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A fake encounter, yet again?

Police has promised investigation into the Lawaypora encounter in which the army killed three allegedly innocent youth. The police for its part let on that two of the three were reportedly ‘hardcore associates of terrorists’ or over ground workers (OGW). In none of the army’s doctrinal products on counter insurgency, low intensity conflict and hybrid war, as the nature of the conflict in Kashmir has been variously characterised, is there any mention of elimination of OGW. The term used is ‘neutralize’, which by no means implies killing them off.

However, it has long been suspected that in many instances not only in Kashmir but in the north east OGWs have been eliminated rather brought in to face the law. Perhaps most of the 1500 or so allegedly fake encounters referenced in the Supreme Court case in Manipur involve the discreet elimination of OGWs, an Indian equivalent of Dirty War, the killings by the Argentinian junta. Often proxies have been used for such dirty work, such as the Ikhwan in Kashmir and surrendered Assamese militants.

As a line of action in an insurgency there may be a power-oriented logic. To deprive the militant of oxygen, the supporting infrastructure needs dismantling. This is comprised by OGW, who provision necessities, information, surveillance, finances and recruiting support. Where the intensity of insurgency is high, the state lacks capacity to interdict the OGW base through legal means, leading to the legal shortcuts that extrajudicial killings necessarily imply. It was argued by no less than KPS Gill that such was the case in Punjab.

By no means can this argument apply in Kashmir today. The police informs that in 103 encounters last year, 225 militants have been eliminated. A mere 300 or so militants are reportedly poised across the Line of Control to take up their place. For control of the situation resulting from ending of the status of the state under Article 370, the state had pumped in additional troops, most of whom continue in place. Besides, the police itself has, using modern means as matching telephone records, vouched for the OGW status of two of those killed in the encounter in question, suggesting that they have the capacities to take down OGWs by alternative means. Lately, the improved security situation has enabled the security apparatus to neutralize the support base by other means such as tracing hawala transactions, a method tom-tommed by security analysts.  

Therefore, their being killed instead calls for an explanation.

In Kashmir, the killings of OGW have intermittently been part of strategy. Early in the militancy, a perhaps apocryphal story has it that a divisional commander, though with a tenure in the counter insurgency school under his belt, began his daily chore by rhetorically asking those assembled in his operations room, ‘Aaj kitne titar-bater mare? (How many patridges have been eliminated today?)’ Then, some 200 Jamatis – supposedly the support base for the pro-Pakistan Hizbul Mujahedeen that was then displacing the pro-freedom Liberation Front militants - were eliminated. By mid-decade, the Ikhwan was used to good effect towards the same end. Even human rights workers were not spared; Jalil Andrabi being a case to point.

Consequently, a lazy explanation could be that inertia leads to recurrence. Generals in command today were young officers through the nineties, many going on to serve multiple tenures. Some prefer command in areas of their familiarity, in this case, Kashmir. Thus, adapting to the changed circumstance, even if warranted, may not readily beat the ease of path dependence. 

A more sophisticated explanation is that there have always been two contrasting doctrinal strands within the military. There is the Winning Hearts and Mind (WHAM) school, which official doctrine endorses, and there is the counter narrative, the ‘get them by the ____, and the hearts will follow’ school. It would be fair to say that most of those who served command assignments in Kashmir subscribed to the official school. Sadly, this has never always been the case. The counter narrative has won out repeatedly and sometimes handsomely. Thus, counter insurgency ‘experts’ are now a dime a dozen in the military, and once their sell-by date in service is over, populate television studios.

If this were not the case, the Shupian (Amshipora) fake encounter would not have happened. The army has it that in this case, “powers vested under the AFSPA 1990 were exceeded,” and, “dos and don’ts of the Chief of the Army Staff as approved by the Supreme Court have been contravened.” Thirty years into the troubles, it can be expected that the army has the standard operations procedures in place to oversee operations, especially in an environment when these are few and far between. It beggars the mind that a captain, Captain Bhoopendra Singh, can organize such killings using his troops and the hierarchy does not get a wind of it for three weeks. That the army took three weeks to wrestle down the counter narrative within it indicates the levels of its salience.

