LIMITED WAR : A SUB-CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE

 Ever  since  the end of the Nehruvian era, during  which  liberal

 internationalism  was the dominant ideological framework of  for

 eign  and security policy, there has been a realist turn  to  the

 same. This has increasingly resulted in the Realist sponsored aim

 f regional hegemony, as a prelude to global power status, gaining

 in credibility and adherents. Implicit in this is the methodology

 for  attaining  the same - acquisition of power,  an  example  of

 which is the recent Indian accession to nuclear-power status.

 

 The professed aim of doing so is to bolster our national security

 strategy  of  deterrence. Given the changed global  and  regional

 security  environment,  specifically the demise of our  Cold  War

 relationship with a super-power now defunct , and of the reported

 Sino-Pak nexus, respectively, a nuclear component to conventional

 strength  was  deemed imperative for continued reliability  of  a

 deterrence posture.

 

Therefore conventional deterrence, in the form of a large, moder

 nising  and  professional  military has been  supplemented  by  a

 recessed,  and  of late, an overt,  nuclear  deterrence  posture. 

 Deterrence  as a concept, however, also posits the  communication

 of  capability  and credibility for  effectiveness.  Our  present

 status  of  having  nuked our way into the nuclear  club,  to  an

 exent,  undergirds both, with the crossing of  the  technological

 threshold  demonstrating capability; and our decision to  do  so,

 being evidence of credibility. For effective deterrence moving on

 to  the next level, comprising of weaponisation,  acquisition  of

 delivery  systems,  and  a  command facility  in  the  capability

 sphere;  and, credibility enhancing incorporation of nuclear  use

 into  strategy, through formulation and dissemination  of  appro

 priate doctrine,  is necessary.

 The  political  utility  of  nuclear weapons,  in  terms  of  the

 Clausewitzian  formulation of war being politics by other  means,

 is in the prevention of threat of use of the same at best, or, in

 prevention  of their use, at worst. The strategy addressing  this

 in our context has been termed `minimal deterrence',  alternately

 called  `proportional deterrence'. However, it is the second  pod

 of  doctrine, concerning the military utility of  these  weapons,

 that  is  the  focus of this essay.  If strategy be  the  art  of

 relating means to ends, ends being politically determined,  then,

 essentially, a nuclear war-waging strategy is within the ambit of

 Limited War doctrine.  This essay examines the efficacy of Limit

 ed  War  doctrine in the nuclear context.  The  understanding  is

 that,  the  nature  of nuclear weapons being  such,  exercise  of

 discipline  in  determining  the ends and means  of  war  becomes

 imperative.

 A  historical backgrounder precedes a theoretical  discussion  of

 the  philosophy  and  concept of Limited  War,  as  it  developed

 through  the Cold War.  The problems in the nature of  limitation

 are  highlighted  by way of a critique.   Having  introduced  the

 subject,  in its expansive scope, the essay situates the  discus

 sion  in  the subcontinental context by, first,  looking  at  the

 controversial record of limitation in conventional war, and, then

 by analysing war in the Age of Subcontinental Nuclear Deterrence.

 The need for such a review owes to the inevitability of continued

 nuclearisation.  The impetus to the same will be through institu

 tional  pressure of the emerging military-industrial  complex  in

 India,  headed by the DRDO; and, the bid by the military to  gain

 access  to  prestige-enhancing nukes, by evolving  rationale  and

 doctrine  for  their operational applicability.  Lastly,  in  the

 Indo-Pak  context India's conventional deterrence strategy  of  a

 counter-offensive  has  been checkmated  by  Pakistani's  nuclear

 capability. Pakistan's strategy of offensive-defence is, also, at

 a  similar impasse.  Therefore, there is likely to be some  move

 ment in strategic thaught and doctrinal direction.  This essay is

 a  contribution  in  sensitising the readership  with  regard  to

 implications of the same.

 PART I

 

Limited War : An Introduction

 Backround  :  Massive Retaliation was the initial US doctrine  in

 the era of its nuclear monopoly and asymmetry.  The enormity,  in

 terms of moral and political costs of such reprisal, rendered  it

 incredible,  and, with the onset of nuclear  parity,  persistence

 with it could also prove suicidal.   Therefore, was advanced  the

 concept of Limited War to offset the relative paucity in  conven

 tional forces - thereby also imparting a utilitarian value to  an

 increasingly effective and diversified nuclear arsenal.

 Total  War, that had been the dominant form of war in the Age  og

 Nationalism,  had been rendered unthinkable in the  Nuclear  Age,

 given  the  mutual vulnerability of  similarly  armed  opponents.

 Therefore,  initial  Limited  War theorising,  by  proponents  as

 Osgood and Halperin, was to condition American opinion - the  as

 sumption being that the introverted, isolationist and  moralistic

 Americans were historically inclined more towards the waging of a

 Total War. Given their perception of malevolence of Communism, by

 now niclear armed, this could prove, both, inevitable and  suici

 dal.   Therefore,  the theorising by Cold  War  strategists,  and

 operationalising of the Limted War  doctrine by the  military, as 

 evident  in  Korea,  Vietnam, the Cuban crisis et  al.   In  fact

 military strategy in the Cold War had this as its principal focus

 and source.

 

 The Philosophy :  The ends-means balance is the cornerstone,  not

 only  of strategy, but also of the Just War doctrine.  Given  the

 unlimited nature of the means, the ends had perforce to be limit

 ed.  In Clasewitzian terms, this implied sujecting military power

 to  exacting  political discipline to ensure  the  prevention  of

 spiral into the Clausewitzian conceptualisation of Absolute  War. 

 Thus,  did the Limited War formulation ensure the  continued  in

 strumentality of war as an adjunct of politics. In short, nuclear 

 weapons had not  made `war' unthinkable.

