From the archives, 23 Mar 1995

MILITARY AND POLITICS

Can the Military be apolitical? Should it?

 

"The Army should become a state within a state. It should be merged into the state through service. It should become the purest image of the state."                                        von Seeckt

 

'The  military establishment has no autonomous  reason  to
exist.  It  can do so only if its client  defines  its  function, expectations and behavior'. As a theoretical construct this is  a reasonable  proposition.  Given the often nebulous and  state  of

affairs of affairs of state, especially so in states in the midst
of the state making and nation building experience, the  military
has a self defining obligation to its client. The modern military
is  charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the  security
of  its client- the nation state. The are two aspects  worthy  of
deliberation  here,  one being the concept of  security  and  the

other  being  the nature of the client- as to whether it  is  the

abstract  nation-state or its representative- the regime or  gov­

ernment.
 

 

 

The Expanded Concept of Security
'Security  is  the  extent to which  a  nation  is  secure

against  the  danger of having to sacrifice its  core  values  to

avoid  war  and its ability if challenged to  maintain  these  by

victory in such a war'. This is essentially an externally direct­

ed  capacity  of the state which gives it the degree  of  freedom


from  coercion  from without. Security  has  an  all-encompassing

definition  beyond the limited Lippmann conceptualisation of  the

same.  Vide this comprehensive understanding, 'it is the  protec­

tion against and elimination of the vulnerabilities that threaten

or have the potential to bring down or significantly weaken state

strength,  both  territorial and institutional, as  well  as  the

regimes  that  preside over these and profess to  represent  them

internationally'.
 The  states  have developed organs and  the  mechanism  of

their  application to forestall and eradicate these  vulnerabili­

ties  to the extent of maturation of their political culture.  In

fact  this degree of differentiation and institutionalisation  of

state security structures is a measure of its political  develop­

ment. The more a state falls towards the invulnerable end on  the

vulnerable- invulnerable continuum, the more secure is the state.

Thus  states  of  a higher order  of  internalised  institutional

discourse cluster at the invulnerable end. By implication in such

states  the  military  responsibility for  security  is  vectored

against primarily military and exclusively external threats.
 

 

  The states tending towards the vulnerable end are  subject

to a plethora of threats against which, as  their location on the

continuum  would  indicate, they are less than capable  of  safe­

guarding their core values and national interests. It is in  such

states that the role of the military, through its sole custodian­

ship  of the means of violence, is expanded. In these states,  in

which is evolving political organisation and behavior, the  mili­
tary  would  require  to participate in the  national  effort  at

acquiring the same.
 

 

Encapsulating this proposition it may be stated that where

the  military can be apolitical, it should be so.  Alternatively,

the military should be apolitical when it can.
 

 

Political Culture.
 

The states level of political culture is a function of  the

legitimacy  of the authoritative complex of civil procedures  and

organs and of the public involvement and attachment to these. The

differences  in  states  is the degree  the  respective  politics

embody  'consensus, community, legitimacy,  organisation,  effec­

tiveness  and stability. In the Developed countries the  citizens

and leaders share a vision of public interest and of the  society

and of the tradition and principles on which political communica­

tion  is based'. In Developing countries the efforts  to  achieve

'goals  as  unification, order, modernisation  and  urbanisation'

face obstacles surmountable by concerted action of the  magnitude

the  conventional   political establishment  cannot  deliver  on.

Therefore  the incidence of overt political participation of  the

military.
 

 

Higher Level of Political Culture
 In mature political cultures the historical maturation  of

processes and structures negates the requirement of and scope for

a political stance by the military. Therefore the military can be

apolitical. This is not entirely on account of an inability to be

political. This has been termed as the Democratic model in  which


the military is strongly motivated by the military ethic. In this

is  the creation of Huntington's 'classic  professional  soldier-

single and supreme protector of the state in its purely  military

function'.  The model assumes the prevalence of the  professional

ethic  and acceptance of the supremacy of civil institutions  and

of the social consensus on the modality and ends of governance by

the  military.  Though this is not a historical  reality  but  an

objective of political policy, its elements have been achieved in

some Western industrialised democracies.
 

 

 An  illustrative  case is the dismissal of  Gen  MacArthur

from command in the Far East as an assertion of civilian suprema­

cy  and the restrictions on the political role of  the  military.

