From the Archive, 1997/8

COMPANY COMMAND : A TEMPLATE

Published in Infantry India 

The first KRA of the  Chief, himself an Infanteer, is to `consol­
idate  combat  effectiveness and strategic vision'.  Whereas  the
latter is within the domain of responsibility of the `brass', the
former  requires action at company command level for  translation
into reality.  Such action has to be based on reflection on  what
constitutes combat effectiveness, and how can it be generated  at
company  level. Indeed, this reflection-action cycle sums up  the
responsibility of a Company Tiger.
 

This  article is a retrospection-based theoretical survey of  the
domain  of  company  command. The premise  that  undergrids  this
approach  to the highly personal, and coincidently  professional,
experience  of company command is that from action flows  theory,
and  theory informs action. The aim is to focus attention on  the
crucial  importance  of command at the company  level  to  combat
effectiveness.  The article takes a look at the nature of  combat
effectiveness, and analyses the command input for its  generation
at the company level.
 

Combat Effectiveness : A Worm's View     
 

Though Combat Effectiveness finds mention in any military's glos­
sary,  it may be defined to read - `Optimisation of potential  to
dish out and withstand violence, and harmonisation of such poten­
tial  and output in military action'.  It is evident  that  there
are two spheres of interest : the preparatory and the  executive.
From  this flows the responsibility at company level -  in  peace
and  in operations. Whereas the job definition in  operations  is
rightly  recognised as `combat leadership', its features in  non-
operational environment are relatively less self-evident.    
The former is a demonstrated characteristic of the officer corps,
the  preparation for  which  begins well prior to the Antim Pag.
Instilling  the  latter is more a function of the  unit,  and  is  
based on inter-generational cultural transmission. Since this  is
largely  dependent  on  tradition and  institutional  ethos,  the
theoretical  substructure in human psychology and  organisational
behavior,  is  often neglected. To understand this is  vital  for
adaptation to change - an inevitability in any dynamic army.
 

The  contention here is that in a non-operational tenures,  where
preparation  for  the next `round' is the pre-occupation,  it  is
fostering and maintaining cohesion that forms the primary respon­
sibility of the company commander.  Cohesion is a force-multipli­
er and has three dimensions at company level - horizontal, verti­
cle, and organisational.  This responsibility is easier  fulfiled
in operations, given the clear and present danger therein.
Horizontal  integration is primary group cohesion at section  and
platoon level.  Verticle integration is the upward flow of  faith
and  respect,  and downward flow of trust and  love,  within  the
hierarchy of officer-JCO-NCO-OR.  Lastly, organisational cohesion
is the synergy developed of the sections within a platoon, and of
platoons within a company, and, externally, of companies within a
battalion.
 

Foremost  among  these at company level is to  encourage  primary
group bonding.  However, it is most difficult to achieve owing to
personnel turbulence.  Its importance stems from the insight from
research into battle milieu from which is apparant that it is not
for god, colour, or country, that mean die for, but for comrades-
in-arms.   This  identity-transference onto the sub-unit  by  the
individual makes for his willingness to sacrifice himself for the
sake  of preservation of the sub-unit.  This phenomenon  owes  to
the  sub-unit, comprising his fellows and buddies, being seen  as
the provisioner of psychological, physiological and social  needs
of  the   individual,  especially in  the   heightened  adrenalin
environment of combat.  For this spirit to flower, in adverse and
dangerous  circumstances, of its own, the seed has to be  planted
prior to entry into the same, ie. in peace. 
 

Systemic instability in non-operational tenures (and, indeed,  in
operational stints as well, for instance in the RR) also  impacts
adversely  on verticle integration.  The `paternal'  relationship
between the leader and the led, observed as crucial in a landmark
study on the German Army of World War II, already exists.  It has
been  simply put by a British regimental officer as - `love  your
men'!  However, a certain degree of detachment for maintaining  a
professional  relationship  is  required.  So the  quote  can  be
qualified as - `but not too much'!  With this  matter-of-the-soul
as pre-requisite, competence in sub-unit tactics and  administra­
tion is adequate guarantee of success as a leader down to section
commander  level.  In this, the Indian soldiery has  hithertofore
been  most indulgent, being inclined to carry the leader  on  the
shoulder  if he proves deserving of his stars or stripes.   Howe­
ver,  complacency, in an environment of increased  awareness,  in
this regard, can undercut this job-satisfaction imparting  ingre­
dient of command.
 

