https://www.dropbox.com/s/8br8w9rs1zctdt0/On%20the%20Indian%20Army%20of%20my%20time.pdf?dl=0

https://www.academia.edu/100135521/On_the_Indian_Army_of_my_time

On the Indian Army of my time

For my Commanding Officers

-       in gratitude

 

Preface

This e-book’s contents date to when I was in uniform, either in regimental service as a middle piece officer of the Light Infantry and in the Rashtriya Rifles or in extra-regimental assignments elsewhere in the junior echelon of service. The period straddles the turn of the century, with the commentaries written sometime between 1995-2005 or so. The book is thus a good snapshot of the army at the time, a worm’s eye view as it were.

I had a somewhat unique vantage point, having done a War Studies course on study leave somewhat early in service. I thought that the course provided me some insight which made my viewing the Service somewhat different from the perspective of my colleagues in traditional career paths. I therefore believed that communicating these observations to the Service was an obligation, for having spared me for undertaking the course.

While I have inserted a few articles that did see the light of day in Service publications, majority of the pieces here were not so lucky. Some of these were written as observations on contents of Service periodicals – such as the part in this book on Letters to Editor. Others were as responses to in-Service essay competitions – sent with no intention of winning, but only to make a point as contribution to Service thinking. Some were contrarion, but only constructively so. 

The articles cover War and Insurgency, the primary preoccupation of the Army in my time and carried in successive sections here. The Punjab and Sri Lankan engagements in the eighties – both of which I saw as a foot slogger – and the extensive commitments in the nineties in Kashmir and Assam - both of which provided locales for jungle bashing and my claim to have soldiered once. The tussle was between votaries of the hard and softline, with me lining up with the latter and fleshing out the Ashokan tradition in Indian strategic thought on the intellectual frontlines within the Service. These writings are part of the second section, on Insurgency, in this ebook.

 As backdrop, was the discussion on how to keep the conventional deterrent honed, to keep the subconventional challenge manageable. India dramatically came up with a nuclear answer to this. At the time of writing, this answer was deflated by Pakistan’s upping of the subconventional ante. The professional concerns nuclearization generated energised a small debate within the Service. I lent shoulder to the less popular – though to my mind more sober and mature – strategic alternative by overlaying the Limited War theory on the emerging strategic equation in South Asia. The output is carried in the section on War in this ebook.

Admittedly, some of the impulse behind articles collated here in the Military Sociology part, was grouching, no more than the usual survival strategy of infantrymen. But it was also informed by my learning – admittedly somewhat immodestly put – from my elective ‘Armed Forces and Society’ at the bespoke course. It discusses not only higher order matters as civil-military relations but also the military’s relationship with its mandate, officership and the military as a calling.

A significant aspect of historical interest is in the Letters to Editor pages here. The Letters to Editors were written in response to articles carried on their publication’s pages. These letters usually queried the insertion of Hindutva world view into the professional consciousness using the pages of in-Service journals by officer purveyors. This is in the period of the right-wing government’s first stint in power. It is easy to see how ideological entrepreneurs in uniform used Service conduits to infiltrate Hindutva into the military. At the time they were still in the closet. Editorial inattention allowed for Hindutva discourse to be normalised in the Service. I think this was at the cost of professionalism. The Letters provide a glimpse of Hindutva’s early infiltration into military innards.

I have put in a section on Book Reviews, for in-Service readers. Reading is a habit that is advocated for officers, though increasingly they are not from the catchment of reading public. Besides, service life is apparently considerably busier these days, than was in my time. The idea is to encourage reading, which is ambitious these days and, on that count, inescapable – especially for upwardly mobile officers.

This book owes to the latitude extended to me by my Commanding Officers – for no reasons I was privy to (though I suspect it was to keep me far from the Adjutant’s chair). I have benefited from their stewardship of my time in Service. I used the time to engage with issues way outside my pay grade, as a hobby for most part.

