From the archive, 4 Jun 2002

CHANGE AND THE INDIAN MILITARY: THE UNADDRESSED DIMENSIONS

 This essay deals with the subject of ‘Change’ by avoiding recourse to the more popular managerial approach to it that generally confines itself to the amply dissected terrain of structural engineering; the optimal weapons and equipment mix; and realist inspired geo-strategic reflections. On the contrary, in order to illumine its under-explored dimensions it takes a ‘long and hard look’ at the changing Indian military in the backdrop of its changing socio-technological and politico-strategic context. The aim of attempting to approach the subject in this manner is to inform and thereby forearm the policy maker with sophisticated insights on fresh intellectual terrain. This has been necessitated by the absence of such reflection in the military literature churned out over the recent past.

It deals with the relatively under-exposed facets in Parts I and II: namely, the sociological changes required to cope with the ongoing RMA in Part I; and interprets the meaning of ‘apolitical’ in the changing political context in Part II. In the subsequent two parts, we examine issues of topical interest in a radical manner. Part III takes a radical look at the oft-discussed subject of Indo-Pakistan relations with respect to Kashmir; while Part IV revisits the nuclearisation instigated limited war doctrine. By doing so the essay casts fresh light on the meaning ‘change’ has for the military – an aspect dealt with in getting the four dimensions addressed together into a coherent whole in the Conclusion.

 

PART I: THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE

The Society-Military Relationship

There are indeed portents of a generational change within the militaries on the manner of viewing and conducting war. This has been occasioned by the emerging technologies being adapted to war fighting, thereby changing the nature of the battlefield in terms of tempo, scope and relationship between skinware, software, and hardware. This aspect has not escaped the Indian military. In this endeavor, Indian society may be seen as being generally supportive of the military for the military has been performing its social responsibility with dedication and apolitically. However, the national trend is towards positioning India for an economic takeoff. To this end, the government, even at the cost of the military, is harnessing budgetary resources. It has also sought to allay criticism of neglecting military preparedness by an investment in the high profile sectors of nuclear and missile defense. The downgrading of the military sector over the past decade also owes to the cost-benefit analysis ruling out war as an option. Therefore, the military has entered the nuclear age in which the prime purpose is not to fight war but to deter it.

Therefore, the military has been constrained to cater for the strategic imperatives as also contend with ongoing low intensity conflict deployment within these resources. The incorporation of RMA related programs to bolstering conventional dissuasive capabilities is thus a relatively slow process - made faster in the short term by the fallout of the Kargil War. The onset of nuclearisation has made conventional conflict recede, though limited wars under its umbrella are not ruled out. Thus, though the RMA is deemed as required, its pace will be regulated by the availability of funds – rendered scarce by the current societal and governmental concentration on liberalization.

In the technological field the somnolent pace manifests itself owing to the primacy of the governmental sector in provisioning the inventory. This self-reliance has both prestige and cost related reasons. The traditional, post-colonial practices of the military are another impediment. This inertia owes to the size of the officer cadre and of the force. Reform can only begin by being more selective, down sizing and bringing in elitism and professional arrogance. On the contrary, the present trend is towards institutional expansion.

The Change Internal to the Military

A brief review of the internal changes necessitated by the RMA in the military is in order. There has been an import in managerial practices and ethos form the civil world, thus narrowing the peer identification between the military and the civil. This has led to a dilution in the warrior ethic, except in the sword arms where radical professionalism can yet be witnessed. However, the technical manpower having increased, the dilution is more evident. These technologists are not necessarily in uniform and yet have a greater impact on the battlefield beyond the horizon. Specialization is the order of the day. The need to keep this voluntary manpower in service has required requisite incentive be given. It is also being supplemented by the female induction even into combat support arms. For the officer cadre, the emphasis is on mental mobility and intellectual development, to include degrees in civil universities. Thus, the regimentation that characterized military life has been a casualty to the RMA. The direction of the future is to turn out soldier-scholars. The defining characteristic of military culture - discipline - would no longer be obedience to orders but be redefined to mean action in the absence of orders. 

