From the archives, 14 Mar 1995
THE POLITICO-MILITARY UTILITY
OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
CASE STUDY OF
INDIA
It is oft said that historically India has
lacked a strategic culture[1]. There is an innate and inchoate national aspiration. Expression to
this has been given in an unsystematic manner by the state determined to fulfil
its self defined manifest destiny. A manner of doing so has been its
technological endeavours, primarily its nuclear and space programmes[2]. The
inevitable, and perhaps more desired end, is the military fallout in the form
of a nuclear capability and the means of its delivery- ballistic missiles
(BMs).
The
study seeks to present the long term options that India's BM programme equips
it with. This is however an adventitious fallout of a politically motivated BM
programme. The military utility of the programme is in the ability so acquired
of long range delivery of a nuclear payload. The BM programme riding on the
space programme has politico-military utility in the eventual acquisition of a
missile based nuclear deterrent.
Strategic Context of BM.
A model for guiding national
endeavour is as: Grand Vision- National Aims- Policies- Strategies. In India
this translates as-
Grand Vision Global Actor
National Aims
Strength,Prosperity,Prestige
Policies: Political Democratic accommodation
Economic Liberalisation
Social Minimise dislocation from economic
reform
Psychological Indianness
Security: Short term Status quo
Middle term Regional Power
Long Term Global Actor
Technological Ensure the above
The
security policy encompasses a response to perceived threats and the manner to
achieve an environment conducive to the furtherance of national aims. This
necessitates a threat assessment to facilitate the appropriate response-
strategy.
Pakistan. For the purpose of generating
national identity, its endeavour is to be equated with India and thereby deny
India regional power status in the medium term. The short term threat to India
is its support for the irredentist Kashmir problem. To this end it maintains a
respectable conventional strength and has an acknowledged nuclear capability.
China. A short term detente exists
over a disputed border. The medium term prospects are dependent on China's
political future. In the long term there is the apprehension of a conflictual
relationship between the two Asian giants in the predicted Asia-Pacific
century. The nuclear asymmetry in the relationship casts a shadow over the
Indian heart land and over the future[3].
Geopolitical Environment. It is a quasi-unipolar world
with primacy of the economic factor in power calculations. The equations as had
evolved through the Cold War are as[4]-
'64- '71 nuclear (N) US+ N USSR+ India = N China +
Pakistan
'71- '74 N USSR + India = N China + N US + Pakistan
'74- '87 N USSR + possibly nuclear (n) India
= N China+ N US + Pakistan
'87- '91 N USSR + n India = N China + N US + n
Pakistan
'91- '94 n India = N China + n Pakistan
It
is possible that the skewed balance can be realigned on the lines as existed in
the Cold War ( N US: N USSR: N China), in the manner- N China: N India: N
Pakistan[5]. This
suggests a nuclear capability for India. This implies that India must acquire
the capability to deter China through acquisition of the means of doing so ie,
long range BMs. Since this is a proposition viable only in the long term, India
must seek to maintain the status quo for the duration it takes to acquire and
emplace the capability. This is for two reasons- first is that the ongoing
economic reforms are not derailed either by misdirected expenditure or by being
subject to American led economic and technological sanctions (MTCR)[6]; and
second is that a sudden change in the power equations could prove destabilising
at a time India has not for which readied itself.
An Assessment of the SRBM
Programme.
[7]
India has taken advantage of the
strategy of ambiguity to retain its nuclear status. It is on the verge of
supplementing its air resources by deploying the SRBM Prithvi. It has launched
an IRBM, Agni, as a technology demonstrator. It hopes to marry the technology
demonstrated in the Agni test namely reentry heat shield and terminal guidance,
with the PSLV for gaining an ICBM
capability[8]. With
that it would have acquired the capability that will permit change in its
'nonweaponised', 'recessed', 'threshold' and 'ambiguous' nuclear deterrence to
an operational and therefore credible 'minimalist' deterrent.
Military Viability of the
Prithvi.
India has the Mig23, Mig27, Mig29, the Jaguar and the Mirage2000 that can be
modified for nuclear delivery[9]. They can
deliver their payload to any part of Pakistan on account of its lack of depth[10]. A
nuclear payload is better delivered by all-weather aircraft as it can return to
base in case of problem and of recall, when related to the questionable
capability of indigenous BMs[11]. The
Prithvi has had a mere 14 test launches. Of its field trials less is known.