This collection of in-Service reflection is in part testimony of intellectual concerns of officers of my generation. Put out by an atypical officer, there is no claim to any consensus on the thoughts expressed. I take full responsibility for deficits. The hope is that when some military historian or researcher wishes to understand the Service of the turn of the century, she would find here an enlightening page or two.

 

 

Further reading

Ali writings comments and reviews

Institutional Interest: A Study Of Indian Strategic Culture By Major Ali Ahmed

Right wing ascendance in India and politicisation of India’s military.

Indian Security A Vantage Point_Ali Ahmed.pdf

Unpublished work - ali.pdf

Published work - ali.pdf

Inside India's Army

On Indias Military - Writings from within - Ali Ahmed1.pdf

From Within - Reflections on Indias army - Ali Ahmed1.pdf

 

 Contents

War

1.     Reflection On The Threat Of Nuclear War – 9

2.     Nuclear Risk Reduction – 13

3.     The Doctrinal Challenge – 14

4.     The Politico-Military Utility Of Ballistic Missiles - Case Study Of India – 17

5.     Limited (Nuclear) War – 25

6.     The Threat Of War - 26

7.     Limited War: A Sub-Continental Perspective – 27

8.     Two Front Threat Perspective – 34

 

Insurgency

9.     LIC And International Law – 38

10.  LIC : Intervention As Paradigm – 42

11.  A Controversial Look: Counter-Insurgency And Human Rights – 45

12.  Jihad And Revolutionary War – 52

13.  Jihadi War In Strategic Theory – 64

14.  On Military Leadership In Counter-Insurgency Operations - 68

15.  'Kashmir Diary: The Psychology Of Militancy' - A Critical Review - 71

16.  Questionable Statistics on Kashmir - 74

17.  Hindu India: The Security Dimension - 76 

18.  Counter-Guerilla Strategy: A Perspective Of The Future - 78

19.  Threat To Indian Society Posed By Man-Portable Weapons And Explosives - 83

20.  J&K: The Perspectives Contrasted - 90

21.  Tackling Psychological Pressures On SF In LIC – 93

22.  Comments On Article: The J&K Peace Process - 97

23.  Widening The Discourse On Terror – 103

24.    Offensive Air Power In J&K? – 104

Military Sociology

25.  Military And Politics: Can the Military be apolitical? Should it? - 108

26.  Civil-Military Relations: A Theoretical Perspective - 111

27.  Company Command: A Template - 113

28.  What Is `It'? - 115

29.  Reflections On Officership In The Infantry – 117

30.  Officership In The Army : A Redefinition - 119

31.  Change And The Indian Military: The Unaddressed Dimensions - 125

32.  The Strategic ‘Community’ - 133

33.  The ‘Pathology’ Of Info War - 136

34.  A Question Of Identity: The Leader-Manager Binary – 140

35.  Reflection On Military Ethos - 143

36.  The Fauji Memsahib : A More Than Cosmetic Change - 146

37.  An Anti-Drill Diatribe - 150

Letters to Editor

38.    Infantry India, 7 Jul 1998 - 154

39.    Infanry India, 24 Nov 1995 – 156

40.    USI Journal, 28 Nov 1998 - 157

41.    Naam, Namak, Nishan, Infantry Plus, 29 March 2001 – 160

42.    Defence Management Journal, 11 May 2001 – 160

43.    The Threat Of Politicisation, Infantry India - 164

44.  Equally ‘Free And Frank’, Pinnacle – 166

45.  Combat Journal, 6 Feb 2003 – 167

46.  Pratividrohi, 2 Sep 2003 - 168

47.    Infantry India, 11 Oct 2003 – 170

48.    Of Martyrs And Infantrymen, 2 Feb 2003 – 171

Book Reviews

49.  C Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon; The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy - 174

50.    Wajahat Habibullah, 'The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict - Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. Policy - 175

51.    Lt Gen (Retd.) Sood, VK; Swahney, P., Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished – 177

52.    Philpot, D., Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations - 179

53.    Major Vivek Chadha, The Book of Military Quotations – 180

54.    Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military – The Changing Security Environment – 180

55.    Maroof Raza, ed. Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan – 182

56.    Karnad, B., ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy’ – 183

57.    Robert W Stern, Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia: Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh – 185