Over the long term there will be a need to review quite a lot of what we take as granted. This could include the regimental system; our generalist orientation; the place of tradition and regimentation; our parochial affiliations to regiments, arms and services; the ungainly nature of our mass army – aging and top heavy; and the manner of training and socialization. The point to note is that there is likely to be a transition from an institutional ethos to an occupational one. The point is that we would require to preserve the essential features of institutionalism, for the military would still remain a profession that makes the ultimate call on the individual – to sacrifice his very life. With that assured, we would do well to support the occupational trends, such as a managerial orientation and ascendance of those technically qualified, in order that we assimilate the technologies better into war fighting.

Findings: Part I

In so far as India is concerned, there is some evidence to show for the revised approach to the use of armed force in keeping with the past trends in advanced societies. This does not amount to being ‘revolutionary’ in any way. Therefore, the typically Indian momentum is likely to attend the inclusion of RMA related structural, doctrinal and hardware reform in the Indian military. Given our technological potential, and the reach of our ambition, it is likely that this could be harnessed for military purposes. However, to call this revolutionary would be to overstate the case presently. In so far as the changes internal to the military are concerned, the onset of the RMA is visible. The change with regard to attitudes, behavior, and value systems is largely in the dilution of the warrior ethic. The institutional-occupational strain will have to play itself out for a new military to emerge. It would not be premature to now say that the brain would eventually and finally eclipse brawn; thinking replace obeying; a key board a rifle; and possibly a pony tail a crew-cut. As a last word it may be said that the RMA is relevant to the context of the advanced information societies, and has yet to acquire the same connotations and immediacy in the developing societies including India

 

PART II: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE

The Change in National Politics

Two complementary trends in Indian politics are notable over the past decade. One has been the splintering of the center with the decline of the Congress and the second has been an ascendance of the political formations of the Right to political credibility. The reconfiguration of electoral power has resulted in an era of coalition politics. This democratic phenomenon by itself is unexceptionable. However, in the strategic community, this is viewed with some concern. It is conservatively assessed that this impacts adversely on stability, will and consistency in policy. Much of the discourse is along the lines that strong governance is thus compromised, with obvious implications for security.

Cumulatively the positions of the strategic community, the security agencies, and the interested political parties combine to conjure an image of ‘threat’. Whereas for the agencies, the ‘threat’ is largely in the external domain, it is not necessarily so for the parties concerned. The precedent of Rajiv’s Congress getting the largest parliamentary majority on the contrived image of an internal enemy aided by the ‘foreign hand’ exists. Thus, new sources to generate internal paranoia can be found, in order that new ‘vote banks’ can be generated.

The Threat to an Apolitical Military

A major problem area resulting from the contest in the political arena is the unwitting import of the same into the security agencies. The result of the politicization of the police is self-evident in India. An illustration of the wider problem resulting from such identification is in order. The German General Staff has been among the most potent war managing mechanisms the world has seen. Crippled by the Treaty of Versailles, it was eager to cut its teeth in the new concepts of the age of mechanized war all through the twenties. The political tumult of the Weimar Republic was ended by the rise of Hitler to legitimate power. He enabled the rearmament of Germany. This was of nationalist and professional interest to the officer corps. Their technocratic and scientific preoccupation with the tools and mechanics of their craft made them disinterested in the changing socio-political scene in their own society. The older general officers were gradually unceremoniously forced out thorough trumped up charges, one of which was even homosexuality. Thus came about the unfortunate marriage of convenience between the interests of National Socialism and the General Staff. The rest as they say is history.

The point of this narration is that history is for being heeded. The issue being raised is that there appears a need for introspection in the Indian context. Examples may help amplify this point. The popular position on various issues in the armed forces can be discerned by a textual analysis from the myriad professional journals. However, what is of concern is that even unwarranted presumptions that are now part of the wider discourse creep into what passes for strategic analysis. Take for instance the following extract:

 ‘Regardless of the differences with its hostile neighbor to the West, it is home to nearly 130 million Muslims. They are Indian citizens. While some of them may have been subverted by the blandishments of the militants, the vast majority of them have contributed considerably to the progress that India has made since Independence.’(Maj Gen Sehgal, (Retd.), USI Journal, July-Sep 2000, p. 441) 

