LIMITED WAR : A
SUB-CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Ever since
the end of the Nehruvian era, during which liberal
internationalism
was the dominant ideological framework of for
eign and
security policy, there has been a realist turn to the
same. This has
increasingly resulted in the Realist sponsored aim
f regional
hegemony, as a prelude to global power status, gaining
in credibility
and adherents. Implicit in this is the methodology
for
attaining the same - acquisition of power, an example
of
which is the
recent Indian accession to nuclear-power status.
The professed aim
of doing so is to bolster our national security
strategy of
deterrence. Given the changed global and regional
security
environment, specifically the demise of our Cold War
relationship with
a super-power now defunct , and of the reported
Sino-Pak nexus,
respectively, a nuclear component to conventional
strength
was deemed imperative for continued reliability of a
deterrence
posture.
Therefore
conventional deterrence, in the form of a large, moder
nising and
professional military has been supplemented by a
recessed,
and of late, an overt, nuclear deterrence
posture.
Deterrence
as a concept, however, also posits the communication
of
capability and credibility for effectiveness. Our
present
status of
having nuked our way into the nuclear club, to an
exent,
undergirds both, with the crossing of the technological
threshold
demonstrating capability; and our decision to do so,
being evidence of
credibility. For effective deterrence moving on
to the next
level, comprising of weaponisation, acquisition of
delivery
systems, and a command
facility in the capability
sphere;
and, credibility enhancing incorporation of nuclear use
into
strategy, through formulation and dissemination of appro
priate
doctrine, is necessary.
The
political utility of nuclear weapons, in
terms of the
Clausewitzian
formulation of war being politics by other means,
is in the
prevention of threat of use of the same at best, or, in
prevention
of their use, at worst. The strategy addressing this
in our context
has been termed `minimal deterrence', alternately
called
`proportional deterrence'. However, it is the second pod
of
doctrine, concerning the military utility of these weapons,
that is
the focus of this essay. If
strategy be the art of
relating means to
ends, ends being politically determined, then,
essentially, a
nuclear war-waging strategy is within the ambit of
Limited War
doctrine. This essay examines the
efficacy of Limit
ed War
doctrine in the nuclear context. The understanding is
that, the
nature of nuclear weapons being such, exercise of
discipline
in determining the ends and means of war
becomes
imperative.
A
historical backgrounder precedes a theoretical discussion of
the
philosophy and concept of Limited War, as
it developed
through the
Cold War. The problems in the nature of
limitation
are
highlighted by way of a critique.
Having introduced the
subject, in
its expansive scope, the essay situates the discus
sion in
the subcontinental context by, first, looking at the
controversial
record of limitation in conventional war, and, then
by analysing war
in the Age of Subcontinental Nuclear Deterrence.
The need for such
a review owes to the inevitability of continued
nuclearisation. The impetus to the same will be through
institu
tional
pressure of the emerging military-industrial complex in
India,
headed by the DRDO; and, the bid by the military to gain
access to
prestige-enhancing nukes, by evolving rationale and
doctrine
for their operational applicability. Lastly, in the
Indo-Pak
context India's conventional deterrence strategy of a
counter-offensive
has been checkmated by Pakistani's nuclear
capability.
Pakistan's strategy of offensive-defence is, also, at
a similar
impasse. Therefore, there is likely to
be some move
ment in strategic
thaught and doctrinal direction. This
essay is
a contribution
in sensitising the readership with regard to
implications of
the same.
PART I
Limited War : An
Introduction
Backround
: Massive Retaliation was the
initial US doctrine in
the era of its
nuclear monopoly and asymmetry. The enormity,
in
terms of moral
and political costs of such reprisal, rendered it
incredible,
and, with the onset of nuclear parity, persistence
with it could
also prove suicidal. Therefore, was
advanced the
concept of
Limited War to offset the relative paucity in conven
tional forces -
thereby also imparting a utilitarian value to an
increasingly
effective and diversified nuclear arsenal.
Total War,
that had been the dominant form of war in the Age og
Nationalism,
had been rendered unthinkable in the Nuclear Age,
given the
mutual vulnerability of similarly armed opponents.
