From the Archives, 26 Apr 1996

 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In numerous articles in the Infantry (India), the issue central to this Opinion piece finds mention, if only in passing. It is the understanding of this author that most authors do not have an accurate and adequate theoretical anchor in so far as this issue is concerned. This failing distracts from their otherwise worthy arguments. This Opinion essay seeks to survey the theoretical work on the subject for providing the readers with a guide for further self-study- through which alone a comprehensive understanding of this important issue can be arrived at. The essay shall furnish the theoretical basis and critique the position adopted on the issue in two articles in the December 1995 issue. 

Reflecting on the officer-man relationship in the journal, Major Azimuddin considers ‘it high time that senior military leaders start making their presence felt in the corridors of power in Delhi’ (p. 13). A few pages later its Lt Gen (Retd) Sardeshpande who opines that ‘there is a need on the part of the military to evolve necessary understanding, norms and persuasive forcefulness to interact with the government and people’.  Maj Azimuddin’s comments are offered in the context of remedies for the ‘lowered prestige of the Army’, while the General discourses on the same theme in connection with the ‘eroded credibility and effectiveness of the military in the kind of internal security mess the country finds itself in’. In effect both authors have offered increased assertiveness of the military as antidote in the themes they tackle. It would therefore appear that civil-military relations are of considerable interest. This is explicable and understandable given the commitment and consequent exposure to the issue in CI operations. It is precisely for this reason that it must be studied in greater depth. 

The obvious beginning is to appreciate war as an instrumentality of national purpose. It being an extension of politics by other means, it is but a corollary that it must be subject to political control. Taking the logic a step further- political control is a product of acknowledgement of the principle of political supremacy. This Clausewitzian formulation of war as a means to a political end was a result of his understanding of the escalatory dynamic of war into Absolute War . Therefore, political control through definition of the ends, means allocation and manner of execution is imperative. To quote Clausewitz- “As war is dominated by the political objective the order of that objective determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be attained” . 

This is applicable for CI operations also. The militarisation of CI leads by the escalatory logic to brutalisation and alienation. Therefore strict political control is a must. The trinitarian nature of war- the military, the government, the people - is most evident in the CI environment. The government is the link between the military and the people. The government is the politico-bureaucratic structure, which in a democracy as ours is responsible to the people’s representatives in parliament. 

A facet of political control is military professionalism. In the Huntingtonian thesis, military professionalism coupled with objective political control is best in a democracy. Professionalism he defines as expertise in the management of violence that gives the military an advisory function; corporateness as a bureaucratic organisation  gives its leadership a representative function; and social responsibility for defence is its purpose . Objective civilian control implies non-intrusive control by the political executive through the incorporation of the apex of the military hierarchy into the decision-making structure . This last provision is not as yet evident in the Indian system owing to the intervening bureaucratic layer between the military and the political head. Even so this is not entirely without its merits given the praetorian experience of other third world states and the need to moderate the postion adopted under influence of the ‘military mind’ . 

Given this constraint the military must continue to influence the formulation of the national security policy in fulfilment of its social responsibility. In the Edmond’s model of military intervention this influence may be direct and indirect. The former would be in the normal course of bureaucratic politics (G Allison) and the latter through channels as lobbies and the media . The problem is to identify the primary motivation of the military, for on this motivation depends the extent, energy and channels through which the military can mount the pressure. 

Extrapolating from this theoretical basis, it would appear that the military can press its demands for ‘heightened prestige’ as Maj Azimuddin suggests only to a limited extent, since the  motivation is to further Corporate interest. However should this be impacting adversely on military effectiveness (for example by not attracting the suitable candidates for officership) then the motive is rooted in its duty to fulfil its ‘social responsibility’. The scope for pressing the same demands then gets enhanced.

The General’s point on the sagacity of MacArthur (p. 30) can also be similarly assessed. He praises MacArthur’s ‘unshakeable conviction and firmness’ with regard to his earlier dismissal from command.  Since the ends and means allocation is for political determination, MacArthur’s ‘absolutist’ predisposition for seeking ‘no substitute for victory’, required that he be dismissed. Furthermore, MacArthur went over the head of the Administration in pressing his position despite his existing orders to desist and the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . In fact the MacArthur controversy is what prompted the debate into the role of the military in a democracy and therefore deserves our attention in greater detail than space permits here. 

In our democracy the primacy of the parliamentary institutions is yet evolving to full maturity. The imperative of socio-economic development continues as the prime preoccupation of the executive. This is the environment that must be kept in mind, by the military leadership, alongwith the tenets of civil-military relations theory, to arrive at the correct level of issue-area based influence it wishes to exercise to press its demand. In the Opinion of this author, the military has admirably preserved its traditional distance from politics. Any further involvement through increased assertiveness will prove to be the ‘pull’ factor  that shall deepen involvement to the level of intervention. Ultimately we would end up in a preatorian situation anti-thetical to democracy. Therefore, Maj Azimuddin’s indictment of the ‘higher leadership for a weak kneed approach to oppose erring bureaucrats’ and the General’s observation of the military’s ‘virtual prostration’ are a trifle extreme and immature. 

The Opinion here is that the military has adequate political space already. Any further encroachment would be detrimental to democratic polity. Besides the very governmental credibility and efficacy that the military seeks to advance and defend would suffer adversely, rendering the exercise counterproductive. This would result in further accretion in power and responsibility to the military thereby eroding its very own professionalism. A vicious circle is predicted foe such an enterprise. The results of ‘wanton politicking and socio-ethnic- economic turmoil’ (p. 36)  that the military handles in CI, are an inevitable part of the modernising process. They can only be resolved through the same. The attributes of the military mind - pessimistic, power and order orientation, nationalistic, militaristic- make the environment seem threatening. The military, like the government, must understand that a pro-active and technocratic approach cannot hasten history. 

It is suggested that an understanding of the Indian situation informed by a robust theoretical perspective, would moderate the point of view presented by the authors critiqued here. Since theirs is a notion widely subscribed to in the Army, it is imperative that a rational rethink be undertaken. This can only be done through comprehension of the concept of civil-military relations and relating it to the situation as obtains in a developing democracy as ours- a task that has been attempted here.