To  an extent the salience of the `paltan-ki-izzat' tradition  of
our  army  may be reassessed, for the unit  level  is  relatively
remote  in  terms of immediacy to the concerns  of  the  fighting
soldier.   On  the contrary, it is the sub-unit  with  which  the
soldier  identifies.  Therefore, the emphasis on the  unit  level
must be for organisational cohesion, and the focus be shifted  to
the company for generating fighting spirit.  Here the  inportance
of command at company level, and below, multiplies exponentially. 
The  approach, in this regard, must be that just as the  rest  of
the  army  exists for support of the infantry, the  unit  is  for
support of the company.
 

A Practicable Recipe
 

If  that  be a theoretical overview of the job description  of  a
company commander, it begs the question as to how to translate it
into a practical agenda.  If cohesion be interpreted as and team-
work, the aim should be to indirectly beget these through tacking
the  two fundamental ingredients of an infanteer - physical  fit­
ness and mental agility. 
 

Physical fitness has foundationary implications, but by no  means
is  it a `given' in our aging army.  If the most interesting  way
to fitness be the best way, then the aim must be to make  fitness
`fun'.  The endless routine of PT and games must be injected with
the  element of competition.  Whereas competitions, to this  end,
begin  at  the company level in our army, the  endeavour  of  the
company commander must be to introduce it down to platoon  level. 
Thus,  inter-platoon company-level competitions in games,  or  in
informal  and improvised ways, would not only yield fitness,  but
also comarderie.
 

 

The  second feature - mental agility - has  critical  operational
relevance, not only tactically but also to understand the context
of  our employment.  The drill-deadened mental faculties have  to
be re-energised.  Given a higher educational level of intake, and
increasing  awareness  owing to media exposure, this  is  now  an
easier proposition.  However, systemic factors as routine, tradi­
tion,  centralisation, over-commitment, and  misutilisation,  re­
quire a greater effort at inspirational leadership. 
 

For  adaptation  to the modern  technology-intensive,  mechanised
battlefield, and, in the circumstance of internal security opera­
tions,  a  people-centered one, requires exercise  of  initiative
down  to  section level.  The preparation for this is  in  decen­
tralisation,  and - contrary to the  popular notion -  a  reduced 
emphasis  on detail in briefing and orders.  Only then will  sur­
vivability be enhanced.  In effect, discipline must now be  taken
to  mean `action in the absense of orders'.  Thus can the  opera­
tional  level concept in mechanised warfare - aufragstaktik -  be
adapted by the foot slogger. 
 

Down  to section leader level, mastery of the  inter-relationship
of  the four factors that make tactics - subunit, weapon,  ground
and  time  - can only be done by creating a  `thinking  soldier'. 
This  forms the transformative and futuristic  agenda.  It  would
require   delegation,  decentralisation,  depersonalisation   and
disengagement.  Only then can the JCOs and NCOs be held accounta­
ble, and the men be made self-reliant and self-confident. 
 

Feudal leftovers as darbars; time consuming fall-ins ; a  depend­
ency syndrome fostering interview system; and `CHM timings', will
have  to be dispensed with. A notice-board system of  passage  of
orders could replace the roll-call system.  This will create time
for  access  to the media, and through it to the world,  for  the
men.  Regulation of time and rationalisation of duties would make
available  time  and energy for men  to  pursue  self-development
related activity, such as reading. 
 

The  point  is that an enlightened soldier is a  better  soldier. 
Such  a  soldier requires professional handling,  rather  than  a
traditional  and paternalistic approach.  The premium on  leader­
ship will therefore, paradoxically, be qualitatively more demand­
ing, though  any compelling need for the same will proportionally
decline - given the qualitatively superior soldiery.
 

This  may  not find favour initially with the  veteran  NCOs  and
JCOs.   But they have to be persuaded as to its merits.   It  may
have  teething  troubles, and may be at odds  initially  with  an
organisational culture that has, of late, elevated show over sub­
stance.   But to this end, must the company commander be  willing
to stake his career.  Compulsions of superiors, and his own ambi­
tion,  will have to be disregarded, if he has to have the  satis­

faction of seeing in the eyes of his men the respect they reserve
for warrior-leaders.
 

Conclusion
 

Company  command is where the action is, what memories  are  made
of, and what Badgam and Rezangla are all about.  Company  command
is the ultimate test of an infantry officer.  The key to  scoring
on  the  job-satisfaction scale is to understand the  concept  of
cohesion  in  its  three dimensions -  horizontal,  verticle  and
organisational.  With this as the company level KRA, to translate
the Chief's uppermost KRA into reality, the practical thrust must
be on physical fitness and mental agility of the soldier and  his
leader.  Only then will the Company Tiger be assured of a company  
able to withstand the test of lead and steel, and the company  be
assured of a Tiger as leader.