From the archives, 25 Dec 1998
OFFICERSHIP IN
THE ARMY : A REDEFINITION
Literally, an officer is one who holds a commission, it being a
parchment endorsing the status conferred by the
President of
Republic, in his capacity as the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. In the legal sense,
officership is by a virtue of ap
pointment by a constitutionally enjoined
competent authority.As
any holder of the commission will testify, this is
merely a
formal position that by no means can encompass the depth the term
has acquired in
practice over the millenia.
While it
is indeed the highest constitutional authority
that
confers the responsibility of officership on
self-selecting
aspirants, selected and trained to bear it, it has the value of
the paper it is written on, until it is ratified in the hearts
of the men the officer commands.
This perspective on officer
ship highlights the crucial nature of the moral covenant, between
the officer and his men, to the legitimacy and his effectiveness
as an officer. (Though the
masculine gender is used, the ob
servations hold true in equal measure for lady officers).
This has
been a trans-historical and cross-cultural phenomenon
with regard to officering in the army, owing to the incidence of
wars in inter-societal relations, and the convergence
in the
methods and means of war - a function of the process of mimesis.
Owing to a shared genetic inheritance, human nature varies at
best to accommodate environment related ethnic peculiarities, but
never so much as to preclude officiership from
the societal
division of labour.
The role, simply, is leadership of the
fighting man, and lately the management of the
instrument of
violence.
As with
most dynamic institutions, army officership has had to
keep pace with military evolution.
In this era of accelerated
history, there has been a change in the nature of armed conflict,
stemming, of necessity, from social change. The consequence on
the nature of officership has been transformative, a process that
is on-going, both, surely and rapidly.
This essay
is a theoretical examination of the
impact of this
process of change on the nature of officership in the army. In
order to escape the tag of being merely `academic', it takes
a
critical look at officership in the Indian army, as a precursor
to a prescriptive agenda.
The aim is to analyse the ongoing
redefinition of officeship, in order to inform thinking on policy
and the Indian Army.
A THEORETICAL
OVERVIEW
On the Nature of
Officership
The army
as an institution bears the social responsibility of
provision of security. To this end, it
has relative autonomy in
terms of corporate identity; expertise in the
management and
application of violence; and a representative function, to in
clude an advisory one (Huntington). Of
necessity, the army is
hierarchical, comprising three layers - the executive, the super
visory and the directional. The army fills the slots in
these
layers by dint of merit and seniority.
At the executive level,
the junior officers are at the interface with man and
machine
that comprise the tools of war.
The supervisory level is for
effective management of the means of war. At the directional
level, concern is with the methods of application of force
to
beget security - it being defined politically.
An
alternative interpretation is in the form of the
tactical,
operational, and strategic level - the realm of `grand strategy'
being reserved for the political master, but at which the
army
must fulfill its representative function.
Yet another variant is
in the command and staff
alternation - this being by virtue of
the appointment held or by the nature of the appointee,
as a
warrior or a non-warrior. In
short, the foregoing taxonomy of
officership makes for a complex analytical exercise.
Combat
effectiveness of the army is a function of coherence of
the three levels, and
the deftness of enlightened
political
control. Of vital importance
in this regard is the executive
level. Input from military
sociology is unanimous on the fact
that the fighting man fights not for god, country or the colors,
as myth would have it, but for a primary group, no larger than a
sub-unit. This owes to horizontal
bonding, termed as cohesion.
Since the physiological,
phychological and social needs of the
individual are met under adverse conditions by his comrades, his
identity expands to encompass sub-unit, to the extent of instil
ing a willingness to the sacrifice his very own life
for its
preservation.
If that be
findings of research from numerous conflicts, it gives
us a clue as to the role of officership at the executive
level.
It is to ensure instilment and positive articulation of cohesion
for organisational ends.
These organisational ends are the
military interpretation of political ends done at the directional
level, by senior officers, colloquially referred to as
`brass'.
