https://www.thebookreviewindia.org/untangling-an-intriguing-riddle/
Saturday, 5 December 2020
https://www.epw.in/author/ali-ahmed
Articles
by Ali Ahmed
Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating Escalation
India’s unwillingness to tactically manipulate escalation makes
its responses predictable and has led to strategic inertia most evident in the
handling of the situation at the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. The
responsibility for this inertia primarily lies with the political leadership,
but the...
Why India Did Not Go to War with China
India had the military ability to evict the intrusions in Ladakh
or carry out a quick grab action of its own in the early stages of the crisis.
Yet, it did not exercise the offensive military options. The explanation for
such strategic reticence lies at the political level.
The Portentous India–Pakistan Escalation Dynamic
.
Approaching Kashmir through Theoretical Lenses
The National Democratic Alliance government’s Kashmir policy can
be analysed through the lenses of security studies and peace studies. Insights
from these disciplinary fields could help gauge the implications of recent
actions and suggest a possible different course.
Military Professionalism and Effectiveness
The military’s input to national security may be swayed by
ideological winds if it loses its apolitical grounding. The government and
military must thus maintain the status quo on civil–military relations.
The influence of Hindutva in political culture on India’s
strategic culture has been traced. It has resulted in a hardening of strategic
culture with the bias towards the offensive also resulting from the military’s
organisational culture that has been independently penetrated by Hindutva. But,
a strategic doctrine of compellence is combustible, and the retraction of
Hindutva from polity is a prerequisite for stability.
Putting India’s Land Warfare Doctrine in the Dock
.
Army’s Robustness in Aid of Civil Authority
When the army is called in aid of civil authority, robust action
taken by the army in a timely manner can prevent civil disturbance from
exacting a strategic cost. The recent revelations on army inaction in the
critical first 24 hours during the Gujarat carnage in 2002 are examined.
Nuclear decision-making, when examined at the institutional and
individual levels, suggests that India’s case is fraught with shortcomings.
This adds to the complications for regional security, already present on
account of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making being military dominated. The
aggravated institutional infirmities of India’s nuclear decision-making
structures and the authoritarian tendencies in India’s primary nuclear
decision-maker, the Prime Minister, heighten nuclear dangers in future crises and
conflicts.
As the ruling party at the centre, the Bharatiya Janata Party,
contemplates the forthcoming national elections, its record on national
security warrants a review. The key player in crafting and implementing its
national security strategy has been National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. An
examination of Doval’s record over the past four years reveals that his
principal contribution has been in facilitating national security interests to
be held hostage to the electoral calculus of the Narendra Modi–Amit Shah
combine.
The Missing Muslim Army Officers
The representation of Muslims in the army officer corps, at
around 2%, is abysmal in contrast to their percentage in the population of
India. Diversity is also compromised in the army, with over half of army officers
hailing from a handful of north Indian states. This deficit of diversity along
social and geographical lines has negative implications for the army’s
apolitical and secular credentials.
The Kashmir Charade This Winter
The ill-planned and hurried appointment of an interlocutor for
Kashmir by the government, supposedly for a sustained dialogue, does not
suggest that the government is serious about resolving the Kashmir conflict.
The initiative, however, appears to want to hold the United States at bay,
which needs India and Pakistan talking to safeguard its Afghan engagement. The
interlocutor’s mission will likely turn out to be yet another wasted
opportunity in Kashmir
Articles
by Ali Ahmed
Dilating on a ‘Half-front War’
The reference to a “two and a half front war” by Army Chief
General Bipin Rawat is critically dissected. The “half front” apparently covers
large tracts of India and a significant number of its marginalised people. The
thought of a war on the half front, as conjured by this term, needs to be
controverted outright. The army’s imagining of such a war and preparation for it
is questioned.
The recently released joint doctrine of the armed forces
outlines the manner in which they expect to fight the next war. Though the
doctrine suggests “decisive victory” is possible, it bears reminding that the
closer they get to this the closer would be the nuclear threshold. Since the
doctrine does not dwell on the nuclear level, it cannot be said that the
doctrine makes India any safer. However, the doctrine’s take on civil–military
relations is far more interesting.
Corrosive Impact of Army’s Commitment in Kashmir
The army has had an extended deployment in Kashmir. While it has
enabled operational experience for its members, there is a danger that the
advantages of this can make the army acquire a stake in the disturbed
conditions. This makes the army part of the problem in Kashmir. Its deployment
is not without a price in regard to the internal good health of the army.