58.    Kanwal, G., Nuclear Defense: Shaping the Arsenal – 185

59.    Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, (eds.) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change – 187

60.    Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignity: Organised Hypocricy - 187
______________________________________________________

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From the Archives, 26 Apr 1996

 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In numerous articles in the Infantry (India), the issue central to this Opinion piece finds mention, if only in passing. It is the understanding of this author that most authors do not have an accurate and adequate theoretical anchor in so far as this issue is concerned. This failing distracts from their otherwise worthy arguments. This Opinion essay seeks to survey the theoretical work on the subject for providing the readers with a guide for further self-study- through which alone a comprehensive understanding of this important issue can be arrived at. The essay shall furnish the theoretical basis and critique the position adopted on the issue in two articles in the December 1995 issue. 

Reflecting on the officer-man relationship in the journal, Major Azimuddin considers ‘it high time that senior military leaders start making their presence felt in the corridors of power in Delhi’ (p. 13). A few pages later its Lt Gen (Retd) Sardeshpande who opines that ‘there is a need on the part of the military to evolve necessary understanding, norms and persuasive forcefulness to interact with the government and people’.  Maj Azimuddin’s comments are offered in the context of remedies for the ‘lowered prestige of the Army’, while the General discourses on the same theme in connection with the ‘eroded credibility and effectiveness of the military in the kind of internal security mess the country finds itself in’. In effect both authors have offered increased assertiveness of the military as antidote in the themes they tackle. It would therefore appear that civil-military relations are of considerable interest. This is explicable and understandable given the commitment and consequent exposure to the issue in CI operations. It is precisely for this reason that it must be studied in greater depth. 

The obvious beginning is to appreciate war as an instrumentality of national purpose. It being an extension of politics by other means, it is but a corollary that it must be subject to political control. Taking the logic a step further- political control is a product of acknowledgement of the principle of political supremacy. This Clausewitzian formulation of war as a means to a political end was a result of his understanding of the escalatory dynamic of war into Absolute War . Therefore, political control through definition of the ends, means allocation and manner of execution is imperative. To quote Clausewitz- “As war is dominated by the political objective the order of that objective determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be attained” . 

This is applicable for CI operations also. The militarisation of CI leads by the escalatory logic to brutalisation and alienation. Therefore strict political control is a must. The trinitarian nature of war- the military, the government, the people - is most evident in the CI environment. The government is the link between the military and the people. The government is the politico-bureaucratic structure, which in a democracy as ours is responsible to the people’s representatives in parliament. 

A facet of political control is military professionalism. In the Huntingtonian thesis, military professionalism coupled with objective political control is best in a democracy. Professionalism he defines as expertise in the management of violence that gives the military an advisory function; corporateness as a bureaucratic organisation  gives its leadership a representative function; and social responsibility for defence is its purpose . Objective civilian control implies non-intrusive control by the political executive through the incorporation of the apex of the military hierarchy into the decision-making structure . This last provision is not as yet evident in the Indian system owing to the intervening bureaucratic layer between the military and the political head. Even so this is not entirely without its merits given the praetorian experience of other third world states and the need to moderate the postion adopted under influence of the ‘military mind’ . 

Given this constraint the military must continue to influence the formulation of the national security policy in fulfilment of its social responsibility. In the Edmond’s model of military intervention this influence may be direct and indirect. The former would be in the normal course of bureaucratic politics (G Allison) and the latter through channels as lobbies and the media . The problem is to identify the primary motivation of the military, for on this motivation depends the extent, energy and channels through which the military can mount the pressure. 

Extrapolating from this theoretical basis, it would appear that the military can press its demands for ‘heightened prestige’ as Maj Azimuddin suggests only to a limited extent, since the  motivation is to further Corporate interest. However should this be impacting adversely on military effectiveness (for example by not attracting the suitable candidates for officership) then the motive is rooted in its duty to fulfil its ‘social responsibility’. The scope for pressing the same demands then gets enhanced.