Superficially this is unexceptionable, since the popular discourse has inured us to its troubling facets. The fact is that the retired General is linking gratuitously a minority to the coreligionist neighbors as though this minority has a monolithic national existence. Secondly, he further makes the subtle linkage of the community to militancy, propagating the lie that the militancy has none but the religious factor as inspiration. Thirdly, the backhanded certificate he patronizingly hands out is also questionable. Nevertheless, this tract has found entry into a reputed journal without critical comment. Another illustration will prove the point:   

‘Manage the perceptions of Muslim population of India. Wean away clergy and madrassas. Provide them with money, computers, and modern facilities. An in-depth policy of reassuring Indian Muslims should be evolved and implemented. Active participation of Hindu cultural and religious organizations in the process is a must. (Brig Arun Sahgal and Col Anil Sharma, Combat Journal, Sep 2000, p. 32.)

The perspective that these authors apparently subscribe to needs spelling out. It is that the Muslim India is a vulnerable and exploitable section of our society on account of the religious commonality with the Western adversary. The said neighbor is making inroads into this community with its premier intelligence agency, the ubiquitous ISI. Given that they are a potential ‘fifth column’, they require to be ‘reassured’ – lest they turn into one. Such perspectives are increasingly finding their way into the strategic discourse due to editorial oversight or complicity. Thereby they are acquiring an increased acceptability.

There are also instances of accepting, if not adopting, a revised symbolic format. An example in this regard is the installation of a religio-cultural image of the Goddess of Learning in the library of a leading military training institution, the Valmiki Library of the DSSC. The point is that only those images that contributed to the warrior ethic were permissible in public spaces. The problem is in the search to substitute the British legacy through idealization. This search is not unproblematic for it poses the question of defining the complex ‘idea of India’. It would appear that military ethos is now in danger of deriving its inspiration from the tenets of cultural nationalism, arbitrarily defined and non-representative. This may indicate a certain level of absorption of the currently popular discourse that is not necessarily in the best interest of the institution.

Findings: Part II

The Kargil windfall, and keeping pace with the ongoing revolution in military affairs, is likely to be the core of our concern over the next decade. The pursuit of this is likely to blind us to the soft underside of security, namely its societal context. Whereas this is indeed a democratic battlefield, it is not solely where the forces will play themselves out. The military would require to be more guarded in its environmental interaction. Additionally, it is but a reflection of or a cross section of society. Therefore the possibility of import of the ideological assumptions and predilections into military space is cannot be dismissed. This is more likely to be through default than by design. The moot point is that military socialization may not by itself prove equal to combat this. There has to be a concerted effort to do so. However, it may be reiterated that the perspective regards ‘Change’ presented is about trends not yet fully manifest. Therefore, it may not (it is hoped) stand the rigorous test of the future. That would be the ultimate testament to the apolitical character of the military. However, complacency in this regard could prove the point. Therefore, to be forearmed would entail being more alert to intrusions of ideological fallacies into strategic discourse.

 

 

 

 

PART III: THE GRAND STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CHANGE

Kashmir Revisited

Kashmir has been central to Indian security concerns over the past decade, and therefore merits our attention with regard to the possibility and direction of ‘Change’. Keeping in mind the instrumentality of the army to political purpose, any revisit to the Kashmir question cannot be in a political vacuum. The Indian case with regard to Kashmir is well rehearsed. The main contours of the Pakistani animus are also widely acknowledged. Given the popular position with regard to the recent and ongoing happenings in Kashmir it is surprising that the popular position is not ambivalent on the extent of apportioning the blame for the state of affairs there. It takes cognizance of Pakistani complicity while being neglectful of Indian contribution to the problem. In being less than holistic such a position does not lend itself to rational policy formulation. It is therefore important to revisit the issue at this stage, for the military strategy cannot be arrived at in a vacuum or based on false premises.

Two points on the Indian handling of the situation are of pertinence. The first is at the political level, in which India has been reluctant to countenance movement on its position. Being the revisionist power, the status quo is not in Pakistan’s preference. The Indian stand is that it will not engage in negotiations at the ‘point of the gun.’ The Pakistani’s, fearing that India might resile from its commitment, are wary of giving up the sub-threshold use of force as a means of pressure. The present position in Kashmir can be taken as a militarized dialogue, one described as ‘the dialogue of the deaf’. The recent invitation to the Pakistani CEO for talks is an effort to end this stalemate.  