Strategic logic, which an army can reasonably be expected to sign up to, would have it that costs must be factored-in in choosing between strategic options. The costs of success of the counter narrative are easy to see. A Kashmir observer David Davidas in his book, Rage, makes the that the violence the departure from official doctrine wrought in Kashmir in the nineties has given rise to the generation of ‘rage’ today. Under a right-wing government’s will-to-power, referred to by the Concerned Citizen’s Group leader, Yashwant Sinha, as ‘doctrine of state’, the counter narrative appears to have won out. Else, how can a yet another possibly fake encounter - Lawaypora – follow brazenly on the heels of filing of the charge sheet by the police in the Amshipora fake encounter in a court in Shupian? That another inter-generational passing of the insurgency baton is potentially in the offing should lend pause to the army from proceeding down such a track.  

The army would do well to take its own doctrinal products seriously. These are not meant as information war products. They confer adequate latitude on commanders at the frontline to use force tempered with judgment. That such judgment can be clouded by the counter narrative is a potent threat the army needs cautioning against.

Doctrine should be internalized in schools of instruction and the command climate in theatres of counter insurgency operations must provide for a ‘no-ifs-and-buts’ implementation. It should not be that the recent appointment of the first major general to head its human rights cell, Major General Gautam Chauhan, views his mandate as a white-wash of the army’s record rather than ensuring military wide dissemination and implementation of policy.

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THE DOVAL AND HOODA PRESCRIPTIONS EXAMINED

The Congress has bitten the bullet by attempting a head start on its rival, the ruling party, in the release of its manifesto. It hopes to seize the agenda-setting initiative from the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which it had lost seemingly decisively in the wake of the Balakot aerial strikes. Initial optics indicates that it has made a dent with its championing of dole to the destitute under the 'Nyay' scheme.

Of greater consequence to readers of this paper is the vision for Kashmir that it lays out. Since this has apparently been done with the input of a former commanding general in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), DS Hooda, it makes for enhanced credibility. Hooda had earlier taken on the request of the Congress to turn in a security doctrine for use by the party as it headed into elections. The grand old party, often criticized for its showing on the security front particularly in comparison with the BJP that projects a strong-on-defence image, has apparently benefited from his insight, using it to pepper its manifesto.

Hooda is regarded as a hero after the surgical strikes. Besides a wealth of military experience in counter insurgency, he has shown himself to be empathetic to the people of the state. His major legacy is in arraigning of the perpetrators of the Machhil incident and in making the trigger-happy security detail at a road check-point to face consequences for killing two Kashmiri youth out on a joy ride.

In the event, the armed forces tribunal let off the Machhil perpetrators on trivial grounds, even as his taking the responsibility for the check point killings was criticized as a political stunt by no less than the former director of the army's think tank on land warfare studies. (The former director went on to join a right wing think tank that has connections with Ajit Doval's family, Doval being the current day national security adviser.)

The Doval imprint on Kashmir has been apparent over the past three years, ever more so over the past three months. His latest intervention has been in the bans on the Jamaat and the J&K Liberation Front. Since Doval is an old warrior in the intelligence game with Pakistan over the past four decades, the bans are akin to vendetta with the animus dating to the early nineties when the two entities were reckonable antagonists for Indian intelligence agencies in Kashmir. The charge-sheet against the JKLF includes 'genocide', a clear give away of the accumulated bile in decision makers that can only cloud strategic thinking.

In effect, the advantage is to the voter. She has two Kashmir policy prescriptions to choose from, respectively the Hooda and Doval prescriptions. Since the voter's would be a forward-looking exercise, the prospects of the two are examined here.

To begin with: the Doval prescription. The pillars of this into the fifth year of implementation are by now amply clear. 'No talks' with either Pakistan or with Kashmiris is its hallmark. Since talks figure universally as a check box to be ticked in policy repertoire in counter insurgency and inter-state relations, internally, there is a perfunctory representative of the Union who makes the rounds, while externally, every now and again India takes one step forward for talks with Pakistan followed soon thereafter with two steps back.