 The  Concept  :  Osgood, the originator and propagandist  of  the

 concept,  defines Limited War as one in which  `belligerants  re

 strict the purpose for which they fight to concrete, well-defined

 objectives,  that do not demand the utmost in military effort  of

 which  they  are capable'.  Though war has been,  to  an  extent,

 limited  by the principles of necessity, discrimination,  propor

 tionality  and humanity, the `limited' in Limited War  implies  a

 self-imposed  restraint in objectives, forces,  weapons,  targets

 and areas.  The concept was expanded by Kissinger to include  the

 nuclear  ingredient  of the technological environment,  with  his

 advocacy of tactical nuclear weapons to redress the  conventional

 forces  imbalance in Europe.  Later, Herman Kahn's discussion  of

 the  `escalation ladder', with its various fire-breaks, dwelt  on

 the possibilities of keeping nuclear-war limited - thus, bringing

 the nuclear game back into strategy.

 The Limitations  :  Firstly, is limitation in political aims  and

 military objectives for achievement with less than total  applic

 tion  of  resources available.  Secondly, is  its  distinguishing

 factor  from  wars that stay limited due to lack of  resources  -

 limitation  in  `means'.  Since the means used  are  the  primary

 manner  of  communicating limitation, as intent,  to  the  enemy,

 limitation  in targets and weapons assumes salience. In  the  nu

 clear  scenario,  the  conventional-nuclear  firebreak;  and  the

 determinants  of tactical and strategic role of nuclear  weapons,

 such  as,  type of target, its relation to the  combat  zone  and

 population   centers,  are vital to non-escalation.   Lastly,  is

 scope of war in terms of level of intensity, geographical spread,

 alliance partners, etc.

 A Critique.  The concept of Limited War is the appropriatte  doc

 trinal  response  to the limited capacity of  military  means  in

 achieving political ends, in a situation of symmetry in capabili

 ties. The problems, however, include: firstly, mission-creep with

 regard to aims and objectives, given the emotion-laden decision-

 making environment, and public passions, in war; secondly, limit

 ed  means  may be `limited' in relation to the quantum  and  kind

 available,  but  not to the nature of damage perpetrated  in  the

 combat area; thirdly, since it takes two to tango, it is relative

 `escalation  dominance' that will determine mutuality of  limita

 tion, thus bringing escalation back into the realm of  probabili

 ty;  and, fourthly, such incorporation of nuclear  weaponry  into

 war-waging  doctrine legitimises and reinforces the power of  in

 fluence  of our indigeneous MIC, a matter fraught with  political

 and  policy  implications;  and, lastly nuclear  dogma  gets  en

 trenched, and becomes less amenable to the demand for a  `nuclear

 free' world.

                              PART II

 The Sub-Continental Scene 

 In  defending India's nuclear case, euthusiasts have  alluded  to

 the `gentlemanly' nature of the wars on the sub-continent, empha

 sising  their  `limited'  nature in terms  aims,  means,  extent,

 duration,  intensity, passions and the fact of  subsequent  nego

 tiated settlement. Critics have however, pointed out, that though

 factually so, this is analytically imprecise, in that, limitation

 in war was more on account of limited means (1962, 1965), and, on

 the contrary, a case of mission-expansion, on the Eastern  Front,

 rather  than limitation (1971). 

 Only  the 1947-48 Indo-Pak conflict can be considered  as  having

 been limited, for war termination in 1948 owed to war aims having

 been  met to an extent, and to Nehru's desire to get on with  the

 task of nation-state building. Further successful military action

 (as  the military position now has it, that it was  then  capable

 of),  would  have developed into a counter-productive  long  term

 strategic  threat  to the Pakistani heartland; was  of  uncertain

 probability of success, given the terrain, and, Pak Army's  entry

 into  the  conflict in earnest; and, the long, term impact  of  a

 long-drawn  out war on civil- military and  inter-communal  rela

 tions.   

 The case of 1965 war is more straight-forward, in that there  was

 an  expansion  to encompass the Punjab  theatre;  and  incidental

 limitation  was  on  account of Gen  Chaudhri's,  (now  disputed)

 appreciation of the depleted state of artillery ammunition reser

 ves  - itself a result of international pressure, in the form  of

 an arms embargo.

 As  for  the 1971 victory, it was not the intended outcome  of  a

 grand  design,  the  original aim being a  nibbling  of  adequate

 territory to implant the Bangladeshi government-in-exile back  on

 native soil.   However the situation on the Western Front can  be

 said  to be meeting the requirements of Limited War, in that  war

 aims were restricted. The part on international pressure in this,

 in the very visible form of the USS Enterprise, was incidental.

 Thus,  broadly, in the conventional scenario, there is  a  strong

 case against  the  fallacy  that subcontinental wars  have   been 

 Limited  Wars. However, a look in this context at the Low Intens

 ity Conflict or Proxy War is revealing. 

 In  both Punjab and Kashmir, the level of Pakistani  interference

 has  been within the threshold of Indian tolerance, in  that,  it

 has  been a case of `escalation dominance' by India.   The  cost-

 benefit  calculus, primarily of the economic factor, and the  Pak

 recessed  nuclear deterrent, has also informed strategic  choice.

 Unable  to take on India's conventional  superiority,  Pakistan's

 intervention,  nuanced to keep the level at sub-tolerance  thres

 hold of India, is a case of auto-limitation.  India's capability,

 at  this level, demonstrated by return of near-normalcy  to  both

 regions, has kept the Indian option to escalate at abeyance.        

 Given  the  Afghan-conflict experience;  available  weaponry,  to

 include  surface-to-air missiles; and, footloose  expertise,  the

 LIC in Kashmir could have been made  unsustainable for  India  by

 `upping-the-ante'. Presently, with a casualty figure of 1000 army

 men in eight years, as  against 1400 in three  years in SriLanka,

 India  could and has, displayed strategic restraint.  In  effect,

 and  interestingly so, the LIC obtaining can be subsumed  in  the

 Limited  War category, if the definition of `war' is expanded  to

 include this end of the spectrum of armed conflict.

