From the Archives, 31 May 2001

THE DOCTRINAL CHALLENGE

Published in USI Journal 

Two important documents have been released recently for the security community to digest, and for the lay person to apprise himself/herself about the relatively opaque field for security.  Both together fulfill a long felt need of transparency and articulation of Indian strategic thaught.  The first is the dIND of the NSAB, the second is the army publication on `fundamentals, doctrine and concepts' by its think tank, the ARTRAC.While the otherwise welcome dIND did encounter a controversial reception, the army doctrine, though unclassified, has kept a low profile.  Even though the army doctrine preceded the dIND by a year, it did give out an institutional position on the nuclear question that was later echoed the dIND.  Whereas the dIND has rightly been discussed threadbare, if has not been read in relation to pre-existing service doctrines, such as that of the air-force and the army.  This owes largely to the independent origins of all three.  Therefore, despite such doctrinal effusion, there is only incomplete evidence of doctrinal clarity.  In short, the present doctrinal challenge is to attain the same.

The requirement of such evolution is to instill and enable jointness; to provide unambiguous guidance for decision makers; to iron out institutional conflict; and to inform the citizenry of the good health of the security system.  But by far the most important reason for taking these as a start-point, rather than an end-product, is to convey an unmistakable message to potential adversaries.  Since deterrence is now the mainstay of Indian security intent, its credibility is bolstered by definitive communication.  Towards this end the doctrinal challenge needs now to be met. 

Both the doctrines are unanimous on the need to acquire a nuclear deterrent.  To both the deterrent, is with respect to nuclear use by a prospective opponent, and not necessarily to deter war itself.  Both advocate a minimum credible nuclear capability based on a triad of delivery systems.  Both are cognisant of the political utility of nuclear weapons.  However, when mated there emerges a conundrum that has thus far escaped comment of analysts.  This article highlights a specific problem area at the junction of the dIND and the army doctrine with respect to nuclear use.

 

Specifically, the nuclear conundrum  will have origin in enemy (read Pakistani) reaction to operationalisation of the army doctrine.  The army doctrine postulates a pro-active, aggressive, and offensive strategy in pursuit of decisive vitory on enemy territory.  Should we assume Pakistan as an adversary, it would imply threatening of Pakistani vital areas directly and comprehensively.  This would be to capitalise on the Pakistani vulnerability of lack of depth, and our own conventional superiority.  Such a doctrine, coupled with air force efforts as dictated by its own doctrine, can only eventuate in a nuclear response from Pakistan under the logic of `last resort'; `use it or lose it'; or of `nothing to lose'.

This gives rise to three problems. One is the lowering of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan in the hope of deterring such a conventional tryst.  Second is the pre-emptive employment of its nuclear capability by Pakistan in order to negate the launch of the Indian offensive.  Last is the usage of the nuclear weapons on military targets in own territory in order to redress the conventional imbalance.  This may take the form of a shot-across-the-bow or the `greenfield' option.  Of these the last will be legally and morally justifiable; the second is less so but is not entirely unreasonable; and the first is certainly unexceptionable.  In short, we have handed Pakistan a fair case for retrospective justification of nuclear use.

The nuclear conundrum is however of a higher order.  In face of such Pakistani action, we will be required to make good on our dIND declaration of intent of unleashing `unacceptable damage' on receipt of a nuclear attack.  We have also included a nuclear attack on our forces as trigger.  In such straits as outlined, India will not be able to make good on its promise.  In effect, the threat lacks credibility not only for the absense of justification, but also because we will be self-deterred from escalating.  In technical jargon, Pakistan will enjoy escalation dominance.  It will enable conflict termination on favourable terms for Pakistan, as international pressure will then be both swift and sure.

The conundrum, therefore, is in our inability to distinguish between `first strike' and `first use'.  Whereas `unacceptable damage' in return for `first strike' is credible, against `first use' it is less so.  Causing `unacceptable damage' is comprehensible only if the enemy is denied like satisfaction in revenge.  This can only be through an attempt at a successful `first strike' against the enemy's `first use'.  There be no guarantee of `success', `unacceptable damage' to own assets is not unlikely.  It is this that makes Pakistani `first use' viable, while denying same status to our formulation.  By no means is there a certainity of `first use' being as a `first strike'.  Indeed, the contrary is likely to be true.

