From the archives, 23 Dec 2004
REVIEW: SPECIAL REPORT 121 OF UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Wajahat Habibullah, 'The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict - Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. Policy', http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2004/0427_habibullah.html>
The
report, otherwise customarily declaimed as the author's personal perspective,
has drawn its bit of controversy with the opposition parties taking exception
to a bureaucrat airing his views on national policy on foreign soil. This owed
more to his known closeness with the Gandhi family than any major disagreement
with the contents of the report. Though India has traditionally been prickly
about external interest in its Kashmir predicament, of late its closeness to
the US has enabled it to countenance the US as a ‘facilitator’, a position the
report also forwards.
His
notable insight is that the underpinnings of the conflict in Kashmir, as also
its solution, lie as much in the political sphere, as in the less obvious, and
therefore largely neglected, economic one. He advocates an ‘honest broker’ role
for the US owing to the ‘popular perception among Kashmiris being that the
sporadic periods of near normalcy achieved in Jammu and Kashmir have been the
result of U.S. efforts.’
The
report is timely in influencing the nascent impetus to conflict resolution in
the region. India and Pakistan are into the second round of 'composite
dialogue' that has included the vexed issue of Kashmir. India is engaging the
separatist Kashmiri leadership - the Hurriyet Conference - through
interlocutors such as Habibullah, who commands wide credibility in the Valley.
It is interesting to speculate how much weight does the Habibullah perspective
– that of an ‘insider’ - carry within the Indian establishment and whether it
is serving in any way as a driver in changing the conflict backdrop.
The
report is primarily aimed at the US in identifying the manner it could urge the
peace process along. The US has been more concerned with the nuclear dimensions
of the Indo-Pak conflict dyad in wake of the prolonged crisis in 2002. As a
consequence it is neglectful of the economic dimension of the conflict. The
potential economic openings highlighted are watershed development, the timber
industry, fruit processing, and power generation. The long-term sustainability
of this plan is dependent on the US staying the course and the two governments
‘promoting infrastructure investment and development, which would then
attract and sustain investment in industry by private investors’.
Habibullah diagnoses the ‘revolt’ of the
people as one brought about, inter-alia, by the India's insular policy in
Kashmir of keeping the state on dole and under corrupt regimes. The economy has
been the sector most hit by the militancy. The HDI indices of Kashmir are not
inspiring either. It has only 33% literacy, over one lakh unemployed, 6.5% GDP
and over 20000 orphans. Presently it is a conflict economy with vested
interests profiting in the disturbed conditions. An example Habibullah provides
is of logging being indulged in by security forces for making ‘houses in
Haryana and Punjab’!
He recommends the opening up of the
economy to US lead multilateral foreign investment, albeit one channeled
initially by the two central governments in respective portions of J&K.
With youth absorbed in economic activity, there can be expected a decline in
the prevalent 'gun culture'. Down stream benefits he is optimistic about
include demilitarization, scaling down in mutual threat perceptions and
subsequent democratization in Pakistan and a sub-regionally balanced economic
trajectory for India.
His succeeds in redefining the conflict from being
perceived as an inter-state one, involving territory and national identity, by
focusing on people and the effect of the conflict on them. His advocacy of a
program tackling post-traumatic stress disorder and psychiatric care is an
instance of privileging the 'human security' paradigm, in refreshing contrast
to the plethora of writings on Kashmir using the politico-military and
state-centric approaches.
Criticism on whether his prescription of kick
starting the economy, and that too with capital infusion from the US, is
sustainable is credible. However, to bring in fresh thinking on a subject
otherwise well flogged is to the credit of the author. His taking of a position
at variance to what is perceived to be the line of thinking in the
establishment only bolsters his reputation for plain speaking that Indian
bureaucrats as a tribe could do well to emulate. In this context it is worth
recalling that the report predates the national elections. Therefore it is not
proximity to Mrs. Gandhi alone that compelled Mr. Habibullah to put his mind to
paper.
A
well-founded reservation to leaving the conflict dynamics in the region to the
state parties involved is pointed out by a leading South Asianist, Stephen
Cohen, of the Brookings Institute, "Based on past evidence, the (Indo-Pak)
thaw will not last”. That the thaw has lasted a year is evidence that there is
a need for the US to stay engaged since it has both parties competitively
wooing it. In the words of the author, this involves “actively encouraging
economic revitalization…(to) help the young people of Jammu and Kashmir, the
fulcrum of the conflict, to create constructive lives for themselves and to eschew
violence.”
Habibullah’s
recommendation, based on insight born in a career of service in Kashmir, is
that anti-Americanism is not incident in Kashmiri attitudes. Therefore American
facilitation of peace building and conflict resolution is both possible and,
under the circumstance of post 9/11 skepticism of American aims in the Muslim
world, is also desirable. Addressing the drivers of terrorism - economic under
development and perennial regional conflicts – is the best manner of waging the
‘war against terror’.