The General’s point on the sagacity of MacArthur (p. 30) can also be similarly assessed. He praises MacArthur’s ‘unshakeable conviction and firmness’ with regard to his earlier dismissal from command.  Since the ends and means allocation is for political determination, MacArthur’s ‘absolutist’ predisposition for seeking ‘no substitute for victory’, required that he be dismissed. Furthermore, MacArthur went over the head of the Administration in pressing his position despite his existing orders to desist and the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . In fact the MacArthur controversy is what prompted the debate into the role of the military in a democracy and therefore deserves our attention in greater detail than space permits here. 

In our democracy the primacy of the parliamentary institutions is yet evolving to full maturity. The imperative of socio-economic development continues as the prime preoccupation of the executive. This is the environment that must be kept in mind, by the military leadership, alongwith the tenets of civil-military relations theory, to arrive at the correct level of issue-area based influence it wishes to exercise to press its demand. In the Opinion of this author, the military has admirably preserved its traditional distance from politics. Any further involvement through increased assertiveness will prove to be the ‘pull’ factor  that shall deepen involvement to the level of intervention. Ultimately we would end up in a preatorian situation anti-thetical to democracy. Therefore, Maj Azimuddin’s indictment of the ‘higher leadership for a weak kneed approach to oppose erring bureaucrats’ and the General’s observation of the military’s ‘virtual prostration’ are a trifle extreme and immature. 

The Opinion here is that the military has adequate political space already. Any further encroachment would be detrimental to democratic polity. Besides the very governmental credibility and efficacy that the military seeks to advance and defend would suffer adversely, rendering the exercise counterproductive. This would result in further accretion in power and responsibility to the military thereby eroding its very own professionalism. A vicious circle is predicted foe such an enterprise. The results of ‘wanton politicking and socio-ethnic- economic turmoil’ (p. 36)  that the military handles in CI, are an inevitable part of the modernising process. They can only be resolved through the same. The attributes of the military mind - pessimistic, power and order orientation, nationalistic, militaristic- make the environment seem threatening. The military, like the government, must understand that a pro-active and technocratic approach cannot hasten history. 

It is suggested that an understanding of the Indian situation informed by a robust theoretical perspective, would moderate the point of view presented by the authors critiqued here. Since theirs is a notion widely subscribed to in the Army, it is imperative that a rational rethink be undertaken. This can only be done through comprehension of the concept of civil-military relations and relating it to the situation as obtains in a developing democracy as ours- a task that has been attempted here.

 https://m.thewire.in/article/security/what-will-be-general-bipin-rawats-place-in-indias-military-history

What Will Be General Bipin Rawat’s Place in India's Military History?

Now that the dust from the helicopter accident has settled, it is worth examining General Rawat’s contribution at the apex of the military. He occupied space at the highest levels for some five years, more than anyone in independent India, having been army chief for some three years and chief of defence staff (CDS) for close to two years.

During this period, significant and unprecedented military developments took place in respect of Pakistan and China and, equally importantly, in regard to Kashmir and the North East. Consequential military reforms were also undertaken, including his elevation as the first CDS, first permanent chairperson of the chiefs of staff committee and secretary of the newly created department of military affairs (DMA) within the defence ministry. The greatest shift has been in terms of cultural transformation under the mostly-indirect influence of the foundational philosophy of New India, hindutva. These form the backdrop for determining the General’s place in history.

Pakistan figured large in the early part of the General’s tenure. Right off the blocks, he cleared up  India’s best kept puzzle: its conventional doctrine. India had not owned up over some fifteen years of its existence to the Cold Start doctrine. Not only did the General take ownership of the doctrine, but initiated steps for its operationalisation in the creation of integrated battle groups (IBG), the work horses of limited offensives into Pakistan in case compelled by Pakistani proxy war provocations.

Even so, it is a retrogressive step since it more or less accepts a lack of adeptness in maneuver warfare. There is no compelling need for preconfigured, objective-specific IBGs, when mechanized formations can flow into battle reconfiguring on the march. If they do not have this felicity at the outset, then it is incomprehensible how these battle groups can outlast the first bullet fired, which as military history teaches puts a spanner in the works of the best laid plans.

