https://www.thebookreviewindia.org/sino-indian-entente-a-distant-dream/
two book reviews
Sino-Indian Entente–A Distant Dream?
Both authors need no introduction to the public attentive to strategic matters. Between them, they have fifty years of engagement with strategic affairs. Both have past publications that place them in good standing as readers appraise whether they should pick up their latest wares. While Joshi’s landmark book was on Kashmir – The Lost Rebellion - in the nineties, Sawhney’s co-authored one - The War Unfinished - was on the India-Pakistan crisis of early this century. Both have been deeply immersed in the subject of the two books – India-China strategic relations – ever since. While Joshi was on the panel of a defence reform committee some ten years back, Sawhney has been founder editor of a respectable publication on defence issues over past twenty years. Both justify their credentials in their respective books under review.
The subject itself is very topical. China has
been breathing down India’s neck for some ten years now, beginning with
intrusions of temporary duration exactly ten years back, building up to a wholesale
intrusion three years ago. It can reasonably be speculated that had Covid not
intervened, the two countries might have come to fisticuffs. Their respective
No First Use pledge notwithstanding there is no guarantee the outcome could
have been benign for either.
Therefore, understanding what happened is
important, particularly when even Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, a China-hand,
has admitted to being nonplussed by the Chinese action. The Chinese continue to
be present on India-claimed territory and the two sides are poised to weather
their third winter in a continuing face-off in the high Himalayas. Both books
provide a vantage point towards understanding how the Southern Asian neighbours
got to this pass. While Joshi’s provides context to the Chinese action, Sawhney’s
explains why the Chinese cannot be militarily evicted.
Joshi’s is a readable survey of history of the
border going back into the British Indian period. He shows how Independent
India, as the successor state, took to preserving its inheritance. The
coincident advent of revolutionary China on the world stage, witnessed the
scramble for Tibet. While India conceded Tibet to China, it perhaps hoped that
in return its claims on the border would find recognition by China in reciprocation.
Though not Joshi’s interpretation, in the event, the two thieves fell out –
complicit in depriving Tibet of statehood they could not agree on the spoils.
Joshi - along with some other recent books -
offers a start point for possible resolution in recounting the unilateral
fixing of India’s border by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. This enables
flexibility to the present government, that wastes no opportunity to denigrate
Nehru, to negotiate the border. However, that it is refrains from doing so owes
to its nationalist credentials. It cannot be seen as discussing the border from
a position of disadvantage, when Chinese troops sit in a threatening posture.
This explains Jaishankar’s refrain that Chinese need to sheath the sword before
normalcy obtains.
Joshi’s coverage of India’s leaning on the
United States (US), as part of external balancing, indicates that China will
not let up the pressure either. A security dilemma appears to be driving the
two neighbours apart. The US is gainer in its competition with China for global
hegemony, with expectations of an Asian Century in a Sino-Indian entente are
dashed. That the two sides are wary of coming to blows is evident from military
talks yielding up ideas as buffer zones to resolve the impasse.
Sawhney takes up where his other co-authored
book on China – The Dragon on our Doorstep - left off just prior to the
Doklam episode, when China was surprised by Indian muscle flexing and resolved
to outdo India. Ladakh resulted, prompted in part by the political reshuffling
in Jammu and Kashmir with the amendment to Article 370. This upset the status
quo over the status of Ladakh, giving China an opportunity to try and do India
down preemptively before its apprehended competition with the US heats up and
the Taiwan issue boils over.
Sawhney paints a cautionary picture in
advocating that India not rise to the bait. His prognosis is that China has
lately built the capability to deal a 1962-like blow to India through its
military modernization. Pitching itself as competitor of the US, China has
exerted to redress the asymmetry it started off its military reforms with. It
studied US’ military trajectory since the Gulf War, drew the right lessons and
has built up its capabilities and in some domains of war, drawn ahead of the
US. This has enabled it to get the better of India in any confrontation, given
– as Sawhney rues – India has not done a similar exercise in aping its peer
militaries.
To Sawhney, India’s military chose instead to
get immersed in Kashmir and distracted in staying ahead of a weaker military,
Pakistan. It was thus distracted by the immediate threat rather than one over
the horizon. The result is for all to see in Ladakh, where it has had to
scramble to not only ward off the threat, but to go about a military reset. To
Sawhney, this is bolting the barn after the horse has fled.
Sawhney therefore pitches for arriving at a
modus vivendi with China – and Pakistan. This will allow the military to buy
time to get to grips with twenty first century warfare. Sawhney is particularly
informative on what the new character of war is all about. This portion of the
book might interest the military – even if it is miffed by his view that it is
liable to suffer defeat in a mere 10 days in any fisticuffs today - but will
certainly be engrossing – even if a tedious read for non-technical readers -
for defence studies faculties and lay military buffs.
Sawhney hints that a military reverse is likely
so long as the Indian military brass does not return to the professional straight
and narrow, devoting a chapter to the ‘politicisation’ of the Indian military.
Hopefully, the military will not, on this count, throw the baby out with the
bathwater – especially since this reviewer has also made the same point - on
military politicization.
The problem with the recent plethora of
publications on the crisis and the border problem have been chary of dwelling
on possible solutions. They advocate managing the issue till India has grows
the teeth to come to grips with it – so that concessions inevitable in border
negotiations are not seen as from a position of weakness or disadvantage. The
problem with this is that gaining a position of strength is to chase a receding
horizon.
Consequently, it’s better that the government –
that has the singular advantage of having the numbers and being nationalist to
boot – be encouraged to make the compromises necessary. The government appears
to be on the right track in downplaying the border incidents, including Galwan,
in order not to have hyper-nationalism tie its hands. It needs to be bold to go
a step further. This does not need to await first arriving at military symmetry
with China. China would do well to incentivize India down this route by letting
up military pressure – lest it in its overkill it pushes India into the
expectant arms of the US. The two books lay the ground work for furthering such
heretical – if not seditious – thinking and on that count are a recommended
read.