This does not build confidence in its capability to substitute aircraft for
delivery of nonconventional warheads[12].
As
regards the conventional payload that it is advertised to carry, it may be
noted that aircraft can carry upto thrice its payload and they are reusable. It
has been proven that only when attrition rates are over 20-35% for aircraft
that missiles are cost effective. But attrition rates are seldom more than 10%.
It is only when an airforce is outclassed as was the Syrian Air Force against
the Israelis in 1982 that such high rates obtain[13].
In India such a situation cannot arise.
With
respect to China these missiles are irrelevant on account of their short range.
The mountainous terrain precludes their deployment within 250 km from the
border. The range then available into Tibet can more effectively be covered by
artillery.
A
conventional warhead is not very effective as the killing area formed from its
blast effect is about 100m. This is not useful against military targets unless
many missiles are used in tandem. Even in this tasking missiles are less than
effective because of the present lack of surveillance means to requisite depth.
Lack of real time intelligence will make them useless against moving targets.
Stationary targets are better dealt with by the more lethal aircraft when
located in depth and by artillery if in the vicinity of the FLOT. This
capability of surveillance is being developed by India in its RPV programme,
Nishant.
Against
civilian targets as populated areas their use can only be as terror weapons.
Statistics indicate that even this is a questionable proposition. In London the
average damage from the 1T HE of the V2 was damage to 40 buildings, 5 deaths
and 13 injuries. The 11 Scud hits in Tel Aviv, of which 6 were within the city,
killed only one man. Even the psychological effect of being subject to 'blind
and impersonal'[14] missile
attack wears off with time. The mind state is dependent on the state of the
war- contrast the unease in a weakened Iran when targeted with 190 missiles in
6 weeks with London that received 2000 V2 strikes as Montgomery raced to
eliminate the launching pads[15].
Though
the damage can be severe to Pakistan due to its inadequate civil defence
measures and high population density, it is unlikely to be so subject given the
history of the relatively 'gentlemanly' wars on the subcontinent. Besides the
lesson of the World War II strategic bombing campaigns is that the havoc is
less than decisive. In Pakistan moreover the targeting is restricted by
political factors. For instance the need to win over Sindhis would prevent
attack on Sind and Karachi will similarly be spared owing to its Mohajir
population having filial links with India.
The
possibility of their being used for delivery of a chemical warhead is also
ruled out as India is a signatory to the CWC Convention. Besides effective
chemical attack requires accurate delivery of a huge quantity of agent and in
the optimum meteorological circumstance[16].
This is not cost effective and requires far too many missiles fired
simultaneously, which is beyond Indian capability.
The
only feasible military utility of SRBMs in the conventional mode is in SEAD as
was the employment of cruise missiles in Desert Storm. Even here cruise
missiles are more cost effective than BMs. With a CEP of 250m the Prithvi could
be so employed. But the requirement of about three BMs for assurance per task
may be an expensive proposition. High density air defence of vulnerable points
and areas can be degraded by BMs before being struck by aircraft. Air corridors
can also be created by eliminating enemy radar screen. BMs could prove useful
in instances when the enemy has catered for local air superiority as a
protective measure for say, progressing an assault across a water
obstacle.
The
only other advantage is as a deterrent against coercive use of force by the
lone superpower. The possibility of Desert Shield would probably have been
ruled out if Iraq had nuclear tipped Scuds[17].
Elimination of missile launchers is a formidable task as was revealed later.
Even the Patriot defence had a questionable success rate. Further refining of
the TMD system has been complicated by the effect of THAAD on the ABM treaty.
Thus even with overwhelming air superiority the missile threat cannot be
ignored. This possibility in the Indian context is however academic.
The Motivation for the SRBM
Programme. As discussed there is no apparent military
utility of the SRBM Prithvi that justifies its pursuit. Therefore it is obvious
that the motivation for the programme lies elsewhere.
Technological. India has the third largest
technical manpower. A socialist legacy has given command over this human
resource to a scientific-bureaucratic elite impelled by a self-preservatory
need to contribute to the state and thereby acquire a larger slice of the
resource cake. The philosophy is by necessity nationalistic as evident from the
statement of the Indian Missile Man, Dr Kalam- 'Strength respects strength.