In abandoning strategic restraint in favour of strategic
proactivism, India is transiting from a strategic doctrine of offensive
deterrence to compellence. This is not without its dangers since the military
doctrines of India and Pakistan are presently coupled in a volatile way. Moving
towards proactivism makes them altogether combustible. This makes the strategic
logic of the shift suspect, prompting speculations as to its inspiration.
A case for the peace lobby to continue its engagement with
anti-war issues, even in times of relative peace. The military doctrines are
geared for a quick war, resulting in shorter crisis windows. Therefore, keeping
the public informed and capitalising on such preparations for ensuring
moderation in strategic decisions in crises and war can prove useful when push
comes to shove. This would be an uphill task, but inescapable for war avoidance
and limitation.
The debate on nuclear retaliation options has been hijacked by
realists, with even the liberal security perspective marginalised. Engagement
with the issue by nuclear abolitionists is called for, lest the impression of a
consensus develops around the realist offering of "unacceptable
damage" that promises nothing but genocide, a global environmental
disaster and national suicide in its wake.
Yoga as a Prelude to Politicisation of the Military
Drawing on the news reporting of the army's association with
Ramdev's organisation for yoga training, a discussion on the potential and
possibility of politicisation of the military with Hindutva philosophy.
That India's No First Use policy is under threat of the axe in
any future review of the nuclear doctrine is apparent from the election time
controversy over the mention of a nuclear doctrinal review in the manifesto of
the Bharatiya Janata Party. The reference - subsequently toned down - was
possibly an attempt by the conservative party to live up to its image as a
strategically assertive replacement of the Congress Party.
https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/48/strategic-affairs/eschewing-and-not-manipulating-escalation.html
Eschewing and (Not) Manipulating
Escalation
India’s unwillingness
to tactically manipulate escalation makes its responses predictable
and has led to
strategic inertia most evident in the handling of the situation at the Line
of
Actual Control in
Ladakh. The responsibility for this inertia primarily lies with the political
leadership, but the
military top brass also shares this responsibility.
On 7 November, at the
60th anniversary observance webinar of the National Defence
College (NDC), New
Delhi, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat expressed worries
on the possibilities
of escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), saying, “border
confrontations,
transgressions and unprovoked tactical military actions spiraling into a
larger
conflict cannot be
ruled out” (Pandit 2020). He had averred to similar dangers a year ago
but in relation to the
Line of Control (LoC), when he said, “The situation along
the LoC can
escalate any time. We
have to be prepared for the spiraling of the escalatory matrix”
(Times of India 2019).
Rawat’s fears were expressed in the context of Pakistani border
action teams actively
supporting last-minute infiltration attempts prior to the usual winter
respite in Kashmir. A
year on, the LoC witnessed a significant spike in firing over the
Diwali
period this year.
Escalation dangers can
be seen in Pakistan’s strike back after the Indian surgical strike
at Balakot, launched
in response to the Pulwama terror attack in February 2019. Apparently,
Pakistan’s aerial
counter was so provocative that India had prepared to retaliate. Recent
internal political
salvos between the government and opposition in Pakistan reveal that the
Indian preparations
caused the Pakistani army chief and its foreign minister considerable
apprehension (Economic
Times 2020). In the event, Pakistan pre-empted the missile strike by
returning the Indian fighter pilot downed in the aerial dogfight over
the LoC, short circuiting what Prime Minister Narendra Modi later
colourfully depicted as could well have been a qatl ki raat (night
of killing) from missile strikes (Asian Age 2019). That it would
not have been a one-sided qatl (killing) is evident from
Pakistan reportedly readying three times the number of missiles in a
counterstrike (Miglani and Jorgic 2019).
As for China, its
Ladakh intrusions suggest that it has a measure of India’s sensitivity to
escalation. Its incremental intrusions began with cutting off Indian patrolling
in Depsang sector in April, before intruding along the northern bank of the
Pangong Tso in May. India, fearing escalation if it took the more robust action
of either evicting the Chinese or taking equivalent territory in real time
elsewhere, settled for mirror deployment, leading by the onset of winter to
some 30,000 troops being deployed in Ladakh. Its occupation of Kailash range,
south of Pangong Tso in end August, though depicted as a vigorous response, was
limited to securing unoccupied heights on its own side of the LAC. The
much-touted tactical action, which is certainly a remarkable martial feat, was
at an operational cost. India lost both an opportunity and an avenue of
approach to offset Chinese intrusions elsewhere.