This betrays a military incapacity, brought about, in part by the counter insurgency fixation over past three decades. Incidentally this focus led to General Rawat, bolstered by supposed counter insurgency expertise, pipping at the post two of his seniors, from the mechanized forces, to the rank of general. Arguably this professional preoccupation led to India being blind-sided by China’s intrusions into Ladakh.

Though the army under General Rawat had taken a firm stand at Doklam, it proved a meager deterrent. The Chinese apparently rightly reading India’s reluctance to up the military ante walked into Ladakh, clubbing a score Indian soldiers to death as they did so. This unwillingness to chance escalation suggests a deficiency in the exercise of operational art in terms of manipulation of the escalation threat in order to make the other side blink. As CDS, Rawat was overly impressed by the gap in comprehensive military power between the two sides, resting on his oars with mirror deployment, jargoned as ‘proactive localized deployment’, rather than going for a quick counter-grab in riposte. 

It is in relation to Kashmir that the General’s military reputation stands to suffer most, since it’s the site of his expertise. Not only did the General oversee a human rights-insensitive counter insurgency campaign, Operation All Out, but did not alert the government to the adverse long term effects of its Kashmir policy twist, the voiding of Article 370. As the lead agency in the Valley, the army should have asked for voicing its input and done so by thumping the table against the initiative. That it did not do so bespeaks of either being persuaded by the action or not having the gumption to take a stand. Either way is unedifying.

The post-Uri terror attack surgical strikes were prior to the General’s tenure at the helm, but were based on his stewardship of similar high-publicity strikes into Myanmar as corps commander in the North East. These led to his catching the eye of National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, an ethnic fellow. Similar strikes the following year were downplayed by the then eastern army commander, General Praveen Bakshi, resulting in part in his being sidelined from the army Chief’s chair, since it deprived the political masters of an opportunity to grandstand over a military feat.

Surgical strikes have thus had more of a domestic political fallout than an external strategic one. Pakistan, the intended target of deterrence, has gone one-up over India in its aerial riposte to Balakot. That Pakistan has been relatively restrained over the General’s tenure in Kashmir owes to its privileging the Afghanistan denouement over the past few years, rather than being impressed by India’s strategic shift advertised by surgical strikes. 

The recent botched military operation in Nagaland shows up vulnerability, accentuated in the ongoing long-duration crisis with China. Whether and to what levels General Rawat input the government’s policy is not known. For instance, the Nagaland imbroglio continues since the Framework Agreement cannot be operationalised as the Nagas insist on a separate flag and Constitution. India, having only recently deprived Kashmiris of the same federal privileges has in effect shot itself in the foot twice over. Strategic level input from the army, the lead counter insurgency force in both locations, should have been to influence policy away from such counter-productive initiatives. It is lost to history if General Rawat exercised his known social capital with the regime to put some strategic sense into its moves.

It would be tragic if later biographers were to alight on evidence that his input on such decisions was instead to acquiesce. It brings into question his elevation, raising the question was it because he would likely play along - either being docile or a believer himself - that led to his selection as first CDS? Recall the announcement of the position was delayed till after his contender, the then air chief, retired. Even the CDS position was not without a spoke-in-the-wheel in that with the creation of the DMA – a bureaucratic silo without precedent in any democracy - the first CDS was reduced to being just another secretary, from a protocol equivalence to cabinet secretary.

Here, General Rawat busied himself with structural transformation without the benefit of a political directive, resulting in separate public and embarrassing jousts with the air and naval chiefs. It is also unclear if the trajectory of jointness to culminate in front-specific integrated theatre commands has political imprimatur, given that the mandate does not explicitly figure in the remit of the CDS in the press release on the appointment. The process therefore appears to be somewhat of a wild goose chase that shall prove a bugbear if his successor does not take the opportunity of a change over to course correct.  