The supervisory level is to ensure vertical cohesion for
they
form the intermediary level. The
brass have an additional task
of ensuring societal support for military endeavor. This, along
with horizontal and vertical integration, begets organisational
cohesion - a prerequisite for combat effectiveness, the
raison
d'etre of an officer corps.
On the Nature of
Society and War
With the
foregoing as encapsulation of the discourse on levels
and roles, gauging the impact of the changing nature of
armed
conflict on the same, is in
order. That `armed conflict'
is
being used to substitute for
`war' is evidence enough of the
changed nature of `war'. In fact, `war',
having been outlawed in
the Charter era, has undergone mutations best expressed by
the
inclusive term `armed conflict'.
This change owes
to societal change - a characteristic feature of
collective human existence - that varies from being evolutionary
to revolutionary, and is not necessarily linear. The explana
tions on the omni-present feature of force and its utility
in
societal affairs and inter-societal relations, also vary from the
realist and neo-realist views to leftist versions of the elite-
mass dichotomy. Suffice it to
mention, for the purpose of this
essay, that it is only lately, with the `triumph' of
liberal
democracy and socially responsive capitalism, that there has been
emergence of what are termed as `warless societies'.
While this
change is from the modern to the post-modern, the
industrial to the information age,
ethnic to the national, it is
a certainty that the period of transition to the
communication
revolution inspired global village, shall be marked by the itera
tive use to force. Thus, though
officersahip is not obsolescent,
the roles require constant revision.
The Moskos
classification is taken as the start
point for this
analysis. `Warless societies' apart, most societies fall in the
`war-deterrent' and `war-preparedness' categories. The latter is
true for most Third World states, whereas the former
includes
states trying to escape the Third World tag. In war-readiness
societies, the army is mass oriented; low-tech; territory defend
ing; and anthoritarian in leader orientation.
In `war-dererrent'
societies the army is lean, hi-tech, democratic in
ethos and
cammands a high per-capita expenditure. In the former, its
components are easily replaceable; in the latter they are
too
expensive to lose.
In this is the
germ of the obsolescence of the utility of force.
A weaponry too expensive, and nuclearisation, have combined
to
eliminate war as an option in the extension of politics by other
means. Thereby, the onset of `warless
societies', in which mili
tary power has been eclipsed by the economic component as
the
determinant of power, influence, and index of prosperity.
Another facet of
social organisation - the state system, and its
evolution, has had an influence on the nature of officership.
The state has in the modern era grown to maturity, and is
even
now under the threat of supercession. In pre-modern times,
feudal ties bound the aristocracy which their retainers. In the
early periods of state formation, the elite provided officers and
the masses soldiers, the inter-relationship being
patrimonial.
With the onset of nationalism, maturing of the concept of citi
zenship, and the impact of technology, this linkage has
been
professionalised. Socio-economic
change in terms of equality,
education, rising living standards, spread of
opportunities,
urbanisation etc, and the premium on expertise in handling tech
nology intensive weaponry, the patronising element in officer-man
relations has been rendered anachronistic. This is more so in
technical arms. Where the human element is central to function,
there also the professional content also over-shadows, the per
sonal bond. Thus is seen the
clausewitzian trinity - society,
state and the military - interactive in the sociological field,
the impact being of transformative character.
OFFICERSHIP IN
THE INDIAN ARMY
On the Nature of
Indian Society
Indian society in
its cultural space transcends the boundaries of
the Indian state. It encompasses the
three civisational waves -
agricultural, industrial, and post-industrial.
It is internally
differentiated, with coexisting contradictions and complementari
ties. An army, being but a
cross-section of society, reflects
the same in ethos, composition and structure.
For instance, the
army still retains an inherited racial composi
tion, alongwith innovations on composite lines. Its officer class
has an industrial age orientation; whereas the soldiery in
the
technical arms is educated, informed and
competent, while that
in the major fighting arm - the infantry - is still largely
of
peasant
stock. Nuclear weaponry and
missiles coexist with gen
erations-old small arms. In officer
culture, a warrior ethos is
coexistent with a technocrat-managerial one.