Unwilling to Escalate
Escalation thus
appears to loom large in India’s thinking, resulting in both adversaries taking
advantage of India’s sensitivity. Pakistan, a relatively weaker opponent, has
exploited Indian escalatory concern by restricting India’s options to
lower-order, sub-conventional-level surgical strikes. At this level, there is a
degree of equivalence where it seeks to give as good as it receives. Up the
proverbial escalation matrix, it has matched the Indian doctrinal movement. Even
as India firmed up its Cold Start doctrine of swift, conventional punishment
for terror incidents, Pakistan has adopted a new doctrine, namely “new concept
of war fighting.” For good measure, it brought to the fore the nuclear card in
its operationalisation of full spectrum deterrence, with the tactical nuclear
weapons at the vanguard and keeping a step ahead of India in nuclear warhead
numbers.
China, for its part,
has thrown the onus of escalation on to India. In its turn, India, convincing
itself that the escalation advantage was with China, owing to its comprehensive
national power, allowed China to get away with territorial gains. When
challenged by the intrusions, India instead settled in favour of prudence over
risk-taking. Even while experts argued that it is not the cumulative power that
matters as much as the power that can be brought to bear at the point of
contact at the end of a long line of communication in Ladakh (Menon 2020),
India took the counsel of its fears and decided on talks as the route for an
expansive, if unrealistic, aim of a return to status quo ante. The rounds of
talks—that at last count included eight at military level, three at the level
of the diplomats in the working group, three ministerial level talks, including
a telephonic conversation between the two special representatives—have neither
brought down troops to more hospitable altitude levels nor lessened their
numbers in Ladakh.
Escalation concerns
dominate Indian considerations on the use of force. Its military power is hobbled
by self-deterrence brought on by an interpretation of escalation as inevitable
and uncontrollable. Contrast this to the Pakistani and Chinese approach to
escalation concerns. Pakistan has deliberately exploited the possibility of
escalation. Not only did the landward surgical strikes not prevent the major
terror incident at Pulwama, but the aerial surgical strikes, already
debilitated by their inability to hit the target, resulted in a setback to
India in the dogfight they provoked. An outcome has been Pakistani
psychological ascendance, which the subsequent information war has not quite
obscured.
Against China, over
the years, India settled rather tamely in the initial stages itself, for
deterrence by denial, where deterrence by punishment might have been warranted.
India’s doctrinal shift in the decade prior was from deterrence by denial to
deterrence by punishment with precisely such intrusion scenarios impelling the
shift. The mountain strike corps was to be the vehicle. Since the financing of
the strike corps progressively stalled, the army shifted last year to
innovating, with integrated battle groups for a reconfigured, if truncated,
corps. It innovatively flexed its muscles in Exercise Him Vijay,
held in Arunachal Pradesh, even as Chinese premier Xi Jinping landed for the
Chennai Connect dialogue at Mamallapuram (Peri 2019). Even so, when push came
to shove in Ladakh, India was either unprepared or unwilling to shift to its
newly minted and practised doctrine. This is reminiscent of India’s Cold Start
doctrine lacking teeth in the wake of the Mumbai 26/11 terror attack.
Prime Minister Modi,
in his Diwali address to troops at Longewala, explaining India’s strategic
reticence, had this to say: “Today the strategy of India is clear. Today’s
India believes in the policy of understanding and making others understand. But
if attempts are made to test us, the reply they receive is intense” (Free
Press Journal 2020). While it is true that India has been “tested” by
both adversaries, it is difficult to see from recent strategic developments
that India’s reply has been “intense” against either of them. India’s
unwillingness to chance or inability to manipulate the escalatory threat led it
to rely excessively on dialogue as substitute, even where force is manifestly
warranted as and when territorial integrity is at stake.
Self-deterrence
Escalation is
intrinsic to the use of force, prompted not only by the usual play of chance
and the fog of war, called inadvertent escalation. This impelled the
Clausewitzian concept of Absolute War or war’s tendency to spiral (Walzer 1977:
23–24), if untrammelled by political control and the constraint of friction.
