From the archives, 12 Nov 1997

ON  MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

  Both leadership and counter-insurgency are familiar terms to  the

readership  of this journal. Indeed, exercising military  leader­

ship is our professional responsibility. That we have increasing­ly  had to do this in a counter-insurgency environment  has  made

leadership in counter-insurgency our forte. We know from  experience  that leadership in such environments is critical to  opera­tional  performance and success. Therefore, the subject  requires

critical  appraisal. This article is an attempt in  this  regard.

The aim is to raise certain connected issues in order to generate

thought  on  the  subject that we  otherwise  overlook  as  self-

evidently obvious.
 

The  manner  the  topic shall be addressed is  by  examining  the

exercise  of  leadership at the various levels  of  the  military

hierarchy- the executive level upto company commander; the direc­

tor level and supervisory level to include the Commanding Officer

and  the  formation commanders; and the apex level of  corps  and

above. The differing pressures, unique to the insurgency environ­

ment,  that impact on these levels and the manner of response  of

each will be studied.
 

 

The Junior level

 

It  is unanimously acknowledged that the junior level  leadership

has,  as in wars, been exemplery. The statistics speak for  them­

selves,  in that the officer casualty figures  make  self-evident

that the officer cadre ethos is to lead from the front.  Inciden­

tally, the record of JCO casualties in counter-insurgency in both

Sri Lanka and Kashmir, belies the notion that this rank does  not

pull  its weight in operations, for their casualties in  line  of

duty are equally praiseworthy.
 

 

That  said,  it must be recognised that these  figures  hide  the

relatively  fewer  NCO casualties as leaders of  respective  sub-

units. Though the statistics of NCO casualties are often subsumed

under those for ORs, a higher loss rate of platoon commanders and

company  sabalterns  indicates a certain lack of  enterprise  and

initiative  at the level of leadership of the section- the  level

at  which the casualty causing fire-fight and battle drills  take

place.  It  is possibly a reflection on the kind of  soldiery  we

have that makes this so- stolid, phlegmatic. Clearly, there is  a

case to be made for a relook at the training and selection  proc­

ess  at this level. In the long term, this is a factor  that  can

only  improve given the level of mental mobility of  an  educated

soldiery.  However, it would require inspirational leadership  at

the company level to keep thinking subordinates razor sharp.
 

 

A vital aspect is to exercise control in an environment  rendered

complex  by  bullets and strictures against  collateral  civilian

casualties. The difficulty is in prolonged low intensity conflict

where  there  is  a possibility  of  ethical  boundaries  getting

blurred with the onset of escalation and brutalisation. Not  only

has  personal mental and physical strain to be handled,  but  the

soldiers  have to be ministered to psychologically.  Assuming  an

importance  over  technical competence is  a  socio-cultural  and

historical sensitivity. This alone leads to WHAM. Thus leadership

acquires  a  criticality beyond its  dimensions  in  conventional

setting.  Ensuring  the  internalisation of this  aspect  is  the

responsibility  of  the  next higher rung - that  of  the  middle

level.   
 

The Middle Level

 

It  is  a  recognised fact that the commanding  officer  has  the

pivotal  role  in  the heirarchy. He directs  the  instrument  of

violence which is administered to the insurgency affected  socie­

ty. Therefore, his touch has to be as deft as that of a  surgeon.

Thats  among  the  reasons why his is a high  pressure  job.  The

consensus  is  that  with an increasing  commitment  in  counter-

insurgency scenarios, the accumulated experience has resulted  in

a higher standards at this level.
 

 

The  formation  commanders are responsible  for  supervision  and

resourse  allocation. Increasingly, most have been in  CI  opera­

tions  as leaders of men when younger, and, therefore,  are  ade­

quately   sensitised to the demands on leadership. Being  at  the

interface  of  civil-military,  and  military-public   relations,

theirs  is  a critical responsibility to maintain the  esteem  in

society  of the army. This they do not only  through  interaction

with the other agencies of governance and with civil society, but

also  in overseeing the manner of conduct of the units  in  their

formations.
 

It  is at this level that the two kinds of  pressures-  organisa­

tional,  and personal are manifest. The organisational  ones  in­

clude the institutional requirement for 'results'. This conspires

alongwith  the next one- 'unit ki izzat', to impact adversely  on

the conduct of the unit. There is a requirement for the formation

commanders  to  ensure that the 'numbers  game'  is  discouraged.