Therefore,
initial Limited War theorising, by proponents
as
Osgood and
Halperin, was to condition American opinion - the as
sumption being
that the introverted, isolationist and moralistic
Americans were
historically inclined more towards the waging of a
Total War. Given
their perception of malevolence of Communism, by
now niclear
armed, this could prove, both, inevitable and suici
dal. Therefore, the theorising by Cold
War strategists, and
operationalising
of the Limted War doctrine by the military, as
evident in
Korea, Vietnam, the Cuban crisis et al. In fact
military strategy
in the Cold War had this as its principal focus
and source.
The
Philosophy : The ends-means balance is the
cornerstone, not
only of
strategy, but also of the Just War doctrine.
Given the
unlimited nature
of the means, the ends had perforce to be limit
ed. In Clasewitzian terms, this implied sujecting
military power
to exacting
political discipline to ensure the prevention of
spiral into the
Clausewitzian conceptualisation of Absolute War.
Thus, did
the Limited War formulation ensure the continued in
strumentality of
war as an adjunct of politics. In short, nuclear
weapons had
not made `war' unthinkable.
The Concept
: Osgood, the originator and
propagandist of the
concept,
defines Limited War as one in which `belligerants re
strict the
purpose for which they fight to concrete, well-defined
objectives,
that do not demand the utmost in military effort of
which they
are capable'. Though war has been,
to an extent,
limited by
the principles of necessity, discrimination, propor
tionality
and humanity, the `limited' in Limited War implies a
self-imposed
restraint in objectives, forces, weapons, targets
and areas. The concept was expanded by Kissinger to
include the
nuclear
ingredient of the technological environment, with his
advocacy of
tactical nuclear weapons to redress the conventional
forces
imbalance in Europe. Later, Herman
Kahn's discussion of
the
`escalation ladder', with its various fire-breaks, dwelt on
the possibilities
of keeping nuclear-war limited - thus, bringing
the nuclear game
back into strategy.
The
Limitations : Firstly, is limitation in political aims
and
military
objectives for achievement with less than total applic
tion of
resources available. Secondly, is
its distinguishing
factor from
wars that stay limited due to lack of resources -
limitation
in `means'. Since the means used are the
primary
manner of
communicating limitation, as intent, to the enemy,
limitation
in targets and weapons assumes salience. In the nu
clear
scenario, the conventional-nuclear firebreak; and
the
determinants
of tactical and strategic role of nuclear weapons,
such as,
type of target, its relation to the combat zone and
population centers, are vital to
non-escalation. Lastly, is
scope of war in
terms of level of intensity, geographical spread,
alliance
partners, etc.
A Critique. The concept of Limited War is the
appropriatte doc
trinal
response to the limited capacity of military means
in
achieving
political ends, in a situation of symmetry in capabili
ties. The
problems, however, include: firstly, mission-creep with
regard to aims
and objectives, given the emotion-laden decision-
making
environment, and public passions, in war; secondly, limit
ed means
may be `limited' in relation to the quantum and kind
available,
but not to the nature of damage perpetrated in the
combat area;
thirdly, since it takes two to tango, it is relative
`escalation
dominance' that will determine mutuality of limita
tion, thus
bringing escalation back into the realm of probabili
ty; and,
fourthly, such incorporation of nuclear weaponry into
war-waging
doctrine legitimises and reinforces the power of in
fluence of
our indigeneous MIC, a matter fraught with political
and policy
implications; and, lastly nuclear dogma gets en
trenched, and
becomes less amenable to the demand for a `nuclear
free' world.
PART II
The
Sub-Continental Scene
In
defending India's nuclear case, euthusiasts have alluded to
the `gentlemanly'
nature of the wars on the sub-continent, empha
sising
their `limited' nature in terms aims, means,
extent,
duration,
intensity, passions and the fact of subsequent nego
tiated
settlement. Critics have however, pointed out, that though
factually so,
this is analytically imprecise, in that, limitation
in war was more
on account of limited means (1962, 1965), and, on
the contrary, a
case of mission-expansion, on the Eastern Front,
rather than
limitation (1971).