Therefore, as with
Indian society, reflections on the Indian army can only be lit
tered with qualifications.
Based on
the preceding theory, Indian society may be classed as
transiting from being a war-deterrent to a
warless society.
Earlier the army had been permitted its toys, evident from India
having the dubious distinction of being the largest importer of
arms through the 80s. However the
balance of payments crisis in
the early 90s, caused in part by the
military profligacy of the
80s, resulted in a resource crunch.
This has also been occa
sioned by the ongoing economic liberalisation, which is primary
evidence with regard to Indian society effecting the said transi
tion. In effect, the message is for a strategic disengagement, in
favour of an economic reach into a globalised market.
Secondary
evidence is in the form of the lowered status of the
officer class, despite the military
rearguard action in terms of
hi-tech acquisition and high visibility public relations
cam
paign. Beside periodic recording of
parliamentary concern, there
is also little evidence of `societal attention for the
army's
preoccupations in operational areas as Kashmir and Siachen - this
despite ascendance, in recent times, of the right wing in polit
ics. Clearly, the Indian elite is
attuned to the global environ
ment, while the regional elite and masses in general are inter
ested in the economic dividend and the local agenda.
The
consequence is on, both, the soldiery and the officer, and
their inter-relationship. The army is
now `just another job' in
the job market, easily accessible to the middle rung of qualified
candidates. The officer
is thus faced with the question of
whether the army is `more than just a job' (Moskos), particularly
in operations. To the soldier his
job remains `rozgaar', till
the ties that bind become apparent in face of danger.
In the technical
arms, this situation is better handled given the
mediation of hardware. It is
in the fighting arms that it is
deemed a malaise, the solution being seen as a leadership func
tion of officer-leaders, who, as the paradox would have it, are
themselves afflicted with the same, as an entity. Thus, where
`paltan ki izzat' was to foster
cohesion, it has been corrupted
by the careerist virus. Elitism in
weaponry operated or skills,
compensates in some measure, but, for the large mass of the army,
the answer is in extensive surgery, in consonance with indirect
societal demands.
The problem
with this is in inertia, vested
interest, and a
dated role definition.
More importantly, there seems to be
inadequate comprehension of the psychology of the fighting
man.
This is most evident from the experimentation with the Rashtriya
Rifles in operations. Whereas, cohesive
groups perform best,
this
nascent organisation has a curious mix of
officers and
soldiers - any bond they form being one in face of danger. The
impact of this on the operational environment - the Kashmiri com
munity - aside, such a disregard of fundamentals, to work round
personnel problems of the early 90's, is suspect. The problem,
therefore, will also be one stemming from lack of conceptual
clarity.
The broad
tenets of such reengineering in the long term include
downsizing, professionalising, and disengaging from an
omni-
directional forward posture.
In the short term the in-house
measures already instituted may be reviewed as part the an intro
spection to discern the direction, the ends, and the
way to
negotiate the interim.
It is the `holy
cow' image stemming from lethargy and ignorance ,
and the success, in some measure, of the army's public relations
blitz, that will keep at bay external pressure
for reform.
Therefore the premium on in-house measures. These will be sub
ject to group think, traditionalism and prejudice in the form of
`when we were youngsters', especially of the brass. The problem
is compounded by
the upper echelon having the onus of initiating
change in hierarchial and quasi-authoritarian systems
as the
army. Any prescription will have
to be sensitive to these re
tarding issues if it is to be relevent. It must, therefore,
identity key issues; create the mental space with
regard to
these; and suggest an evolutionary program.
Firstly, a
re-education is recommended for the officer corps.
At the in-service level it may be in the form of
capsules in
courses, but it must be incorporated into pre-commission academic
syllabi. This would include military sociology and a
history of
war, the latter being different from present-day campaign study
format. This would aid professionalism
to develop, for an empha
sis on technical features brings about a technocratic
approach.