In its fifth year, it is easy to examine the outcome. It can plausibly be argued that the conditions created by the Doval prescription led to the Pulwama car-bomb attack. Recall, prior to the mid February car-bomb strike with which Pulwama has now eternally come to be associated with, it was known for the frequent stand-off between stone-pelters and security forces. In one incident in December last year, seven civilians were killed on the sidelines of a military operation. Also, along with the 250 militants killed last year, 28 militants were killed before the car-bomb attack. With no lee-way on offer in terms of outreach by the representative of the Union government, escalation was only waiting to happen. In short, the government's policy needs being blamed for the escalation, besides its intelligence lapse and tactical imprudence, such as basic convoy drills, that led to the success of the car-bomb attack directly.

As for the deterrence value of the surgical strikes post Uri, the car-bomb attack has shown it up as vacuous. Pakistani restraint in its proxy war is apparent in its overlooking some 400 killed in the past three years in Kashmir without infusing fresh blood and material in to the proxy war. The Balakot aerial strike and the continuing of a 'no talks' policy can only incentivize it to reverse gear over the coming summer. In case the government is right on numbers killed ('a very large number' according to its foreign secretary) and the ruling party chair is right on his figure of 300 killed, then it can easily predicted to be a pretty hot summer indeed. As to effects on the assembly elections, these will surely be postponed - in case Doval remains in the chair after elections - allowing for Operation All Out to go all out.

If the BJP is re-elected on its pitch of doing away with Article 35A to begin with and it proceeds to queer the pitch on Article 370, it has been forewarned by the two mainstream parties in the Valley that there would be consequences. While the Modi-Doval combine might rightly believe that the 'Modiji ki sena' (in the inimitable words of a candidate successor to Modi, Ajay Singh Bisht, aka. Yogi Adityanath) would deliver, it would be hard pressed. However, there is no call for its professionalism to remain on test by aggravation of the conditions it operates in. Not politically addressing the problem amounts to political abdication of its role by the central government. But to further muddy waters politically would amount to a criminally liable dereliction of responsibility, once the nuclear balloon goes up.

The Balakot-Naushera aerial exchange indicates that the Modi-Doval prescription sets up the region for a perfect storm. While Doval apologists in the strategic community have it that India has called Pakistan's nuclear bluff, the view from the other side could well be that Pakistan has called India's conventional bluff. The starving of the defence budget, even as preening was at a peak by the government, made for a conventional bluff easy to puncture. At the nuclear level, a one-time military adviser in the national security system, Prakash Menon, observed a touching belief in both sides in respective nuclear bluffs. Both sides are liable to go into their next crisis determined to call the nuclear bluff of the other side: India wanting to call Pakistan's first use nuclear bluff and Pakistan out to show up India's massive nuclear retaliation as bluff.

It is easy to see that the Hooda prescription has the antidote to the regional predicament on account of Kashmir. The military's role is considerably eased by the political content in the Congress manifesto. The Congress manifesto calls for civil society interlocutors to dialogue with the Kashmiris, even as it dilutes the militarization in Kashmir and reviews the working of the armed forces special powers legislation. Clearly, Modi's reaction that it is a Pakistani conspiracy is perhaps the best indicator that it is a contrary prescription with potential to mitigate, if not reverse, the strategic impasse in Kashmir. The criticism that it could lead to 'balkanization', voiced by Modi's chief spin doctor, Arun Jaitley, is easily refuted since it has captured the grievances of Kashmiris, thereby addressing separatism. Enticing Kashmiris by presenting an inclusive and liberal version of democracy and respecting the foundational constitutional articles as regards the merger, it creates the political framework for Kashmiris to step into the mainstream.

