From the Archives, 22 Oct 1999

LIMITED (NUCLEAR) WAR

  

In the nationalist hysteria succeeding the nuclearisation of  the 
subcontinent, a sobering fact seems to have been missed.  We  are 
told  that the nukes are not meant to be used.  That they  are  a 
political - not military - weapons.  We 've given unto  ourselves 
a  ground  strategy of `no first use'.  Our nuclear  weapons  are said  to be for the sole defensive purpose of  deterring  nuclear use by the adversary.  The fact is that we have entered a  quali­tatively different era, in effect war is quite a different  ball-game now. 

The  textbookish dIND promises `unacceptable costs'  to  dissuade 
any  use  by the other side of its nuclear weapons.   In  popular understanding  this  means we will be keeping   their  urban  and industrial  centres  as  hostage to their  good  behavior.   This imagery conjures up dooms-day scenarios across the  Indo-Gangetic plain,  thereby  making it unthinkable.  We are lulled  into  be­lieving that a nuclear war is neither fightable nor winable - and is therefore hypothetical.  Thus our acceptance of our supposedly enhanced  status, as a NWS, in world affairs - leaving aside  the details.  However, the devil is in the detail, in that there  are factors that have been deliberately left unaddressed in a  public debate  hither to fore dominated by the pro-nuclear  lobby.   The salient one is that the scenarios painted, being implausible, are not  how  strategy will orchestrate them.  Strategy  is  to  make nuclear war thinkable, by making us believe we can control  esca­lation.  The doctrinal aim of deterring nuclear war is to be  met by assurance of being able to fight one.
 

 Next is the fallout of nuclearisation in raising the threshold of outbreak  of war.  Given the consequently greater scope for  sub-conventional  engagement,  we are, post-Kargil, in the  midst  of also  enhancing  our conventional capabilities.  The idea  is  to deter LIC by conventional ascendancy.  The fact is that  Pakistan would respond by lowering the nuclear threshold in line with  the logic  -  `use it or lose it'.  Its menu of options is  from  the `green  field'  warning  shot-across-the-bow to  dropping  it  on military  targets in its own territory.  With our `no first  use' pledge  lapsing  as a result, we would have to make good  on  the promise  of `unacceptable costs'.  Thus, the problem  will  arise when  `first  use'  is  not in the envisaged  form  of  a  `first strike'.   

Having used the weapon, to blunt our conventional edge,  Pakistan would have `escalation dominance' - in that, the onus  will be on us  to  escalate.  In its use of the Bomb,  Pakistan  would  have taken care to deprive us of the option of inflicting  `unaccepta­ble'  damage in return.  In short, nuclear retaliation  would  be politically and militarily redundant, and morally outrageous.  We will  find  ourselves self-deterred.  This implies  in  one  fell swoop, Pokhran II has succeeded in presenting Pakistan a  compre­hensive deterrent.
 

 If  that  be the conundrum that faces Indian strategists,  it  is worth  enquiry  as  to their likely solution.   The  answer  very simply  is  Limited (Nuclear) War.  This presupposes  a  democles sword  of  a mutual nuclear exchange over  `counter-value'  (read people)  targets.   The strategists prefer to feel  that  holding this  in abeyance is a viable proposition - to believe  otherwiseis  to put themselves out of buisness.  They do not  reckon  with the power of the `mutilation' stories on the mob, the forces  and the  politician.  Its so much easier to drop a Bomb on the  hated `other'.  In short, escalation is axiomatic.   

In  fact, having reviewed the problem, the solution may  also  by
now  be obvious.  And its clearly not one the `strategists',  the forces, the scientific Establishment, or their present day political  master will let on.  It goes under the jargon  -`non-offensive defence'.  The idea is that since nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented practically, or disowned politically, it is best that under  their  umbrella the quest for  conventional  dominance  be discontinued.  The wiser answer to LIC is on the plane of  internal security management and is at the political level.  Thus  can India partake of any nuclear dividend,  while avoiding the costs. 

It  is  time therefore to revisit these details  of  the  nuclear debate,  lest inertia be mistaken for consensus.  Any  acceptance of  the pro-nuclear position rests, as we have seen,  on  partial and selective exposure to nuclear reality.  The latest twist  the spin  doctors and would-be strategists wish to impart has  to  be debunked  by  being unequivocal over the  synonimity  of  limited nuclear war and nuclear war.  It may save us, by a hawks calcula­tion, Rupees Seven followed by eleven zeros!