Nuclear deterrence in India’s strategic doctrine

 A talk at SIPRI, 2015

 

India does not have a declaratory strategic doctrine. It does not exist as a written document. It has to be discerned from the Annual reports of the ministries related to national security, the speeches of national security dignitaries, parliamentary and standing committee proceedings etc. It is to be read like tea leaves from India’s strategic behaviour. Any inferences are liable to question since what is looked at, the lens through which it is looked at etc would vary and so would the image received.

 

Strategic doctrine determines the military’s conventional doctrine and the politico-military nuclear doctrine. Strategic doctrine could vary between compellence to one of appeasement. Its variants could therefore be compellence; deterrence with its two subcategories – defensive deterrence and offensive deterrence; defensive strategic doctrine; and an appeasing strategic doctrine. Strategic doctrine is articulated in practice by conventional doctrine and nuclear doctrine. It is to control the place of nuclear weapons in the scheme of things.

 

This presumes ‘deterrence’ is not the only role that nuclear weapons can be put to. While this is undoubtedly so in so far as existential deterrence goes, deterrence is not necessarily the only role or utility of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrine. For instance a strategic doctrine of deterrence would understandably rely on deterrence value of nuclear weapons. In case of deterrence itself there are two variants reflecting the deterrence philosophy subscribed to: deterrence by punishment (defensive deterrence) or deterrence by denial (deterrence by warfighting and offensive deterrence). But a strategic doctrine of compellence would perhaps wish to ‘do more’ with nuclear weapons. A defensive strategic doctrine might rely on existential deterrence and a placatory strategic doctrine may even imply nuclear abnegation.

 

Given all this, I am doubly disadvantaged. I am to reflect on what is India’s strategic doctrine – if such an animal does exist in first place – and second what is the place of nuclear weapons in it, and this could be anything but what it is advertised to be. I can take the easy way out saying that India’s strategic doctrine goes by the term ‘strategy of restraint’ and is therefore one of defensive deterrence. The nuclear doctrine is one based on deterrence by punishment.

 

It can be argued that the strategy of restraint has been visible in both India’s strategic articulations and behaviour over the decades beginning with its antecedents in Nehruvianism. Over the recent past India has not responded aggressively to the long running Pakistani proxy war or periodic terror provocations, the latest instance being 26/11. India’s nuclear doctrine likewise is also one of NFU, making it a last resort defense. India says as much with a declaration reading:

 

Its defence policy and force postures remain defensive in orientation while its nuclear policy is characterized by a commitment to no-first-use, moratorium on nuclear testing, minimum credible nuclear deterrence, and the rejection of an arms race or concepts and postures from the Cold War era.

 

Are there departures from the declaratory? What does this ‘blind man’ ‘see’?

 

I feel India’s strategic doctrine is a differentiated one (to borrow a term from Bharat Karnad), in that there is a strategic doctrine directed at Pakistan and one in relation to China. The one in respect of Pakistan is one of compellence. Consequently, its nuclear doctrine is being worked in more ways than the acknowledged, and intrinsic, one of deterrence. Why do I say so?

 

Compellence would imply getting Pakistan to do something it would otherwise not do: change its offensive strategic doctrine to a placatory one. This is in keeping with India’s unacknowledged goal of regional hegemon, in keeping with its great power ambitions.

 

Further, India sees itself and is seen by others as a status quo power challenged by a revisionist Pakistan. However, while it is a status quo power if territorial control is central to the definition, India can also be seen as a revisionist power. Though it promises to end the territorial status quo through talks, it is revisionist in resiling from meaningful talks. As a revisionist state therefore it has to compel Pakistan to resign itself to the territorial status quo by ending proxy war.

 

How does it work? Military doctrine is an indication of strategic doctrine where the latter is not articulated. India’s earlier military doctrine was based on a strategic doctrine of defensive deterrence and therefore was predicated on a counter offensive capability. However, the move lately to offensive deterrence, as a half way house to compellence, has shifted military doctrine to ‘proactive offensive’. The aftermath of 26/11 suggested that there was work still to be done. Ongoing conventional and nuclear developments are a linear movement in this direction. 

 

An offensive military doctrine has not proven enough since it has to contend with Pakistan’s nuclear card. India’s corresponding nuclear doctrine has therefore not only to deter Pakistani first use, but to enable India’s conventional power fullest play. This means it has to deter early first use in a low threshold mode. It has to force a high threshold or late use last resort choice of first use on Pakistan. So even if the operational nuclear doctrine is not one of ‘massive’ punitive retaliation as declared, but posits ‘unacceptable damage’ in a punitive retaliation, it is to push upwards Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Taking advantage of this nuclear maneuver, conventional forces are to make the gains necessary if push comes to shove.  The nuclear doctrine is therefore not one for deterrence alone, but for compellence.

 

But let me caveat all I have just said. First, this is regarding strategic doctrine. It does not mean that ‘strategy’ is one of compellence. The neoliberal paradigm requires time and space. The government working within it would not wish to be involved in compellence or any other diversion either. Therefore, it leaves the strategic sphere alone, such as articulating of strategic doctrine, so long as it remains quiet and does not divert from the central strategic concern, the economy. Lastly, there is comfortable theoretical assumption behind the doctrine-force development-technology linkage. India’s complicated reality comprising a political and institutional interface requires a departure from theory. So while doctrinal and institutional factors push for acquisitions, India’s government deploys procedural brakes, lest an untimely ‘security dilemma’ trip things up. 

 

What does ‘framing’ such as this have to say for the questions posed for this session?

 

As for the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy, I reiterate, strategic doctrine is distinct from national strategy. A look at strategy must begin with the aim. The aim to me is to over-awe Pakistan, by deepening the power asymmetry between the two states. In other words, to emerge as a hegemon by fulfilling Sun Szu’s acme of skill, i.e. without a shot being fired. This is not impossible since Pakistan’s ability for external balancing to short-circuit this has been steadily degrading. The role of the nuclear factor is escalation dominance, to convince Pakistan that its game is up and get it to bandwagon.

 

The second question requires rewording. It says ‘minimum credible deterrence’. This sequencing has long since been given up in favour of ‘credible minimum deterrence’. Strategic sufficiency is therefore predicated on ‘credibility’. This is a shifting goalpost. So the planning parameter is: ‘more of every thing including of emerging technologies’. How are these determined? There is a scientific determinism behind it, institutional weight of technologists, the military’s institutional needs and a politically useful great power quest. Nascent organizational changes in the National Security Council Secretariat, such as a military adviser and another, a former SFC commander in chief, are promising in terms of bringing strategic rationale to developments in nuclear weapons. The danger is in the NSC itself being hijacked by conservative-realists warm to compellence; something that can happen as easily and early as a change in government.     

 

On the extent of doctrinal objectives guiding decision making, this is partially the case, with technological drivers accounting for the balance. Actors involved in these decisions are in the main technologists and the national security bureaucrats. The military is the dark horse, interested in the here and now. The politician is in it to prove he is not ‘soft’ on defence. Political imprimature is a matter of routine, since the PM or the PMO cannot really spare attention and time from managing a neoliberal economy. The military has gained a pie of the action in the SFC but not quite a seat at the high table.

 

I hope the view is controversial enough to merit a discussion and not so controversial as to be marginalized.