Weaklings are not honoured. So we must be strong.'[18]
The programme rides on a space programme which is a reasonable undertaking
given India's potential and ambition, but questionable in terms of priorities
for a developing nation. Thereby it is also a credible justification for
progressing the civil programme.
Economic. The government is amenable so
long as the costs do not impact adversely on the economic reform. The military
aspect of the nuclear and space programmes is presently affordable being of an
incremental nature. An indigenous capacity for self sustenance has been a
national priority since the Swadeshi (Buy Indian) slogan of the independence
movement[19]. It is a
safeguard against the military sanctions imposed during the wars of '65 and
'71. The recent collapse of the USSR, on which India depended for 70% of its
military hardware has only reinforced the lesson. Its security predicament has
not been rendered acute as Pakistan is presently subject to military sanction
by its benefactor, the US, under the Pressler Amendment and China is
concentrating on the economic front.
The
ongoing liberalisation alone will ensure the viability of the long term missile
programme. For its progress it relies on American investment among others and
of American controlled financial institutions. Thus the level of provoking
American reaction has to be at the sublimal level.
In
financial terms the costs of a Prithvi equipped battery have been worked out to
$25 million. When compared to that of an aircraft this is minimal. The quantum
envisaged for manufacture is also negligible ie, 75 for the Army and 25 for the
Air Force[20]. The
total cost of about $266 million for the BM programme thus far is thought to be
manageable[21]. What,
therefore, are the benefits that accrue at this price?
Political: External. India in demonstrating its
capability has repeatedly gatecrashed into the elite club. Its missile
programme, it would appear, is in keeping with this tradition as has been
admitted to by India's foremost strategic thinker, K Subramaniam- 'Its role as
a weapon is the least of its roles. It is a confidence builder and an assertion
of self reliance not merely in defence but in the broader political arena as
well'. India prefers to believe itself as a node in the quasi-multipolar world.
In keeping with this self image it has staked its claim for a seat at the high
table at the UN. This is a manner for it to back up its claim. While not having
the economic credentials of the other competitors to like status, it hints that
it has the merits that are presently common to the P5.
Internal. Internally the capability is
for a centrist government to dissolve the plank of the rightist opposition. The
manifesto of the latter is to declare India a nuclear power. The corollary is
of course a missile based deterrent. The ruling party by pursuing the BM
programme hopes to prove that it is not soft on Pakistan thus depriving the
nationalistic criticism of the opposition of credibility[22].
This concentration on a visibly impressive strand of the security policy is
reminiscent of the '80s when a naval buildup was pursued[23].
It was dumped in favour of the BM programme when the balance of payment crisis
struck in early '90s[24].
Thus
it would appear that the BM programme has its basis in its political value. Its
strategic utility in terms of the options that it provides in the long term is
adventitious. The strategic assessment as conducted in the first section of the
paper is incidental to the calculations that impact on a government in the
exercise of its choice. This is applicable to most states being fashionable in
acquiring BMs of late.
Doctrine and Employment.
The SRBM Prithvi. A discussion of the employment
philosophy and deployment of the Prithvi is as yet premature as the missiles
are undergoing the field tests that alone can generate the requisite experience
for formulating the same. These trials shall involve recce of fire positions,
survey of targets, selection of shoot and scoot circuits and hideaways, C3I and
communication links and hands-on training. They shall be located out of enemy
aircraft range to prevent preemption and shall be air inserted in to the
theatre of operations on initiation of hostilities. The Army has converted a
heavy artillery regiment for the role[25].
Of
interest is the interservice fracas that their induction has generated. The
services had been opposed to nuclearisation until Pakistan acquired the
capability. The change in their stand has been to position themselves
favourably for being the service chosen for the onerous task. This would be in
respective corporate interest. Thus the Air Force has envisaged the creation of
a Strategic Air Command to include the nuclear warheads, surveillance means and
their delivery systems. Its case rests on the fact that it already controls the
strategic surveillance systems as the Mig25 and has the aircrafts[26].
