From the archives, 25 Dec 1998

OFFICERSHIP IN THE ARMY : A REDEFINITION

Literally,  an officer is one who holds a commission, it being  a

parchment  endorsing  the status conferred by  the  President  of

Republic,  in his capacity as the Supreme Commander of the  Armed

Forces.   In the legal sense, officership is by a virtue  of  ap­

pointment by a constitutionally enjoined  competent  authority.As

any  holder  of  the commission will testify, this  is  merely  a

formal position that by no means can encompass the depth the term
 

has acquired in practice over the millenia.

 

 

While  it  is indeed the highest  constitutional  authority  that 

confers  the  responsibility  of  officership  on  self-selecting 

aspirants,  selected and trained to bear it, it has the value  of

the paper it is written on, until it is ratified   in the  hearts

of  the men the officer commands.  This perspective  on  officer­

ship highlights the crucial nature of the moral covenant, between

the officer and his men, to the legitimacy and his  effectiveness

as  an officer.   (Though the masculine gender is used,  the  ob­

servations hold true in equal measure for lady officers).
 

 

This  has been a trans-historical and  cross-cultural  phenomenon

with regard to officering in the army, owing to the incidence  of

wars  in  inter-societal relations, and the  convergence  in  the

methods and means of war - a function of the process of  mimesis. 

Owing  to a shared genetic inheritance, human nature  varies   at

best to accommodate environment related ethnic peculiarities, but

never  so  much  as to preclude officiership  from  the  societal

division  of  labour.   The role, simply, is  leadership  of  the

fighting  man,  and lately the management of  the  instrument  of

violence.
 

 

As  with most dynamic institutions, army officership has  had  to

keep  pace with military evolution.  In this era  of  accelerated

history, there has been a change in the nature of armed conflict,

stemming,  of necessity, from social change.  The consequence  on

the nature of officership has been transformative, a process that

is on-going, both, surely and rapidly. 
 

 

This  essay is a theoretical examination  of the impact  of  this

process  of change on the nature of officership in the army.   In

order  to escape the tag of being merely `academic', it  takes  a

critical  look at officership in the Indian army, as a  precursor

to  a  prescriptive agenda.  The aim is to  analyse  the  ongoing

redefinition of officeship, in order to inform thinking on policy

and the Indian Army.
 

 

A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

 

On the Nature of Officership
 

 

The  army  as an institution bears the social  responsibility  of

provision of security.  To this end, it has relative autonomy  in

terms  of  corporate identity; expertise in  the  management  and

application  of violence; and a representative function,  to  in­

clude an advisory one (Huntington).  Of necessity, the  army   is

hierarchical, comprising three layers - the executive, the super­

visory  and  the directional. The army fills the slots  in  these

layers  by dint of merit and seniority.  At the executive  level,

the  junior  officers are at the interface with man  and  machine

that  comprise  the tools of war.  The supervisory level  is  for

effective  management  of the means of war.  At  the  directional

level,  concern  is with the methods of application of  force  to

beget  security - it being defined politically.   
 

 

An  alternative  interpretation is in the form of  the  tactical,

operational, and strategic level - the realm of `grand  strategy'

being  reserved for the political master, but at which  the  army

must fulfill its representative function.  Yet another variant is

in  the command  and staff alternation - this being by virtue  of

the  appointment  held or by the nature of the  appointee,  as  a

warrior  or a non-warrior.  In short, the foregoing  taxonomy  of

officership makes for a complex analytical exercise.
 

 

 

Combat  effectiveness of the army is a function of  coherence  of

the  three  levels, and  the  deftness of  enlightened  political

control.   Of  vital importance in this regard is  the  executive

level.   Input from military sociology is unanimous on  the  fact

that the fighting man fights not for god, country or the  colors,

as myth would have it, but for a primary group, no larger than  a

sub-unit.   This owes to horizontal bonding, termed as  cohesion. 

Since  the  physiological, phychological and social needs of  the

individual are met under adverse conditions by his comrades,  his

identity expands to encompass sub-unit, to the extent of  instil­

ing  a  willingness to the sacrifice his very own  life  for  its

preservation.
 

 

If that be findings of research from numerous conflicts, it gives

us  a clue as to the role of officership at the executive  level. 

It is to ensure instilment and positive articulation of  cohesion

for  organisational  ends.   These organisational  ends  are  the

military interpretation of political ends done at the directional

level,  by senior officers, colloquially referred to as  `brass'. 