Finally, and most importantly, was General Rawat’s perhaps historic role of ushering the Indian army into the New India of the Second Republic. To be fair to the General, he was at the helm at the most difficult of times for the military. When all institutions succumbed to the hindutva juggernaut and bent to the will of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it would have been quite a feat had the military leadership cauterised the military from being influenced by political forces.

The military’s political masters decided to go in for ‘deep selection’ as the new policy for selection of higher appointments, Rawat being a prominent beneficiary. It remains to be known whether he swayed with the wind pragmatically and, as lead gatekeeper, assented to open up the military only partially and selectively. This might have been a plausible strategy, lest in taking a stand the military were to keel over altogether. However, from his utterances from time to time, it cannot unambiguously be said that Rawat was not a bhakt himself. That might with time turn out his unfortunate legacy.

https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/8/strategic-affairs/putting-indias-land-warfare-doctrine.html

Putting India’s Land Warfare Doctrine in the Dock

The Indian Army’s second iteration of its doctrine, “Land Warfare Doctrine—2018,” was released in mid-December in the form of a link placed on the news pages of its website (Indian Army 2018). The army has also not shared hard copies of the 13-page document. Such a low-profile release does not do justice to the content of the land warfare doctrine (LWD) document, which deals with significant matters of national interest (Ahmed 2019). Indeed, the soft copy of the document placed on the army’s website in a rather non-descript manner gives no publication details, indicating a rather purposeful approach to keep the document from public scrutiny.

Perhaps, the army has learnt the wrong lessons from its release of the earlier version of its doctrine, “Indian Army Doctrine” (ARTRAC 2004), which not only attracted considerable attention but also substantial criticism. However, the advantage of the transparency that attended the release of the 2004 doctrine, dubbed Cold Start doctrine (CSD), was in the vigorous discussion it generated on the issues of linkage between the subconventional, conventional, and nuclear levels of war (Ladwig 2008). The low-profile release of the second iteration of its doctrine may help the army avoid criticism, but this is at the cost of keeping the significant matters it raises from the benefit of an informed discussion. As it happened in the wake of the CSD release, discussion of the doctrine is useful in terms of enabling feedback for the army on its doctrine and enhancing doctrinal thinking and strategic culture in general (Ladwig and Narang 2017).

One reason for the army’s reticence is perhaps its foreknowledge of the controversial content of the document. Given this, there is greater need to place the content in the public eye. This article first discusses the significant issues covered in the document, and thereafter considers the document in its implications for civil–military relations.

The aspect of particular interest is the army’s putting down in an official document its long-standing view on the collusive two-front threat (Gurung 2018)—the document terms this “multi-front” (Indian Army 2018: 1)—and its view on how this needs to be met. What this spells for civil–military relations is that the “two-front” threat thesis, which has not persuaded the government enough thus far to act accordingly—such as through reflecting the heightened threat in the defence budgets—has been included in the document. This amounts to unilateral agenda-setting and bottom-up dictation on the strategy to tackle it.

This doctrinal articulation of the army may have informal endorsement of its civilian masters; else it is difficult to see how the army can pre-empt the national security strategy review, which procedurally ought to be preceding military doctrines. The national security strategy review, reportedly nearing completion by the National Security Advisor (NSA)-headed newfangled Defence Planning Committee (DPC) (Kartha 2019), has not been released yet. While the placing of the LWD in the open domain suggested a bucking of civil–military relations by the army, the absence of reference to it over the last two months by the military brass itself indicates prudence finally prevailed.

Examining the LWD

The document carries forward two long-known aspects of the army’s doctrinal thinking: CSD and two-front threat. On the CSD, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat has been upfront, acknowledging the doctrine with finality early in his tenure (Unnithan 2017). Ever in the public eye, he had in an earlier media interaction given out the army’s intent to follow up on the joint doctrine, “Joint Doctrine: Indian Armed Forces,” released in April 2017 (IDS 2017), by updating its 2004 document (Peri 2017). Recently, the army has been emphasising the creation of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), the bedrock of CSD, in order to operationalise the doctrine. This is the first and most significant of the four high-level studies approved at the last army commanders’ conference (Sen 2018). The IBGs are to be tested in exercises this summer. On the restructuring to follow, the army would presumably be able to prosecute the CSD and defuse the criticism the CSD has received.

