From the archives, 28 Nov 1998

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

`PROXY WAR' REAPPRAISED

 

'Proxy   war'  entered  indigeneous  terminology  on  war  as   a descriptive  term,  and  has since found  its  way  into  popular
discourse  on affairs military. However, as with most jargon  and
cliche,  it is staple for journalistic use, and is  not  entirely
wholesome  for,  either, the scholar or professional.  Given  its
attraction in for simplifying presentation of a complex politico-
military  issue,  it has value for the purposes  of  `information
warfare.'  Conversely, its usage in a broader context, by  policy
and decision makers, can only be counter-productive.
 

 

The  contention  in  this essay is that  this  is  precisely  the
problem  that has attended the dominant narrative on the  Kashmir
issue.  In the popular understanding, the problem in Kashmir  has
been  unleashed by Pakistan. To quote an eminent panelist at  the
USI organised seminar on `Proxy War', (proceedings of which  were
published  in  the USI Journal of Jul-Sep 1998), `it  is  a  well
planned  and  meticulously  executed operation  by  the  ISI  and
mastermimded  by the then Pakistan President  Gen  Zia-ul-Haq....
codenamed  Op TOPAC'.  That this position has been  reflected  in
writings elsewhere also, indicates a wide subscription.
 

 

Following   from  the  assumption  of  Pakistani  complicity   in
initiation and sustenance, are prescriptions in terms of `turning
the  situation around in six months or a year' (Mr KPS  Gill,  at
the  same seminar), given the `will' to do so (Lt Gen  (Retd)  HK Kaul).  Neither have been explicit as to the means to alter  what
they call the `stop and go' policies. Elsewhere, the methodology,
has been relatively indelicately put as -`If terrorists and their
kind are accepted as enemy soldiers, then what is (sic) this hum-
bug  efforts  to  bring  `misguided'  people  into  the  national
mainstream?'  (Col  Rajinder  Singh, Combat  Journal,  Dec  1992,
p.83).  Thus, such a hardline view has origin in  the  assumption
that the problem has an external source.
 

Having seen the effect of perception on the prescription, it  may
be  appreciated that misperception, or  misrepresentation,  could
render  askew appropriateness of response.  Therefore,  a  deeper
understanding  of  `proxy war' as a concept, and its  utility  in
understanding  the  Kashmir problem, is in  order.   This  reader
response is an exercise in the same.
 

Proxy War : A Tentative Theory
 

Proxy War literally translates as pursuit of political aims by  a
`manipulative  state'  through surrogate military forces, in  the
territory of, and against, a `target state'.  On a larger  plane,
proxy war can be between to manipulative states using  respective
surrogates,  and not on either power's territory (eg. Soviet  and
American  Cold  War  tussle in the Horn  of  Africa).   
 

 

We  shall restrict the discussion to the former kind.   In  this, `proxy  war'  may be defined as support  of  surrogate  politico-
military  organisations in terms of material  and  organisational
aid, to further the manipulative power's political ends,  against
a  target  state.  The kind of support that is provided  is  well
known,  but,  it  must  be  noted,  that  political,  moral   and
psychological  support  for  a  surrogate  cannot  be  taken   as
complicity in proxy war.
 

 

In  international law, the judgement of the ICJ in the  Nicaragua
case  is relevant to the issue. The court had pronounced  that  a
state is liable under international constitutional law, based  as
it  is  on the UN Charter, if the nature of  its  involvement  in
supporting  surrogates  is of the level of an armed attack  on  a
subject   state.  The  temporal  duration,  scope   and   extent,
directness  of involvement, and effects of the same can be  taken
as criteria for assessing the threshold of 'armed attack'.  Where
it  is  considered to have been passed, the subject state  is  at
liberty  to  proceed  with  proportionate  military  self-defence
measures. However, as stipulated in the Charter, the UNSC thereby
acquires a role.
 

 

Given  that we prefer to keep to the bilateral settlement  tenets
of  the  Simla  Agreement,  this  is  not  a  preferred   option.
Therefore,  the  resort  to  LIC to  contain  and  eliminate  the
insurgency/proxy  war  in J&K. The problem with the  hardline  is
that  the  necessary  distinction between  these  two  coincident
problems  is lost. Thus, the population is subject to a level  of
hardship that keeps alive its alienation, and thereby its support
of   the  surrogate  forces.  Understanding  this  is  vital   to
appropriate  doctrinal and tactical response in J&K, as  also  to
appreciating the events of this decade there.
 

