From the archive, 9 Jan 1999

LIC : INTERVENTION AS PARADIGM
 

 

Intervention, in both its avatars - intra and extra-regional -  is

characteristic of inter-state relations in Southern Asia. Whereas,

in  colonial times it was along the periphery of  the  'br-indian'

empire;  in  the post-colonial era the constituent states  of  the

region also exhibit the propensity - making the phenomenon endemic

in South Asia.
 

 

This   owes  to two factors.  The first is  the  preponderance  of

India on the sub-continent in terms of giantism and power.   Thus,

India  is, at best, `big brother', and, at worst,  an  existential

threat.   Therefore, the two reactions, in terms of  intervention,

of  certain  states,  by,  either,  invitation  to  extra-regional

powers  to fulfil the `need' to `balance India'    (extra-regional

intervention); or, by  sustaining irridentism and secessionism  in

India, in order  to whittle it down to size (intra-regional).   In

turn,  India,  to live up to its self-image of a  regional  power,

plays  a like game - that  of exploiting its  neighbour's  vulner­

abilities.
 

 

The  second factor, also a characteristic of the subcontinent,  is

the  very  existence  of these  vulnerabilities,  that  constitute

threats  to  juridical and territorial sovereignity.   This  stems

from the multi-faceted, and overlapping, nature of  socio-economic

terrain in terms of diverse ethnicity, religions, castes,  classes

and linguistic communities in societies - themselves  artificially

circumscribed by national boundaries. 
 

 

The  consequent  nation-state building process, often  results  in

political  alienation, or  a perception of  relative  deprivation,

which in turn occasions militancy in the  expression of  disaffec­

tion,  or  insurgency - the latter condition  subsumed  eventually

under the category of LIC. 
 

 

These  `vulnerabilities'  are  exploited by  an  interested,  mal-

intentioned,  neighbour,  operating in the Realist  paradigm    in

which  relations are viewed as a zero-sum game.  Though  strategic

advantage  is taken of a neighbour's predicament,  the  spill-over

effect  of  conflict  may also  occasion  intervention.  Owing  to

the  overlapping  nature  of spread  of  ethno-cultural  entities,

states   acquire  an  interest  in  the  `internal   affairs'   of

neighbours. 
 

 

Thus,  can  be  witnessed the phenomenon  of  intervention,  which

predictably  expands  in the Clausewitzian  logic  of  escalation. 

Where  the strategic interest of the intervening  state  supplants

the  original stake in the neighbour's  back-yard, the  condition,

in regional parlance, is termed `proxy war'.
 

 

Given   that  in  the  Charter  era,  intervention  in  terms   of

interferance in internal affairs is illegal (Article  2:7  of  the

UN  Charter), it is, either, covert or quasi-covert, for  ease  of 

`plausible  deniability'.   Thus,  fueling  an  insurgency  on   a

neighbour's   territory  may be a covert act, but  engaging  in  a

`proxy  war'  may involve overt moral and political  support,  and

quasi-covert  physical  and material support  for  the  surrogate. 

(The  third  manner of intervention may be overt,  as  the  Indian

inter‑vention in Bangladesh in Nov-Dec 1971 and in Srilanka in June

1987. Discussion of this  manner is, however, beyond the scope  of

this essay.)
 

 

To   complete   this  theoretical  background,   a   typology   of

intervention,  leading up to LIC,  may be said to include :  overt

military; state-sponsored; and state-supported; and,  trans-border

transnational  forces-insurgent  nexus.   Where the state  is  not

directly  implicated,   such linkage may  be  with  state-condoned

governmental  agencies pursuing their own agenda;  state-tolerated

non-governmental  organisations  pursuing autonomous ends  ;  and,

with   fronts   of   trans-national   forces   as   fundamentalist

organisations,  drug cartels, and crime syndicates.

An  illustrative example, at this stage, would help  validate  the

preceding theory.  A look at Kashmir is, therefore,  in order, for

to  do  so  would also help dispel the mythology  that  has  built

around  this  emotive  symbol of national  resolve,  identity  and

effort - on both sides of the Radcliffe   line.       
 

 

Proxy War in Kashmir : An Illustration
 

 

Pakistan's case is that the territory is of disputed status,  and,

therefore,  it  has  a locus standi, given, in  its  version,  the

military  suppression  of  a  self-determination  movement  there. 

There,  having been no movement in terms of bilateral  negotiation 

towards  a  'final settlement',  as posited by the  Simla  Accord,

and,  given  that  it deems its action as not  being  against  the

sovereignity or territorial integrity of India  (in its version of

the status of Kashmir), it feels it can provide  moral,  political

and diplomatic aid to the militants in Kashmir.  It does not admit

to  material or organisational support, since it has  'privatised' 

such  aid,  and provides it under the auspices  of  an  ostensibly 

renegade  intelligence  agency, the  ISI -   thereby,  seeking  to

decrease its culpability  as a state. 
 