 The Nuclear Context

 The  nuclearisation  of  the subcontinent is now  a  decade  old,

 though  formally acknowledged only recently.  Strategic  thinking

 on  the  issue goes back even further in India, to  the  Sundarji

 era. At the post-Pokhran II juncture, the type of test, the deve-

 lopment in missilery, and the spurt in literature on threats  and

 options, indicates that an across-the-board nuclear capability is

 in the pipeline in the long term. Whereas the distinction between

 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is in the juncture of use,

 targets,  survivability, yield, and vulnerability, it is  evident

 from  the sub-kiloton test, and missile payloads being aimed  at,

 that  even tactical nuclear weapons for battle field use  are  in

 the offing.   Theoretically, these are desirable also to  bolster

 deterrance,  for a threat of strategic nuclear use is  incredible

 when  addressing   an operational level circumstance.   This  is,

 also,  part of the logic of verticle proliferation.  If  this  be

 so, then a nuclear doctrine for Limited War has to be etched out. 

 Speculation  on  the contours of the doctrine, on  the  pros  and

 cons, is in order.

 Among  the  pros, the deterrence rationale  having  been  already

 discussed, is the political - internal and external - utility  of

 the  technological  mastery so displayed. Next, is  the  military

 need to keep  up with the Jones' externally; get a prestige-boost

 internally;  and, gain a leverage in the sphere  of  bureaucratic

 politics. Lastly, tactical nuclear capability enables the  commu

 nication  that  is vital to Limited War, and  to  deterrence.  It

 thereby  facilitates 'tacit bargaining'- a prelude to  negotiated

 conflict termination.

 Among the cons in the subcontinental context are,  firstly,  that

 limitation implies the relative expendability of the combat  zone

 with  respect to the heartland.  In a federal structure  this  is

 politically fraught.  Secondly, given limited depth, Pakistan  is

 more  vulnerable.   Thus it may not play ball.  Thirdly,  nuclear

 targets  being only in the desert area, are, also, not  lucrative

 enough to cross the crucial conventional-nuclear firebreak.

 Secondly,  the Age of Nationalism, a characteristic of  which  is

 Total  War, has arrived in the subcontinent.  This is evident  in

 the  ascendent chauvinism, displayed on both sides of the  border

 after  their respective blasts.  Nationalist passion, being  more

 dangerous  than  the ideological one (the  latter  conflict  area

 being  the  only precedent of successful deterrence  and  crisis-

 management appropriate in this setting), could well contribute to

 the escalatory impulse.

 Thirdly, as corrollary of the above, is the cumulative effects of

 factors as the propagandistic demonisation of the `other' on both

 sides of the border that may preclude the compromise implicit  in

 Limited  War;  the  demand to end the  Paksitani  posturing,  the

 previous wars being deemed as having brought an indecisive  peace

 - a call that limits political options; and a perception, in  the

 military, that there is no 'substitute for victory'.  The  latter

 belief is untenable in the Atomic Age - the earlier realised, the

 better.  

 Lastly,  there are flashpoints that erupt periodically into  cri

 sis.  These are staple for subcontiental nuclear-war scare-  sce

 nario  writers.   The element of truth  in them is in  our  less-

 than-satisfying  record of crisis-management, such as,  the  col

 lapse of the Sri Lankan Accord of Rajiv; and, to pick an instance

 from the internal sphere, the destruction of the Ayodhya  mosque.

 Though  efforts are on at engineering a national security  formu

 lating process and mechanism, credence for our record on institu

 tion viability does not make for nuclear comfort.

 In  so far as China is concerned, there is  conventional  parity. 

 It  is deterrence resting on a strategic nuclear  capability,  in

 terms of missile-payload, range and weapons yield for a  counter-

 value  exchange,  that is being aimed for, in  the  medium  term.

 Commonality of interest in preserving the peace in the short  and

 medium  term,  alongwith  conventional  deterrence,  and  minimal

 conflict  areas,  are  likely to  keep  conflict  in  abeyanance. 

 However, the long term prognostications being such, it is  likely

 that limited war doctrine will eventually acquire a premium  even

 in this context.

 Conclusions

 Limited  War  as  a conceptual categorisation of  warfare  is  of

 recent  vintage,  their closest parallels in  history  being  the

 Continental  wars  in the time of Marlborough.   Napoleonic  wars

 were  the  original `revolution in military  affairs',  which  by

 adding  the third dimension, of popular involvement,  made  whole

 Clausewitz's  trinity  of the government, the  military  and  the

 nation.  Ever since, wars have had a escalatory tendency  towards

 the conceptual Absolute War and the very real Total War.  In  the

 Nuclear  Age such a propensity brings within the realm of  possi

 bility  the unthinkable General War.  Nuclear sanity,  therefore,

 demands that war be remodeled as an instrument of policy.   Since

 strategy flows from policy, it has been operationalised, for  the

 purpose, by way of the Limited War doctrine.

 The subcontinental protagonists, having demonstrated and declared

 their  status  as nuclear powers, have also entered  the  era  of

 Limited  Wars.  An appropriate doctrine can, therefore,  be  pre

 sumed  to  be  on the make.  While the specifics  have  not  been

 addressed  here, the foregoing contextual discussion in terms  of

 background, desirability and viability does not infuse confidence

 in  the nuclear future.  In so far as we are sensitised  to  this

 aspect,  it  would help further the conflict avoidance  and  con

 fidence building measures on the subcontinent, for, if the danger

 of  escalation in war is to be avoided, then wars are not  to  be

 fought  at all. 