Admittedly, if the Congress does come to power and even if it intends to follow through with its 'Congress will deliver' slogan, it would likely be in a weak coalition and one buffeted by a strong opposition coalition led by the BJP. Therefore, the Congress would require staying the course, unlike in its previous tenure at the helm, United Progressive Alliance II years, when it was fearful of being outflanked by the BJP. The BJP having been exposed in the Modi years and the Doval prescription having been found wanting, the Congress would need to step up. It would be well advised to allow Hooda himself, as the new national security adviser, to implement the policy he wrote up.

Foregrounding ‘Non-Combatant Immunity’

http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ForegroundingNonCombatantImmunity_AAhmed_300109

Ali Ahmed

January 30, 2009

A fundamental principle of humanitarian law, non-combatant immunity, has been virtually consigned to history during the Bush years. To a large extent this can be considered a ‘success’ for terrorists. That terrorists do not respect the principle of non-combatant immunity is central to the definition of terrorism. The aim of terrorists is substantially achieved when states also adopt their language and grammar. This has been done to an extent by the US in its militarily aggressive response to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan. With US inaction, Israel has gone farthest by violating the principle of non-combatant immunity in its just concluded attack on Gaza that claimed over 1300 lives, mostly civilian. In the American case, ‘military necessity’ has dictated targeting indicating that the principle of non-combatant immunity is taken seriously, but not always followed. Thus civilian casualties in operations outside Green Zones in Iraq, in particular spectacular ‘clear and hold’ operations such as Falluja, are treated as unintended ‘collateral damage’. Israel has, on the contrary, focused on civilian targets deliberately, in order to bolster deterrence and to punish the Palestinian population for its continued support to Hamas. Closer home in South Asia, non-combatants have been affected considerably in counter insurgency operations, be it in Nepal earlier or in continuing operations against the Tamil Tigers and in Swat and Bajaur of Pakistan.

While it is true that any historical survey would reveal that non-combatant immunity has seldom been conceded by warring armies, it is of equal import that the principle has been reinforced by religious, ethical and political commentary over the ages and in all cultures. Medieval religious wars did not respect this principle as the political aim was to proselytize. Siege warfare permitted the logistic shaping of the battlefield in cutting off supplies to the besieged populace. Revolutionary wars tapped the nationalist energy of the populations, thereby bringing in ‘people’ as combatants. Guerrilla wars enlarged the scope of people’s participation. Warfare accompanying these changes identified people in terms of their will as a way of imposing their ‘will’ over an enemy. Social Darwinism of the Nineteenth century presaged the Total Wars of the succeeding century in which the doctrine of ‘unconditional surrender’ ensured that civilians were identified with regimes being contested violently. The fire bombings, strategic bombing, concentration camps and the use of nuclear weapons were the culmination of this tendency in warfare. In the Cold War period, deterrence to which is attributed the ‘long peace’ - was based on holding adversary populations hostage. In areas peripheral to the central strategic balance, revolutionary wars, dubbed ‘peoples wars’ predominated. Vietnam and Afghanistan are the most illustrative cases of violations of non combatant status of affected populations. Asymmetric warriors of today assume they are not required to genuflect to this principle, because their political project is based on the terrorism-suppression-alienation cycle.

Civilian populations have also suffered disproportionately more than regimes from the imposition of sanctions purportedly designed to topple regimes. The classic examples are Iraq in the Nineties and Gaza over the last two years. Sanctions against Iran, and possibly a non-compliant Pakistan, are possible targets. Sanctions appear to be the strategic equivalent of ‘shaping the battle’. The population is punished for the actions of the ruling regime. This is precisely the logic of the terrorist. Islamists too identify Western people with their governments and in making that connection attempt to legitimize their tactic of targeting civilians. The logic of the Israelis ironically vindicates the Islamist position, for in democratic states, in theory the electorate has some control over the government actions. Therefore if actions of western governments are hostile, then in the Islamist narrative the population is to blame for being inert and culpable. The danger of this logic of conflating populations with their governments is the weakening of the immense strides made in human rights and humanitarian law post World War-II.