The ambiguity in the perceived nature of the client of the  mili­

tary is reflected in MacArthur's observation- 'the new and  here­

tofore  unknown  concept  that members of the  armed  forces  owe

primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily  exercise

the  authority of the executive branch of government rather  than

to  the  country  and its constitution which they  are  sworn  to

defend'. This espousal of the Nuremberg 'higher loyalty' philoso­

phy complicates the assimilation of objective civilian control.
 

 

 Objective civilian control seeks maximisation of  military

professionalism  through distribution of political power  between

civil  and  military  groups in a manner most  conducive  to  the

emergence  of a professional attitude and behavior in  the  mili­

tary. With increased complexity of the national security calculus

this  is fostered through the Fusionist model that envisages  the
political  participation of the apex military authority.  Through

this measure is military expertise respected, authority delegated

for  discharge  of responsibility  and  military  'corporateness'

recognised. In effect a premium is placed on the  professionalism

of the military by its  acknowledgement, while incorporating  the

apex of the hierarchy into fusionist bureaucratic politics.
 

 

 Gen  Powell's recommendation of ending the Gulf War  after

100  hours of the land battle on other than purely military  con­

siderations  is  indicative of this approach. In  it  the  'prime

essential of civilian control, of minimising military power',  is

met  through  the  market mechanism of  negotiations  with  other

executive  agencies,  themselves  differentiated  and   corporate

oriented,  thereby  also maximising the  likelihood  of  military

security. This renders the military-civil conflict horizontal and 

ensures  that the military-state relationship is symbiotic.  This

is assured by the conviction in the military professional of  his

sharing in the in the formulation of national security  strategy.

Recognition  of the special attributes of  professional  distinc­

tiveness of the military thereby provide the realistic basis  for

maintenance  of civilian political supremacy  without  disturbing

its professional autonomy.
 

 

Lower Level of Political Culture

 

 In states with less differentiation and  institutionalisa­

tion  of  the national security apparatus, the military,  in  the

discharge  of  its responsibility dictated  by  the  professional

military  ethic, has perforce to step beyond its  representative,
 
advisory and executive function. It has to acquire a position  in

the  'hierarchy of obedience' commensurate with the  salience  it

wishes  to  impart  to its input. This is not  at  variance  with

Huntington's  military ideal of perfection of loyalty and  obedi­

ence when fidelity is due in a certain and conditional measure to

the Executive arm of a State. The reason is that the requirements

of  the  liberal model of civil control of a  pervasive  civilian

ethic,  regard  for  expertise and  corporate  inviolability  are

seldom met in most states with low and minimal political culture.
 

 

 This is not to justify praetorian action. The only circum­

stance that do so are intervention in the case of loss of legiti­

macy  of the regime or the collapse of constitutional  machinery.

The restriction on the possibilities warranting intervention  has

been  necessitated in acknowledgement of the  characteristics  of

the  military  attitude  that values order, is  ill  disposed  to

extensive  and  intensiveecurity  has  an  all-encompassing

definition  beyond the limited Lippmann conceptualisation of  the

same.  Vide this comprehensive understanding, 'it is the  protec­

tion against and elimination of the vulnerabilities that threaten

or have the potential to bring down or significantly weaken state

strength,  both  territorial and institutional, as  well  as  the

regimes  that  preside over these and profess to  represent  them

internationally'.
 

 

 The  states  have developed organs and  the  mechanism  of

their  application to forestall and eradicate these  vulnerabili­

ties  to the extent of maturation of their political culture.  In

fact  this degree of differentiation and institutionalisation  of

state security structures is a measure of its political  develop­

ment. The more a state falls towards the invulnerable end on  the

vulnerable- invulnerable continuum, the more secure is the state.

Thus  states  of  a higher order  of  internalised  institutional

discourse cluster at the invulnerable end. By implication in such

states  the  military  responsibility for  security  is  vectored

against primarily military and exclusively external threats.
 

 

 The states tending towards the vulnerable end are  subject

to a plethora of threats against which, as  their location on the

continuum  would  indicate, they are less than capable  of  safe­

guarding their core values and national interests. It is in  such

states that the role of the military, through its sole custodian­

ship  of the means of violence, is expanded. In these states,  in

which is evolving political organisation and behavior, the  mili­
tary  would  require  to participate in the  national  effort  at

acquiring the same.
 

 

Encapsulating this proposition it may be stated that where

the  military can be apolitical, it should be so.  Alternatively,

the military should be apolitical when it can.