The  supervisory  level is to ensure vertical cohesion  for  they

form  the intermediary level.  The brass have an additional  task

of ensuring societal support for military endeavor.  This, along­

with  horizontal and vertical integration, begets  organisational

cohesion  - a prerequisite for combat effectiveness,  the  raison

d'etre of an officer corps.
 

 

On the Nature of Society and War

 

 

With  the foregoing as encapsulation of the discourse  on  levels

and  roles,  gauging the impact of the changing nature  of  armed

conflict  on  the same,  is in order.  That `armed  conflict'  is

being  used  to substitute  for `war' is evidence enough  of  the

changed nature of `war'.  In fact, `war', having been outlawed in

the  Charter era, has undergone mutations best expressed  by  the

inclusive term `armed conflict'.
 

 

This change owes to societal change - a characteristic feature of

collective human existence - that varies from being  evolutionary

to  revolutionary, and is not necessarily linear.   The  explana­

tions  on  the omni-present feature of force and its  utility  in

societal affairs and inter-societal relations, also vary from the

realist  and neo-realist views to leftist versions of the  elite-

mass  dichotomy.  Suffice it to mention, for the purpose of  this

essay,  that  it is only lately, with the  `triumph'  of  liberal

democracy and socially responsive capitalism, that there has been

emergence of what are termed as `warless societies'.
 

 

While  this  change is from the modern to  the  post-modern,  the

industrial to the information age,  ethnic to the national, it is

a  certainty that the period of transition to  the  communication

revolution inspired global village, shall be marked by the itera­

tive use to force.  Thus, though officersahip is not obsolescent,

the  roles require constant revision. 
 

 

The  Moskos classification  is taken as the start point for  this

analysis.  `Warless societies' apart, most societies fall in  the

`war-deterrent' and `war-preparedness' categories.  The latter is

true  for  most Third World states, whereas the  former  includes

states  trying to escape the Third World tag.   In  war-readiness

societies, the army is mass oriented; low-tech; territory defend­

ing; and anthoritarian in leader orientation.  In `war-dererrent'

societies  the  army is lean, hi-tech, democratic  in  ethos  and

cammands  a  high  per-capita expenditure.  In  the  former,  its

components  are  easily replaceable; in the latter they  are  too

expensive to lose. 
 

 

In this is the germ of the obsolescence of the utility of  force. 

A  weaponry too expensive, and nuclearisation, have  combined  to

eliminate war as an option in the extension of politics by  other

means.  Thereby, the onset of `warless societies', in which mili­

tary  power  has been eclipsed by the economic component  as  the 

determinant of power, influence, and index of prosperity. 
 

 

Another facet of social organisation - the state system, and  its

evolution,  has  had an influence on the nature  of  officership. 

The  state has in the modern era grown to maturity, and  is  even

now  under  the  threat of supercession.   In  pre-modern  times,

feudal ties bound the aristocracy which their retainers.  In  the

early periods of state formation, the elite provided officers and

the  masses soldiers, the inter-relationship  being  patrimonial. 

With  the onset of nationalism, maturing of the concept of  citi­

zenship,  and  the impact of technology, this  linkage  has  been 

professionalised.   Socio-economic change in terms  of  equality,

education,  rising  living standards,  spread  of  opportunities,

urbanisation etc, and the premium on expertise in handling  tech­

nology intensive weaponry, the patronising element in officer-man

relations  has been rendered anachronistic.  This is more  so  in

technical arms. Where the human element is central to   function,

there  also the professional content also over-shadows, the  per­

sonal  bond.  Thus is seen the clausewitzian trinity  -  society,

state  and the military - interactive in the sociological  field,

the impact being of transformative character.
 

 

 

OFFICERSHIP IN THE INDIAN ARMY
 

 

On the Nature of Indian Society
 

 

Indian society in its cultural space transcends the boundaries of

the Indian state.  It encompasses the three civisational waves  -

agricultural, industrial, and post-industrial.  It is  internally

differentiated, with coexisting contradictions and complementari­

ties.   An army, being but a cross-section of  society,  reflects

the same in ethos, composition and structure.
 

 

For instance, the army still retains an inherited racial composi­

tion, alongwith innovations on composite lines. Its officer class

has  an industrial age orientation; whereas the soldiery  in  the 

technical  arms is educated, informed and  competent, while  that

in  the major fighting arm - the infantry - is still  largely  of

 

 

 

peasant  stock.  Nuclear weaponry and missiles coexist with  gen­

erations-old small arms.  In officer culture, a warrior ethos  is

coexistent with a technocrat-managerial one.  Therefore, as  with

Indian  society, reflections on the Indian army can only be  lit­

tered with qualifications.
 

