From the archives, 24 Jun 2002
TACKLING PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES ON SF IN LIC
Contribution to literature on the psychological impact of protracted counter insurgency operations by security forces has primarily been of American origin. Their searing Vietnam experience and the propensity of their open society to debate it, has resulted in a wealth of studies on ‘integration and disintegration’, the most famous being Gabriel and Savage’s brutal expose ‘Crisis in Command’. Other armies have had equally compelling experiences, the noteworthy ones being that of the French Army in Algeria, the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and of the Russian Army in Chechenya. The Indian sojourn in Sri Lanka could have resulted in a similar Indian predicament had the enlightened political decision to disengage not been taken in the timeframe that it was taken.
A central point that emerges from a
study of these examples is that the level of adverse psychological impact on
members of security forces engaged in Low Intensity Conflict corresponds to the
level of brutalisation of a conflict. The level of brutalisation is in turn a
resultant of the perceived ‘success’ or potential for ‘success’ of a campaign.
This perception is dependent on the premium placed on success as against the
envisaged obstacles, not excluding an adversary’s military efficacy. Where to
succeed is an imperative, the military effort will be accordingly employed.
However, if it is perceived to be effectively thwarted by the opposition, there
is likelihood of frustration expressing itself in brutalisation. The American
Vietnam experience is an example.
Such a situation does not obtain in our
experience in LIC in our country owing largely to the fact that the opposition,
though sustained, has never been of the proportion as to upset our operational
equilibrium. In effect, not only has the adversary been relatively weak, but
our considerable strengths are liable to underestimation. This explains the
absence of brutalisation in the internal conflicts that have been our
considerable preoccupation lately. Brutalisation being absent, we have escaped
any inordinate adverse consequence on the psychology of members of our fighting
arms. This assessment is not unmindful of the proxy war being waged by Pakistan
in J&K. Even though this conflict has been the most taxing for us, it has
been deliberately pitched at a level that would not attract our retribution by
Pakistan. It has consistently been kept within our ‘threshold of tolerance’
(though evidently our patience has increasingly worn thin since the attack on
Parliament on 13 Dec 01).
There was a point in time in the early Nineties that had compelled the then Chief Gen Rodrigues to hint that there was a threat of over-extension of the Army. He was referring to the constant deployment in operations of large proportions of the Army, intermittently ever since Operation Woodrose. It had been followed by the war scare of Ex Brasstacks and Op Trident. Thereafter was the deployment of an over 75000 strong IPKF in Sri Lanka. Deinduction of the IPKF offered no respite, for there was the near war situation in 1990 that had to be coped with. Forthwith thereafter, was the simultaneous embroilment in restoring the democratic process in Punjab in the West and Op Bajrang and Op Rhino in Assam in the East, even while our engagement in J&K deepened. The critical years were thus the early Nineties. Having weathered these, and thereafter restored the situation in J&K repeatedly back to near normalcy (1995-96, 2000-02), it is evident thatì¥ÁM
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(êêÖÖÖÖ[1]ÙUSI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION: GROUP A
TACKLING PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES ON SF
IN LIC
Contribution to literature on the
psychological impact of protracted counter insurgency operations by security
forces has primarily been of American origin. Their searing Vietnam experience and the propensity of their
open society to debate it, has resulted in a wealth of studies on ‘integration
and disintegration’, the most famous being Gabriel and Savage’s brutal expose
‘Crisis in Command’. Other armies have had equally compelling experiences, the
noteworthy ones being that of the French Army in Algeria, the Soviet Army in
Afghanistan and of the Russian Army in Chechenya. The Indian sojourn in Sri
Lanka could have resulted in a similar Indian predicament had the enlightened
political decision to disengage not been taken in the timeframe that it was
taken.
A central point that emerges from a study of these examples is that the level of adverse psychological impact on members of security forces engaged in Low Intensitì¥ÁM
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ence. These factors cumulatively alleviate any psychological pressures that may afflict a force operating in similar operational environments with less obvious strengths as possessed by our Army.
A survey the psychological facet of LIC
can only be complete if the negative factors are also included. Admitting to
these, without exaggerating them in any manner, has the benefit of focusing our
meliorative effort in the desired direction. It must be borne in mind that the
‘negatives’ considered below have a qualifying influence on the supports
mentioned. Therefore addressing these, as discussed in the section that follows
the discussion of these ‘negatives’, will enable strengthening of the supports
contributing to the psychological well-being of both the institution and
members.
Firstly is the received understanding of
the conflict situation and dynamics. The main ingredient of the popular
conceptualization of such conflicts is that they are externally engineered. The
corollary is that with ending of foreign support and adequate economic
incentives these restive areas can be pacified. This is a monocular
understanding and neglects the political angle that is generally endemic to
alienation. Armed with only a partial understanding of the problem, and witness
to its continuance, there results dissonance in the minds of the
counter-insurgent. This may lead to frustration which has operational
manifestation in the form of high handedness, contributing to a deepening of
the emotional fissures in the minds of the populace. Thus there forms an
undesirable alienation-aggression cycle.