Only the
1947-48 Indo-Pak conflict can be considered as having
been limited, for
war termination in 1948 owed to war aims having
been met to
an extent, and to Nehru's desire to get on with the
task of
nation-state building. Further successful military action
(as the
military position now has it, that it was then capable
of), would
have developed into a counter-productive long term
strategic
threat to the Pakistani heartland; was of uncertain
probability of
success, given the terrain, and, Pak Army's entry
into the
conflict in earnest; and, the long, term impact of a
long-drawn
out war on civil- military and inter-communal rela
tions.
The case of 1965
war is more straight-forward, in that there was
an
expansion to encompass the Punjab theatre; and
incidental
limitation
was on account of Gen Chaudhri's, (now
disputed)
appreciation of
the depleted state of artillery ammunition reser
ves -
itself a result of international pressure, in the form of
an arms embargo.
As for
the 1971 victory, it was not the intended outcome of a
grand
design, the original aim being a nibbling of
adequate
territory to
implant the Bangladeshi government-in-exile back on
native soil. However the situation on the Western Front
can be
said to be
meeting the requirements of Limited War, in that war
aims were
restricted. The part on international pressure in this,
in the very
visible form of the USS Enterprise, was incidental.
Thus,
broadly, in the conventional scenario, there is a strong
case against the
fallacy that subcontinental
wars have been
Limited Wars. However, a look in this context at the
Low Intens
ity Conflict or
Proxy War is revealing.
In both
Punjab and Kashmir, the level of Pakistani interference
has been
within the threshold of Indian tolerance, in that, it
has been a
case of `escalation dominance' by India.
The cost-
benefit
calculus, primarily of the economic factor, and the Pak
recessed
nuclear deterrent, has also informed strategic choice.
Unable to
take on India's conventional superiority, Pakistan's
intervention,
nuanced to keep the level at sub-tolerance thres
hold of India, is
a case of auto-limitation. India's
capability,
at this
level, demonstrated by return of near-normalcy to both
regions, has kept
the Indian option to escalate at abeyance.
Given the
Afghan-conflict experience; available weaponry, to
include
surface-to-air missiles; and, footloose expertise, the
LIC in Kashmir
could have been made unsustainable
for India by
`upping-the-ante'.
Presently, with a casualty figure of 1000 army
men in eight
years, as against 1400 in three years in SriLanka,
India could
and has, displayed strategic restraint.
In effect,
and
interestingly so, the LIC obtaining can be subsumed in the
Limited War
category, if the definition of `war' is expanded to
include this end
of the spectrum of armed conflict.
The Nuclear
Context
The
nuclearisation of the subcontinent is now a
decade old,
though
formally acknowledged only recently.
Strategic thinking
on the
issue goes back even further in India, to the Sundarji
era. At the
post-Pokhran II juncture, the type of test, the deve-
lopment in
missilery, and the spurt in literature on threats and
options,
indicates that an across-the-board nuclear capability is
in the pipeline
in the long term. Whereas the distinction between
strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons is in the juncture of use,
targets,
survivability, yield, and vulnerability, it is evident
from the
sub-kiloton test, and missile payloads being aimed at,
that even
tactical nuclear weapons for battle field use are in
the offing. Theoretically, these are desirable also to
bolster
deterrance,
for a threat of strategic nuclear use is incredible
when
addressing an operational
level circumstance. This is,
also, part
of the logic of verticle proliferation.
If this be
so, then a
nuclear doctrine for Limited War has to be etched out.
Speculation
on the contours of the doctrine, on the pros and
cons, is in
order.
Among the
pros, the deterrence rationale having been already
discussed, is the
political - internal and external - utility of
the
technological mastery so displayed. Next, is the
military
need to keep up with the Jones' externally; get a
prestige-boost
internally;
and, gain a leverage in the sphere of bureaucratic
politics. Lastly,
tactical nuclear capability enables the commu
nication
that is vital to Limited War, and to deterrence. It
thereby
facilitates 'tacit bargaining'- a prelude to negotiated
conflict
termination.