 

Based  on the preceding theory, Indian society may be classed  as

transiting  from  being  a war-deterrent to  a  warless  society.

Earlier the army had been permitted its toys, evident from  India

having  the dubious distinction of being the largest importer  of

arms through the 80s.  However the balance of payments crisis  in

the  early 90s, caused in part by the military profligacy of  the

80s,   resulted in a resource  crunch.  This has also been  occa­

sioned  by the ongoing economic liberalisation, which is  primary

evidence with regard to Indian society effecting the said transi­

tion. In effect, the message is for a strategic disengagement, in

favour of an economic reach into a globalised market. 
 

 

Secondary  evidence is in the form of the lowered status  of  the

officer class, despite the  military rearguard action in terms of

hi-tech  acquisition  and high visibility public  relations  cam­

paign.  Beside periodic recording of parliamentary concern, there

is  also  little evidence of `societal attention for  the  army's

preoccupations in operational areas as Kashmir and Siachen - this

despite ascendance, in recent times, of the right wing in  polit­

ics.  Clearly, the Indian elite is attuned to the global environ­

ment,  while the regional elite and masses in general are  inter­

ested in the economic dividend and the local agenda.  
 

 

The  consequence is on, both, the soldiery and the  officer,  and

their inter-relationship.  The army is now  `just another job' in

the job market, easily accessible to the middle rung of qualified

candidates.   The  officer  is thus faced with  the  question  of

whether the army is `more than just a job' (Moskos), particularly 

in  operations.  To the soldier his job remains  `rozgaar',  till

the ties that bind become apparent in face of danger.
 

 

In the technical arms, this situation is better handled given the 

mediation  of  hardware.  It is in the fighting arms that  it  is

deemed  a malaise, the solution being seen as a leadership  func­

tion  of officer-leaders, who, as the paradox would have it,  are

themselves  afflicted with the same, as an entity.   Thus,  where

`paltan ki izzat' was to foster  cohesion, it has been  corrupted

by the careerist virus.  Elitism in weaponry operated or  skills,

compensates in some measure, but, for the large mass of the army,

the  answer is in extensive surgery, in consonance with  indirect

societal demands. 
 

 

The  problem  with this is in inertia, vested   interest,  and  a

dated  role  definition.   More importantly, there  seems  to  be

inadequate  comprehension of the psychology of the fighting  man. 

This is most evident from the experimentation with the  Rashtriya

Rifles in operations.  Whereas, cohesive groups perform best,
 

this  nascent  organisation  has a curious mix  of  officers  and

soldiers  - any bond they form being one in face of danger.   The

impact of this on the operational environment - the Kashmiri com­

munity  - aside, such a disregard of fundamentals, to work  round

personnel  problems of the early 90's, is suspect.  The  problem,

therefore,  will  also be one stemming from  lack  of  conceptual

clarity.
 

 

The  broad tenets of such reengineering in the long term  include

downsizing,  professionalising,  and disengaging  from  an  omni-

directional  forward  posture.  In the short  term  the  in-house

measures already instituted may be reviewed as part the an intro­

spection  to  discern  the direction, the ends, and  the  way  to

negotiate the interim.     
 

 

It is the `holy cow' image stemming from lethargy and ignorance ,

and the success, in some measure, of the army's public  relations

blitz,  that  will  keep at bay  external  pressure  for  reform. 

Therefore  the premium on in-house measures.  These will be  sub­

ject to group think, traditionalism and prejudice in the form  of

`when we were youngsters', especially of the brass.  The  problem
 

 

is compounded by the upper echelon having the onus of  initiating

change  in  hierarchial and quasi-authoritarian  systems  as  the

army.   Any prescription will have to be sensitive to  these  re­

tarding  issues  if it is to be relevent.   It  must,  therefore,

identity  key  issues;  create the mental space  with  regard  to

these; and suggest an evolutionary program.
 

 

Firstly,  a  re-education is recommended for the  officer  corps.  

At  the  in-service level it may be in the form  of  capsules  in

courses, but it must be incorporated into pre-commission academic
 

syllabi.  This would include military sociology and a history  of

war,  the latter being different from present-day campaign  study

format.  This would aid professionalism to develop, for an empha­

sis  on technical features brings about a technocratic  approach. 