The second point flows from the first, in that, the Indian engagement with the Kashmir problem militarily owes in part to the ability of the military to deliver. The army’s ability to cauterize the problem has had the fallout in terms leaving no incentive for political resolution of the problem. It has thus been a victim of its own success. Militarily the price has been in terms of erosion of the conventional deterrent. The less visible price has been the political and physical expansion of the army resulting in an unacknowledged decline of professionalism.

Clearly, there also exists a military need to revisit the Kashmir strategy. Presently, the contemplation of military strategy is along the two lines of deterrence, namely, deterrence by punishment, as recommended by the Kargil Review Commission, and deterrence by denial as exists at present. The latter is as much an expression of the attritionist mindset of the military, as of the territorial fixation of a modern state. Both are identifiable characteristics of the state and its army of the now bygone modern era. The need is therefore to move beyond the baggage of the last century. Presently the impetus to this end arises in the disproportionate cost factor, in terms of strained finances, personnel policies and morale. Responding to the military logic of the situation by merely moving on to deterrence by punishment is inadequate, in light of the ongoing nuclear weaponisation in the subcontinent. The situation calls for a comprehensive reevaluation of assumptions, positions and courses open.

Rethinking the India-Kashmir-Pakistan Equation

Adequate literature exists to implicate the Indian state with regard to the making of and sustenance of the problem in Kashmir. Suffice it to mention that the India-Kashmir equation demands redefinition. This implies that the adversarial postures have to be relegated, firstly, as regards the alienated populace of Kashmir, and later with the interested party, Pakistan. With respect to the Kashmiri people it has to be a peace tempered with justice. A cause that exacts over thirty thousand lives deserves nothing less. The fruits of Indian constitutional existence, specifically democracy, have to be made available to the people of the Valley in complete measure.

The approaches that have import for South Asia’s future lie in the non-traditional conceptions of security. These include concepts as environmental, human, and cooperative security, while the means include multi-track diplomacy, economic engagement, cultural interpenetration and people-to-people contact. These have not found a constituency within our strategic community, enamored as it is with the dominant international relations paradigm - realism. In short, we are in a strategic cul-de-sac. However, with regard to addressing the Pakistan factor, substantial ground can be traversed. Specific contours of this in military terms are downsizing; adoption of non-offensive defense; sensitivity to the ‘soft’ underside of security; demilitarization of the LC and Siachen; military diplomacy; and confidence building in the nuclear field.

Findings: Part III

The inescapable fact is that the most irresistible thing is an idea whose time has come. In other words, the army will have to adapt to change, lest it be forced to do so by the circumstances. In order to maintain a measure of initiative in this regard, it needs to dwell on the contours of its continued utility into the future. Only the bare outline can be reflected on here. The future is of regional economic blocs. Globalization implies an interdependence that will constrain the military sphere. Traditional military power, territorial aggrandizement and bean counting are passé. The more aware populace is unlikely to want to be defended unto death, as the nuclear shadow portends. It is an age of ‘warless societies’. Armies are anachronistic, if not redundant. They will need to downsize, become less visible and take on new roles. Institutional momentum may see the present through the near term, however the future is already here.

The Indian army is an ideal candidate, being of the nation that sees this century as its own. By seizing the initiative, it will be delegitimise the Pakistani army’s hold over its society. This would enable the reclamation of political space in Pakistan by the liberal element. This would usher in the elusive détente. Such a denouement is indeed what Sun Tzu may have meant in saying that the finest victory is one in which the enemy is subdued without a fight.                                       

 

PART IV: THE DOCTRINAL CONTEXT OF CHANGE

The Onset of Limited War Theorizing

 

Only recently has the strategic community addressed itself to exploring the nature of limited war as applicable in the subcontinental scenario. Since this is a change of recent vintage it requires to be addressed in the context of our wider deliberations on the implications of the phenomenon ‘Change’. Here the logic of limitation is carried to its logical conclusion, it being at variance with the votaries of limited war theology. The prevalent logic is that, given the nuclear deterrence operative between the perennial adversaries of the subcontinent, there is a need to create space for the continued utility of the conventional forces in a conventional war, albeit a limited one. It is for that reason that the Draft Nuclear Doctrine posits that the conventional capability will continue to be well honed, despite nuclearisation. This aspect of the doctrine is challenged here by an examination of the problems of limitation in a conflict between these to nuclear-armed neighbors.