 

The criticality of this owes to the Limited War concept lending a

 dangerous aura of rationality and control to nuclear war,  making

 it appear avoidable, and, if not so, then winnable.  The point is

 that  to  fight a war, with nuclear symmetry as backdrop,  is  to

 ignore the understanding of war as an instrument of policy. Would

 the  realist  school, steeped in nuclear  theology,  please  take

 note!

 From the archives, 7 Jul 1998

LETTER TO THE EDITOR
 

 General Shah's 'approach to motivation training', outlined in his

article of the same name in the Infantry India Dec'96 issue, is that  downsizing

of  the mechanized forces ('white elephant') would be in  keeping

with  the  strategic environment and release the  resources  that

would  help  make of the infantry a privileged elite.  He  favors

nuclearisation as a substitute deterrent, under cover of which an

infantry-heavy army could engage in wars of the future, LICs.  In

this  letter, not only will his thesis be debated, but  also  its

ideological underpinnings.
 

 

Firstly,  he devotes two pages to attacking the ARTRAC  paper  on

'Combat  Motivation',  though the effort is  superfluous  to  his

argument.  The paper is relevant to the army as it  is  presently

configured.  Although the hygiene factors that the General  advo­

cates as necessary are indeed so for motivation, an army based on

the  regimental  system has to emphasize  spiritual  factors  for

motivation. The aim of the present system is to achieve Cohesion.

Cohesion  is facilitated by likeness in background of the  group.

Since  diversity  makes India an amorphous idea (as  the  General

himself observes), the utilization of 'race and caste' to  gener­

ate  the  same is not so defenseless a proposition as to  be  de­

bunked as summarily as has been done in the article.
 

    
 

Secondly,  he  devotes  only three paragraphs  to  enunciate  his

thesis.  Thus his position is based on certain arguable  proposi­

tions. These are tackled below:
 

- The nuclear deterrent would cater for the conventional  threat,

under  cover of which the mechanized forces could be  reduced  to

release  funds for combating insurgency- the form of war  of  the

future. A contending school of thought has it that it is recessed

nuclearisation  that has led to incidence of proxy war. It  draws

analogy  from the experience of the two protagonists of the  cold

war  who  engaged in proxy wars elsewhere so as to  preserve  the

central  strategic  balance. Thus,  nuclearisation  would  ensure

persistence  of externally initiated and sustained internal  con­

flicts.  The General merely furnishes a solution  (in  suggesting

the upgradation of the infantry to combat such interference)  for

the problem his advocacy of nuclearisation gives rise to.
 

 

-  As a motivational measure, he suggests a lateral induction  of

the soldiery into the CPOs after a 7/8 year stint with the infan­

try.  It  is unlikely that the soldiery would appreciate  such  a

mid-career move, for life in the CPOs is not very agreeable given

that  they too are enmeshed in internal security operations.  The

lateral  shift, would in the General's opinion, lead  to  'disci­

pline and an army ethos' CPOs. This would involve a change in the

character  of the CPOs, making them incline more to the  military

end of a police-military continuum, thus belieing their name  and

raison d'etre. Having the entire force available permeated by the

army and the its ethos would be dangerous to civil authority over

the  military,  a matter of central concern  in  a  parliamentary

democracy  as  ours. Needless to add is that  the  suggestion  is
 
virtually  unimplementable,  given that the CPOs  themselves  are

institutions  of some strength. Lastly,  should,  hypothetically,

such a change take place, would not the infantry, for whose bene­

fit the General advances this suggestion, become obsolescent? For

the  CPOs now 'less faction ridden' would be kin to the  infantry

and, therefore, be more capable (by the General's logic- again an

arguable proposition that military force is the antidote for LIC)

of combating insurgency on their own.  
 

 

- The General envisages the creation of 'a privileged elite,  who

like the Roman gladiators will be feted and whose every whim will

be fulfilled'. Does not Gibbon tell us that the 'Decline and Fall

of the Roman Empire' is attributable to the Praetorian Guard?  In

this, albeit well-meaning suggestion, are portents subversive  of

freedom and democracy for India.
 

 

Lastly, it is important that the General's perspective on history

be critiqued. He seems to lament the diversity that characterizes

Indianness.  He deems it to be the dilution of 'purity of  race',

'basic character' and 'racial pride'. These phrases have  hitler­

ian  connotations  and  reflect the ideology of  the  far  right.

Another  illustrative  example of the General's  mindset  is  his

denigration of the foremost libertarian movement of this century-

the  empowerment  of  the underclass-  as  'Mandalisation'.  Such

ideological  polemic is counterproductive and irrelevant  to  the

General's  case.  Lastly, General, who, pray, are  the  'invaders

from whom 'we' have absorbed less desirable traits as racial  and

religious intolerance'? The Aryans!?

 From the archives, 12 Nov 1997

ON  MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

  Both leadership and counter-insurgency are familiar terms to  the

readership  of this journal. Indeed, exercising military  leader­

ship is our professional responsibility. That we have increasing­ly  had to do this in a counter-insurgency environment  has  made

leadership in counter-insurgency our forte. We know from  experience  that leadership in such environments is critical to  opera­tional  performance and success. Therefore, the subject  requires

critical  appraisal. This article is an attempt in  this  regard.

The aim is to raise certain connected issues in order to generate

thought  on  the  subject that we  otherwise  overlook  as  self-

evidently obvious.
 

The  manner  the  topic shall be addressed is  by  examining  the

exercise  of  leadership at the various levels  of  the  military

hierarchy- the executive level upto company commander; the direc­

tor level and supervisory level to include the Commanding Officer

and  the  formation commanders; and the apex level of  corps  and

above. The differing pressures, unique to the insurgency environ­

ment,  that impact on these levels and the manner of response  of

each will be studied.
 