Another trend is the displacement of civilian populations due to military operations. Examples closer home are recent population movements in FATA-NWFP and in Sri Lanka in Killinochchi and Mullaitivu. While humanitarian emergencies have accompanied combat operations earlier, the lethality, firepower and shock effects have increased manifold. There is insufficient evidence to document the psychological effects of attacks by drones in the post heroic age. The political effects are more than evident in any case.

It would appear that non-combatant immunity has been more of an ideal than a fact. But the developments in the Charter era with the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and Japan, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions marking its early years have elevated non-combatant immunity from a principle to customary law status in the law of armed conflict. Treaty law has not kept pace in that the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 have not been acceded to yet by most states. There is thus a tension between state practice and this principle.

The aspect of accountability of the political head for the resulting human tragedy would deter mindless assaults and would facilitate the political plank in terms of resolution options. The International Criminal Court can be energized to pursue crimes of international concern such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Presently there are 108 signatories to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the Court. India is not represented and nor is the USA. The deterrent effect would be substantial. For punishing violators of jus in bello retributive justice through International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts should be pursued until the ICC gains traction. Justice meted out to Milosevic and Karadzic through the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia are examples. This would foster the notion of individualized guilt and would act as a deterrent for key political actors.

To obviate violations at the ground level, militaries would require factoring in civilian casualties from the beginning in the planning and preparation stage. The after-the-fact arrival of aid, under what passes now as Stabilisation Operations, is no longer enough, given population densities and numbers involved. This should dovetail military planning with execution carried out by civilian administrators in league with NGOs. This should form part of curricular innovation at staff colleges. The Disaster Management organizations in states can be co-opted to follow up to ameliorate conditions in conflict zones. This makes political sense in that it would facilitate peace in post conflict conditions. The example of Iraq indicates that the possibility of Asymmetric War in the aftermath of the conflict could be lessened. For this to happen targeting must be against military targets and needs of the affected populations should be met immediately to deal with advancing military forces. This insight is relevant for India that has adopted a Limited War strategy that may necessitate incursions into Pakistan held territory.

To the extent that tenets of international law are influenced, modified and eventually replaced by state practice, the principle of non-combatant immunity is endangered. The international community is responsible for pressuring the regime and ensuring compliance. In case it proves inadequate for the latter, there would be a convergence between terrorism and state terrorism, generating a self sustaining cycle in terms of violence and its legitimisation. This would add to the erosion suffered by the international order during the Bush years that resulted in illegal detention and rendition, preventive war and expansive interpretation of military necessity. These issues could be revisited, through perhaps an international conference. This will lend more urgency to the long neglected Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions dealing with protection of persons in both interstate and intra-state conflicts.

State practice, often determined by strategic considerations, would require taking into account the political benefits of occupying the moral high ground and the need to preempt the alienation-terrorism cycle. Human security concerns are not adequate to persuade states that operate in the dominant realist tradition. Where the political argument fails, as has been found repeatedly to be the case with Israel and the US, setting a precedent for coercing states to comply with norms is imperative. The opportunity offered by Israel’s targeting of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) compound in Gaza should be seized to set up a war crimes investigation by the UN or the ICC, as suggested by the head of its Gaza operations, John Ging. While this is unlikely to dissuade Israel, it could impact calculations of future actors elsewhere. It would help refocus attention on peace making and conflict resolution.

The Missing Elements in the Counter-Naxal Strategy
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-missing-elements-in-the-counter-naxal-strategy-3617.html

