Thursday, 7 January 2021

 https://thekashmirwalla.com/2021/01/in-kashmir-centre-could-pay-a-heavy-price-for-going-the-gd-bakshi-way/

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In Kashmir, the GD Bakshi way

Maj Gen GD Bakshi has been a very visible face on the idiot box over the past decade. While in military service he was perhaps one of the most prolific of writers of his generation. Though his writings dot the gamut of military publications over the years, one piece that did not see light of day back then has recently surfaced.

In a close look at the defence staff college in Wellington, an American author, David O. Smith, made a reference to this unpublished article by GD Bakshi. Interestingly, Smith first came across the article, ‘Low Intensity Conflict Operations: The Indian Doctrinal Approach’, while undertaking his earlier study of the Pakistani joint command and staff college at Quetta.

Apparently, there it was among the readings for students, quite like in India. It is likely that American attendees at Wellington receiving the article in their pre-course material package, shared it with fellow American military officers attending the staff course at Quetta, which is how it trickled into the recommended reading there.

I came across the article in the readings package while attending the staff course some twenty years back. Efforts since to trace the article in service journals did not bear fruit, indicating that editors possibly balked at publishing it for some reason. That it found its way into the staff course reading material perhaps owes to GD Bakshi, who taught at the college as a colonel causing its insertion into the bumpf.

That it was not carried in service journals (to my knowledge after years of trying to track it down) tells a story. The article then amounted to a counter narrative. While the narrative up-front had it that counter insurgency operations centered on ‘winning hearts and minds’ (WHAM), the counter narrative was that these were part of low intensity conflict (LIC), as GD Bakshi puts in it in the title.

While LIC draws on a kinetic approach associated with Americans, counter insurgency tilts towards the British way of countering insurgency, encapsulated by the Templar-Kitson model, the former, Gerald Templar who as governor in Malaya applied its tenets while Frank Kitson subsequently articulated these in his writings. In the late nineties, there was considerable doctrinal ferment in the Indian military over the two terms – LIC operations and counter insurgency - beset as it had for over a decade in subconventional operations in Punjab, Sri Lanka, Assam and, significantly by then, in Kashmir.

The official narrative was in favour of WHAM, but the ground reality was split between the kinetic approach and a nuanced one. It is best reflected in GD Bakshi’s paper. To him, his articulation of the hardline constituted India’s LIC doctrine. An easy to spot difference between the official narrative on counter insurgency and the GD Bakshi version is on the place of the tactics, cordon and search operations. For Bakshi these were to exhaust the populace in its support for the insurgents. Repeated, extensive and continuing sweeps were to serve as a punitive measure against people, the proverbial ‘sea’, for their support to militant ‘fish’. The Bakshi paper goes on to talk of employment of proxy groups, such as the Ikhwan, the Salwa Judum and the surrendered Assamese fighters. Tellingly in the course material at the defence staff college this page is blanked out, presumably for being rather radical even by the standards of Bakshi’s own paper.

For adjudication, there was a older edition of the counter insurgency pamphlet that relied heavily on the British model and informed by the army’s conduct in the north east. It was only sometime in the nineties, a fresh edition of the counter insurgency pamphlet was put out bearing the imprint of the army’s subsequent experience, particularly in Sri Lanka of the simultaneously hapless and innovative Indian Peace Keeping Force. The pamphlet was less elegant since it was more fleshed out and with tactical operations in greater detail. The newer version too was fairly WHAM friendly. 

It was only in the mid 2000s, that the army came up with a self-regarding doctrinal product on counter insurgency, ‘The Doctrine for Subconventional Operations (DSCO)’. The early 2000s saw the army writing up its doctrines at long last, with the doctrine on conventional operations of 2004 superseding its first edition of 1998 without so much genuflecting to the predecessor doctrine product.

The new subconventional doctrine was also in favour of a people friendly approach, perhaps under influence of the then army chief, JJ Singh, who had once famously teared up on national television. It was also released in a race with the Americans, then writing up their doctrine under tutelage of David Patraeus, and therefore presumably needed to emphasise its distinction from the American approach, then sliding into discredit in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Even so, the dissonance on ground was reflected in doctrine. The DSCO ruled in favour of kinetic operations initially to gain ascendancy over militants and, with stability restored, shifting to population sensitive intelligence-led operations. While it echoed the Supreme Court on ‘minimal’ use of force, the joint doctrine – hierarchically a higher one – called for ‘optimal’ use of force, seemingly a larger latitude to use of force.