Consequently, it is reasonable to be wary of escalation and especially so in a
nuclear dyad such as India respectively finds itself in with its two
adversaries. The very first dictum put out early in the nuclear age by Bernard
Brodie (1946: 76) remains applicable: “Thus far the chief purpose of our
military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must
be to avert them.” However, the danger is in over-learning, for it opens up a
state to the fear of escalation, eroding its will to use force. Thomas
Schelling (1967: 142–43) conceptualised the manipulation of the dangers as
follows:
It is in wars that we have come to call
“limited wars” that the bargaining appears most vividly and is conducted most
consciously. The critical targets in such a war are the mind of the enemy … the
threat of violence in reserve is more important than the commitment of force in
the field.
Escalation is thus
Janus-faced, a threat that also provides a strategic opportunity.
India’s strategic problem therefore is not to allow self-deterrence to a degree
that the use of force where warranted is negated substantially. Further, the
collusive “two-front” threat, while in the realm of possibility, is not in that
of probability. Nevertheless, it has been repeated so often that India has
begun to believe it, further constraining willingness to resort to force.
The reticence to use force
stemming from self-deterrence requires explaining, particularly for a
government that projects a muscular strategic approach. A case for ‘‘strategic
patience’’ is currently being argued. Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar
(2020), in his new book, lays out the narrative thus
We need to cultivate the strategic patience …
Use of force must always be the considered option, never the first one …. Major
nations have multiple weapons in their armoury and blunt instruments are
usually the least productive. But efficacy aside, the imagery is no less
significant. Those who casually advocate application of force abroad do damage.
Such actions, as the instructive epic (Mahabharat) tells us, are an
option reserved for imminent danger or serial offenders.
While this is
explicable for the ‘‘application of force abroad,” its utility is
somewhat diminished when a state faces loss of territory, a core
characteristic, that elevate such threats to constituting an “imminent danger.”
China’s record of salami-slicing over the past decade makes it count amongst
‘‘serial offenders.” Also, as the ‘‘imagery is no less significant,” Indian
reluctance to use force nevertheless is at a reputational cost. To overplay its
securing of the Kailash range to compensate may have had internal political
utility, such as in the fig leaf it afforded the government from questioning by
the opposition in the recent Bihar election campaign, but the limited
significance of the operational level manoeuvre just ahead of the defence and
foreign minister level talks is evident from its inability to compel China to
blink.
The narrative that
India stared down China by preventing it from chewing off more than what it
already has is being played up. This year’s Vijayadashami address by the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS) supremo, Mohan Bhagwat, said that,
“Bharatiya defence forces, government and the people remained unfazed and
responded sharply to this attack. This example of a strong resolution,
exercising self-respect and bravery has stunned China” (Bhagwat
2020). Such self-congratulations undergrid his Jaishankar-reminiscent
prescription: “Rising above China economically, strategically, in securing
cooperative ties with our neighbours and at international relations” as
“the only way to neutralise those demonic aspirations”
(emphasis added; Bhagwat 2020).
Strategic Inertia
At the political
level, the policy of dialogue has been exposed at its critical test against
China. Not only was the “Wuhan spirit” vacuous, but the talks have been
infructuous. The strategy of patience—to hold one’s horses till comparative
comprehensive national power enables an Indian military response—ends up but as
an alibi for doing nothing. The intensity of the information war that sees
India manufacturing favourable military history is testimony to the fact that
it knows it has something to hide.
Since the political
level supersedes the strategic, a top-down cadence is visible in Bipin Rawat’s
usual media interventions. His hyping up of escalation possibilities, including
a collusive two-front threat, seemingly allow India to weigh in on the side of
pragmatism and prudence. In the midst of an economic downturn and a pandemic,
it would not be sensible to be off to war reflexively. But then, it is
ostrich-like to determinedly avoid a war when warranted, especially since
models of war are available that eschew escalation, even while manipulating it.
Rawat, familiar with
the spectrum of war, knows that war is not necessarily Total War, else the
Limited War concept would not obtain in strategic theory. Clausewitz (2008: 7)
wrote that,
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that
either the objective is to over throw the enemy … or merely to occupy some of
his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at
the peace negotiations.
In a nuclear dyad,
only the latter, limited form of war, is possible. Indian military thinking has
an exaggerated impression on the inevitability of the latter turning into the
former, apparently bought into by the political level.