The Indian Position

First is an examination of the present Indian position on limited war. It borrows on the American definition in that such a war is one kept deliberately limited by an exercise of strategic choice by the political decision maker. The form of limitation may be in terms of political aims, strategic objectives, operational means and methods employed in pursuit of these, and with restrictions on spatial extent and intensity. It is worth looking at its chief characteristic – it being that it takes ‘two to waltz’ i.e. both sides tacitly accept and respect the limits. In other words limitation is a result of neither side escalating. The importance of escalation dominance therefore emerges, specifically that the restraint on escalation is a function of the belief on the insignificance of any gains accruing as against the cost of doing so.

The point to note is that this is a calculation left to the adversary to make. All that a side can do is to orchestrate the forces in a manner, and communicate the same to the enemy by tacit in-conflict signaling, so as to reinforce the perception in his mind of the undesirability of escalation. This is a difficult proposition for it is overly reliant on the rationality of the enemy and disregards the noise element in the signals sent.  This is the crucial problem with regard to limitation in an Indo-Pak conflict. 

The present position is that India must retain the option of responding with conventional forces should the Pakistani provocation in Kashmir cross our tolerance threshold. Lately it has been appreciated that Pakistan has upped the ante in Kashmir under the impression that the logic of mutual deterrence has raised Indian tolerance levels. In short, it is under the impression that it possesses escalation dominance with respect to the LIC in Kashmir. The Indian assessment is that the falsity of this can only be brought home to Pakistan by creating the strategic space to enable employment of Indian conventional advantage. This would be a dissuasive measure to help rein in Pakistani proxy war. This explains the recent Indian interest in limited war. The limits to the exercise of Indian conventional strength arise from the nuclear backdrop. The main implication of this limitation would need to be the discarding of the ‘Sundarji model’ of war making of deep thrusts. The limits could be in the form of limited objectives, shallow penetrations and nuclear non-use – given the problems of assessment of the Pakistani nuclear threshold.

Pakistan has for its part anticipated this well and has sought to deny India this space it seeks, by resorting to the NATO model of nuclear use – deterrence by denial, i.e. a doctrine that envisages the employment of nuclear means to redress their conventional disadvantage. They have tried to reinforce this by the ploy of ‘the rationality of irrationality’, by posing as a state that cannot be relied to see the writing on the wall. To offset this adroit bit of Pakistani strategic footwork, Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine states that India would consider itself released from its ‘no first use’ pledge should its territory or ‘its military forces’ be subject to a nuclear attack. In short, this is an effort to gain escalation dominance by reliance on deterrence by punishment.

The Problems with Limitation

It is here that the plethora of problems that plague in-conflict limitation comes into play. The foremost has already been averred to earlier, namely, that it is reliant on the good sense of the Pakistani decision making elite. The pertinent point here is that this is an effort to call Pakistan’s bluff. In doing so it plays into Pakistani hands, in that it has to contend with Shelling’s concept ‘threat that leaves something to chance’ – the second fundamental of Pakistani nuclear deterrence. Indian political decision maker is likely to end up being self-deterred, for to exercise the conventional option may well be to take a prohibitive chance.   

The ‘plethora’ mentioned above must now be addressed. The foremost is the theoretical one drawn from Clausewitz on the inherent tendency towards Absolute War in the age of nationalism. In other words, limitation is rendered problematic by the political pressures arising in the involvement of the passions of the masses. This may be multiplied in our case given the demonisation that exists on both sides of the ‘other’. It is pertinent to recall here that in a leading Pakistani’s assessment one assumption that underlay the four wars waged by Pakistan has been the inferiority of the ‘hindu’ decision makers. Second is that most wars are begun with the assumption that they will be short, affordable and winnable. In the event, this proves to be unwise. Lastly, is that institutional pressure that may lead to mission expansion.