 

The Junior level

 

It  is unanimously acknowledged that the junior level  leadership

has,  as in wars, been exemplery. The statistics speak for  them­

selves,  in that the officer casualty figures  make  self-evident

that the officer cadre ethos is to lead from the front.  Inciden­

tally, the record of JCO casualties in counter-insurgency in both

Sri Lanka and Kashmir, belies the notion that this rank does  not

pull  its weight in operations, for their casualties in  line  of

duty are equally praiseworthy.
 

 

That  said,  it must be recognised that these  figures  hide  the

relatively  fewer  NCO casualties as leaders of  respective  sub-

units. Though the statistics of NCO casualties are often subsumed

under those for ORs, a higher loss rate of platoon commanders and

company  sabalterns  indicates a certain lack of  enterprise  and

initiative  at the level of leadership of the section- the  level

at  which the casualty causing fire-fight and battle drills  take

place.  It  is possibly a reflection on the kind of  soldiery  we

have that makes this so- stolid, phlegmatic. Clearly, there is  a

case to be made for a relook at the training and selection  proc­

ess  at this level. In the long term, this is a factor  that  can

only  improve given the level of mental mobility of  an  educated

soldiery.  However, it would require inspirational leadership  at

the company level to keep thinking subordinates razor sharp.
 

 

A vital aspect is to exercise control in an environment  rendered

complex  by  bullets and strictures against  collateral  civilian

casualties. The difficulty is in prolonged low intensity conflict

where  there  is  a possibility  of  ethical  boundaries  getting

blurred with the onset of escalation and brutalisation. Not  only

has  personal mental and physical strain to be handled,  but  the

soldiers  have to be ministered to psychologically.  Assuming  an

importance  over  technical competence is  a  socio-cultural  and

historical sensitivity. This alone leads to WHAM. Thus leadership

acquires  a  criticality beyond its  dimensions  in  conventional

setting.  Ensuring  the  internalisation of this  aspect  is  the

responsibility  of  the  next higher rung - that  of  the  middle

level.   
 

The Middle Level

 

It  is  a  recognised fact that the commanding  officer  has  the

pivotal  role  in  the heirarchy. He directs  the  instrument  of

violence which is administered to the insurgency affected  socie­

ty. Therefore, his touch has to be as deft as that of a  surgeon.

Thats  among  the  reasons why his is a high  pressure  job.  The

consensus  is  that  with an increasing  commitment  in  counter-

insurgency scenarios, the accumulated experience has resulted  in

a higher standards at this level.
 

 

The  formation  commanders are responsible  for  supervision  and

resourse  allocation. Increasingly, most have been in  CI  opera­

tions  as leaders of men when younger, and, therefore,  are  ade­

quately   sensitised to the demands on leadership. Being  at  the

interface  of  civil-military,  and  military-public   relations,

theirs  is  a critical responsibility to maintain the  esteem  in

society  of the army. This they do not only  through  interaction

with the other agencies of governance and with civil society, but

also  in overseeing the manner of conduct of the units  in  their

formations.
 

It  is at this level that the two kinds of  pressures-  organisa­

tional,  and personal are manifest. The organisational  ones  in­

clude the institutional requirement for 'results'. This conspires

alongwith  the next one- 'unit ki izzat', to impact adversely  on

the conduct of the unit. There is a requirement for the formation

commanders  to  ensure that the 'numbers  game'  is  discouraged.

However, they too are also subject to other personal pressures as

professional ambition, domestic matters, physical decline, and to

the  male  male  'menopause'. The pyramidical  structure  of  the

organisation  makes  these  acute. So it behoves  on  the  higher

commander  in theatre to keep the working ethos such  that  short

cuts,  that could set the clock back in terms of 'winning  hearts

and minds', are precluded.

The Higher Commander

 

His is the pivotal role. He has to further the military  perspec­

tive in the higher coodinating councils; interact with the media;

strategise,  plan and communicate; induce the ethos in his  force

that  is sensitive to the 'means-ends' balance; and,  to  inspire

his  command. In short, his is a delicate mix of  managerial  and

leadership  oriented job content. While leadership at this  level

is,  both, situation specific and a matter of personal style,  it

is  worth  reflection that there are two diverse  views  on  this

aspect,  given the 'delicate mix' mentioned. These are valid,  to

an extent, for the formation commanders also.
 

 

The  two views have equally articulate exponents and  illustrious

practitioners. They are respectively expounded in Lt General Sar­

deshpande's  'Assignment Jaffna', and Maj General Ray's  'Kashmir

Diary'. Gen Sardeshpande views in his own words:
 

"CI is longdrawn, laborious, sapping, tricky, taxing, uncertain, and flexible to a much higher degree than conventioan­

al  war. Without an equally high level of comaraderie,  con­cern for and involvement with men and sincere and  effective

exercise  of heroic pattern of leadership, there can  be  no

inspirational  leadership (page 151)...In this  context  the

commander  has to increase his interaction down to rank  and

file level to explain the stakes, his contribution, and  the

nature and significance of his tasks."
 

Contrast this with Gen Ray's equally compelling logic:

 

"While  battalions kill militants, the generals must get  on

with  the mission of winning the information  war...This  is

what  generalship  is all about...to lean back  and  take  a

wide-angled  view of the ground and political situation.  He

must continually keep on sharing his intent with subordinate

commanders, fighting the info war, and managing the environ­

ment (page 185)...At the operational level military command­

ers  are obliged to spend more time on  the  socio-political

aspects,  and  let brigade and battalion commanders  get  on

with tactical operations (page 195)."
It  is  indicative of intellectual vitality that  there  are  two

views  on  the  subject of higher leadership  in  CI  operations.

Therefore, it would appear there is a menu from which a commander

could  choose. The parameters of choice would be personal  style;

level  of intensity, escalation and brutalisation;  national  and

international  attention; and, time frame for and requirement  of

'results'. However, it is moot that a wrong choice can have major

repercussions on the conduct of and success in operations. 
 