The past year revealed
that either the Indian military lacks expertise in the art of strategy in terms
of manipulating escalation to one’s advantage or it did not press the political
level enough to allow it to prove its credentials. If in the case of the latter
it was denied the opportunity, there has been no resignation from its upper
ranks to prove that it pressed fulsomely to exercise its professional expertise
in the national interest. Consequently, the onus for strategic inertia in
Ladakh does not rest at the political level alone, but also with the brass in
its compromising on its advisory and representational role.
References
Asian Age (2019): “Going to be ‘Qatal Ki Raat’: PM
Warned Pak during Abhinandan’s Captivity,” 21 April, viewed on 30 October
2020, https://www.asianage.com/india/politics/210419/either-i-will-be-alive-or....
Bhagwat, Mohan (2020):
“Address by Param Poojaniya Sarsanghchalak Dr Shri Mohan Ji Bhagwat on the
Occasion of Sri Vijayadashami Utsav 2020,” RSS website, 25 October, viewed on
15 November, https://www.rss.org/Vijayadashami_Speech_2020_Eng.pdf.
Brodie, Bernard
(1946): The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Clausewitz, C von
(2008): On War, B Heuser (ed), Translated by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret, Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics.
Economic Times (2020): “Pakistan Army Chief’s ‘Legs Were Shaking’ as Shah
Mehmood Qureshi Said India Would Attack,” 29 October, viewed on 6
November, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/army-chief-trembled-fo....
Free Press Journal (2020): “India Believes in Policy of Understanding and
Explaining: Modi,” 14 November, viewed on 15 November, https://www.freepressjournal.in/india/india-believes-in-policy-of-unders....
Subramayam, Jaishankar
(2020): The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, New
Delhi: HarperCollins India.
Menon, Prakash (2020):
“Political Will and Military Power,” Deccan Herald, 12 August,
viewed on 4 November, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/comment/political-will-and-military....
Miglani, Sanjeev and
Drazen Jorgic (2019): “India, Pakistan Threatened to Unleash Missiles at Each
Other: Sources,” Reuters, 17 March, viewed on 1 November, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight-idUSKCN1...
Pandit, Rajat (2020):
“Confrontations on LAC Could Spiral Into Larger Conflict: CDS,” Times
of India, 7 November, viewed on 15 November, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lac-crisis-cant-rule-out-borde....\
Peri, Dinakar (2019):
“Army’s Mountain Strike Corps to Conduct Exercise in Arunachal,” Hindu,
11 September, viewed on 15 October 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/armys-mountain-strike-corps-to-co....
Schelling, Thomas
(1967): Arms and Influence, Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
Times of India (2019): “Situation Along LoC Can Escalate Any Time: Army
Chief Bipin,” 18 December, viewed on 30 October 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/72872824.cms?utm_source=c....
Walzer, Michael
(1977): Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations, London: Basic Books Classics.
Saturday, 17 October 2020
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1gl4QibiF0
CISS Webinar on 'India’s Growing Strategic Capabilities: Dynamics and Consequences'
Thursday, 15 October 2020
https://ciss.org.pk/ciss-webinar-on-indias-growing-strategic-capabilities-dynamics-and-consequences/
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
INDIA’S
GROWING STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES: DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES
To begin with a brief Clausewitzian theoretical recap, that politics supersedes the strategic sphere.
Strategic theory has at the
top of the intellectual pyramid political ideology.
Political ideology, when
combined with constitutional verities, strategic culture, strategic
circumstance etc, informs strategic philosophy at the next lower rung.
Strategic philosophy
determines strategic doctrine.
While political ideology may
be found in party manifestos, a national security white paper articulates the
strategic philosophy and sets out the strategic doctrine.
The overarching strategic
doctrine is translated by down-stream national security doctrines, such as the
nuclear doctrine, and more narrowly, military, joint and service specific
doctrines.
Political ideology varying
from radical on either end can vary from liberal to conservative.
Each has a counterpart
strategic philosophy: offensive realism or defensive realism. While radical
ideology lends itself to offensive realism, conservative and liberal ideologies
can settle for either offensive or defensive liberalism.
Defensive realism is the
husbanding of enough power to fulfil the ends of state and societal security,
whereas offensive realism is to nurture power for its own sake, and, in
addition to security, for other purposes such as for prestige.
The strategic philosophy
determines the bias in strategic doctrine ranging from defensive, deterrence,
offensive and compellence.
With that as theoretical
prelude, I will confine myself to Indian political developments, their
strategic implications and their meaning for nuclear doctrine.
