From the Archives, 31 May 2001
THE DOCTRINAL
CHALLENGE
Published in USI Journal
Two important
documents have been released recently for the security community to digest, and
for the lay person to apprise himself/herself about the relatively opaque field
for security. Both together fulfill a long
felt need of transparency and articulation of Indian strategic thaught. The first is the dIND of the NSAB, the second
is the army publication on `fundamentals, doctrine and concepts' by its think
tank, the ARTRAC.While the otherwise welcome dIND did encounter a controversial
reception, the army doctrine, though unclassified, has kept a low profile. Even though the army doctrine preceded the
dIND by a year, it did give out an institutional position on the nuclear
question that was later echoed the dIND.
Whereas the dIND has rightly been discussed threadbare, if has not been
read in relation to pre-existing service doctrines, such as that of the
air-force and the army. This owes
largely to the independent origins of all three. Therefore, despite such doctrinal effusion,
there is only incomplete evidence of doctrinal clarity. In short, the present doctrinal challenge is
to attain the same.
The requirement
of such evolution is to instill and enable jointness; to provide unambiguous
guidance for decision makers; to iron out institutional conflict; and to inform
the citizenry of the good health of the security system. But by far the most important reason for
taking these as a start-point, rather than an end-product, is to convey an
unmistakable message to potential adversaries.
Since deterrence is now the mainstay of Indian security intent, its
credibility is bolstered by definitive communication. Towards this end the doctrinal challenge
needs now to be met.
Both the
doctrines are unanimous on the need to acquire a nuclear deterrent. To both the deterrent, is with respect to
nuclear use by a prospective opponent, and not necessarily to deter war
itself. Both advocate a minimum credible
nuclear capability based on a triad of delivery systems. Both are cognisant of the political utility
of nuclear weapons. However, when mated
there emerges a conundrum that has thus far escaped comment of analysts. This article highlights a specific problem
area at the junction of the dIND and the army doctrine with respect to nuclear
use.
Specifically, the
nuclear conundrum will have origin in
enemy (read Pakistani) reaction to operationalisation of the army
doctrine. The army doctrine postulates a
pro-active, aggressive, and offensive strategy in pursuit of decisive vitory on
enemy territory. Should we assume
Pakistan as an adversary, it would imply threatening of Pakistani vital areas
directly and comprehensively. This would
be to capitalise on the Pakistani vulnerability of lack of depth, and our own
conventional superiority. Such a
doctrine, coupled with air force efforts as dictated by its own doctrine, can
only eventuate in a nuclear response from Pakistan under the logic of `last
resort'; `use it or lose it'; or of `nothing to lose'.
This gives rise
to three problems. One is the lowering of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan in
the hope of deterring such a conventional tryst. Second is the pre-emptive employment of its
nuclear capability by Pakistan in order to negate the launch of the Indian
offensive. Last is the usage of the
nuclear weapons on military targets in own territory in order to redress the
conventional imbalance. This may take
the form of a shot-across-the-bow or the `greenfield' option. Of these the last will be legally and morally
justifiable; the second is less so but is not entirely unreasonable; and the
first is certainly unexceptionable. In
short, we have handed Pakistan a fair case for retrospective justification of
nuclear use.
The nuclear
conundrum is however of a higher order.
In face of such Pakistani action, we will be required to make good on
our dIND declaration of intent of unleashing `unacceptable damage' on receipt
of a nuclear attack. We have also
included a nuclear attack on our forces as trigger. In such straits as outlined, India will not
be able to make good on its promise. In
effect, the threat lacks credibility not only for the absense of justification,
but also because we will be self-deterred from escalating. In technical jargon, Pakistan will enjoy
escalation dominance. It will enable
conflict termination on favourable terms for Pakistan, as international
pressure will then be both swift and sure.
The conundrum,
therefore, is in our inability to distinguish between `first strike' and `first
use'. Whereas `unacceptable damage' in
return for `first strike' is credible, against `first use' it is less so. Causing `unacceptable damage' is
comprehensible only if the enemy is denied like satisfaction in revenge. This can only be through an attempt at a
successful `first strike' against the enemy's `first use'. There be no guarantee of `success',
`unacceptable damage' to own assets is not unlikely. It is this that makes Pakistani `first use'
viable, while denying same status to our formulation. By no means is there a certainity of `first
use' being as a `first strike'. Indeed,
the contrary is likely to be true.