 

Conclusions

 

Leadership is the key to any collective enterprise, more so in so

very complex a task as CI. It is the synergy generated across the

heirarchy  that yeilds the result of a return of normalcy in  the

long  run. However, it is interesting to speculate if there is  a

level that is the more critical one. Both Generals quoted are  in

agreement  that  senior and junior level leadership  win  the  CI

'war'.  General Sardeshpande, reflecting on the IPKF  experience,

writes:  'What  the sabaltern lacked in knowledge, he  more  than

made up in his enthusiasm, keeness, guts, and promptness...If the

leader, particularly the formation commander, did not inspire his

command,  that  body of troops would be at half  its  efficiency'

(page 150). General Ray concurs: 'An army wins or loses at  these

two  crucial  levels of command- the platoon  commander  and  the

general' (page 178). General Sardeshpande's is the more inclusive

understanding  of  senior commander, whereas General  Ray  refers

only to the commanding general in theatre.


 

 

What  is remarkable is that neither mention the Commanding  Offi­

cer.  It is at this level that the intent of the  commanders  are

translated  for action by the junior level. Their's is a  pivotal

function,  as the best intention of the higher commander and  the

bravest act of the sabaltern would be futile should integrity  at

this level be below par.
 

 

Summing  up, one can say that the jolt to the peace-time army  at

Jaffna was a timely one. The involvement of the army in CI opera­

tions  since has increased exponentially. It is required that  we

review  the leadership function in CI, in order  that  heightened

standards  beget  the desired results in what  shall  remain  our

continued preoccupation into the future.          
 

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 

 

1. Lt Gen Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna
 

2. Maj Gen A Ray, Kashmir Diary
 

 

 From the Archives, 12 Nov 1997

'KASHMIR DIARY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITANCY'

A CRITICAL REVIEW

General  Ray's book is unique in being both a first hand  account

of operations in Kashmir and a psychological study of  militancy.
The  book is both descriptive and prescriptive, and is  a  worthy
contribution to the study of war by one who is both a thinker and
practitioner. The author draws on his professional experience  in
Kashmir,  and  his  observations  on  politico-military   matters
through  his distinguished service, to throw light on a  critical
facet  of LIO- psychological operations. Understandably the  book
has evoked appreciative comment from experts in the field.

 

Having  acknowledged  the  General's  contribution  to   military
thought  and  recent history of  Kashmir,  uncritical  acceptance
would be an injustice to his effort and intent. This review essay
hopes to provoke a debate by raising counterpoints to the  Gener­
al's  arguments. The manner of doing so would be to  present  the
General's  contention on the issue under scrutiny,  and  critique
his  position.  The  idea is to thereby shed more  light  on  the
issue, since those chosen for discussion are of primary relevance
to coping with insurgency militarily in a democratic polity. Only
those issues have been dealt with that lend themselves to  alter­
native  perspectives, while taking care to present  the  author's
view in all fairness.

 

The Genesis and Sustenance

 

The  militancy  in Kashmir owes to 'alienation born  of  economic
deprivation' (p. 40), fuelled by islamic fundamentalism' (p.  18)
exported  by Pakistan in accordance with their strategy  document
OP TOPAC dating from Apr 1988 (p. 47). In pursuing the  strategic
objective  of its 'info-islamic war', that of 'islamisation as  a
pre-requisite to... overthrow of the Indian yoke' (p. 48),  Paki­
stan has taken care to keep the threshold of the proxy war  below
what may provoke an Indian conventional reaction (p. 63).

 

This  is indeed the popular version. The General also  makes  the
error  of  believing that OP TOPAC exists as more  than  a  semi-
fictional  piece of scenario writing by an IDR research team.  In
doing so the General is in the august company of Mr  Subramanyam,
who was gracious enough to apologise. That apart, there are major
analysis that are more socio-politically sensitive on the issue.

An  understanding has it that the promise of Indian democracy  in
mobilising  the people was squandered in it being unable to  con­
cede  political  space to the forces so generated in  Kashmir  (S
Ganguly).  This lead to an sub-national arousal, fuelled  by  the
tide  in  international affairs at the turn of  the  decade.  The
people  centered movement for ethnic assertion was  subverted  by
the inoculation that fundamentalist forces received from a  Paki­
stan unamused by the rhetoric of 'azadi'. The external dimension,
militarisation  and fundamentalisation legitimised  the  military
option  for India, while relegating any political remedial  meas­
ures.

 

Counter-Militancy Operations

 

The  General  rightly delineates the  constituency  of  militancy
being the people (p. xviii), and the objectives being psychologi­
cal-  WHAM (p. 151). Theorising on the contrast between  war  and
LIC in terms of the interpretation of victory and the measure  of
violence  involved (p. 166-8), he opines that  the  clausewitzian
logic  is  untenable in LIC (p. 155). Whereas  in  war  maximises
violence on a 'hated enemy', in LIC this is unthinkable (p.  150-
1).  Given this he believes that at the 'two critical  levels  of
command' (p. 178), there must exist socio-political understanding
at  platoon  commander level, and the ability in  the  commanding
general to 'lean back and take a wide angled and distant view  of
the  ground and political situation' (p. 186). His  judgement  is
that  the soldier- 'the strategic resourse' (p. 187)- 'has  stood
the  test of time' (p. 205), and so has the  military  leadership
(p. 96, 106).