Whereas earlier there was dissonance within the service between the official narrative and the counter narrative, today the very name ‘Operation All Out’ and the manner of its conduct over the past five years suggests that what was once the counter narrative is now the officially sanctioned one. National Security Adviser Doval’s protégé, General Bipin Rawat, early in his tenure signified the shift unapologetically in his wanton defence of Major Leetul Gogoi’s infamous use of a human shield.

Today the trend is starkly manifest. The police figures for militants killed in Kashmir last year is 225. Only late in the year at long last, they let on surrenders were being accepted, with some nine militants surrendering. This level of kinetic operations must be seen in light of a mere 200 militants operating across Kashmir and reportedly under considerable material shortfalls.

Clearly, the earlier self-effacing counter narrative that was in any case alive and kicking even when people were reputedly at the heart of India’s counter insurgency effort, has been ascendant in the Modi era. That it is blatantly so is evident from the Shupian encounter late last year in which three innocents were killed and guns planted on them. Since the crime was called out then, resulting in military justice consequence for the perpetrators, there is yet another in-your-face crime, this time the killing of three at Lawaypora is sought to be justified by the police alluding to the victims being ‘associates’ of militants.

Whereas the official doctrine called for neutralization of over-ground workers (OGW), it appears that now such action includes elimination of OGW. The timing of the latest crime, coinciding as it does with the legal developments in the Shupian case, specifically filing of a charge sheet filed in the court of chief judicial magistrate Shopian, indicate brazenness, reminding the target population, long beset Kashmiris, that they continue in the corner, lest emboldened by small victories as in exposing the uniformed killers of Shupian, they attempt a break out.

The dissonance within the military as to how to view counter insurgency persists. The counter narrative on taking over the intellectual high ground characterizes insurgency as hybrid war. Hybrid war is now the catch-all, a proxy war waged in the ‘gray zone’ with information war as its motif for relatively stable times. Information war includes propaganda by deed, to borrow a phrase from the terror lexicon, which in this case includes deliberate human rights infringements, with impunity broadcast, to show a populace its place as subjects.  

Observers such as David Davidas in his book, Rage, have showed up the strategic price the country has paid. The case he makes is that the violence the departure from official doctrine wrought in Kashmir in the nineties has given rise to the generation of rage today. Under a right wing government’s will to power under what Yashwant Sinha called the ‘doctrine of state’, the counter narrative has won out. The price shall be into this decade, when GD Bakshi is well into his dotage.

 





Tuesday, 5 January 2021

 http://epaper.kashmirtimes.in/index.aspx?page=4

http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=107042

A fake encounter, yet again?

Police has promised investigation into the Lawaypora encounter in which the army killed three allegedly innocent youth. The police for its part let on that two of the three were reportedly ‘hardcore associates of terrorists’ or over ground workers (OGW). In none of the army’s doctrinal products on counter insurgency, low intensity conflict and hybrid war, as the nature of the conflict in Kashmir has been variously characterised, is there any mention of elimination of OGW. The term used is ‘neutralize’, which by no means implies killing them off.

However, it has long been suspected that in many instances not only in Kashmir but in the north east OGWs have been eliminated rather brought in to face the law. Perhaps most of the 1500 or so allegedly fake encounters referenced in the Supreme Court case in Manipur involve the discreet elimination of OGWs, an Indian equivalent of Dirty War, the killings by the Argentinian junta. Often proxies have been used for such dirty work, such as the Ikhwan in Kashmir and surrendered Assamese militants.

As a line of action in an insurgency there may be a power-oriented logic. To deprive the militant of oxygen, the supporting infrastructure needs dismantling. This is comprised by OGW, who provision necessities, information, surveillance, finances and recruiting support. Where the intensity of insurgency is high, the state lacks capacity to interdict the OGW base through legal means, leading to the legal shortcuts that extrajudicial killings necessarily imply. It was argued by no less than KPS Gill that such was the case in Punjab.