 

Owing  to   Pakistan  being a 'soft state',  with  all  manner  of

nonstate  autonomous  actors disturbing its polity,  it  has  only

tangenially  been made accountable for intervention  in  violition 

of  international  law in international public  opinion.   Another

reason  for  such  an attitude is that  the  Pakistani  state,  as

represented  by  the civil government, is a `known  devil,'  being

relatively  moderate in comparison to the forces that threaten  to

take  over. To destabilise such a government, which may itself  be

a  convenient front for  forces that  may indeed include the  Army

(which  is  said  to control  the ISI), would  be  to  enable  the

triumph of these ex‑tremist forces - thereby further  destablishing

the region.
 

 

The  relationship  of the Pakistan army  with  the  fundamentalist

conduit of control of the Kashmir intervention is instrumental, in

that,  the  situation  in  Kashmir  helps  keep  India  tied  down

strategically, both, politically and militarily-hereby  redressing

the  power  assymetry. In so far as the situation  in  Kashmir  is

within Indian capability of containment, escalation is ruled  out. 

Thus,  can be discerned the  strategic aim as being an outcome  of

the Realist philosophy which informs Pakistani Kashmir policy.  By

this  yardstick,  Pakistan is, indeed, engaged in a  'proxy  war',

having  hijacked  an  insurgency of indigenous origin to  its  own

politico-military ends.
 

 

The 'indigenous' roots of the insurgency spanning the period 1989-

92 are well documented.  In so far as Pakistani complicity in this

was concerned, it was, at best, more than the normal  intelligence

game  on between the two countries, given the circumstances of the

Punjab and Afghan situations then.  The so-called OP TOPAC, or the

K2 plan, in thier expansive versions, are  not quite history.  Our

error  of misrepresenting, or misperceiving,  the  people-centered

movement   of   the  early  1990's  occasioned    the   rise    of 

`insurgency' per-se. 
 

 

In this regard four landmarks can be discerned : the Rubaiah case,

the January 1990 crackdown, the prolonged curfews and the massacre

at the Mirwaiz's burial procession. Given Pakistan's calculus, its

abatement of the resulting insurgency was predictable. It was only

by  1992-93 that the Kashmir angst declined, and Pakistani  vested

interests were ascendent.  (This  is the crucial point made by  Lt

Gen  (Retd) Nayar in a recent article in the USI Journal).  It  is

then that intervention amounting to 'proxy war ' emerged.
 

 

The  lesson of this in terms of internal security  management  for

India  is  to sensitise the SF and  politico-military  policy  and

decision  making apparatus to socio-political issues.  This  would

help us distinguish between a popular militancy and an insurgency,

and  between  an  insurgency  and proxy-war,  in  order  that  the  

obtaining  situation be addressed appropriately in a  pre-emptive,

re‑storative   and  foundationary  mode.   It   is   for   military

professionals  to  realise the doctrinal implications of  such  an

analysis of the status of an internal security situation, in order

that    the   military   template   is   situation-specific    and

casesensitive.
 

 

[1]Conclusions[1]
 

 

Having  disscussed  the   'why?' and  'how?',  and  witnessed  its

operation through a case-study, it is necessary, if this paper  is

to  go beyond theory  to being policy relevant, to consider  'what

then?'.   Recapitulating  the  identified  'causes'  -   perennial

vulnerabilities,  and  exploitation of the same  from  without  in

accordance  with  the tenets of the realist philosophy;  and,  the

'effects' corresponding to the level of exploitation, in terms  of

LIC and proxy war - it is clear that while military containment is

apposite for the latter, the former requires a political approach. 
 

 

A  holistic  - external and internal - approach would  require  to

comprise  of two strands : internally, in the provision of  socio-

political space for autonomy of ethno-cultural collectivities, in,

both,  precept  and  practise;  and, on  the  external  plane,  to

reconfigure  the perception-action model from a realist  framework

to a liberal-rationalist one.  With this as the direction a polity

informed  by  robust theory ought to take, it may be  of  interest

here to do a brief reality-check. 
 

 

On  the  external  plane, the SAARC  exists  for  a  functionalist

impetus  to  re-ordering  relations.   Internally,  the  direction

democracy  is  taking  in  all these states  is  indicative  of  a

healthier  centre-periphery relationship.  The former  will  shift

the  accent  from a realist discourse based  inter-course   to  an

integrative, inter-dependence oriented structural realist model  -

a philosophy anchored in the broader definition of security and to

its  implications for the long term.  The latter is  in  political

engineering already underway, given the economic imperative.
 

 

Whereas  the  expriment to this end is not without  impediment  in

terms  of  revivalism,  majoritarianism,  and  fundamentalism,   a

realistic (as against Realist) regional agenda fromulation demands

a pro-active, economy and ecology sensitive, collective  approach. 

Inherant to such an approach  is the obsolesence  of intervention- 

the  paradigm  of  LIC - as an instrument  in  the  repertoire  of

interstate  relations  on  this  sub-continental   'civilisational

area'.