 

In  tackling  the  theory of war, the General  has  mistaken  the
Moltkean  understanding  of Clausewitz (p. 167)  as  Clausewitz's
gospel  'on war'. Clausewitz used Absolute War as an ideal  type,
and  emphasised that friction and political constraints  made  it
so. Thereby, his definition of war as politics by other means. By
this  yardstick, LIC, too, is subject to the clausewitzian  logic
of  political  aims determining military objectives. So  the  au­
thor's  contention that the 'centre of gravity'- the  people-  in
LIC (p. 169) cannot be addressed with bullets is in accord  with,
and not opposed to Clausewitz, as he seems to think (p. 167).

 

Secondly,  'hate'  is not essential for armies to  win  'decisive
victories', witness the victory in East Pakistan in 1971.  Third­
ly,  war  is  not 'Darwinian' (p. 166).  This  insight  has  been
Clausewitz's  landmark  contribution to the theory  of  war.  The
military  objective is not to 'destroy the enemy' per se, but  to
facilitate the political objective. This holds true for LIC also,
in  that  the military objective is to so  degrade  the  militant
forces  as  to  gain a position of advantage  for  the  political
solution  to be effected. This has been Indian policy  (S  Gupta,
'India  Redefines  its Role'; Adelphi Paper 293), though  Mr  KPS
Gill laments this in the Foreword (p. xiv).

 

If his book is to be 'read between the lines' (quoted by Harinder
Baweja  in  her review), then the symptoms of  brutalisation  (p.
171)  and the 'fatal attraction of the 'bean count' and  'numbers
game'' (p. 179) can be deemed to have been present in Kashmir. Is
this the explanation for the 40000 casualties (p. 5) there in six
years, whereas the toll in Punjab, where brutalisation was  self-
evident,  it  was 25000 in ten years? In the three years  of  the
IPKF episode, we lost 1200 dead, as against 800 in the six  years
in Kashmir. Despite the greater intensity of the fight there,  to
include  the Jaffna battle, there were, by the LTTE's own  admis­
sion,  only  13000  casualties. Given that 60%  of  the  Kashmiri
militants  were not aggressive (p. 40); the kind of arsenal  they
had at their disposal courtesy Pakistan; the levels of recoveries
of  armaments; and, Pakistani care to keep the 'boiling pot'  (p.
63)  from spilling over, it would appear that the level of  armed
opposition cannot justify the casualty figure.

 

Therefore,  this analysis seems to indicate that the  General  is
rather  sanguine in addressing the effect  Indian  civilisational
ethos  (p.  188) may have had on  the 'faulty  perceptions  about
Kashmiris' (p. 142-3), and on degrading the influence of the then
ascendent  doctrine of hindutva (p. 136-7). Besides,  traditional
mores  are under severe assault in society. The officer class  is
not  inured to such currents. Thus the impact on  attitudes,  and
consequence  on  action, may have been more than  the  author  is
willing  to concede. In this perhaps is the explanation  for  the
seemingly exhorbitant casualty figure.

 

He praises the regimental system (p. 196), while overlooking that
the  'unit ki izzat' mentality may have prepetuated  the  'result
syndrome'.  Furthermore,  the  unstated  prejudices  that  inhere
within  the  psyches and memories of the various  ethnic  groups,
have scope for expression where the ethnic factor is foundational
as in the regimental system. This syndrome can also be attributed
to careerism (p. 171), the result in turn of a pyramidical organ­
isational structure, and, to the intake of 'mediocrity', itself a
result  of 'marginalisation of the  military in national  psyche'
(p. 175).

 

If this critique be true, then, is the General's prescription on

generalship  (p. 186) valid? Merely 'sharing his  intention  with
his  subordinate commanders, fighting the info war, and  managing
the  environment'  (p. 186) may not be 'what generalship  is  all
about' (p. 186). General Sardeshpande's position on formation and
higher level military leadership ('Assignment Jaffna', p.  150-1)
acquires  credibility.  He  envisages a  hands  on  inspirational
leadership as answer in environments, as these, where the army is

found to be less responsive than desirable, which incidentally is
how the General describes armies (p. 149-57). Where leadership is
such, it precludes the excesses, and allegations based on the 'no
smoke without fire' analogy, that invite media expressed societal
opprobrium- thereby winning the info war by deed.

 

On Civil-Military Relations

 

The General opines that the 'army belongs to the people, never to
the  government, accordingly, the army is answerable only to  the
people'  (p. 197). Given this, the 'commitment of the nation  has
to  be kept alive' (p. xix). The manner of doing so is to  inter­
face with the instrument that conditions the mind of the  people-
the  media-  in order to win the info war.  This,  alongwith  the
'management  of  the environment' (p. 186) and  strategising  (p.
178), is the sphere of operational responsibility of the command­
ing general.

 

The  General's  views on the military-society  relationship  echo
MacArthur's contention before his sacking underlined the position
of  the military in democratic polity. The army is an  instrument
of  the  state run by a government accountable  to  the  people's
representatives  in parliament. Inadequate understanding of  this
has led to military expansion (which, by implication, occurs when
the  commanding  general  acts in accordance  with  the  author's
outline of his role) into the political sphere, beyond its legit­
imate  involvement  in bureaucratic politics. The  military  must
defend  the  turf of its social responsibility of  protection  of
state and society, but this has the danger of the military equat­
ing its institutional interest with the national interest. It  is
for this reason the military is subordinate to the political head
in non-praetorian polities.

 

Understandly,  as  with any profession, the military  strives  to
protect  its  autonomy in the sphere of its  expertise.  However,
where the field is inherently political ('low intensity wars  are
political wars' (p. 167)), political control is doubly important.
It is at arriving at a modus vivendi that some of the problems of
interface, the General mentions in passing (p. 179), occured. The
author's severe indictment of the administration as 'nervous' and
'panicky'(p.  38-9)  in connection with the  media  clampdown  at
Tsrar  is an interesting casestudy. It would have been a  service
to  contemporary historiography on Kashmir had he put  on  record
what  the army' point of view put across was at the juncture  the
decision  was made, and subsequently, at the climax. As the  lead
and  controlling agency for operations in Kashmir, other than  in
Srinagar  town, it would be interesting to know if the  army  was
overruled  in this regard. If not, then to blame the  administra­
tion  entirely, as the General does, is to protect  institutional
interest- the danger alluded to earlier.