However, they too are also subject to other personal pressures as

professional ambition, domestic matters, physical decline, and to

the  male  male  'menopause'. The pyramidical  structure  of  the

organisation  makes  these  acute. So it behoves  on  the  higher

commander  in theatre to keep the working ethos such  that  short

cuts,  that could set the clock back in terms of 'winning  hearts

and minds', are precluded.

The Higher Commander

 

His is the pivotal role. He has to further the military  perspec­

tive in the higher coodinating councils; interact with the media;

strategise,  plan and communicate; induce the ethos in his  force

that  is sensitive to the 'means-ends' balance; and,  to  inspire

his  command. In short, his is a delicate mix of  managerial  and

leadership  oriented job content. While leadership at this  level

is,  both, situation specific and a matter of personal style,  it

is  worth  reflection that there are two diverse  views  on  this

aspect,  given the 'delicate mix' mentioned. These are valid,  to

an extent, for the formation commanders also.
 

 

The  two views have equally articulate exponents and  illustrious

practitioners. They are respectively expounded in Lt General Sar­

deshpande's  'Assignment Jaffna', and Maj General Ray's  'Kashmir

Diary'. Gen Sardeshpande views in his own words:
 

"CI is longdrawn, laborious, sapping, tricky, taxing, uncertain, and flexible to a much higher degree than conventioan­

al  war. Without an equally high level of comaraderie,  con­cern for and involvement with men and sincere and  effective

exercise  of heroic pattern of leadership, there can  be  no

inspirational  leadership (page 151)...In this  context  the

commander  has to increase his interaction down to rank  and

file level to explain the stakes, his contribution, and  the

nature and significance of his tasks."
 

Contrast this with Gen Ray's equally compelling logic:

 

"While  battalions kill militants, the generals must get  on

with  the mission of winning the information  war...This  is

what  generalship  is all about...to lean back  and  take  a

wide-angled  view of the ground and political situation.  He

must continually keep on sharing his intent with subordinate

commanders, fighting the info war, and managing the environ­

ment (page 185)...At the operational level military command­

ers  are obliged to spend more time on  the  socio-political

aspects,  and  let brigade and battalion commanders  get  on

with tactical operations (page 195)."
It  is  indicative of intellectual vitality that  there  are  two

views  on  the  subject of higher leadership  in  CI  operations.

Therefore, it would appear there is a menu from which a commander

could  choose. The parameters of choice would be personal  style;

level  of intensity, escalation and brutalisation;  national  and

international  attention; and, time frame for and requirement  of

'results'. However, it is moot that a wrong choice can have major

repercussions on the conduct of and success in operations. 
 

 

Conclusions

 

Leadership is the key to any collective enterprise, more so in so

very complex a task as CI. It is the synergy generated across the

heirarchy  that yeilds the result of a return of normalcy in  the

long  run. However, it is interesting to speculate if there is  a

level that is the more critical one. Both Generals quoted are  in

agreement  that  senior and junior level leadership  win  the  CI

'war'.  General Sardeshpande, reflecting on the IPKF  experience,

writes:  'What  the sabaltern lacked in knowledge, he  more  than

made up in his enthusiasm, keeness, guts, and promptness...If the

leader, particularly the formation commander, did not inspire his

command,  that  body of troops would be at half  its  efficiency'

(page 150). General Ray concurs: 'An army wins or loses at  these

two  crucial  levels of command- the platoon  commander  and  the

general' (page 178). General Sardeshpande's is the more inclusive

understanding  of  senior commander, whereas General  Ray  refers

only to the commanding general in theatre.


 

 

What  is remarkable is that neither mention the Commanding  Offi­

cer.  It is at this level that the intent of the  commanders  are

translated  for action by the junior level. Their's is a  pivotal

function,  as the best intention of the higher commander and  the

bravest act of the sabaltern would be futile should integrity  at

this level be below par.
 

 

Summing  up, one can say that the jolt to the peace-time army  at

Jaffna was a timely one. The involvement of the army in CI opera­

tions  since has increased exponentially. It is required that  we

review  the leadership function in CI, in order  that  heightened

standards  beget  the desired results in what  shall  remain  our

continued preoccupation into the future.          
 

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 

 

1. Lt Gen Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna
 

2. Maj Gen A Ray, Kashmir Diary