The Home Ministry’s Annual Report states this about its counter-Maoist strategy: “While it is necessary for the State Governments to conduct proactive and sustained operations against the extremists, and put in place all measures required for this, it is also necessary to simultaneously give focused attention to development and governance issues, particularly at the cutting edge level.” This is based on “the belief of Government of India that through a combination of development, security and Forest Rights related interventions, the LWE problem can be successfully tackled.”
The development front comprises the well known flagship programmes and the INR 1500 crore  Planning Commission monitored Integrated Action Plan in the targeted 78 districts. However, the kidnappings of the district administration heads of Malkangiri, and more recently, Sukma,  suggest that the development prong may be laudable in intent but the state lacks capacity for implementation. The Annual Report admits to the inability, stating, “the process of development has been set back by decades in many parts of the country under LWE influence.”
There is no doubt that security needs have to be met first.  Towards this end 74 battalions of the Central Armed Police Forces have been deployed including 10 Cobra battalions for offensive tasks, and 34 India Reserve units have been raised. However, the nature and culture of central police forces rule out proactive operations that can vacate ‘liberated zones’. Therefore, at best, what the forces can achieve is self-preservation through force protection and showing the flag.
Their incapacity, particularly in training and leadership, have to be removed over the long-term. 21 counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism training schools are being set up for achieving this objective. A reduction in the 16 per cent deficit in the IPS cadre has been achieved through innovative measures such as absorbing 150 officers from the military and paramilitary after special tests by the UPSC, augmenting the vacancies from the civil services exam to an intake of 130 per year, and having UPSC exam separately for IPS cadres.
The interim nevertheless has to be tidied over.
Although Operation Green Hunt is officially denied, slow motion operations continue to take place. Confidence is being gained incrementally through actions, such as the recent foray of forces into Abujhmad for the first time this year. The reliance on militias and proxies tends to compensate for the capability deficit.
However, this practice has been viewed adversely by the Supreme Court in its judgments on the Salwa Judum and on the employment of Special Police Officers. These irregular forces, intended as eyes and ears of the forces, end up acquiring greater power and impunity. This has the potential to disrupt the social fabric of the tribal societies. Therefore, even though they may fill a critical gap in terms of terrain knowledge and the interface between the community and intelligence, their use is counter-productive.
The third prong of strategy – though unacknowledged - is decapitation. The killing of Cherukuri Rajkumar, alias Azad, is an example. The Supreme Court has ruled out a judicial inquiry into the killing. This strategy has accounted for the arrest of Kobad Gandhi and killing of Kishenji in West Bengal. The home secretary has owned up to it on camera, telling the parliamentary committee that the policy is to ‘capture or kill’..
The last prong of strategy is related to peace talks. This has been sabotaged by Azad’s reported killing when he was in the midst of peace negotiations with the government’s unofficial intermediary, peace activist Swami Agnivesh. Also, there is a gain for the state after the lapse of peace talks as happened in Andhra Pradesh and last year in West Bengal. It is fairly obvious, then, that the Maoists are unlikely to resume peace talks.
The upshot of strategy contradictions is that tribal people will be torn between pro and anti-Maoist camps, and a culturally and ethnically alien forces in the form of central police forces will be in their midst. Irregulars will be empowered further. Perception management will be resorted to to air brush the fallout.
The areas controlled by the Maoists will be cauterized with the onus of its under-development laid at their door. The Annual Report states, “This needs to be recognised by the civil society and the media to build pressure on the Maoists to eschew violence…” The opprobrium Maoists attract through their non-military actions such as abductions and so on will further marginalize them, enabling opinion-shaping along the hard line.
The peace plank has not found mention in the Annual Report. Chidambaram has changed his line, stating, "They (Naxals) are not misguided. They are guided by their own objectives. We are misleading ourselves by misreading their objectives." The problem of how to distinguish between Maoists and tribals remains.
Since going after Maoists imposes inordinately on tribal populations, there is a tradeoff to be made. The peace process alone offers a way out in terms of prioritizing human interests over elimination of the Maoists. The state must realize that it has little choice.

Internal Security Reform: Yet Another Opportunity
http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/internal-security-reform-yet-another-opportunity-3430.html

In a landmark judgment on a writ petition filed by Nandini Sundar, Ramchandra Guha, EAS Sarma and others, Justice B Sudershan Reddy and Justice Surinder Singh Nijjar have asked the Chhattisgarh government to discontinue the counter-insurgency employment of SPOs, Salwa Judum and the Koya commandos. Since this is a significant dimension of countering Maoist insurgency, there has been consternation in the security establishment. The reaction should instead be one of re-examining counter-insurgency doctrine in general and approach to ‘root causes’ in light of the judgment.