The principal feature in
Indian politics over the recent past has been the firming in of the right wing
at the helm of the state. As the government’s self-advertisement goes, it is a markedly
different one from its predecessors. This self-confessed difference is
important to register.
The political philosophy
informing the Indian state is that of Hindutva. The reelection of the
nationalist party last year led to its self-confidence in furthering its
national transformation agenda.
What then are the strategic
implications of Hindutva?
It is yet again an oft-reiterated
self-advertisement of this government that it is offensive, proactive, muscular
and strong-on-defence. It usually points to the ‘surgical strikes’ as evidence.
Theoretically put, it can be
taken as a philosophical shift from defensive realism to offensive realism.
In terms of strategic
doctrine, India’s subscribing to offensive realism means that it is now at the
offensive segment of the defense-compellence continuum.
National security doctrines - that
include military and nuclear doctrine – can therefore be expected to reflect
this bias.
This is easy to see in
conventional military doctrines.
The ‘Cold Start’ doctrine
(CSD), as the name suggests, is an offensive one. The last army chief at long
last publicly took ownership of the doctrine. The media from time to time
carries reports of its ongoing operationalization of CSD, such as creation of
integrated battle groups etc.
What of the nuclear doctrine?
Whereas the nuclear doctrine
has remained unchanged from its adoption in 2003, there are pulls aplenty for
changing its critical pillars: No First Use; the balance between ‘credible’ and
‘minimum’; and the nature of retaliation.
To briefly mention two
interlinked developments: the discussion around the NFU and the direction of technology.
Technical developments make
feasible a move away from NFU.
The technical developments
open the possibility of a counter force posture and thereby a potential move to
first strike.
However, the professed nuclear
doctrine remains unchanged making assertions on such a movement speculative,
even if this is informed speculation.
That the official nuclear
doctrine remains frozen could mean either of two things: one, that it has not
changed or, two, that transparency - that doctrine promulgation itself suggests
- is now replaced by ambiguity.
It is easy to infer that with a
changed political ideology, strategic philosophy and strategic doctrine there
would be a change in nuclear doctrine.
The current nuclear doctrine
informed as it is by ‘deterrence by punishment’ is already in the offensive
deterrence segment, as against defensive deterrence in which is located
deterrence by denial.
Further, the nuclear doctrine
is not so much for deterrence alone.
The earlier conception was
that nuclear weapons are to deter nuclear weapons use against India.
However, India’s nuclear
doctrine adds ‘against Indian forces anywhere’. Thus, the nuclear doctrine is
also being used to expand the scope for conventional operations.
Consequently, the nuclear
doctrine is beyond offensive deterrence and bordering on compellence.
What are the strategic implications?
While the government is
self-congratulatory on its muscular record on defence, I offer a moderating
perspective.
Let’s take the ‘surgical
strikes’.
The Pakistan army brushed off
the surgical strikes on land. There was much ado over the effectiveness of aerial
surgical strikes.
This means that while India
may be quicker on the draw, it is wary of escalation.
Its response to the Chinese
intrusions has also been rather reticent.
The explanation to the counter-intuitive
continuation of ‘strategic restraint’ – the strategic doctrine of its
predecessor - by this government lies at the political level.
The ruling party has an
aspirational, transformation agenda. This is largely in the internal domain, a
make-over of India. It is currently in the consolidation stage. It can afford
to do without escalatory diversions in the external plane.
It hopes to reinforce
deterrence against diversions from outside by projecting doctrines that are
more offensive in content than actual. This projection of muscularity outside
also has an internal utility, of consolidating Hindutva.
Thus, the change in doctrines
is a work-in-progress. As Hindutva definitively takes over Indian political
culture, India can be expected to self-consciously change doctrines.
India’s transformation to a
majoritarian democracy is not assured. Covid, an economic downturn and the
Chinese have upset the applecart somewhat.
Thus, a persistence in the
doctrinal status quo is likely. A continuity in strategic restraint is
foreseen.
In the end, to get back to the
topic – “India’s evolving nuclear thinking: Motives and strategic underpinnings”.
India’s evolving nuclear
thinking is currently aspirational since its political motivations in Hindutva
are now under consolidation.
However, the two are mutual
constitutive. Nuclear doctrinal shift will help consolidate Hindutva as much as
consolidation of Hindutva midwives a new nuclear doctrine.
As to what might happen on
Hindutva’s dominance of political culture is an open - and intriguing -
question.
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