This explains
Pakistani reservations on our `no first use' offer, besides the fact that their
interpretation of deterrence is wider than ours. For them it is to deter war itself, and not merely an opponent's use
of nuclear weapons. For us, it is to
deter nuclear use, since, as the army doctrine indicates, our superiority convinces
us of continued utility of the military as a political instrument.
In summary of the
argument made thus far, it may be said that our doctrinal efforts have in one
fell swoop negated both our conventional and nuclear advantage. Military action, at the conventional level,
would invite Pakistani nuclear response.
However, Pakistani nuclear use, by no means, implies a carte blanche for
our nuclear forces. The conundrum,
therefore, will arise when Pakistan takes ample care in nuclear targeting so as
to constrict our nuclear options. The
point is that having caused `unacceptable damage' is no consolation for ending
up as a recipient of the same.
The need clearly
is to move beyond independent, institutionally espoused, doctrines. It is not solely task of the NSC, with its
own dIND being but one more doctrine in need of integration. Given the lacunae dwelt on already, two
aspects, in terms of the direction of evolution, need highlighting. With regard to the army doctrine, it is to
rethink the sine qua non of the political utility of military force. In so far as the dIND goes, it is to repeat
history in moving beyond the hint of `massive retaliation' in it, in favour of
`flexible response'.
First lets take
the army and its doctrine. Its
professional concern of furnishing and delivering on the extreme option of high
intensity conventional conflict in pursuit of a political objective needs to be
diluted. Even if nuclearisation of a
conflict is taken as a `last resort', and there is no guarantee of this being
so, a quest for, `decisive victory' may be counter-productive. Thus the `go for it' `once and for all'
thinking in the army has to be resensitised to the clausewitz thesis. Nuclearisation compels Limited War. From the army's push to call the nuclear
bluff of Pakistan during the Kargil crisis, it is not certain wheather the
qualitative change weaponisation begets has been registered. Reliance on in-conflict deterrence is not a
sane option for a government to take.
The second,
prescriptive, feature is with regard to the dIND threat of `unacceptable
damage'. While there are other problems
with this draft, informed by economics and the perception-misperception theory,
here only the aspect of `the nuclear conundrum' is discussed. Once our forces have been stalled by the
nuclear card within Pakistan, the scenario will be one of lightened
pressure. This will spring not only from
the army, unwilling to fight from a position of disadvantage, but also from the
mob. Taking the conflict to its logical conclusion
will be both a tempting and a daunting proposition. We will have been denied the justification
for inflicting `unacceptable damage'.
Given that `unacceptable damage' would be in a setting when the armies
are toe-to-toe,
possibly in high
density population areas, the legal, moral, and military viability of the same
would have become questionable.
Thus, there is a
need to move beyond the avatar of `massive retaliation', that is the dIND.
Massive Retaliation was in place when the superiority of the US over the USSR
was unassailable. After the scare of the
missile-gap in late fifties, evolution towards the `flexible response'
formulation of McNamara took place. It
would appear India needs to make the transition quicker. Such a step does not detract from the other
plank in our doctrine-that of `no first use'.
In short, the doctrine need not be verbally bellicose as now -
`unacceptable damage', indeed! - but be unmistakable about our being released
from our `no first use' commitment in face of a nuclear attack. Since our intent of causing `unacceptable
damage' in return is credible only
in case our population centres
and
nuclear-industrial concentrations are hit, inclusion of military forces as
targets that will invite such response makes it less credible. Since response should be proportionate and
discrimatory, a progressively punitive response through target prioritisation
needs to be done. Therefore our manner of utilising our nuclear capability
would need to be situation-specific, so as to best serve our national interest
involved in those straits. The ambiguity
beyond this formulation, in terms of contingency planning, itself contributes
to deterrence. In this direction must
the draft evolve in order to get state imprimature.
The doctrinal
dialectic thus far has had this trajectory: in order to keep the LIC within
sub-tolerance threshold, India requires a viable conventional capability; in
order to redress the conventional imbalance, Pakistan deems it requires a
nuclear deterrent; in order to prevent operational employment of the Pakistani
nuclear capability, the dIND posits `unacceptable damage'. Having seen its credibility as suspect, it is
imperative that we move beyond it.
This can only be
possible when the doctrines are integrated.
The present versions are only a `take-off' point and, in that limited
sense, serve a purpose. Given that they
are of institutional origin, any evolution may witness institutional
conflict. Here political attention and
input will be necessary in taking further formulation beyond the bureaucratic
confines of the NSC, into the realm of parliament, the strategic community and
the public - as indeed befits a democratic polity.