The judgment makes three major points that can usefully lead such a re-examination. The first is the skepticism it expresses on the neoliberal paradigm of development in operation in India over the past two decades. The ‘have nots’ this is creating brings into question the corporate-friendly approach to development and governance.

The second point made is that the practice of employing SPOs is violative of Article 14 on right to equality and Article 21 on right to life. The SPOs are used as ‘force multipliers’ and for a meager ‘honorarium’ of INR3000 are expected to perform duties of trained policemen at a greater risk to their lives. Since the criteria for recruitment is based on passing Class Five and training consists only of two months, their employment in dangerous duties on the frontline against Maoists has been deemed ‘unconscionable’.

The third, and most significant point, is that while the state has the duty to provide security for people, its actions have to be within constitutional bounds. The state does not have unlimited powers. Given the constitutional scheme explicated in Article 355 regarding the Centre’s responsibility towards internal disturbance, the court opined that it expected greater engagement with the nitty-gritties of operations than was on display by the Home Ministry.

The question as to why the situation has come to such a sorry pass needs answering. The larger point on rethinking India’s neoliberal grand strategy is outside the scope here. However, counter-insurgency relevant points made in dismay by the court could provide yet another opportunity to revisit doctrine and structures.

The utility of the SPOs was brought out by the counsel for the government. They serve as ‘eyes and ears’ of the security forces, who are handicapped by their limited knowledge of the human and physical terrain. Since they remain in location while counter insurgents rotate into and out of the theatre, there is continuity and institutional memory. Their familiarity with the forests and jungle-lore honed instincts makes them good operatives in the jungle, widely recognized as the most challenging terrain. Given that the paramilitary are not trained to Infantry level specifications, the SPOs help increase the effectiveness of the force.

However, the judgment demonstrates that the casualties suffered have been out of proportion in comparison to those of the paramilitary. This indicates that they are being employed on warlike missions beyond the scope of their capabilities or contract. Additionally, they are being misused in actions with plausible deniability, such as in alleged atrocities in the Morpalli, Tadmetla and Timmapuram case that attracted the Court’s ire.

It is clear that India lacks the policing capabilities of the order necessary to bring insurgency under control. Given this a policy decision needs to be taken on the employment of the Army that is better suited and trained for such tasks in forbidding terrain. That it has not been employed so far perhaps owes less to the publicly aired reservations of the brass than to the effect on investments in the region that may be less forthcoming in the knowledge of the real dimensions of the problem.

The government would do well to heed the Court’s admonishment that it develop “well trained, and professional law enforcement capacities and forces that function within the limits of constitutional action.” On this, firstly, as of the moment, there is no overarching doctrine put out by the Home Ministry. The constitutional parameters need to have been set out in such a doctrine. This is evidence of lack of expertise in the bureaucrat-controlled Home Ministry. There is no doctrine for the paramilitary. The military’s own sub-conventional conflict doctrine is autonomous. No wonder it sees a role for ‘friendlies’.

Second, there is little hope of policing reform. The latest has been increasing recruitment into the IPS to a yearly intake of 150. This needs contrasting to the Army taking in over 1500 a year. Therefore calling in the Army is the answer. The fear that this would be disproportionate force misses that fact that the Army is more professional, has learnt its lessons on proportionality and has a doctrine that is people-centric.

Third, the reservations of the military for such deployment understandably spring from its external security concerns. India needs to recalibrate instruments to address the external threat, such as by using negotiations meaningfully; thereby releasing the Army for such duty. Better still it could take the Court’s opinion seriously that it undertake “all those necessary socially, economically and politically remedial policies that lessen social disaffection giving rise to such extremist violence.” 