By no means can this argument apply in Kashmir today. The police informs that in 103 encounters last year, 225 militants have been eliminated. A mere 300 or so militants are reportedly poised across the Line of Control to take up their place. For control of the situation resulting from ending of the status of the state under Article 370, the state had pumped in additional troops, most of whom continue in place. Besides, the police itself has, using modern means as matching telephone records, vouched for the OGW status of two of those killed in the encounter in question, suggesting that they have the capacities to take down OGWs by alternative means. Lately, the improved security situation has enabled the security apparatus to neutralize the support base by other means such as tracing hawala transactions, a method tom-tommed by security analysts.  

Therefore, their being killed instead calls for an explanation.

In Kashmir, the killings of OGW have intermittently been part of strategy. Early in the militancy, a perhaps apocryphal story has it that a divisional commander, though with a tenure in the counter insurgency school under his belt, began his daily chore by rhetorically asking those assembled in his operations room, ‘Aaj kitne titar-bater mare? (How many patridges have been eliminated today?)’ Then, some 200 Jamatis – supposedly the support base for the pro-Pakistan Hizbul Mujahedeen that was then displacing the pro-freedom Liberation Front militants - were eliminated. By mid-decade, the Ikhwan was used to good effect towards the same end. Even human rights workers were not spared; Jalil Andrabi being a case to point.

Consequently, a lazy explanation could be that inertia leads to recurrence. Generals in command today were young officers through the nineties, many going on to serve multiple tenures. Some prefer command in areas of their familiarity, in this case, Kashmir. Thus, adapting to the changed circumstance, even if warranted, may not readily beat the ease of path dependence. 

A more sophisticated explanation is that there have always been two contrasting doctrinal strands within the military. There is the Winning Hearts and Mind (WHAM) school, which official doctrine endorses, and there is the counter narrative, the ‘get them by the ____, and the hearts will follow’ school. It would be fair to say that most of those who served command assignments in Kashmir subscribed to the official school. Sadly, this has never always been the case. The counter narrative has won out repeatedly and sometimes handsomely. Thus, counter insurgency ‘experts’ are now a dime a dozen in the military, and once their sell-by date in service is over, populate television studios.

If this were not the case, the Shupian (Amshipora) fake encounter would not have happened. The army has it that in this case, “powers vested under the AFSPA 1990 were exceeded,” and, “dos and don’ts of the Chief of the Army Staff as approved by the Supreme Court have been contravened.” Thirty years into the troubles, it can be expected that the army has the standard operations procedures in place to oversee operations, especially in an environment when these are few and far between. It beggars the mind that a captain, Captain Bhoopendra Singh, can organize such killings using his troops and the hierarchy does not get a wind of it for three weeks. That the army took three weeks to wrestle down the counter narrative within it indicates the levels of its salience.

Strategic logic, which an army can reasonably be expected to sign up to, would have it that costs must be factored-in in choosing between strategic options. The costs of success of the counter narrative are easy to see. A Kashmir observer David Davidas in his book, Rage, makes the that the violence the departure from official doctrine wrought in Kashmir in the nineties has given rise to the generation of ‘rage’ today. Under a right-wing government’s will-to-power, referred to by the Concerned Citizen’s Group leader, Yashwant Sinha, as ‘doctrine of state’, the counter narrative appears to have won out. Else, how can a yet another possibly fake encounter - Lawaypora – follow brazenly on the heels of filing of the charge sheet by the police in the Amshipora fake encounter in a court in Shupian? That another inter-generational passing of the insurgency baton is potentially in the offing should lend pause to the army from proceeding down such a track.  

The army would do well to take its own doctrinal products seriously. These are not meant as information war products. They confer adequate latitude on commanders at the frontline to use force tempered with judgment. That such judgment can be clouded by the counter narrative is a potent threat the army needs cautioning against.

Doctrine should be internalized in schools of instruction and the command climate in theatres of counter insurgency operations must provide for a ‘no-ifs-and-buts’ implementation. It should not be that the recent appointment of the first major general to head its human rights cell, Major General Gautam Chauhan, views his mandate as a white-wash of the army’s record rather than ensuring military wide dissemination and implementation of policy.





