example Hil Kaka in Surankot Tehsil, it does not follow that the ‘state government would use all its military potential’.   It uses only as much as is necessary and this has never amounted to using offensive air power. Such a concentration has been reduced through employment of our national advantage in terms of trained manpower in operations such as Op Sarp Vinash and lately in Churachandpur district in Manipur.  The media controversy regarding supposed use of armed helicopter assets post Op Sarp Vinash indicates a national unwillingness to approve of egregious violence in addressing problems howsoever recalcitrant.  The military has done well to play by rules set by larger society of which it is part rather than acting autonomously in pursuit of purely military objectives on the impulse of institutional interest. The author’s case is not persuasive enough for India to depart from precedent and policy. 

Since the author does without ‘delving in the past’, a look at ‘future strategies’ in J&K is in order.  The last Chief on retiring has already pronounced the imminent end of militancy.  While critics may contend that this is trifle premature, it does indicate that the level of insurgency does not warrant employment of offensive air power even as per the author’s own criteria.  As for ‘future strategies’, if the present is taken as an indicator of the future, a Strategic Stalemate may be   precluded from alternative futures conjured up.  The   peace   process   in J&K   and the ongoing, if chequered, diplomatic engagement with Pakistan heralds a decline in insurgency.  The Army’s exposure of its human face at the behest of the new Chief will also yield the appropriate reward. 

The American and Russian experience, referred to almost approvingly at places by the author, testifies to their lack of sense of ownership and responsibility for the populations subject to their assault.  Since the author is oblivious to the distinction between colonial powers and democratic societies, he goes on to recommend ‘retribution’ as policy where ‘well advertised’ warnings have not kept people (‘neutrals’) away from their homes and hearths - intended target areas where they could be victims of ‘mistaken targeting’.  This is in the tradition of the US   ‘dropping   500   pound bombs on empty buildings after warning residents to vacate’ just ‘to send a message’ and ‘intimidate’.  Not only would replication of this within own national territory be counter productive strategically, the advocacy is also politically, legally and morally bereft. 

It is interesting that ‘despite the constraints and pitfalls’ he himself discusses and admits to, he recommends employment of the Air Force in an offensive role in J&K.  Equally interestingly there is no mention in the article of two internal conflicts in which offensive air power was most extensively used and perhaps on that account was equally spectacularly unsuccessful - Vietnam and Afghanistan of the 80s.  While not discounting applicability of offensive air power in a trans LC role – itself questionable in terms of its escalatory potential - its employment within J&K will amount to an admission of state incapacity that is both undesirable and unwarranted.

In summation, an emphatic affirmative is solicited as the reply to the author’s rhetorical question:  “Is it the spectre of collateral damage and incidental    civilian casualties which has prevented the employment of offensive air power?!”