 

[1]Kashmir : A Reappraisal[1]
 

It  is  adequately  documented  that  the  origins  of   Kashmiri
alienation is essentially indigeneous.  As Lt Gen (Retd) VK Nayar
brings  out in his artcle in the same issue, the period of  prxoy
war  in Kashmir dates from 1993, the period prior to  that  being
one of insurgency (1990-93).  However, the characterising of the Kashmir  situation as one of `proxy war' began as early as  1990,
in,   both,  professional  and  public  perception.   This   mis-
perception  of  situation  has informed efforts  to  address  the
situation  ever  since.  It is argued here  that  the  consequent
overall `hardline' adopted,  sustained the disaffection, as  much

as  the efforts of Pakistan to take advantage of  the  situation. 
 

If any lesson is to emerge from our Kashmir experience, it is the
importance  of  not being victims of own progaganda.   A  counter
factual could validate this.  Should our response to the Kashmiri
movement  of  the  early  90's have  been  measured,  mature  and
moderate, in keeping with the understanding of indigeneous  roots
of  the militancy, the situation could have reversed itself.   In
the  event, a misapplied hardline made fertile the  psychological
terrain for a Pakistani hijack of the Kashmiri movement.  Maj Gen
(Retd)  S  Ram's reference to the  `one-up-manship'  syndrome  in
Kashmir, in an article in the same issue,  is a pointer.  Whereas ðF A Š

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4
 

 

Gen Nayar admits to  an alleviation in the situation by 1992,  he
attributes  its  subsequent deterioration to Pakistan  launch  of
`proxy  war'.   The contention here is that Pakistan  could  only
have  done so because of the military template operative  therein
then.
 

 

It is important that this perspective be highlighted to  counter-
balance  the  prevalent  theology  on  the  subject.   Take,  for
instance,  the  abuse  of excerpts of  an  IDR  Research  Team's

scenario  writing (IDR issue of July 1989) by a panelist  (p.396)
to  describe  in detail the Pakistani game  plan.   Clearly,  the
distinguished  panelist  has  been  a  credulous  victim  of  own
propaganda, or is himself indulging in a disinfory template operative  therein then.
 

 

It is important that this perspective be highlighted to  counter-
balance  the  prevalent  theology  on  the  subject.   Take,  for
instance,  the  abuse  of excerpts of  an  IDR  Research  Team's

scenario  writing (IDR issue of July 1989) by a panelist  (p.396)
to  describe  in detail the Pakistani game  plan.   Clearly,  the
distinguished  panelist  has  been  a  credulous  victim  of  own 
propaganda, or is himself indulging in a disinfors has its own political bias and its own agenda.  Secondly, Mr Bodansky is a poor scholar on  Kashmir, given  his  belief, put down in print in a report  `Kashmir  :  A Trans-Asian  Axis' (Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies,  Summer 1995),  that  Pakistan seeks Kashmir for,  among  other  reasons,opening  up  a  rail  route  into   Central  Asia:  Thirdly,  the
understanding  the  panelist  shares with  Mr  Bodansky  is  that
Pakistan is out to finish the `unfinished buisness of partition',
and  will,  therefore, go to any lengths,.  This is  an  arguable
proposition, for Pakistan is seeking its own geo-strategic  ends,
and  in  doing  so is hardly likely to  jeopardise  its  national
existence for the sake of integrating Kashmir. Therefore, it will

fish in India's troubled waters, so long as they remain  troubled
-  the turbulence being only partially of Pakistani creation  and
sustenance.   Lastly, for the record Mr Badansky is  Director  of
the  Congressional  Task Force on  Terrorism  and  Unconventional
Warfare  of  the  US House of Representatives, and  not,  as  the
panelist  informs  us, of the US Congress.  His  links  with  the
powerful  jewish lobby are self-evident from his other work  (see http :\\ msanews. mynet.net/scholars/bodansky).

It is evident that there are alternatives to the argument of  the
extent  of  Pakistani responsibility for the  Kashmir  situation.
Misappreciation  as  regards this extent continues  to  adversely effect  our  politico-military effort in  Kashmir.   The  current advocacy  of  a  solution is on  similar  lines  -  `aggressive',
`offensive', `intensive', `pro-active' measures, under a  `single
agency', to `finish' the task `quickly' (Words in quotes used  by
seminar  participants).  If the unstated methodology implicit  in
the above position, is to triumph on its merits, then  discussion
of  the  alternate  perspective must inform  the  appraisal.  The
attempt  here,  is,  therefore, worthy of  the  attention  of  an
audience,  presently  appropriated by the  dominant,  inadequate,
Discourse.