https://www.epw.in/author/ali-ahmed
Articles
by Ali Ahmed
Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating Escalation
India’s unwillingness to tactically manipulate escalation makes
its responses predictable and has led to strategic inertia most evident in the
handling of the situation at the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. The
responsibility for this inertia primarily lies with the political leadership,
but the...
Why India Did Not Go to War with China
India had the military ability to evict the intrusions in Ladakh
or carry out a quick grab action of its own in the early stages of the crisis.
Yet, it did not exercise the offensive military options. The explanation for
such strategic reticence lies at the political level.
The Portentous India–Pakistan Escalation Dynamic
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Approaching Kashmir through Theoretical Lenses
The National Democratic Alliance government’s Kashmir policy can
be analysed through the lenses of security studies and peace studies. Insights
from these disciplinary fields could help gauge the implications of recent
actions and suggest a possible different course.
Military Professionalism and Effectiveness
The military’s input to national security may be swayed by
ideological winds if it loses its apolitical grounding. The government and
military must thus maintain the status quo on civil–military relations.
The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s
strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic
culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s
organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But,
a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of
Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability.
Putting India’s Land Warfare Doctrine in the Dock
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Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority
When the army is called in aid of civil authority, robust action
taken by the army in a timely manner can prevent civil disturbance from
exacting a strategic cost. The recent revelations on army inaction in the
critical first 24 hours during the Gujarat carnage in 2002 are examined.
Nuclear decision-making, when examined at the institutional and
individual levels, suggests that India’s case is fraught with shortcomings.
This adds to the complications for regional security, already present on
account of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making being military dominated. The
aggravated institutional infirmities of India’s nuclear decision-making
structures and the authoritarian tendencies in India’s primary nuclear
decision-maker, the Prime Minister, heighten nuclear dangers in future crises and
conflicts.
As the ruling party at the centre, the Bharatiya Janata Party,
contemplates the forthcoming national elections, its record on national
security warrants a review. The key player in crafting and implementing its
national security strategy has been National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. An
examination of Doval’s record over the past four years reveals that his
principal contribution has been in facilitating national security interests to
be held hostage to the electoral calculus of the Narendra Modi–Amit Shah
combine.
The Missing Muslim Army Officers
The representation of Muslims in the army officer corps, at
around 2%, is abysmal in contrast to their percentage in the population of
India. Diversity is also compromised in the army, with over half of army officers
hailing from a handful of north Indian states. This deficit of diversity along
social and geographical lines has negative implications for the army’s
apolitical and secular credentials.
The Kashmir Charade This Winter
The ill-planned and hurried appointment of an interlocutor for
Kashmir by the government, supposedly for a sustained dialogue, does not
suggest that the government is serious about resolving the Kashmir conflict.
The initiative, however, appears to want to hold the United States at bay,
which needs India and Pakistan talking to safeguard its Afghan engagement. The
interlocutor’s mission will likely turn out to be yet another wasted
opportunity in Kashmir
Articles
by Ali Ahmed
Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’
The reference to a “two and a half front war” by Army Chief
General Bipin Rawat is critically dissected. The “half front” apparently covers
large tracts of India and a significant number of its marginalised people. The
thought of a war on the half front, as conjured by this term, needs to be
controverted outright. The army’s imagining of such a war and preparation for it
is questioned.
The recently released joint doctrine of the armed forces
outlines the manner in which they expect to fight the next war. Though the
doctrine suggests “decisive victory” is possible, it bears reminding that the
closer they get to this the closer would be the nuclear threshold. Since the
doctrine does not dwell on the nuclear level, it cannot be said that the
doctrine makes India any safer. However, the doctrine’s take on civil–military
relations is far more interesting.
Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir
The army has had an extended deployment in Kashmir. While it has
enabled operational experience for its members, there is a danger that the
advantages of this can make the army acquire a stake in the disturbed
conditions. This makes the army part of the problem in Kashmir. Its deployment
is not without a price in regard to the internal good health of the army.
In abandoning strategic restraint in favour of strategic
proactivism, India is transiting from a strategic doctrine of offensive
deterrence to compellence. This is not without its dangers since the military
doctrines of India and Pakistan are presently coupled in a volatile way. Moving
towards proactivism makes them altogether combustible. This makes the strategic
logic of the shift suspect, prompting speculations as to its inspiration.
A case for the peace lobby to continue its engagement with
anti-war issues, even in times of relative peace. The military doctrines are
geared for a quick war, resulting in shorter crisis windows. Therefore, keeping
the public informed and capitalising on such preparations for ensuring
moderation in strategic decisions in crises and war can prove useful when push
comes to shove. This would be an uphill task, but inescapable for war avoidance
and limitation.
The debate on nuclear retaliation options has been hijacked by
realists, with even the liberal security perspective marginalised. Engagement
with the issue by nuclear abolitionists is called for, lest the impression of a
consensus develops around the realist offering of "unacceptable
damage" that promises nothing but genocide, a global environmental
disaster and national suicide in its wake.
Yoga as a Prelude to Politicisation of the Military
Drawing on the news reporting of the army's association with
Ramdev's organisation for yoga training, a discussion on the potential and
possibility of politicisation of the military with Hindutva philosophy.
That India's No First Use policy is under threat of the axe in
any future review of the nuclear doctrine is apparent from the election time
controversy over the mention of a nuclear doctrinal review in the manifesto of
the Bharatiya Janata Party. The reference - subsequently toned down - was
possibly an attempt by the conservative party to live up to its image as a
strategically assertive replacement of the Congress Party.