Having considered the strategic conundrum of limited war in the Indian context, it is worth considering the aims and objectives that may be sought. Clearly, these need to be consciously limited. This raises the question that if this is so then is resort to war worth it? Secondly, the sphere in which the decision is sought is pertinent to the assessment of costs. If it is restricted to the LC, then the mountain terrain will impose penalties in terms of time and casualties, as amply demonstrated in Kargil – where it bears recalling that the defenses were relatively under-prepared.  In both Siachen and Kargil, the strategic expectations from the limited war initiated by India and Pakistan respectively, have proven ambiguous in retrospect. If the area of conflict is across the IB then the subsequent observance of international law by a return to the status quo would not be of consequence enough to justify the war and taking of the chance of it going nuclear.

Findings: Part IV

From the foregoing, it appears inescapable that Limited War as an option flatters to deceive. If it is to be operationalised, then doctrine formulators will have to think through the problems raised here. The question is as to how to bring war fighting back into the reckoning. It can be predicted that resolution of this will be an Indian military planner’s nightmare. Therein is the challenge – to prevent Pakistan having its cake and eating it too!

Only the contours of the resolution need be addressed here, to prove the complexity of the task – doctrine generation being complex at the best of times as it is. The first is to convey unmistakably the Indian resolve to toe the intent given in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine – of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ in retaliation of nuclear use by Pakistan. This could be rendered problematic in the event of Pakistani use of its weapon in defense of its own territory, in its own area and against threatening military targets. Under such circumstance, we would be self-deterred not only from mounting international pressure but also from the incommensurable response of the magnitude of ‘unacceptable damage’. The only alternatives would be to try and prevail conventionally or use tactical nuclear weapons in return on enemy military targets. Neither is acceptable, the first being ruled out due to the domestic demand that we retaliate in kind lest we lose the credibility so essential to nuclear deterrence. Second, is limited nuclear war in highly populated terrain as the Indus basin would be a throwback to the days it was intended by NATO to stop the Soviet attack by tactical nuclear weapons in Germany. Escalation to the next step up the Kahnian ladder – city busting - would be axiomatic. The point is that the firebreaks up this ladder will not appear as pronounced to the politician as to the planner.

The second is the improbability of finding value objectives that are not likely to be unambiguously linked to Pakistani nuclear threshold. Threat to any such objective would have the Pakistani’s reserve the right of nuclear response, thereby compelling us to take what has been termed above as the ‘prohibitive’ option. Reliance on Pakistani rationality would be to impose our strategic sense on an unpredictable adversary – a cardinal strategic error. War being the extension of politics by other means; the political dilemma would then be to arrive at a viable aim. This is likely to prove elusive. The conclusion is that limitation is not an easy proposition, thereby ruling out ‘war’ as an option. This begs the question on the continued utility of military force as presently configured physically and conceptually.

 

CONCLUSION: ILLUMINING CHANGE

This paper has consciously trod the less beaten track in search of the parameters of ‘Change’ and their implications for the Indian military. The intent has been to illumine aspects that do not get the attention they deserve. This neglect is not due to any desire on the part of the strategic community or the military to water down the aspects raised, but are largely on account of the discourse being dominated by the traditionalist conservative-realist paradigm of thought. The alternative perspectives and prescriptions as dwelt on here therefore do not find adequate mention. The idea of doing so was that for finding answers in the dark, it is not enough to merely look in the area already lit up.

The major point that arises when the foregoing dimensions of ‘Change’ are dealt with as a whole can be succinctly summarized as: Downsize and Professionalise. The former imperative arises on account of the need to move beyond ‘mass’ – the chief characteristic of a modern military as against a post-modern one. The latter owes origin to the fact that ‘mass’ detracts from the levels of education and specialization necessary to professionalism of a military of a liberal-democratic state entering the 21^st century. Downsizing can only transpire if we move on from responsiveness to threats to seeking to transform them, in the manner our look at the central military problems, namely, Kashmir and the nuclear issue (Part III and IV), reveals. The need for professionalisation flows from our examination of the sociology of RMA and the dangers of politicization in the current political environment. The   agenda outlined here is a largely an abstract one. The next step is to deal with its military specifics. Any delay in taking this step now cannot be for want of knowing which road to take!                                                                                                                   (Words- 5261)