 

Conclusion

 

That this review essay has highlighted a differing perspective on
some  core  issues  is to the author's credit,  for  his  thought
stimulating work. The alternative perspective is not only academ­
ically important, but must be given due worth in arriving at  any
conclusions on the issues raised by the author. Since LIC is here
to  stay (Toffler, Creveld) such deliberation is well  in  order.
And  is a fitting tribute to those who are called upon to  sacri­
fice their lives in such conflicts- to whom the book is  dedicat­
ed. The author's principle achievement is thus in initiating  the
process with his timely, brave and frank account of the psycholo­
gy of militancy in Kashmir. 

 

Ray,  Arjun;  'Kashmir  Diary: Psychology  of  Militancy';  Manas
Publications, New Delhi; 1997; Rs 495.

 

 

 From the archives on Kashmir, 8 May 1998

QUESTIONABLE STATISTICS

 

In  conducting conventional operations, it is vital to  know  the

mind  of the enemy. Not without reason therefore did  Monty  keep

the picture of the Desert Fox in his caravan, and Swarzkopf  that

of Saddam. This was in keeping with Tsun Zu's dictum- to know the

enemy  is to win half the battle. Similarly, in CI  operations  a

'profile'  or 'portrait' of the militant is necessary  to  outwit

him,  as also help plan psy ops. Therefore the army  conducted  a

psychological study of captured militants in Kashmir.
 

 

Excerpts  of this study are now available in the writings of  Maj

Gen  Arjun Ray, who oversaw the study in his former  capacity  of

BGS,  15 Corps, and Colonel Saldanha, the Army  Psychiatrist  who

conducted  the study. These could have proven helpful  in  under­

standing insurgency in general, and, also, the conflict in  Kash­

mir, and are, on account of this, of interest to the professional

readership  of this journal. However, their efforts, namely,  the

chapter  'Portrait of a Kashmiri Militant' in Maj Gen Ray's  book

'Kashmir  Diary', and Col Saldanha's article 'Profile of a  Kash­

miri Militant' in the Military Intelligence Journal 1996-97, when

read in tandem, serve to confuse rather than enlighten. 
 

 

This  article  is prompted by the discrepancies  in  the  figures

advanced  and conclusions drawn by the two authors, both of  whom

mutually acknowledge the contribution of the other in the  study.

Owing  to difference in images of the militant presented  by  the

two  authors, their intent to enlighten fellow  professionals  is

negated.
 

 

 

Discrepencies
 

 

Col  Saldanha  records  that 67% of the  captured  militants  who

participated  in the study were 'hard core', described as  having

an  'impaired perception of the ego or reality. Believes that  he

is fighting for a cause. Power hungry, beyond rehabilitation' (p.

25).  The 22% Moderates are analysed as having a 'weak  ego'.  As

against  this consider what the  General informs us- '10% of  the

militants fall into the category of zealots...30% militants  fall

into the lumpen category' (p. 40-41). The rest 60% are,  presuma­

bly,  the  'average militant' with a 'weak ego'  whose  'fighting

qualities are suspect'.
 

Whereas the Colonel characterises 67% as hard core, the General's

figure is at best 40%. The latter figure is obtained from  infer­

ring  that the zealots are hard core, and conceding that the  30%

'criminalised'are so too, though not without reservations  since,

they  using  the 'name of jehad and behind the  well  camouflaged

screen  of militancy', are in it for 'Power and Money'  (p.  41).

However, in deference to the Colonel who says that some (an inde­

terminate percentage) have been 'hardened by violence and  crimi­

nal  activity... and made of militancy a profession  they  pursue

with  zeal' (p. 26), these could be counted among the hard  core.

The  difference between the two figures (67% and 40%) is  obvious

nevertheless.
 

It could be that the Colonel's definition is from the psychologi­

cal point of view in that they are 'beyond rehabilitation',  and,

that  of the General from the military perspective as measure  of

fighting  qualities.  The disparity is also explicable  if  their

observations  had  been based on two separate  studies.  However,

terminological  confusion  and the disparity in  figures  detract

from the credibility of the study/studies.

Lastly,  for  the  Colonel, 67% of the  militants  had  'impaired

perception  of the ego', 22% a 'weak ego', and 9% were  'inanima­

tive,  suggestible'.  To a layman it would appear that  none  was

quite  'normal'. However, to General Ray 'their mental  chemistry

and  neuro-dynamics are no different from the common man  on  the

street',  'they are normal people, but with a  different  psycho-

logic  of their own'. Clearly, in the absense of a definition  of

whats 'normal' by either of them, there is a self-evident contra­

diction here.
 

 

Conclusion

 

It  must be highlighted that 'the protrait of the Kashmiri  mili­

tant is not very clear (Ray, p. 41), and that their work 'is only

a begining' (Saldanha, p. 28)- this despite seven years into  the

militancy in J&K. Given that the army has had considerable  expe­

rience in J&K, there is both a personal and professional interest

in the findings of such studies. However the offerings by the two

protagonists of the study serve only to whet the appetite,  which

is in itself their major contribution. Yet, should conclusions be

based on and lessons drawn from their observations, in isolation,

it  could prove counter-productive. Afterall, was not  a  kingdom

lost for the want of a nail!
 

 

 

Bibliography

 

1. Maj Gen Arjun Ray, Kashmir Diary: The Psychology of Militancy;

New Delhi, Manas Publications, 1997.
 

2. Col Saldanha, 'Profile of the Kashmiri Militant', Military

Intelligence Journal, MITSD, 1996-97.