AFSPA: A Practical Approach
http://www.ipcs.org/article/jammu-kashmir/afspa-a-practical-approach-3244.html

Even as the battle against the AFSPA is set to continue, it is equally clear that the Act is not going to be amended any time soon. The Air Chief in his capacity of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee has seconded the earlier statement of the Army Chief on the necessity of the legal cover that the legislation provides soldiers, acting in aid of civil power in counter insurgency. The Northern Army Commander has voiced the Army sentiment on the issue, even if his choice of phrase – ‘pious’ – has come in for uncalled for derision among critics; evidence of frustration at their ineffectual activism.

The spin on current agitations in Kashmir is that these are either about lack of governance or the wider issue of ‘azadi’. A report in the Times of India (Aarti Jerath, ‘On ground it’s a battle for azadi, not against AFSPA’, 25 September 2010) has it that alluding to the AFSPA, as being done by the Chief Minister, is therefore diversionary. At best the Cabinet Committee on Security meeting early this week to discuss the visit of the All Party delegation to Kashmir last week could roll back the application of the Act in areas where it is no longer needed, such as south of the Pirpanjals.

It would be a travesty if this is where the matter is left off, for it is sure to figure in controversy again. This is not because the Army is not cognizant of the need to respect human rights and legal obligations in countering insurgency. Indeed, the need figures prominently in its 2006Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations. It has since brought out comprehensive stipulations in line with Supreme Court directions in its ruling on the constitutional viability of the Act. The chain of command has been sufficiently sensitized to being severe on this score. There exists a human rights cell at every level of the hierarchy. The statistics periodically released suggest that up to 97 per cent cases proved to be baseless.

These are useful steps. For human rights concerns to be at the fore during the winding down phase of counter insurgency is understandable. The intensity of insurgency and operations having gone down, in any case; the Army can afford to be more circumspect in its footprint. Population control measures are less in evidence as operations are fewer and intelligence based. It is easier to be mindful of human rights in such conditions, especially those under media scrutiny.

It bears questioning as to whether they would measure up to the test of high intensity counter insurgency operations in future. Absent a political initiative, potential for reversion in the situation is very much there, both in Kashmir and the North East. Prospects of deployment in counter insurgency in Central India exist, as also in other areas in future given the multiple challenges a developing India will continue to face.

Precedence, the nature of Indian approach and foreign examples of counter insurgency indicate that the state - perhaps rightly to some - would prioritize self-preservation over human rights of alienated citizens. As before, it would overly monitor the human rights record till the situation is well under control. In effect, security forces would be permitted the leeway necessary to cope. The argument that India’s record has been better than most other militaries in such situations legitimizes such an approach.

However, the counter to the AFSPA in civil society and in the affected areas should provoke the government towards a more practical look at the measures for self-regulation within the Army. The military is not monolithic. A ‘warrior’ subculture tends to accord lesser priority to niceties than winning the martial contest against the militant, viewed as ‘terrorist’ and a proxy of the ‘Other’, the ‘enemy’. Quantification of performance linked to promotion prospects and rewards of unit performance amounted once to an institutional pathology. Considerably controlled since, the current Chief has reportedly ordered a rethink on the quantification of officers’ performance.

Additionally, the recruiting base of the military being confined to North India, makes it difficult for the leadership to comprehend the wellsprings of the challenge to the state. For instance, of the 235 commissioned as officer from OTA, Chennai, on 17 Mar 2007, 149 were from this region (39 - UP, 23 - Rajasthan, 19 - Haryana, 16 - Punjab, 16 - Himachal, 14 - Uttaranchal, 11 - J&K, 8 - Delhi and 3 – Chandigarh). The ratio remains representative. This makes for a ‘mainstream’ perception. Political attitudes in the lower middle classes here end up commanding an inordinate influence.

Credence to the expertise of the Army in its recommendation on the AFSPA is set to carry the day. Yet, even as the Army deepens internal vigilance, its institutional limitations need to be borne in mind. This implies that the onus of human rights overwatch is with the Ministry and state governments. A liberal use of Article six provisions permitting prosecutions is warranted. The bogey of ‘morale’ should be left to ministrations of the hierarchy, for which it is paid.