A
compromise was worked out whereby the Army managed to gain the means for
influencing the battlefield beyond heavy artillery range upto the 150 km range
of its 75 Prithvis. The Army would prefer even conventionally armed SRBMs for
this enhanced capability. However with out the matching surveillance means
especially to keep track of mobile targets, as enemy armoured formations,
renders the BMs virtually useless. The requisite capability can only be
available in early next century with the delivery of the Nishant RPV or an
enhanced satellite reconnaissance beyond the present 5m definitional ability of
the IRS satellite.
The
message of the respective acquisitions of the two services, of 75 and 25,
therefore, is that they are positioning themselves for a future role of being
the primary service, the criteria being control of the nuclear arsenal.
The IRBM Agni. The Agni as stated is a
technology demonstrator and a stage in the buildup to an ICBM capability. This
is evident from a consideration of the map. Its use against Pakistan is
irrelevant as Pakistan is covered not only by aircraft but also the SRBM.
For
use against China, it is less than viable given the depth that the
strategically important Chinese seaboard has with respect to India. The Han
population and economic centres are within IRBM range only if the BMs are
positioned in the politically unstable Indian North East. Here the terrain does
not permit the mobility required for security. Besides, in case of war the
likelihood of fighting spreading on to the Indian plain in the Chinese
compulsion to eliminate the threats will then be real. In so far IRBM
capability is concerned, the only possibility it affords is the targeting of
Tibet. This can be eliminated as an option for political reasons[27].
The
last possible use of the Agni is against the US presence in Diego Garcia. For
covering this base of the CentCom it would require to be deployed on the slim
Kerala coast. Here the launchers would be exposed to physical interdiction as
envisaged in the US Counter-Proliferation policy. Therefore India needs
missiles with a range long enough for it to deploy them deep into its own
territory while covering its target areas.
Thus
it is an ICBM capability, in the forthcoming Surya programme, that is the
Indian quest- SLBMs and nuclear submarines being ruled out on basis of cost.
The other option of an air-delivered nuclear payload does not guarantee
penetrability and requires air-refuelling capability, a technology unavailable
in India.
India's Nuclear Deterrent.
BMs, as has been pointed out,
are viable only as purveyors of mass destruction. The threat of mass
destruction is worthy only as a deterrent. Thus BMs can only be understood in
the context of nuclear deterrence.
A
minimal nuclear deterrent in the Indian context has been accepted to require 60
warheads. They are to be kept in a dissembled state for survivability and
security. Assembly is to be initiated on command only on receipt of a nuclear
strike. This time lag preserves against accidents that a LoW system is prone
to. It fits in with the intent of 'no first use'. Targeting would be
countervalue for reassurance that first strike is not contemplated[28].
Directed primarily at China, the proposed doctrine is based on the Tripitz's
'risk theory' idea that underpinned the pre-Great War Anglo-German naval
rivalry.
The
doctrine necessitates a revamped organisation and decisional philosophy[29]. In a
nation that has not as yet an effective Joint Chiefs level body nor a
functional National Security Council this is indeed a long term proposition[30]. That is
precisely the time frame within which the technology that shall demand the
transition shall make itself available. Thus there is adequate time available
to condition the system for intellectual adaptation to the probably unintended
consequence of the ongoing BM programme.
Conclusion.
In fulfiling the ambition of
being a global actor, India seeks strength and prosperity within the democratic
framework. The former implies possession of a deterrent in its peculiar
geopolitical context and the latter provides the means of acquiring it. Thus in
the near term India has given primacy to the latter while pursuing the former
on a long term basis. This has however not been occasioned by a 'grand design'.
It is the bonus on a short term political gain, diplomatic and internal,
accruing from the Indian space and nuclear programme.
The
BMs and nuclear weapons options are complementary. Bms in the subcontinental
scenario are credible only as long range delivery vehicles. The SRBM Prithvi is
a political statement. This is evident from the slow progress towards
productionisation on account of Indian amenability to American pressure against
deployment. If these were a military imperative this would not have been the
case. It also indicates the primacy of the economic agenda in the security
calculus. The IRBM capabilty demonstrated is as a precursor to ICBM capability,
to be unveiled at an opportune time in the middle term, for activation when
desired in the long term. In its eventual marriage with the nuclear project,
shall be the logical culmination of the Indian BM programme.