Monday, 4 January 2021

 https://www.epw.in/engage/article/2020-year-research

3.4 to 4.4 min mark

Saturday, 5 December 2020

 https://www.epw.in/author/ali-ahmed

Articles by Ali AhmedSubscribe to Ali Ahmed

Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating Escalation

India’s unwillingness to tactically manipulate escalation makes its responses predictable and has led to strategic inertia most evident in the handling of the situation at the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. The responsibility for this inertia primarily lies with the political leadership, but the...

Why India Did Not Go to War with China

India had the military ability to evict the intrusions in Ladakh or carry out a quick grab action of its own in the early stages of the crisis. Yet, it did not exercise the offensive military options. The explanation for such strategic reticence lies at the political level.

The Portentous India–Pakistan Escalation Dynamic

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Approaching Kashmir through Theoretical Lenses

The National Democratic Alliance government’s Kashmir policy can be analysed through the lenses of security studies and peace studies. Insights from these disciplinary fields could help gauge the implications of recent actions and suggest a possible different course.

Military Professionalism and Effectiveness

The military’s input to national security may be swayed by ideological winds if it loses its apolitical grounding. The government and military must thus maintain the status quo on civil–military relations.

The Modi Era

The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But, a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability.

Putting India’s Land Warfare Doctrine in the Dock

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Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority

When the army is called in aid of civil authority, robust action taken by the army in a timely manner can prevent civil disturbance from exacting a strategic cost. The recent revelations on army inaction in the critical first 24 hours during the Gujarat carnage in 2002 are examined.

Modi at the Helm

Nuclear decision-making, when examined at the institutional and individual levels, suggests that India’s case is fraught with shortcomings. This adds to the complications for regional security, already present on account of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making being military dominated. The aggravated institutional infirmities of India’s nuclear decision-making structures and the authoritarian tendencies in India’s primary nuclear decision-maker, the Prime Minister, heighten nuclear dangers in future crises and conflicts.

The Doval Scorecard

As the ruling party at the centre, the Bharatiya Janata Party, contemplates the forthcoming national elections, its record on national security warrants a review. The key player in crafting and implementing its national security strategy has been National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. An examination of Doval’s record over the past four years reveals that his principal contribution has been in facilitating national security interests to be held hostage to the electoral calculus of the Narendra Modi–Amit Shah combine.

The Missing Muslim Army Officers

The representation of Muslims in the army officer corps, at around 2%, is abysmal in contrast to their percentage in the population of India. Diversity is also compromised in the army, with over half of army officers hailing from a handful of north Indian states. This deficit of diversity along social and geographical lines has negative implications for the army’s apolitical and secular credentials.

The Kashmir Charade This Winter

The ill-planned and hurried appointment of an interlocutor for Kashmir by the government, supposedly for a sustained dialogue, does not suggest that the government is serious about resolving the Kashmir conflict. The initiative, however, appears to want to hold the United States at bay, which needs India and Pakistan talking to safeguard its Afghan engagement. The interlocutor’s mission will likely turn out to be yet another wasted opportunity in Kashmir

 

Articles by Ali AhmedSubscribe to Ali Ahmed

Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’

The reference to a “two and a half front war” by Army Chief General Bipin Rawat is critically dissected. The “half front” apparently covers large tracts of India and a significant number of its marginalised people. The thought of a war on the half front, as conjured by this term, needs to be controverted outright. The army’s imagining of such a war and preparation for it is questioned.

A Disjointed Doctrine

The recently released joint doctrine of the armed forces outlines the manner in which they expect to fight the next war. Though the doctrine suggests “decisive victory” is possible, it bears reminding that the closer they get to this the closer would be the nuclear threshold. Since the doctrine does not dwell on the nuclear level, it cannot be said that the doctrine makes India any safer. However, the doctrine’s take on civil–military relations is far more interesting.

Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir

The army has had an extended deployment in Kashmir. While it has enabled operational experience for its members, there is a danger that the advantages of this can make the army acquire a stake in the disturbed conditions. This makes the army part of the problem in Kashmir. Its deployment is not without a price in regard to the internal good health of the army.

India's Strategic Shift

In abandoning strategic restraint in favour of strategic proactivism, India is transiting from a strategic doctrine of offensive deterrence to compellence. This is not without its dangers since the military doctrines of India and Pakistan are presently coupled in a volatile way. Moving towards proactivism makes them altogether combustible. This makes the strategic logic of the shift suspect, prompting speculations as to its inspiration.