Among the cons in
the subcontinental context are, firstly,
that
limitation
implies the relative expendability of the combat zone
with respect
to the heartland. In a federal structure
this is
politically
fraught. Secondly, given limited depth,
Pakistan is
more
vulnerable. Thus it may not
play ball. Thirdly, nuclear
targets
being only in the desert area, are, also, not lucrative
enough to cross
the crucial conventional-nuclear firebreak.
Secondly,
the Age of Nationalism, a characteristic of which is
Total War,
has arrived in the subcontinent. This is
evident in
the
ascendent chauvinism, displayed on both sides of the border
after their
respective blasts. Nationalist passion,
being more
dangerous
than the ideological one (the latter conflict
area
being the
only precedent of successful deterrence and crisis-
management appropriate
in this setting), could well contribute to
the escalatory
impulse.
Thirdly, as
corrollary of the above, is the cumulative effects of
factors as the
propagandistic demonisation of the `other' on both
sides of the
border that may preclude the compromise implicit in
Limited
War; the demand to end the Paksitani posturing,
the
previous wars
being deemed as having brought an indecisive peace
- a call that
limits political options; and a perception, in the
military, that
there is no 'substitute for victory'.
The latter
belief is
untenable in the Atomic Age - the earlier realised, the
better.
Lastly,
there are flashpoints that erupt periodically into cri
sis. These
are staple for subcontiental nuclear-war scare- sce
nario
writers. The element of
truth in them is in our
less-
than-satisfying
record of crisis-management, such as, the col
lapse of the Sri
Lankan Accord of Rajiv; and, to pick an instance
from the internal
sphere, the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque.
Though
efforts are on at engineering a national security formu
lating process
and mechanism, credence for our record on institu
tion viability
does not make for nuclear comfort.
In so far
as China is concerned, there is conventional parity.
It is
deterrence resting on a strategic nuclear capability, in
terms of
missile-payload, range and weapons yield for a counter-
value
exchange, that is being aimed for, in the medium
term.
Commonality of
interest in preserving the peace in the short and
medium
term, alongwith conventional deterrence, and
minimal
conflict
areas, are likely to keep conflict in
abeyanance.
However, the long
term prognostications being such, it is likely
that limited war
doctrine will eventually acquire a premium even
in this context.
Conclusions
Limited War
as a conceptual categorisation of warfare is of
recent
vintage, their closest parallels in history being
the
Continental
wars in the time of Marlborough.
Napoleonic wars
were the
original `revolution in military affairs', which by
adding the
third dimension, of popular involvement, made whole
Clausewitz's
trinity of the government, the military and the
nation. Ever since, wars have had a escalatory
tendency towards
the conceptual
Absolute War and the very real Total War.
In the
Nuclear Age
such a propensity brings within the realm of possi
bility the
unthinkable General War. Nuclear sanity,
therefore,
demands that war
be remodeled as an instrument of policy.
Since
strategy flows
from policy, it has been operationalised, for the
purpose, by way
of the Limited War doctrine.
The
subcontinental protagonists, having demonstrated and declared
their
status as nuclear powers, have also entered the era
of
Limited
Wars. An appropriate doctrine can,
therefore, be pre
sumed to
be on the make. While the
specifics have not been
addressed
here, the foregoing contextual discussion in terms of
background,
desirability and viability does not infuse confidence
in the
nuclear future. In so far as we are
sensitised to this
aspect, it
would help further the conflict avoidance and con
fidence building
measures on the subcontinent, for, if the danger
of
escalation in war is to be avoided, then wars are not to be
fought at
all.
The criticality
of this owes to the Limited War concept lending a
dangerous aura of
rationality and control to nuclear war, making
it appear
avoidable, and, if not so, then winnable.
The point is
that
to fight a war, with nuclear
symmetry as backdrop, is to
ignore the
understanding of war as an instrument of policy. Would
the realist
school, steeped in nuclear theology, please take
note!