The  present learning by rote model has to give way to a  reading

habit,  for  gaining breadth and depth of  perspective.   Insight

from the management sciences, imported by the sabbatical  system,

must be disseminated by proper post-sabbatical employment of such

officers. 
 

 

Secondly,  a  fallout of the above will  be  in  professionalism. 
 

This  would undercut careerist short cuts.  Professionalism  imp­
 

lies  a  work oriented approach, as distinguished  from  a  task-
 

oriented  one.  It would help the army adapt to the  occupational
 

features  that are, of necessity, eroding the institutional  base
 

of  the  army.  It would enable cross-fertilisation in  terms  of
 

ideas, models and processes from the civil world.

 

 

Thirdly,  a downsizing is imperative.  The much touted figure  of

12000 (increased recently to 13000) deficiency is evidence of the

inflated authorisation figures.  Expansion to fill these will  be

expansion  in pursuit of institutional interest, quite  like  the

dilution  in  the rank structure of the early 80s,  or  the  fait

accompli  nature of raising additional  formations,  headquarters

and  forces as the Rashtriya Rifles.  On the contrary  a  contra­

ction  is recommended.  This will be predicated on change in  the

 

threat  perception that necessitates expansion.  The  paradox  in

that a large force makes for poor quality, that in turn leads  to

larger size as compensation.
 

 

With  this as recommendatory grid, an examination of the  effects

on officership in its man-management facet is in order.  The  off

shoot  of  the study of modern management  practices,  human  and

organisational  psychology, and sociology in its military  dimen­

sion, is self explanatory.   A more aware and self-aware  officer

is  better than a  tradition bond one.  The result of  forging  a

professional  superior-subordinate  bound will result  in  higher

combat  effectiveness.   Whereas  the importance  of  a  paternal

relationship   with  the  primary group is conceded,  is  it  the

source of this is in the undue proliferation of troop  engagement

in non-military activity - as a tacit bargain.  Lastly,  downsiz­

ing will result in improved quality across the board.  The  indi­

rect  fallout will be in a non-threatening size, with respect  to

our  neighbors, and, thereby, a reduction in a threat  perception

answered by expansion.
 

 

Conclusion
 

 

Summing  up the Indian Scene, it may be said that Indian  society

has been historically  introspective.  The reasons for  continua­

tion of the phenomenon owe now to economic causes.  The strategic

community's  external  focus and effort, in  incidental  alliance

with  the  right wing of polity, to project the same  onto  civil

society, has had visibility, but insubstantial penetration.   The

Indian army, if it is to live  up to its democratic ethos, has to

take its cue from society. 
 

 

Principally,  it requires to disengage and  downsize;  re-educate

and  professionalise; and cater for accomodation of  occupational

trends  within  an institutional ethos.  The impact  of  this  on

officership,  in  its leadership function, would  keep  the  army

apace  with the impact of societal change on, both,  the  officer
 

 

cadre  and the soldiery.  At the officer-man  interface,  profes­

sional detachment would increase with the level and corresponding

role  of  the  officer.  With the non-gazetted  cadre  bearing  a

greater weight at the executive level, the officers could  attend

to  the  management of the means of violence and  application  of

force with greater vigour.
 

CONCLUSION

 

 

The  nature  of armed conflict having  become  increasingly  more

complex,   officership has to be redefined in light of the aim  -

combat  effectiveness.   Officership has  acquired  a  managerial

slant, at the cost of reduction on the premium on leadership.   A

superior  quality of personnel is the requirement, as corollary - 

among other reasons.  Societal change has the potential to deliv­

er  on this requirement.  This can be tapped by making  the  army

socially relevant.  This can be achieved through a sociologically

aware  officer cadre aligning organisational ends with  those  of

society.  This is in the realm of political control of the  mili­

tary.  Given the economic pre-occupation of polity, the army,  as

an institution, will require self-regulation in this regard.
 

 

That  said, the officer cadre will contine to build and  maintain

organisational  cohesion;  in  short, the  executive  level  will

remain  concerned with horizontal integration.  However, a  tech­

nology savvy and `professional' soldiery, enable a will downgrad­

ing  of   the leadership function. Thus,  officer roles  will  be

redefined as  interpreting a given societal conjuncture to  gauge

the  utility of the military addressal of the same, and  if  need

be,  enable  the instrumental use of force towards  the  approved

political end.  Clearly, officership is no longer to `win the
 

next  war', but to control the logic, dynamics and  dialectic  of
 

force.