War and What To Do About It

A case for the peace lobby to continue its engagement with anti-war issues, even in times of relative peace. The military doctrines are geared for a quick war, resulting in shorter crisis windows. Therefore, keeping the public informed and capitalising on such preparations for ensuring moderation in strategic decisions in crises and war can prove useful when push comes to shove. This would be an uphill task, but inescapable for war avoidance and limitation.

Nuclear Retaliation Options

The debate on nuclear retaliation options has been hijacked by realists, with even the liberal security perspective marginalised. Engagement with the issue by nuclear abolitionists is called for, lest the impression of a consensus develops around the realist offering of "unacceptable damage" that promises nothing but genocide, a global environmental disaster and national suicide in its wake.

Yoga as a Prelude to Politicisation of the Military

Drawing on the news reporting of the army's association with Ramdev's organisation for yoga training, a discussion on the potential and possibility of politicisation of the military with Hindutva philosophy.

No First Use Nuclear Policy

That India's No First Use policy is under threat of the axe in any future review of the nuclear doctrine is apparent from the election time controversy over the mention of a nuclear doctrinal review in the manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The reference - subsequently toned down - was possibly an attempt by the conservative party to live up to its image as a strategically assertive replacement of the Congress Party.

 


 

https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/48/strategic-affairs/eschewing-and-not-manipulating-escalation.html

Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating Escalation

India’s unwillingness to tactically manipulate escalation makes its responses predictable 

and has led to strategic inertia most evident in the handling of the situation at the Line of 

Actual Control in Ladakh. The responsibility for this inertia primarily lies with the political

leadership, but the military top brass also shares this responsibility.

 

On 7 November, at the 60th anniversary observance webinar of the National Defence 

College (NDC), New Delhi, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat expressed worries 

on the possibilities of escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), saying, “border 

confrontations, transgressions and unprovoked tactical military actions spiraling into a larger 

conflict cannot be ruled out” (Pandit 2020). He had averred to similar dangers a year ago 

but in relation to the Line of Control (LoC), when he said, “The situation along the LoC can 

escalate any time. We have to be prepared for the spiraling of the escalatory matrix” 

(Times of India 2019). Rawat’s fears were expressed in the context of Pakistani border 

action teams actively supporting last-minute infiltration attempts prior to the usual winter 

respite in Kashmir. A year on, the LoC witnessed a significant spike in firing over the Diwali 

period this year.

 

Escalation dangers can be seen in Pakistan’s strike back after the Indian surgical strike 

at Balakot, launched in response to the Pulwama terror attack in February 2019. Apparently, 

Pakistan’s aerial counter was so provocative that India had prepared to retaliate. Recent 

internal political salvos between the government and opposition in Pakistan reveal that the 

Indian preparations caused the Pakistani army chief and its foreign minister considerable 

apprehension (Economic Times 2020). In the event, Pakistan pre-empted the missile strike by returning the Indian fighter pilot downed in the aerial dogfight over the LoC, short circuiting what Prime Minister Narendra Modi later colourfully depicted as could well have been a qatl ki raat (night of killing) from missile strikes (Asian Age 2019). That it would not have been a one-sided qatl (killing) is evident from Pakistan reportedly readying three times the number of missiles in a counterstrike (Miglani and Jorgic 2019).

 

As for China, its Ladakh intrusions suggest that it has a measure of India’s sensitivity to escalation. Its incremental intrusions began with cutting off Indian patrolling in Depsang sector in April, before intruding along the northern bank of the Pangong Tso in May. India, fearing escalation if it took the more robust action of either evicting the Chinese or taking equivalent territory in real time elsewhere, settled for mirror deployment, leading by the onset of winter to some 30,000 troops being deployed in Ladakh. Its occupation of Kailash range, south of Pangong Tso in end August, though depicted as a vigorous response, was limited to securing unoccupied heights on its own side of the LAC. The much-touted tactical action, which is certainly a remarkable martial feat, was at an operational cost. India lost both an opportunity and an avenue of approach to offset Chinese intrusions elsewhere.