This explains Pakistani reservations on our `no first use' offer, besides the fact that their interpretation of deterrence is wider than ours.  For them it is to deter  war itself, and not merely an opponent's use of nuclear weapons.  For us, it is to deter nuclear use, since, as the army doctrine indicates, our superiority convinces us of continued utility of the military as a political instrument.

In summary of the argument made thus far, it may be said that our doctrinal efforts have in one fell swoop negated both our conventional and nuclear advantage.  Military action, at the conventional level, would invite Pakistani nuclear response.  However, Pakistani nuclear use, by no means, implies a carte blanche for our nuclear forces.  The conundrum, therefore, will arise when Pakistan takes ample care in nuclear targeting so as to constrict our nuclear options.  The point is that having caused `unacceptable damage' is no consolation for ending up as a recipient of the same.

 

The need clearly is to move beyond independent, institutionally espoused, doctrines.  It is not solely task of the NSC, with its own dIND being but one more doctrine in need of integration.  Given the lacunae dwelt on already, two aspects, in terms of the direction of evolution, need highlighting.  With regard to the army doctrine, it is to rethink the sine qua non of the political utility of military force.  In so far as the dIND goes, it is to repeat history in moving beyond the hint of `massive retaliation' in it, in favour of `flexible response'.

First lets take the army and its doctrine.  Its professional concern of furnishing and delivering on the extreme option of high intensity conventional conflict in pursuit of a political objective needs to be diluted.  Even if nuclearisation of a conflict is taken as a `last resort', and there is no guarantee of this being so, a quest for, `decisive victory' may be counter-productive.  Thus the `go for it' `once and for all' thinking in the army has to be resensitised to the clausewitz thesis.  Nuclearisation compels Limited War.  From the army's push to call the nuclear bluff of Pakistan during the Kargil crisis, it is not certain wheather the qualitative change weaponisation begets has been registered.  Reliance on in-conflict deterrence is not a sane option for a government to take.

The second, prescriptive, feature is with regard to the dIND threat of `unacceptable damage'.  While there are other problems with this draft, informed by economics and the perception-misperception theory, here only the aspect of `the nuclear conundrum' is discussed.  Once our forces have been stalled by the nuclear card within Pakistan, the scenario will be one of lightened pressure.  This will spring not only from the army, unwilling to fight from a position of disadvantage, but also from the mob.  Taking the conflict to its logical conclusion will be both a tempting and a daunting proposition.  We will have been denied the justification for inflicting `unacceptable damage'.  Given that `unacceptable damage' would be in a setting when the armies are toe-to-toe,

possibly in high density population areas, the legal, moral, and military viability of the same would have become questionable. 

Thus, there is a need to move beyond the avatar of `massive retaliation', that is the dIND. Massive Retaliation was in place when the superiority of the US over the USSR was unassailable.  After the scare of the missile-gap in late fifties, evolution towards the `flexible response' formulation of McNamara took place.  It would appear India needs to make the transition quicker.  Such a step does not detract from the other plank in our doctrine-that of `no first use'.  In short, the doctrine need not be verbally bellicose as now - `unacceptable damage', indeed! - but be unmistakable about our being released from our `no first use' commitment in face of a nuclear attack.  Since our intent of causing `unacceptable damage' in  return is  credible only  in case our population centres

and nuclear-industrial concentrations are hit, inclusion of military forces as targets that will invite such response makes it less credible.  Since response should be proportionate and discrimatory, a progressively punitive response through target prioritisation needs to be done. Therefore our manner of utilising our nuclear capability would need to be situation-specific, so as to best serve our national interest involved in those straits.  The ambiguity beyond this formulation, in terms of contingency planning, itself contributes to deterrence.  In this direction must the draft evolve in order to get state imprimature.

 

The doctrinal dialectic thus far has had this trajectory: in order to keep the LIC within sub-tolerance threshold, India requires a viable conventional capability; in order to redress the conventional imbalance, Pakistan deems it requires a nuclear deterrent; in order to prevent operational employment of the Pakistani nuclear capability, the dIND posits `unacceptable damage'.  Having seen its credibility as suspect, it is imperative that we move beyond it. 

This can only be possible when the doctrines are integrated.  The present versions are only a `take-off' point and, in that limited sense, serve a purpose.  Given that they are of institutional origin, any evolution may witness institutional conflict.  Here political attention and input will be necessary in taking further formulation beyond the bureaucratic confines of the NSC, into the realm of parliament, the strategic community and the public - as indeed befits a democratic polity.