Secondly, while the Army doctrine to
address LIC has been spelt out by the ARTRAC and is disseminated in its schools
of instruction and during pre-induction training, there is a competing school
of thought at variance with the propounded doctrine. The departure of reality
from the theory causes confusion in the minds of members, thereby adding to the
stress they are ordinarily subjected as part of operating in a hostile
environment. The accepted doctrine rightly denotes LIC as a fight for ‘hearts
and minds’ of people. It privileges humane means and methods of conducting
tactical people friendly operations. On the contrary, the contending school
believes that the ‘rod’ is the appropriate tool to address the situation. The
consequent ‘rambo’ style of functioning, with its undue emphasis on ‘results’,
causes disquiet in the command since it clashes with the approved format for
tackling LIC. The fact is that fighting with ‘one hand tied behind the back’ is
the sole way to tackle LIC as obtains presently within our borders. The
contending argument against this is pernicious and erodes uniformity of
approach with respect to this vital issue.
Thirdly, a proportion of the
psychological stress being borne by the leader, and indeed imparted into the
environment by the leadership, is a result of the dichotomy in the two
leadership styles prevalent in the Army. The two styles in question are of
Directive Control and Restrictive control. Directive Control is delegative,
signifying trust levels in the hierarchy and enables exercise of the command
function at all levels. In contrast, Restrictive control is the jealous
hoarding of power and authority with the leader and an exercise of intrusive
command philosophy by the leader. Both styles are prevalent in the Army, with
the latter being particularly dysfunctional in LIC environments. Where this is
the preferred command style, the liberty of leaders at lower levels is
constrained, thereby increasing egregious stress levels in the hierarchy.
Troops comfortable with one style, and subjected to the other instead, also
require to adapt, thereby increasing the strains they are already under.
Fourthly, there is a propensity to
violate the primary fundamental of battle field cohesion – primary group.
Extensive commitments, particularly in the form of personnel attachments with
the tail, leave room for improvement. There is an over-reliance on the CHM for regulation of duties which
detracts from the formation and sustainment of primary groups. Personnel
turbulence, unavoidable at the best of times, is particularly notorious in the
Rashtriya Rifles with personnel of myriad arms and services in varying stages
of tenure are pitted together. This is unfortunate for this Force has been
raised with the express mandate to combat LIC. Ill formed, heterogeneous
primary groups bear the brunt of the LIC in the Valley. Thus the psycho-social
support that the section and platoon can afford a soldier is not forthcoming,
leading to avoidable stress accumulation at the level most visible to the
people.
The record of our Army is widely
acknowledged as being above reproach, the position of human rights
fundamentalists apart. This reputation has been acquired at the expense of
blood and lives. It is therefore befitting that the supports that are in large
measure responsible for this are reinforced while the ‘negatives’ are whittled.
It behooves us now to briefly turn our attention towards outlining the stress
relievers. Priority must be accorded to addressing the ‘negatives’ over the
supports, for the latter already exist – though there is no call to be
complacent.
In containing the ‘negatives’ there is a
need for education, as against indoctrination. Training regimen must
persuasively impart doctrine. Incentives must be loaded towards exercise of
Directive Control as preferred leadership style across the force. Support for
the primary group must become the focus of attention at the tactical level. In
so far as the supports are concerned, there is a note of caution that needs to
be introduced. The Army is a microcosm of Indian society that is presently in
the throes of socio-economic change. The change of necessity impacts on the
Army as an institution. This impact is both ideational and physical. In terms
of ideas, there has been a Rightist tendency in politics. With respect to
security issues this translates into strengthening the ‘hard line’ options. The
implication of this for ongoing LICs is that the military template is the preferred
political choice in addressing the situation – irrespective of the underlying
core problems. At the physical level, the impact of the tumult of change is
primarily in the changed profile of individuals self-selecting to serve a life
in uniform. These are less likely to be in pursuit of a calling than a
livelihood. In effect, their socialization into Army mores will require to be
that much more stringent. However, whether this aspect has seized our attention
is debatable.
Psychological equanimity is vital to
success in LIC. Dilution in this sphere renders the situation open to
brutalisation – the principal indicator of lack of success. It is therefore
important that the psychological mood of a force engaged in LIC is closely
monitored, and timely course corrections administered. Neglect of the aspect
will result in an over-reaction in the tradition of ‘too little, too late’. In
our case, the Army leadership is charged with the responsibility of overseeing
this aspect. Any problems that have arisen so far have been in the form of
aberrations – understandable given the quantum of force engaged in LIC.
Alertness to the issue for indicators of institution-wide portents of breakdown
is also recommended. In face of the vortex of change in our society, the desired
ends will not emerge of their own. The Army will have to institute and sustain
especial measures for the same.