The present learning by rote model has to give way to a reading
habit, for gaining breadth and depth of perspective. Insight
from the management sciences, imported by the sabbatical system,
must be disseminated by proper post-sabbatical employment of such
officers.
Secondly, a
fallout of the above will be in professionalism.
This would
undercut careerist short cuts.
Professionalism imp
lies a
work oriented approach, as distinguished from a task-
oriented
one. It would help the army adapt
to the occupational
features
that are, of necessity, eroding the institutional base
of the
army. It would enable
cross-fertilisation in terms of
ideas, models and
processes from the civil world.
Thirdly, a
downsizing is imperative. The much
touted figure of
12000 (increased recently to 13000) deficiency is evidence of the
inflated authorisation figures.
Expansion to fill these will be
expansion in pursuit of institutional interest, quite like
the
dilution in the rank structure of the early 80s, or the
fait
accompli nature of raising additional formations,
headquarters
and forces as the Rashtriya Rifles.
On the contrary a contra
ction is recommended. This will be
predicated on change in the
threat
perception that necessitates expansion.
The paradox in
that a large force makes for poor quality, that in turn leads to
larger size as compensation.
With this
as recommendatory grid, an examination of the effects
on officership in its man-management facet is in order. The off
shoot of the study of modern management practices,
human and
organisational psychology, and sociology in its military dimen
sion, is self explanatory. A more aware
and self-aware officer
is better than a tradition bond
one. The result of forging a
professional superior-subordinate bound will result in
higher
combat effectiveness.
Whereas the importance of a paternal
relationship with the
primary group is conceded, is it the
source of this is in the undue proliferation of troop engagement
in non-military activity - as a tacit bargain.
Lastly, downsiz
ing will result in improved quality across the board. The indi
rect fallout will be in a non-threatening size, with respect to
our neighbors, and, thereby, a reduction in a threat perception
answered by expansion.
Conclusion
Summing up
the Indian Scene, it may be said that Indian society
has been historically
introspective. The reasons for
continua
tion of the phenomenon owe now to economic causes. The strategic
community's external focus and effort, in incidental
alliance
with the right wing of polity, to project the same onto
civil
society, has had visibility, but insubstantial penetration. The
Indian army, if it is to live up to its
democratic ethos, has to
take its cue from society.
Principally,
it requires to disengage and downsize; re-educate
and professionalise; and cater for accomodation of occupational
trends within an institutional ethos. The impact of this on
officership, in its leadership function, would keep the
army
apace with the impact of societal change on, both, the
officer
cadre and
the soldiery. At the officer-man
interface, profes
sional detachment would increase with the level and corresponding
role of the officer. With
the non-gazetted cadre bearing a
greater weight at the executive level, the officers could attend
to the management of the means of violence and application
of
force with greater vigour.
CONCLUSION
The nature
of armed conflict having become increasingly more
complex, officership has to be
redefined in light of the aim -
combat effectiveness.
Officership has acquired a managerial
slant, at the cost of reduction on the premium on leadership. A
superior quality of personnel is the
requirement, as corollary -
among other reasons. Societal change has
the potential to deliv
er on this requirement. This can
be tapped by making the army
socially relevant. This can be achieved
through a sociologically
aware officer cadre aligning organisational ends with those
of
society. This is in the realm of
political control of the mili
tary. Given the economic pre-occupation
of polity, the army, as
an institution, will require self-regulation in this regard.
That said,
the officer cadre will contine to build and maintain
organisational cohesion; in short, the executive
level will
remain concerned with horizontal integration. However, a tech
nology savvy and `professional' soldiery, enable a will downgrad
ing of the leadership
function. Thus, officer roles will
be
redefined as interpreting a given
societal conjuncture to gauge
the utility of the military addressal of the same, and if
need
be, enable the instrumental use of force towards the
approved
political end. Clearly, officership is
no longer to `win the
next war',
but to control the logic, dynamics and dialectic of
force.