 

Unwilling to Escalate

 

Escalation thus appears to loom large in India’s thinking, resulting in both adversaries taking advantage of India’s sensitivity. Pakistan, a relatively weaker opponent, has exploited Indian escalatory concern by restricting India’s options to lower-order, sub-conventional-level surgical strikes. At this level, there is a degree of equivalence where it seeks to give as good as it receives. Up the proverbial escalation matrix, it has matched the Indian doctrinal movement. Even as India firmed up its Cold Start doctrine of swift, conventional punishment for terror incidents, Pakistan has adopted a new doctrine, namely “new concept of war fighting.” For good measure, it brought to the fore the nuclear card in its operationalisation of full spectrum deterrence, with the tactical nuclear weapons at the vanguard and keeping a step ahead of India in nuclear warhead numbers.

 

China, for its part, has thrown the onus of escalation on to India. In its turn, India, convincing itself that the escalation advantage was with China, owing to its comprehensive national power, allowed China to get away with territorial gains. When challenged by the intrusions, India instead settled in favour of prudence over risk-taking. Even while experts argued that it is not the cumulative power that matters as much as the power that can be brought to bear at the point of contact at the end of a long line of communication in Ladakh (Menon 2020), India took the counsel of its fears and decided on talks as the route for an expansive, if unrealistic, aim of a return to status quo ante. The rounds of talks—that at last count included eight at military level, three at the level of the diplomats in the working group, three ministerial level talks, including a telephonic conversation between the two special representatives—have neither brought down troops to more hospitable altitude levels nor lessened their numbers in Ladakh.

 

Escalation concerns dominate Indian considerations on the use of force. Its military power is hobbled by self-deterrence brought on by an interpretation of escalation as inevitable and uncontrollable. Contrast this to the Pakistani and Chinese approach to escalation concerns. Pakistan has deliberately exploited the possibility of escalation. Not only did the landward surgical strikes not prevent the major terror incident at Pulwama, but the aerial surgical strikes, already debilitated by their inability to hit the target, resulted in a setback to India in the dogfight they provoked. An outcome has been Pakistani psychological ascendance, which the subsequent information war has not quite obscured.

 

Against China, over the years, India settled rather tamely in the initial stages itself, for deterrence by denial, where deterrence by punishment might have been warranted. India’s doctrinal shift in the decade prior was from deterrence by denial to deterrence by punishment with precisely such intrusion scenarios impelling the shift. The mountain strike corps was to be the vehicle. Since the financing of the strike corps progressively stalled, the army shifted last year to innovating, with integrated battle groups for a reconfigured, if truncated, corps. It innovatively flexed its muscles in Exercise Him Vijay, held in Arunachal Pradesh, even as Chinese premier Xi Jinping landed for the Chennai Connect dialogue at Mamallapuram (Peri 2019). Even so, when push came to shove in Ladakh, India was either unprepared or unwilling to shift to its newly minted and practised doctrine. This is reminiscent of India’s Cold Start doctrine lacking teeth in the wake of the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack.

 

Prime Minister Modi, in his Diwali address to troops at Longewala, explaining India’s strategic reticence, had this to say: “Today the strategy of India is clear. Today’s India believes in the policy of understanding and making others understand. But if attempts are made to test us, the reply they receive is intense” (Free Press Journal 2020). While it is true that India has been “tested” by both adversaries, it is difficult to see from recent strategic developments that India’s reply has been “intense” against either of them. India’s unwillingness to chance or inability to manipulate the escalatory threat led it to rely excessively on dialogue as substitute, even where force is manifestly warranted as and when territorial integrity is at stake.

 

Self-deterrence

 

Escalation is intrinsic to the use of force, prompted not only by the usual play of chance and the fog of war, called inadvertent escalation. This impelled the Clausewitzian concept of Absolute War or war’s tendency to spiral (Walzer 1977: 23–24), if untrammelled by political control and the constraint of friction. Consequently, it is reasonable to be wary of escalation and especially so in a nuclear dyad such as India respectively finds itself in with its two adversaries. The very first dictum put out early in the nuclear age by Bernard Brodie (1946: 76) remains applicable: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.” However, the danger is in over-learning, for it opens up a state to the fear of escalation, eroding its will to use force. Thomas Schelling (1967: 142–43) conceptualised the manipulation of the dangers as follows:

It is in wars that we have come to call “limited wars” that the bargaining appears most vividly and is conducted most consciously. The critical targets in such a war are the mind of the enemy … the threat of violence in reserve is more important than the commitment of force in the field.