The two-front threat has been around since the army’s last closed-door doctrinal review in late 2009 (Ahmed 2010). The review—that in the event did not result in the release of an updated doctrine—was to shift the focus of the army from the western front to China. It rationalised the raising of two defensive divisions in the east and called for the creation of a mountain strike corps. However, the latter was only conceded reluctantly by the previous government and somewhat late in its tenure (Dutta 2018). The current government has also dragged its feet, apparently for financial reasons, resulting in the raising of a mountain strike corps of questionable efficacy and that reportedly was cannibalising the army’s reserves (Economic Times 2018). Given this, the LWD rightly leans towards a posture of defensive deterrence on the Line of Actual Control, based on multi-tiered defensive operations relying on suitable repositioning of reserves and posturing by acclimatised strike formations. In the circumstance of a two-front war, the LWD suggests—without an explicit mention—that the Chinese front be the secondary one, while the western front would be the primary front.

This brings one back to the western front, suggesting an inability of the army transcending Pakistan as its national security fixation. The LWD brings to fore the concept of hybrid war and the attendant “grey zone.” The army chief has been a keen votary of viewing current day conflict as manifestation of hybrid war (Hindustan Times 2018), defined in the LWD as “a blend of conventional and unconventional, with the focus increasingly shifting to multi-domain Warfare varying from non-contact to contact warfare” (Indian Army 2018: 2). Hybrid war according to the LWD is conducted in a “grey zone” (Indian army 2018: 6) involving non-contact domains, such as cyberspace, and plausible deniability by use of proxy fighters.

To the army, the grey zone obtains in Kashmir due to sponsored proxy war and transborder terror incidents. Though the document does not explicitly make a mention of the areas where such proxy war is incident, it can safely be inferred to be Kashmir (Indian Army 2018: 1–2). A resulting conventional conflict could also have hybrid war characteristics, for which the LWD calls on the army to keep its paramilitary—the Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles—handy once the IBGs have achieved the conflict’s politico-military objectives centred on destruction of Pakistan’s centre of gravity—presumably its military’s strategic reserves—and spatial grab. The IBGs are to create conditions for exploitation, implying flexibility for continuing operations into enemy innards. The LWD’s requirement that IBGs be able to prosecute operations in a nuclear-contaminated environment is the only reference to the nuclear factor. This, despite the IBG’s action—if as described in the LWD—being likely to trigger Pakistani nuclear first use. On this count, the LWD does little to boost confidence that the army is cognisant of the nuclear factor.

Critique of the LWD

The absence of reference to the nuclear factor replicates the error of the Joint Doctrine. Both doctrines assiduously separate the conventional level from the nuclear level, believing that the nuclear level relating to strategic deterrence will be managed by their civilian masters in conflict. The LWD appears to assume that nuclear deterrence would work and, in the case of deterrence failure, the army would rely on its ability for “fighting dirty” under conditions of a nuclear battlefield. This leaves the doctrinal space on the nuclear level to the civilian masters. The army needs to think through in greater detail the nuclear environment its operations may well trigger, and the manner of conduct of the resulting operations in a nuclear environment. These need to be included in a future LWD that would also reflect on the currently absent discussion on the nuclear level.

Continuing operations would likely have an escalatory effect. If in the Indian scheme the nuclear dimension is kept confidential, it nevertheless needs engaging with the conventional–nuclear interface and find written expression for doctrinal guidance. Doctrinal thinking, both at the conventional level and nuclear level, deals only with the opening phases of war and introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict, respectively. There is a need for doctrinal thinking to also engage with what happens after: How are war aims affected in a war gone nuclear? How do conventional operations impact escalation? How can de-escalation be brought about? And, how is conflict termination made feasible? The doctrines mostly dwell on how to get into conflict, but much less on the arguably more important part: how to exit a conflict. A holistic nuclear doctrine would require expansion from its current-day focus on deterrence and employment of nuclear weapons in conflict, to include conflict containment, de-escalation, and termination. Any conventional-level implications need inclusion in a comprehensive LWD. Else, what is there to distinguish an LWD written in the nuclear age?

