From the archives, 7 Nov 1998
REFLECTIONS ON OFFICERSHIP IN THE INFANTRY
The perennial debate of art versus science, leadership versus
management, moral versus material, human versus technical, ideal
ism versus pragmatism etc find echo in the demands on officers as
functionaries fulfiling a role. Whereas
it would be an arbitrary
`last word', the argument in this essay is that, in so far as the
infantry is concerned, the
contours of the `last word' on the
subject are discernible. These are
traced in this essay through
an investigation of the responsibilities
conferred by the role
of officering infantry; prioritising these; and assessing officer
orientation with respect to these.
It would appear from this
exercise, as a `last word', that officership in infantry ought to
incline towards the former extreme of the contrasting conceptual
pairs mentioned.
[1]Prioritising
responsibilities [1]
The task of
an infantry officer is to prepare, and, if need be,
employ the infantry in fulfiling its role-based mission. This
task entails responsibility on three
planes - the material, the
operational, and the moral. The
connotations of the first are
fairly self-evident and include `hardware'-centered aspects
as
administration and logistics . The
operational plane encompasses
`software' in terms of planning, and training in
accomplishing
the same. The moral plane involves
ministering the human element
in preparing for, and during, battle.
All three
planes are complementary and mutually influencing.
Therefore, all require attention at every level of the hierarchy.
However, a broad prioritisation, with respect to the level
of
command, can be attempted, as tabulated below :-
----------------------------------------------------------------
[1]Priority |
I II III
------------|
Level[1] |
----------------------------------------------------------------
[1]Formation[1] Material Operational Moral
[1]Unit[1] Operational Moral Material
[1]Sub-Unit[1] Moral Operational Material
----------------------------------------------------------------
The logic
that informs this tabulation is that the
closer the
level is to the infanteer, the more salient is the responsibil
ity on the moral plane. Since, the
influence of the operational
plane is more direct on the moral
plane (ably employed troops
being more effective than the better fed), its supercession
of
the material plane in the levels that
directly deal with troops.
The
dominance of the moral plane at the lower level owes to the
salience of the human element in combat, and indeed, in preparing
for the same. The understanding
here is that the best equipped
army operating on a wizard of a plan may prove inadequate in the
absence of cohesion - the latter being an element on the moral
plane. Having appreciated this, a
look at officer orientation,
in terms of stereotypes, to this facet of the infantry
is in
order.
Officer
Orientation
Infantry
officers can be placed on a continuum from warrior to
non-warrior, based on their dominant
orientation, or the sum of
their respective orientations across a spectrum of characteris
tics. A defining feature of the distinction between the
two
sets of officers is their sensitivity and responsiveness to their
respective responsibility on the moral plane . The `warriors'
are those that are sensitive, whereas the non-warriors are less
so.
A contrast, based
on assorted approachs and attitudes, is present‑
ed under :-
|
---------------------------------------------------------------
Clearly,
their differing
characteristics account for their
professional utility.
Whereas, non-warriors may prove more
effective on staff, in peace stations, in the run up
to the
battle, in handling routine,technical and managerial matters, and
paperwork; warriors are required at the spear end,
where the
rubber meets the road. Where the raw material is men, and the
environs elemental, its warriors we need.
It is well known that
`men cannot be `managed' to their possible deaths'. In short the
infantry needs officer-warriors.
The 'Last Word'
Here space does
not permit going into the debate whether warriors
are `born' or`made'. It is validated theory that environs
and
inheritance mould identities.
Therefore, given a martial envi
ronment, creating warriors is a workable proposition. This logic
informs the
upbringing efforts at the academies and in units.
Suffice it to say
that the infantry has its complement of
warri
or-officers, as any casualty or citation list will testify.
Another
debate, on whether alternation between the two identi
ties, depending on the extant circumstances, is at all possible,
may be raised at this juncture. As
mentioned, the characteris
tics covered in the table, are found in some measure in
every
officer. Therefore, an officer can
capitalise on any as and when
required for fulfilling appointment related roles. However, the
orientation as a warrior or non-warrior will determine effective
ness, nature of output, and comfort with the
appointment. In
short, once a warrior always a warrior - even if the role be of
paper-pushing content. Similarly, no non-warrior officer will be
able to ratify his appointment in the hearts of his men, particu
larly so when lead bestirs the air into a frenzy.
However, it
is moot, with some concern, that the `system' con
spires to `unmake' warriors. The system-determined demands of a
career, professional longevity and placement-satisfaction
are
skewed in favour of the non-warrior, reliant as it is on the core
characteristics found in them. The
impact of the clashing de
mands, of the system and the infantry, on an officer needs
no
elucidation. A tentative explanation of survivability of the
warrior orientation in officers depends on respective dependence
on the service sustenance and the attraction of
`jhanda and
danda'. The decisive distinction
between the two sets of offi
cers, therefore, is whether they stand the test of the system. By
this yardstick, it would appear that the test of an
infantry
officer is to be prepared to pay the price of the privilege
of
being counted a warrior among warriors.