 

Escalation is thus Janus-faced, a threat that also provides a strategic opportunity. India’s strategic problem therefore is not to allow self-deterrence to a degree that the use of force where warranted is negated substantially. Further, the collusive “two-front” threat, while in the realm of possibility, is not in that of probability. Nevertheless, it has been repeated so often that India has begun to believe it, further constraining willingness to resort to force.

 

The reticence to use force stemming from self-deterrence requires explaining, particularly for a government that projects a muscular strategic approach. A case for ‘‘strategic patience’’ is currently being argued. Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar (2020), in his new book, lays out the narrative thus

We need to cultivate the strategic patience … Use of force must always be the considered option, never the first one …. Major nations have multiple weapons in their armoury and blunt instruments are usually the least productive. But efficacy aside, the imagery is no less significant. Those who casually advocate application of force abroad do damage. Such actions, as the instructive epic (Mahabharat) tells us, are an option reserved for imminent danger or serial offenders.

 

While this is explicable for the ‘‘application of force abroad,” its utility is somewhat diminished when a state faces loss of territory, a core characteristic, that elevate such threats to constituting an “imminent danger.” China’s record of salami-slicing over the past decade makes it count amongst ‘‘serial offenders.” Also, as the ‘‘imagery is no less significant,” Indian reluctance to use force nevertheless is at a reputational cost. To overplay its securing of the Kailash range to compensate may have had internal political utility, such as in the fig leaf it afforded the government from questioning by the opposition in the recent Bihar election campaign, but the limited significance of the operational level manoeuvre just ahead of the defence and foreign minister level talks is evident from its inability to compel China to blink.

 

The narrative that India stared down China by preventing it from chewing off more than what it already has is being played up. This year’s Vijayadashami address by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS) supremo, Mohan Bhagwat, said that, “Bharatiya defence forces, government and the people remained unfazed and responded sharply to this attack. This example of a strong resolution, exercising self-respect and bravery has stunned China” (Bhagwat 2020). Such self-congratulations undergrid his Jaishankar-reminiscent prescription: “Rising above China economically, strategically, in securing cooperative ties with our neighbours and at international relations” as “the only way to neutralise those demonic aspirations” (emphasis added; Bhagwat 2020).

 

Strategic Inertia

 

At the political level, the policy of dialogue has been exposed at its critical test against China. Not only was the “Wuhan spirit” vacuous, but the talks have been infructuous. The strategy of patience—to hold one’s horses till comparative comprehensive national power enables an Indian military response—ends up but as an alibi for doing nothing. The intensity of the information war that sees India manufacturing favourable military history is testimony to the fact that it knows it has something to hide.

 

Since the political level supersedes the strategic, a top-down cadence is visible in Bipin Rawat’s usual media interventions. His hyping up of escalation possibilities, including a collusive two-front threat, seemingly allow India to weigh in on the side of pragmatism and prudence. In the midst of an economic downturn and a pandemic, it would not be sensible to be off to war reflexively. But then, it is ostrich-like to determinedly avoid a war when warranted, especially since models of war are available that eschew escalation, even while manipulating it.

 

Rawat, familiar with the spectrum of war, knows that war is not necessarily Total War, else the Limited War concept would not obtain in strategic theory. Clausewitz (2008: 7) wrote that,

War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to over throw the enemy … or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations.

 

In a nuclear dyad, only the latter, limited form of war, is possible. Indian military thinking has an exaggerated impression on the inevitability of the latter turning into the former, apparently bought into by the political level.

 

The past year revealed that either the Indian military lacks expertise in the art of strategy in terms of manipulating escalation to one’s advantage or it did not press the political level enough to allow it to prove its credentials. If in the case of the latter it was denied the opportunity, there has been no resignation from its upper ranks to prove that it pressed fulsomely to exercise its professional expertise in the national interest. Consequently, the onus for strategic inertia in Ladakh does not rest at the political level alone, but also with the brass in its compromising on its advisory and representational role.

 

References

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