It is not known as to whether any thinking on the conventional–nuclear interface has been done internally. This has perhaps been done by the army’s civilian masters, explaining India’s reluctance for military resort in face of considerable provocation, such as the Parliament terror attack and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks (Lamont 2013). This restraint is likely continuing. Consider Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s parameters for the surgical strikes. He had required that the troops involved return without casualty irrespective of whether their strikes are successful or otherwise (NDTV 2019a). In case of any future consideration of the military options, there is little in the LWD that would make the political head favour a military option.

The good news is that this implies continuing of strategic restraint. Nevertheless, as explained in a recent book on the Line of Control (LoC), which brought out escalatory possibilities, “autonomous military factors” stemming from institutional culture and the conflict environment on the LoC could in a period of media-fanned nationalism eventuate in an outbreak of conventional conflict (Jacob 2019: 171–254).

Civil–Military Relations

The LWD’s persistence in denial of the nuclear factor is attributable less as a shortcoming to the army, but more so to national security minders. Absent the promised national security strategic guidance till the fag end of this government, that prides itself on being more mindful of national security than its predecessors, the army has little choice but to reiterate what the military can best do. It is apparent that the DPC has not quite filled in the shoes of the chief of defence staff equivalent position that continues to be vacant, even though the three services have put aside their differences and written to the government asking for the Naresh Chandra Committee recommendation that a permanent chairperson for the chiefs of staff committee be created (Peri 2018). What this suggests is that there is little difference in terms of national security management distinguishing this government, a point necessary to bring out in light of the great lengths it goes to building just such an image through perception management, including through relatively “innocuous” practices such as the recent hit film, Uri, that shows the character of the NSA assaying a warlord role.

The government is apparently continuing—if reluctantly—with India’s long-standing policy of strategic restraint, but is unable to own up to this owing to a cultivated image for the opposite. The Prime Minister dashing off to Wuhan to mend fences with the Chinese after the 73-day Doklam stand-off between the two militaries, and the declining defence budgets of late are suggestive of this. By this yardstick, the LWD appears in consonance with the government’s restrained posture on China in calling for a defensive posture on that front. On the contrary, on the Pakistan front, the government has take a relatively hard line. The LWD reflects this hard line. By including the militancy in Kashmir into the grey zone of hybrid warfare and outlining the manner CSD is to be operationalised as a possible circumstance-dictated response, it makes the conventional response option enticing for the government.

An enlightened speculation needs hazarding here. The LWD’s seeming alignment with the government’s view—mellow on China and tough on Pakistan—makes it appear as a conduit for the government’s placing of its preferred strategic doctrine in the open domain; a case of the national security establishment firing from the army’s shoulders. In so far as the “collusive” threat—described as the “greatest danger”—figuring in the LWD, the government can afford to overlook it as a small price to pay since the threat is unlikely to materialise. This reticence on the strategic review, which allows greater doctrinal space to the military, amounts to shirking on part of the government. Even if the government at the fag end of its tenure puts together the national security review, it would only reduce the important exercise to yet another election gimmick.

Escalatory possibilities, apprehended here, imply that the government needs to include conflict resolution strategies in addressing areas of contention with neighbours and in internal security matters. Its strategies must not remain limited to mere conflict management and hedging against escalation through confidence building, lest in crisis the confidence in the military instrument and its choice as the instrument of response is shown up as lacking in judgment. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister’s electoral bugle call that the back of terrorism will be broken (Tribune 2019), would leave India with little option but to follow through with military action when confronted with provocation such as in the recent terror attack with a car-laden improvised explosive device in Pulwama in Kashmir (NDTV 2019b). The LWD does not provide the necessary confidence that we can have non-escalatory options in such cases. The next government must dig India out of the hole it has got into by putting out a strategic review that is cognisant of the nuclear dimension that can provide a worthwhile starting point for military doctrine-making, both joint and service specific.

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